IR 05000244/1987009
| ML17261A542 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1987 |
| From: | Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17261A539 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-87-09, 50-244-87-9, NUDOCS 8707070464 | |
| Download: ML17261A542 (18) | |
Text
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U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 50-244/87-09 Docket No. 50-244 Licensee No.
'Priority Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York Facility Name:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at: Ontario, New York Inspection Conducted:
April 19, 1987 through May 30, 1987 Inspectors:
T. J. Polich, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna Approved by:
CD J.
owgi
, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No, 1D, DRP
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Date Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on A r il 19 1987 throu h
Ma
1987 Re ort No. 50-244/87-09.
regional and resident inspectors (126 hours0.00146 days <br />0.035 hours <br />2.083333e-4 weeks <br />4.7943e-5 months <br />).
Areas inspected included:
licensee action on previous findings; review of plant operations; operational safety verification; surveillance testing; plant maintenance; and review of periodic and special reports.
Results:
In the six areas inspected, one violation was observed.
The violation involved failure to follow procedures.
Other deficiencies in the licensee's temporary modification program were also noted in paragraph 4.g.
8707070464 870h29 PDR ADGCK 05000244
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted During this inspection period, the inspectors held discussions with and interviewed operators, technicians, engineers and supervisory level personnel.
J.
C.
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- R. W.
R. A.
T. A.
- T. A.
- T. R.
- M. T.
"B. A.
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"J. A.
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Bodine, Nuclear Assurance Manager Filkins, Chemistry 8 Health Physics Manager Kober, Vice President, Electric and Steam Production Marchionda, Training Manager Marlow, Maintenance Manager Meyer, Superintendent Ginna Support Services Schuler, Operations Manager Shaw. Administrative Services Manager Snow, Superintendent Nuclear Production Spector, Superintendent Ginna Production Yanderweel, Ginna Modifications Project Manager Widay, Technical Manager Wood, Supervisor Nuclear Security
- Denotes persons present at Exit Meeting on June 5,
1987.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
a e
(Closed)
Inspector Fol low-up Item (50-244/86-19-01)
The analyses from the licensee and Brookhaven National Laboratory were completed and a comparison was made.
Results were in agreement.
Sample Source Chemical Parameter Ginna Value BNL Value Results in parts per billion (ppb)
, Chloride Fluoride Sul fate Sodium Copper Iron 50.5 46.8 52.5 5.3 489 467
52.5
less than
490 503 Results in parts per million (ppm)
Spent Fuel Pool Bor on 2160 2185
3.
Review of Plant 0 erations a ~
Throughout the reporting period, the inspector reviewed routine plant operations'he reactor operated at full power with the following exception:
On May 9, 1987, a steam leak on valve 3334B, 2B Main Steam Reheater drain line surge tank level control valve, increased to the point a load reduction was required.
The load reduction commenced at 12:55 P.H.
and power was stabilized at 58% at 4:43 P.M..
On May 10, 1987, a further load reduction was initiated at 12:21 P.M, to initiate repair to valve 3334B and power was stabilized at 40% at 1:15 P.M.
The valve repairs were complete and a load increase commenced at ll:20 A.M. on May 11, 1987 and was completed at 10:L8 P.M. when power was stabilized at 100%.
b.
On Apri 1 24, 1987, at 11:30 A.M., while operating at 100% power, a
train B Containment Isolation occurred.
The following systems were isolated due to the containment isolation signal:
Instrument Air To Containment Vessel Reactor Coolant System Letdown Line Reactor Coolant Pumps ¹1 Seal Return Line Containment Ventilation Steam Generator Blowdown The cause of the containment isolation signal was determined to be personnel inadvertently bumping a relay in the safeguards cabinets while performing a walkdown of electrical systems.
The operators restored all affected systems at 11:37 A.M..
This event was reported as Licensee Event Report 87-004.
No violations were identified.
4.
0 erational Safet
. Verification a.
General During the inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify compliance with selected Limiting Condition for Operations (LCOs) as prescribed in the facility Technical Specifications (TS).
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, plant conditions, and trends were reviewed for compliance with regulatory requirements.
Shift turnovers were observed on a sample basis to verify that all pertinent information of plant status was relayed.
During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following:
General plant and equipment conditions Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment Radiation protection controls Conduct of selected activities for compliance with licensee.'s administrative controls and approved procedures Interiors of electrical and control panels Implementation of selected portions of the licensee's physical security plan Plant housekeeping and cleanliness Essential safety feature equipment alignment and conditions The inspectors talked with operators in the control room, and other personnel'he discussions centered on pertinent topics of general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other aspects of the involved work activities.
b.
