IR 05000244/1986014
| ML17251A818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1986 |
| From: | Eselgroth P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17251A816 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-86-14, NUDOCS 8609300287 | |
| Download: ML17251A818 (22) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 50-244/86-14 Docket No. 50-244 Licensee No.
DPR-18 Pri ority Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Facility Name:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at:
Ontario, New York Inspection Conducted:
August 1, 1986 through August 31, 1986 Inspectors:
E.
H. Gray, Reactor Engineer, DRS, MEPS B.
M. Hillman, Reactor Engineer, DRP, Sect.
2A T.
K. Kim, Resident Inspector, Ginna Reviewed by:
T. J. Polich, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna Approved by:
P.
W. Esel th, Chief, Reactor Project ction No. 2A, DRP 9-zz-FC Date Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Au ust
1986 throu h Au ust
1986 Re or t No. 50-244/86-14)
resident inspector and two region-based inspectors (92 hours0.00106 days <br />0.0256 hours <br />1.521164e-4 weeks <br />3.5006e-5 months <br />).
Areas inspected included: plant operations; licensee action on previous findings; surveillance testing; maintenance; IE Information Notice Follow-up management meeting; re-view of periodic and special reports; and inspection of accessible portions of the facility during plant tours.
Results:
In the nine areas inspected, one item of non-compliance was identi-fied involving the station Technical Specification limiting conditions for op-eration.
A Notice of Violation was not issued based upon NRC review confirming that the violation met the criteria for self-identification and correction as specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, V. A. (details in paragraph 3).
The management meeting on licensee gA/gC effectiveness is documented in paragraph 7.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted During this inspection period, the inspectors held discussions with and interviewed operators, technicians, engineering and supervisory level personnel.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
a
(Open) Inspector Follow-up Item (79-CI-05)
Environmental gualifica-tion of Stranded Wire Conductors.
IE Circular 79-05 identified a
problem of interstitial communication of fluid in stranded conductors exposed to harsh environment during design basis accident condi-tions.
Experiments showed that most stranded wire conductors, when subjected to a differential pressure across the conductor ends, will leak steam or moisture through the interstices of the strands of wire.
In accordance with the recommendations in the IE Circular, the licensee performed a detailed review and analysis to determine wheth-er as-installed configurations exist which could adversely affect the operability of safety-related equipment during a Loss of Coolant Accident/Main Steam Line Break (LOCA/MSLB).
The licensee determined that the configurations of cable applications within the containment at Ginna are not subject to this problem.
The inspector s will verify the as-installed configurations in a future inspection.
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (80-BU-08)
Examination of Contain-ment Liner Penetration Welds.
IE Bulletin 80-08 identified that cer-tain non-destructive examinations (NDE) performed on containment penetration welds at several reactor sites did not satisfy the appli-cable ASME Boilers and Pressure Vessel Code requirements.
The welds in question were the primary piping containment penetration flued head (integral fitting) to outer sleeve welds which form a part of the containment pressure boundary.
The examination performed includ-ed ultrasonic and surface inspections of the outer surface.
The bul-letin required that the licensee determine if the Ginna containment contains the flued head design for penetration connections, or other designs with containment boundary butt welds between the penetration sleeves and process piping.
The licensee performed the requested review of Ginna Station penetrations and determined that none of the containment penetrations at Ginna Station resemble the designs of concern as described in Bulletin 80-08.
This is documented in the L.
D. White to B.
H. Grier letter dated May 29, 1980.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (83-02-01)
Determination of Fail-ure Mechanism for ASCO Solenoid valves.
Type 206-381-3RU ASCO sole-noid valves are used at the Ginna Station to direct or vent instrument air to the main Feedwater, Regulating Valves (FRVs).
Fol-lowing the reactor trip on 01/17/83, it was noted that two of the six ASCO valves failed to function properly and resulted in operator
inability to control steam generator water levels.
The licensee de-termined that the solenoid valve failure was due to the swelling of the fibrous valve seat'which blocked the air supply to the FRYs.
The licensee replaced the solenoid valves with ASCO type HU-212-630-2RU which have stainless steel valve seats.
