IR 05000244/1986013

Insp Rept 50-244/86-13 on 860909-11.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise Performed on 860910

ML20215C490
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/02/1986
From:	Conklin C, Lazarus W, Thomas W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215C452	List: IR 05000244/1986013 ML20215C451
References
50-244-86-13, NUDOCS 8610100305
Download: ML20215C490 (6)

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e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-13 Docket N License No. DPR-18 Licensee: Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Facility Name: R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Ontario and Rochester, New York Inspection Conducted: September 9-11, 1986 Inspectors: [ M /~

onklin, Team Leader, EPS, EP&RPB, .-

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. Thomas, EP Specialist, EPS/ EP&RPB, s on'dste RSS T. Polich, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna Station T. Kim, Resident Inspector, Ginna Station J. Pappin, Battelle, PNL B. Haa ensen, Battelle Approved by: . ph W. plazge)/s, Chief, Emergency

/dbdatef6 Preparedness Section, EP&RPB, DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on September 9-11, 1986, (Report N /86-13)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on September 10, 1986. The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC Region I and NRC contractor personne Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's emergency response actionsfor this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public, 00 4 hhk DON G

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b y DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on September 11, 198 R. Morrill, Training Manager S. Spector, Plant Superintendent P. Wilkins, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing 8. Quinn, Corporate Health Physicist D. Burke, Corporate Emergency Planner R. Kober, Vice President Electric & Steam Production B. Snow, Superintendent of Nuclear Production D. Filkins, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager J. Jennejahn, Alternate News Center Manager K. Nassauer, Emergency Survey Center Manager W. Backus, Nuclear Operations Manager T. Meyer, Plant Superintendent The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response per-sonnel, controllers, and observers as they performed their assigned func-tions during the exercis . Emergency Exercise The R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant partial-scale exercise (limited off-site participation) was conducted on September 10, 1986 from 6:45 AM until 4:00 P Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to discuss the objectives, scope, and content of the exercise scen-ario. As a result, minor changes were made in order to clarify certain objectives, revise certain portions of the scenario, and ensure that the scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective actio NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on September 9, 1986, and participated in a discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scen-ario deviation or disruption of normal plant operation .

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The exercise scenario included the following events:

Increasing leak rate from the reactor coolant system;

Fire in the area of the House Heating Boiler;

RCP 1A damage, Reactor Trip and subsequent minor fuel clad damage;

Reactor coolant system discharge piping rupture, (LOCA), partial uncovering of the reactor core and release of gap activity;

Release of radioactivity to the atmosphere;

Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency Classifications;

Calculation of offsite dose consequences; and Recommendation of protective actions to state and local official The above actions caused the activation of the licensee's emergency response facilities and permitted the state (to the extent necessary to support the counties) and counties to exercise their emergency plan B. Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, six NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. In addition, periodic observa-tions were made at the News Media Center. The following activities were observed:

Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events;

Direction and coordination of the emergency response;

Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies of pertinent plant status information;

Communications /information flow, and record keeping;

Fire fighting practices;

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Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions;

Provisions for in plant radiation protection; I l

Performance of off-site and in plant radiological surveys; Maintenance of site security and access control;

Performance of technical support;

Performance of repair and corrective actions;

Assembly and accountability of personnel;

Preparation of information for dissemination at the News Media Center; and Management of accident recovery operation c. Exercise Observations TheNRCteamnotedthatthelicensee'sactivat[onandaugmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

Event classification was completed accurately and within a reasonable time from event recognition;

Protective action recommendations were made pramptly and were correct for the existing plant conditions;

The Plant Operational Review Committee (PORC) provided timely and appropriate reviews of all significant emergency and repair procedures;

Offsite survey teams were well trained, equipped and were effectively managed;

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Facility managers (TSC, EOF) conducted frequent briefings to

their respective staff concerning plant conditions;

Recovery discussions were conducted with both TSC and EOF key players and were complete and thorough; and

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Overall command and control by the respective facility managers !

was timely, decisive and effectiv Open Items The NRC team identified the following areas which need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action:

(OPEN) 50-244/86-13-01: Communications from the scene of the fire to the OSC were inadequate. Messages were garbled and had to be repeated several times (Scott Air-Paks were used with a throat microphone). Important equipment status was not received in the OSC in a timely manner. Several operators were distrac-ted from other duties in an attempt to understand the message *

(OPEN) 50-244/86-13-02: Several times plant operators were observed in the process of making logic errors when following the Emergency Operating Procedures. Each time the logic errors were identified by other operators and corrected, however, the root cause of these potential errors needs to be evaluate *

(OPEN) 50-244/86-13-03: The initial and update notification messages to local and state authorities (SC-701 parts 1 and 2)

contained errors, omissions and illegible entries. In many cases, the forms did not provide offsite authorities with a brief description of events, but only contained specific plant indication *

(OPEN) 50-244/86-13-04: The TSC dose assessment team did not frequently consider the expected duration of the release, nor did they use the default release duration to determine inte-grated doses to the general population. The TSC dose assessment team was not notified of EOF initiated protective actions or implemented protective actions in a timely manne *

(OPEN) 50-244/86-13-05: The offsite monitoring team took environmental air samples with the air sampler located under the hood of the car. This would not have provided a representative sample of the environmen *

(OPEN) 50-244/86-13-06: The licensee should evaluate methods to ensure that ALARA practices are maintained for all teams while in the fiel For example, the Green team was sent back into the plume to collect a 10 minute air sample, even though one member of the team had already received a dose of 1.9 RE *

(OPEN) 50-244/86-13-07: The E0F dose assessment team requested

, that a PASS sample be taken of the containment atmosphere to confirm the Noble Gas to Iodine ratio. This sample was never

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obtained by the plant staf ;

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(OPEN) 50-244/86-13-08: Repair teams did not receive updates concerning plant status while in the fiel Events occurred 4 that would have affected the performance of the repair teams had they been informed of the changed plant statu l Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following open items were identified during the previous exercise (Inspection Report 50-244/85-20). Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and l observations made by the NRC team during the exercise, Open Items )

85-20-01 through 85-20-03 were not repeated and are closed: 1

(CLOSED) 50-244/85-20-01: There was some questions as to the required event classification regarding the ATWS among control room operator *

(CLOSED) 50-244/85-20-02: The TSC and EOF did not update off-site agencies regarding plant conditions from about 0900 to 105 *

(CLOSED) 50-244/85-20-03: The fire brigade did not check adja-cent rooms for involvement until requested to do so by the control roo . Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on September 11, 1986, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The critique adequately addressed the areas where improvements are neede . Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercis The licensee was informed that previously identified exercise items were adequately addressed. Although there were areas identified for improve .

ment, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could imple-ment their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appro-priate action would be taken regarding the identified open items following receipt of this report. At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.