Auxiliar Feedwater S stem On April 30, 1987, Indian Point, Unit 2, identified a potential single failure which would prevent an automatic start of both motor -driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps on receipt of a valid loss of main feedwater or low-low steam generator level signals.
Indian Point, Unit 3, identified a separate problem that also was a
potential single failure problem in the motor-driven AFW pump start circuitry.
In response to the Indian Point problems the licensee immediately conducted a review of the automatic start circuitry for motor-driven AFW pumps and concluded such a problem does not exist at Ginna.
The inspector later rev'iewed the AFW pump circuit diagrams of Ginna and Indian Point, Units 2 5 3, with licensee Instrumentation and Control supervisor s and discussed the differences in the circuitry.
The inspector concurred with the licensee's assessment that AFW pump automatic start circuitry problems like those found at Indian Point do not exist at Ginna.
C.
Bomb Threat On April 20, 1987, at 5:52 A.M., the licensee declared an Unusual Event due to a bomb threat, called in to the Monroe County 911 Center.
Additional security posts were established at the plant training center entrance driveways.
The Unusual Event was terminated at 11:52 A.M. after the appropriate security plan contingencies were performed.
The Rochester City Police arrested a
suspect, on April 21, 1987, and charged him with making the threatening phone cal >>
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The inspector conducted observations of search train procedures vehicle inspections throughout the inspection period.
No problems were noted during any of these observations, Additionally, Ginna Station Security Event Reports 87-02, 87-03 and 87-04 were reviewed by the inspector with no discrepancies noted.
Backshift Ins ection The inspector conducted a backshift inspection on May 25, 1987, Memorial Day, from 2:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M..
The inspector observed control room activities on two shifts and accompanied the Shift Foreman on a tour of the Turbine Building including the battery rooms and the diesel generator rooms.
During the day shift, the inspector observed a paperback book on the desk of the head control operator.
The inspector did not observe the operator to be reading or otherwise inattentive to his duties.
The licensee's Administrative Procedure A-52. 11,
"Conduct of Activities in the Control Room", limits reading material to that authorized by the Shift Supervisor.
The on-duty Shift Supervisor was informed of the observation and later the inspector discussed the observation with the Operations Manager.
The inspector also addressed this concern to plant and corporate management during the exit interview on June 5,
1987.
Further review of control room activities, in particular, non-technical reading material will be conducted during future inspections.
ualit Control Staffin Chan e
The licensee plans to change their guality Control (gC) staffing.
As of June 1,
1987, the licensee will terminate the use of contract gC inspectors to supplement station gC inspectors who perform field inspections..
Each of two gC groups, mechanical and electrical, will have two inspectors who will perform supervisory and planning type work, but will also be available for field inspections should the need arise.
The licensee plans to continue using contract gC inspectors during outages or when workload increases.
The inspector will monitor gC inspector involvement under the new staffing and organizational structure.
Failure to Follow Procedures On May 21, 1987, the inspector observed scaffolding installed over safeguards Bus 14, power supply for the "A" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump.
The inspector found no safety evaluation had been performed for this installation.
The inspector questioned licensee management regarding the scaffolding installations over safety related equipment without a safety evaluation.
Licensee management
stated they take credit for having the opposite train available and they do not routinely install seismically unanalyzed scaffolding over redundant trains of safety related equipment simultaneously.
The only documentation available for the scaffolding installations are the licensee's temporary structural features (TSF) authorization forms.
The inspector reviewed all TSF authorization forms for the scaffolding installations in the Auxiliary Building.
No documentation that the licensee was "taking credit" for the availability of the opposite electrical train equipment (Bus 16) was found attached to the TSF authorization forms'ince these forms do not spec',fy when credit is being taken for the opposite train it is difficult to ensure the the availability of that train.
The inspector questioned the licensee's awareness that the "B" RHR pump breaker was removed from its cubicle on Bus 16 for 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />, from May 20 to May 21, 1987, while the seismically unanalyzed scaffolding was installed over Bus 14.
Licensee management was apparently unaware that Temporary Modifications Control Coordinator allowed unanalyzed scaffolding to be installed over Bus 14 with the assumption that only one train of safety related equipment would be affected at a time and later, with the scaffolding still in place, the Shift Supervisor allowed the "B" RHR pump on the opposite train to be taken out-of-service to perform electrical modifications.
The inspector subsequently conducted a review of the temporary structural features portion of the licensee's Temporary Modification Program.
The review included Administrative Procedure A-1406. 1,
"Installation and Removal of Temporary Structural Features",
and completed TSF authorization forms from the programs inception in February 1986 to May 1987.