These valves have functioned properly since their installation and no similar problems have been observed.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (84-05-05)
Inadequate Qualification Records for NDE Personnel.
During a previous inspection, the inspec-tor reviewed several non-destructive examination (NDE) personnel qualification and certification records and found that these records are incomplete and not current.
Of the 19 individual records re-viewed 10 individuals did not have current eye examinations posted in the master NDE book located at the site.
One individual did not have a current eye examination.
In January 1985 the licensee implemented a
new computerized tracking system for NDE personnel qualification and certification records.
This system includes the tracking of periodic eye examinations.
The inspector discussed the effectiveness of this new tracking system with a licensee representative and verified that there have been no lapses observed in personnel qualification since the implementation of the new tracking system.
This item is closed.
(Open) Inspector Follow-up Item (85-06-01)
General Guidance/Procedure on Experiments/Trouble Shooting Activities.
During an earlier inspec-tion period, the licensee committed to review the need for developing a general troubleshooting procedure or guidance.
The need was based on an apparent lack of appropriate controls while conducting trouble-shooting activities such as the fai lure analysis on the reactor coolant system temperature channel on April 5, 1985.
The inspector determined that the licensee is still pursuing resolution of this issue.
Currently, guidance is provided using the station administra-tive procedure (A-1603), "Maintenance Work Request and Trouble Report",
as an interim measure.
A common industry practice in this area is also being reviewed by the station management.
This item remains open.
(Open) Inspector Follow-up Item (85-06-03)
Exxon Fuel ECCS Evalua-tion Model.
On March 15, 1985, one of the licensee's fuel suppliers, Exxon Nuclear Corporation (ENC), informed the NRC that a coding error was discovered in the program utilized to develop the Exxon Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation model.
Upon further review by the NRC staff, three additional concerns in the ENC Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis were discovered.
In the Safety Evaluation Report prepared by the NRC staff and trans-mitted as an enclosure to Thompson to Kober letter dated April 5, 1985, the staff concluded that the coding error and two of the LOCA analysis concerns were not applicable to Ginna.
The third concern,
I I
the assumed validity and applicability of applying'the Westinghouse derived K(z) curve to ENC fuel, remain unr esol ved pending further quantitative analysis in accordance with the requirements of section I.A. of Appendix K to
CFR Part 50.
However, a significant safety margin does exist regarding peak fuel clad temperature and in the event of a design basis LOCA the maximum fuel element cladding tem-perature will not exceed 2200F.
The staff concluded, that although the K(z) curve for ENC fuel has not been verified using an ECCS eval-uation model in conformance with Appendix K, there is reasonable as-surance that the Ginna plant satisfies the criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 and that the plant can be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety.
As requested in the Thompson to Kober letter, dated April 15, 1985, the licensee has submitted additional information in support of dem-onstrating the conformance of ENC fuel to the Westinghouse K(z) oper-ating envelope for the Ginna reactor.
This item remains open pending NRR review of additional data.
(Closed)
Inspection Follow-up item (85-06-06)
Control of As-Built Drawings and Design Documents.
A previous inspection noted that station personnel might not utilize drawings which accurately reflect as-built conditions following completion of a modification unless, the drawing is classified as a "controlled" document.
The station administrative procedure A-603, "Control of As-Built Drawings and De-sign Documents," defines "controlled" drawings which require updating concurrent with the modification turn-over to the station.
In response to this open item, the licensee formed a Drawing Update Task Force which proposed additions to the control configuration drawing list.
As a result of the May 15, 1986 Drawing Update Task Force meeting, additional categories of drawings were finalized for inclusion as controlled drawings.
Modifications performed in systems affecting these new categories in the future will result in prompt issuance of the as-built drawings to the station central records.
The inspector reviewed the list of proposed additions to the "con-trolled" configuration drawing list and found it adequate for resolu-tion of this concern.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (85-26-01)
Failure to establish and implement procedures in controlling maintenance/modification activity. During a previous inspection, the inspector noted that the licensee did not use an appropriate procedure to control the installation of the new chlorine monitor in the station's State Pollutant Discharge Elimina-tion System.
As a result, a Technical Specification designated ef-fluent monitoring system, connected by a common sample line, was disconnected and remained so for approximately 13 days.
As required in the Technical Specification Section 6.8, Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 states that general procedures for the control of mainte-nance, repair, replacement and modification work should be prepared and include methods for obtaining permission and clearance for per-sonnel to perform the wor The inspector reviewed the licensee's proposed corrective actions and implementation and found them to be consistent with the licensee's commitment as documented in Kober to Murley letter dated April 25, 1986.
Detailed review of the licensee's corrective actions on this violation and the violation found in Inspection Report No. 86-03 is discussed in the next paragraph.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (86-03-01)
Failure to Establish and Implement Procedures in Controlling Maintenance Activity.
During a previous inspection, the inspector noted that the licensee failed to establish and implement appropriate procedures governing preventive maintenance activities performed on Vital Bus 14, result-ing in violation of containment integrity requirements for refueling operations on February 15 and 16, 1986.
In the response to the Notice of violation (Kober to Murley letter, dated April 25, 1986),
the licensee acknowledged the NRC's concern that maintenance planning and control needs to be improved as identi-fied in this violation and the violation in Inspection Report No.
85-26.
(see details in paragraph h)
The inspector reviewed licensee's proposed corrective actions and their implementation and the following were observed:
The shift supervisor and the operations personnel became more aware of their ultimate responsibility and authority in plant status and activity controls through periodic shift supervisors meetings and shift crew meetings.
MWRs are routinely reviewed during the daily Morning Operations Priority Attention Required Meeting (MOPAR).
The MOPAR usually satisfies quorum requirements for PORC meetings.
The training of maintenance personnel on MWR procedure, focusing on establishment of conditions required to perform maintenance, was conducted and documented by the Maintenance Manager.
Maintenance Section was partially reorganized to allow the main-tenance supervisor to devote his full attention in planning and scheduling maintenance activities.
His previous collateral du-ties have been assigned to another employee.
The inspector determined that the status and the licensee's progress on these actions appear to be consistent with the licensee's commit-ment as documented in Kober to Murley letter, dated April 25, 1986.
The proposed implementation of a computerized Maintenance Information System will further aid the licensee in controlling maintenance ac-tivities.
This item is close (Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item (86-11-01)
Corrective Actions on Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) Failure.
Following the reactor trip on July 29, 1986, the "A" steam generator (S/G)
FRV failed to close on a turbine trip/low Tavg signal.
The cause for the problem was identified as a closed manual vent valve on the exhaust port of the solenoid (S-2) for the turbine trip/low Tavg signal circuit.
On high S/G water leve'1, the solenoid valve (S-2) is designed to open and vent off the pressurized air controlling the position of the FRV.
The vent valves on the solenoid valves were part of the system con-figuration originally designed by Copes-Vulcan.
When the Copes-Vulcan operators on FRVs were replaced with Fisher operators, the vent valves were retained.
The licensee engineering staff has re-viewed the current system configuration and determined that vent valves are not necessary with the Fisher operators and may be re-moved.
Subsequently, the licensee removed the vent valves from the exhaust ports of the S-2 solenoid valves on both FRVs and two bypass valves.
The FRVs and bypass valves were then tested satisfactorily with proper responses to a turbine trip/low Tavg signal, a high S/G water level isolation signal, and a safety injection signals The inspector reviewed the licensee's disposition for the Non-conformance Report (NCR 86-210)
and also verified that the Plant Operations Re-view Committee (PORC)
has reviewed and approved proposed corrective actions on the FRVs.
This item is closed.
k.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item (86-11-04)
Details in paragraph 6.
3.
Review of Plant 0 erations Throughout the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed routine pow-er operations.
The reactor operated at 100% power for the entire inspection period.
The reactor was operating at 100% power for about 16 days when the licensee experienced a Xenon transient in the reac-tor core with the AFD swings of up to
+3% for approximately two days prior to the load reduction.
The inspectors reviewed the following activities:
On August 16, 1986, at 1604 hours0.0186 days <br />0.446 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.10322e-4 months <br />, the licensee commenced tur-bine load reduction to reduce reactor power below 90% in accor-dance with the station Technical Specifications action statement (3. 10.2.9) for exceeding indicated Axial Flux Difference (AFD)
limit.
Technical Specification limit on AFD at 100% reactor power is +5% from the target AFD value of -0.2%.
The calculated actual AFD indicated-5.35%.
The AFD was brought back within the
+5% band shortly following the load reduction to 95% power and subsequently the reactor power was raised back up to 100%.
The licensee determined that the decreasing Xenon transient sta-bilityy of the optimized fuel assembly core towards the end of core life and operator inexperience with such core characteris-tics have contributed to, the recent transients The licensee technical staff have instructed operators to minimize control
rod movements and also to minimize the reactor coolant tempera-ture swings in an effort to avoid further Xenon transients and axial flux swings.
The licensee is further investigating the decreasing Xenon transient stability characteristics of the op-timized fuel assembly core with Westinghouse.
On August 16, 1986, at approximately 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />, the control room operators discovered the 'A'oric acid transfer pump inop-erable upon starting the pump from the control room.
Immediate investigation by the primary auxiliary operator found the manual valve (V-331),
on a suction line to the 'A'oric acid transfer pump from the boric acid storage tank, in a closed position.
Further investigation by the licensee indicated that a plant chemistry technician had inadvertently closed the valve (V-331)
during his routine boric acid storage tank sampling assignment, approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> prior to the discovery.
This is in violation of the station Technical Specifications limiting conditions for operation (3.2.2) which in part, states that:
Both boric acid transfer pumps shall be operable.
One boric acid pump may be out of service provided the pump is re-stored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
As an immediate corrective action, the licensee has locked opened the valve (V-331).
The licensee management also coun-seled the involved individual on the station policy of contact-ing the control room prior to operating such valves and components.
The inspector was informed that the licensee is in the process of generating a Licensee Event Report (LER) on this item.
In accordance with the
CFR Part 2, Appendix C, V.A., a Notice of Violation was not issued on this item as:.
(1) it was identified by the licensee (2) it fits in severity level IV or V
(3) it was reported, if required (4) it was corrected within a reasonable time (5) it was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous identified violation.
The inspector will review the LER upon receipt and follow-up on the licensee's final resolution and corrective actions in a fu-ture inspection.
(86-14-01)
b.
During the inspection, accessible plant areas were toured.
Items reviewed include radiation protection and contamination controls, plant housekeeping, fire protection, equipment tagging, personnel safety, and securit C.
Inspector tours of the control room this inspection period included reviews of shift manning, operating logs and records, equipment and monitoring instrumentation status.
d.
Safety system valves and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required for the applicable plant mode as specified by Technical Specifications and plant lineup procedures.
This verification included routine control board indication review and conduct of a partial systems lineup check of the Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, and the Auxiliary Feedwater System on August 12 and August 28, 1986.
No violations were identified.
4.
Surveillance Testin b.
The inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance testing of selected components to verify that the test procedure was properly approved and adequately detailed to assure performance of a sati sfac-tory surveillance test; test instrumentation required by the proce-dure was calibrated and in use; the test was performed by qualified personnel; and the test results satisfied Technical Specifications and procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly resolved.
During this inspection period, the inspectors witnessed the perfor-mance of a portion of the following tests:
System Operating Procedure (S)-15. 1, "Flux Mapping Normal Procedure",
Revision 28, dated March 22, 1986, performed on August 12, 1986.
PT-2.7,
"Service Water System",
Revision 31, dated August 13, 1986, performed on August 27,
.1986.
PT-13.20, "Fire Protection Satellite Station +B'ystem Test", dated April 4, 1986, performed on August 26, 1986.
No violations were identified.
5.
Plant Maintenance During the inspection period, the inspector observed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify:
compliance with regula-tory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifi-cations; compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures; required gA/gC involvement; proper use of safety tags; proper equip-ment alignment and use of jumpers; personnel qualifications; and re-portability as required by Technical Specifications.
The inspector witnessed a portion of the following maintenance activities:
Calibration of "B" Containment Hydrogen Monitor on August 25, 1986.
Calibration Procedure (CP)-53, "Calibration and/or Maintenance of the Containment Hydrogen Monitor System Loop."
Preventive maintenance on "A" Gas Stripper Feed Pump on August 28, 1986.
Maintenance Procedure (M)-11. 11,
"Crane Chempump-major inspection."
No violations were identified.
ECCS Safet Injection Minimum Recirculation Flow Control Valves IE Bulletin 86-01, issued May 23, 1986, informed all Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) licensees and BWR construction permit holders of a recently identi-fied problem at Pilgrim in which a single failure in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system minimum flow control logic could potentially disable all of the RHR pumps.
A similar concern may also exist at a number of Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) involving the potential fai lure in the mi nimum recirculation flow protection configuration.
IE Information Notice 85-94, "Potential for Loss of Minimum Flow Paths Lead-ing to ECCS Pump Damage During LOCA", also informed licensees of this po-tential problem.
During a previous inspection, the inspector discussed these information items with the licensee and reviewed the station Safety Injection (SI)
pump recirculation flow configuration.
Two in-line air operated recirculation flow control valves are used in the common minimum flow return line to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST).
These valves are designed to fail close on a loss of control air.
The licensee concluded that if the SI pumps were running against shut off head (small break LOCA) and concurrent loss of control air was experi-enced, potential pump damage may result due to inadequate recirculation cooling flow.
Consequently, the licensee has fabricated mechanical blocking devices for each of the valves to prevent the valves from closing on a loss of control air.
The Station Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) Section (ES-1.2),
"Cold-leg Recirculation" has been revised to direct the operator action necessary to remove the mechanical blocks before achieving recirculation mode of the ECCS during a
LOCA.
The two flow control valves are inter-locked with the containment sump suction isolation valves to prevent con-tamination of the RWST when operating in the recirculation mode following a
LOCA.
As a contingency measure, the licensee also installed bypass switches for the flow control valve position indication logic relays to enable operators to achieve the recirculation mode of ECCS in case the mechanical blocks can not be removed in the time allowed by the procedure.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's safety analysis involving the de-signed functions of the modified valves and their position indication log-ic relay bypass switches.
The inspector also verified that the safety analysis and the procedure changes have been reviewed by the Plant Opera-tions Review Committee.
Operator training on the revised procedure is being implemented through the operator requalification training progra The inspector noted that the licensee has generated an Engineering Work Request to consider replacing the air operated flow control valves with motor operated valves as a long term corrective action.
The inspector had no further questions.
This item is closed.
7.
NRC/Licensee Mana ement Meetin On August 14, 1986, a NRC/licensee management meeting was held at the NRC Region I Office, in King of Prussia, PA, to discuss the licensee's QA/QC program effectiveness.
The licensee management provided a status of the corrective actions being taken on the previous violations found in NRC Inspection Report (IR 86-02).
The status and the licensee's progress on these actions appear to be re-sponsible to the NRC's concerns and consistent with the licensee's commit-ment made during the Enforcement Conference held on March 27, 1986 to discuss these violations.
The inspectors will follow-up on these licensee actions in a future in-spection.
During the meeting, the overall licensee QA/QC program effec-tiveness and the licensee's QA/QC Task Force recommendation for improvements were also discussed.
8.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts
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Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pur-suant to Technical Specification 6.9. 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the in-spector.
This review included the following considerations:
the reports contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity of the re-ported information.
Within this scope, the following reports were re-viewed by the inspectors:
Monthly Operating Report for June and July, 1986.
Summary Report of Steam Generator Eddy Current Examinations for 1986, dated March 1, 1986.
This report was reviewed for compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.83 and the requirements of the ASME Code Section XI and the Ginna proce-dure S00-4 for Eddy Current Examination of Inconel 600 Steam Genera-tor Tubes.
The report outlines the organization of the Eddy Current Examination Program, summarizes the results of data analysis and,pro-vides for corrective actions.
Interpretation of data is controlled by the sequence of an initial data review, an independent data review and a third party data review to provide cross checking of the data for maximum accuracy of analysis.
Corrective action, either tube sleeving or plugging was taken on 63 tubes.
No deficiencies were note.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection period, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspec-tion scope and findings'ased on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussion held with licensee representatives, it was determined that this report does not con-tain information subject to
CFR 2.790 restrictions.