Procedure A-1406. 1 requires documented reviews if temporary structural features are installed at other than cold or refueling shutdown congitions.
Step 3.4.2, states:
"The Technical Manager or alternate shall document his review providing a determination whether the temporary installation will 1) result in a change to the facility or its operation as described in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question".
Further, step 3.4.6 states:
"If the Technical Manager or alternate determination is negative in all the cases given in step 3.4.2 Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) review will be marked as non-applicable, and approval sign off will be made; documentation of the review
shall be attached to the authorization form, and the authori-zation form shall be forwarded to the Temporary Modification Coordinator for distribution".
The inspector reviewed approximately 100 completed TSF authorization forms.
Upon reviewing TSF authorization forms it was determined that documented reviews are routinely not attached and only one form was found that addressed all three questions in step 3.4.2, of A-1406.1.
Failure to attach documented reviews is an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.
(87-09-01)
Inspection report 87-04 included a notice of violation (87-04-03)
regarding
CFR 50'9 reviews for temporary lead shielding.
The licensee's corrective actions to that notice of violation addressed only the failure to perform
CFR 50.59 reviews performed under procedure A-1406. 1. 1, "Control of Temporary Lead Shielding" without addressing the generic implications of other portions of the temporary modification program.
Additional deficiencies noted by the inspector in his review of the licensee's temporary modification program are:
The Temporary Modification Control Coordinator has been performing reviews as the Technical Manager's alternate since December 1986.
He has initiated and approved without further review more than twenty scaffolding installations while the plant was at power operation.
The licensee's procedure A-1406.1 allows the installation of seismically unanalyzed TSF if only one train at a time is affected.
Additionally, no configuration control program exists to ensure the opposite train is. not affected.
The licensee's procedure step 3.4.6 allows the Technical Manager or alternate, to mark the PORC independent review as non-applicable if all responses to the questions in step 3.4.2 are negative.
This process appears to be contrary to Technical Specification 6.8. 1.7 which requires the PORC to determine in writing whether or not an unreviewed safety question exists for modifications to plant systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety.
No guality Assurance audits of the temporary structural features program have been performed since the programs inception in February 198 The inspector has discussed these findings with the licensee's Technical Manager.
The licensee plans the following corrective actions:
Document reviews for all open TSF authorization forms, if required.
Review all temporary modification procedures to ensure proper reviews are being conducted and documented.
Schedule a guality Assurance audit of the temporary modification program.
The review of licensee actions relative to the temporary modification program is considered an unresolved item.
(87-09"02)
One violation was identified.
S.
Surveillance Testin a o The inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance testing of selected components to verify that:
the test procedure was properly approved and adequately detailed to assure performance of a satisfactory surveillance test; test instrumentation required by the procedure was calibrated and in use; the test was performed by qualified personnel; and the test results satisfied Technical Specifications and procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly resolved.
b.
During this inspection period, the inspector witnessed the performance of selected portions of the following tests:
Periodic Test (PT)- 2.1, "Safety Injection System Pumps", effective December 3,
1986.
PT-2.2,
"Residual Heat Removal System", effective April 20, 1987.
PT-3.0,
"NaOH Additive System", effective August 1, 1986.
PT-11.2, "Security 60 Cell Battery Bank", effective July 21, 1986.
PT-12.2,
"Emergency Diesel Generator 1B", effective March 26, 1987.
PT-16, "Auxiliary Feedwater System", effective December 3,
1986.
Calibration Procedure (CP)-18, "Calibration and/or Maintenance of Reactor Vessel Level Measurement System Loop B", effective May 1, 1987.
No violations were identifie s 6.
Plant Maintenance a 0 During the inspection period, the inspector observed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify:
. compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications; compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures; required QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; qualifications; and reportability as required by Technical Specifications.
b.
The inspector witnessed selected portions of the following maintenance activities:
Maintenance Procedure (M)-11'2. 1, "Safety Injection Pump, Mechanical Inspection", effective April 4, 1986.
System Operating Procedure (S)-16. 16A, "1-A Safety Injection Pump
. Isolation/Restoration",
effective October 9, 1986.
Station Modification (SM)-2799.21,
"RVLMS Recalibration and Testing", effective May 5, 1987.
SM-4225.4, "Installation and Testing of Amptector Overcurrent Devices", effective April 3, 1987.
No violations were identified.
7.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the reports contained the, information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the reported information was valid.
Within this scope, the following report was reviewed by the inspector:
Monthly Operating Report for April 1987.
At periodic intervals during the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
On June 5, 1987, an exit meeting was held to review the details of this inspection report with licensee management.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussion held with licensee representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction S