IR 05000244/1981003
| ML17258B019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1981 |
| From: | Kister H, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258B015 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-81-03, 50-244-81-3, NUDOCS 8105070507 | |
| Download: ML17258B019 (22) | |
Text
R p
N Docket No..
50-244 U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50244-801003 50244-801125 50244-801211 50244-801231
.
50244-810105
'0244-810109 Li N
OHLJIL
'tY Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Cor oration 89 East Avenue Rochester New York 14649 Facility Name:
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at:
Ontario, New York Category C
Inspection conducted:
Dec'ember 1, 1980 thru January 31, 1981 Inspectors:
R.
P.
Z erman, Senior Resident Inspector a'
signed date signed.
Approved by:
H. B. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 4, RO
NS Branch dat signed d te sig ed Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on December 1, 1980 thru Januar 31, 1981 (Re ort No. 50-244/81-03 reas Ins ecte
Routine, onsste, regu ar and bac s
haft inspect>on by t e resident inspector
ours).
Areas, inspected included licensee action on previous inspection finding, plant operating records, surveillance testing; IE Bulletin response; Immediate Action Letter 80-54 verification; periodic and special reports; Licensee Event Reports, and accessible portions of the facility during plant tours.
Results:
Of the eight areas inspected; one item of noncompliance was found in one area
~far ure to Perform radiation emergency drill within required frequency-Paragraph 5.3).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
1~65 ov05o7
DETAILS Persons Contacted
. The below listed technical and supervisory level personnel were among those contacted:
W. Backus, Operations Supervisor J. Bodine, gC Engineer L. Boutwell, Maintenance Supervisor W. Dillion, Supervisor of Nuclear Security C. Edgar, I 5 C Supervisor D. Filkens, Supervisor Health Physics and Chemistry D. Gent, Results and Test Supervisor A. Harhay, Plant Chemist G. Larizza, Technical Engineer R. Morrill, Training Coordinator T. Meyer, Nuclear Engineer J.
C. Noon, Assistant Plant Superintendent C. Peck, Operations Engineer B. guinn, Health Physicist-B. A. Snow, Plant Superintendent S. Spector, Maintenance Engineer J. Straight, Fire Protection and Safety Coordinator The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
Status of Previous Ins ection Items (Closed)
Unresolved Item (244/80-11-04):
Barring devices found engaged in diesel generators.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's investigation re-sult submittals which included Licensee Event Report (LER) 80-09 and letter B.
Snow (RGSE) to B. Grier (NRC), dated November 17, 1980.
The vendor verbally concurred with the licensee that an engaged barring device would not prevent a diesel generator from starting.
Further, missiles generated by the failure of an engaged barring device were deter-mined not to affect the operability of the diesel generator.
A licensee review of security access records to the diesel rooms did not identify the individual who engaged the 'barring device on the 'B'iesel Generato t
The inspector verified the barring device has been removed from both diesel generators.
t1aintenance Procedure 15.1, 'A'r 'B'iesel Generator Removal From Service, was revised to allow installation of the device when required for maintenance and subsequent removal following job completion.
Review of Plant 0 erations a ~
General b.
The inspector reviewed plant operations through-direct inspection and observation throughout the reporting period.
Activities in progress included routine power operations; recovery following 'B'. Circulating Mater Pump trip on 1/7; and f epair of a leaking drain valve and safety valve on the '5B'eedwater Heater on 1/20.
Shift Lo s and 0 eratin 'ecords Operating logs and records were reviewed against Technical Specifications and administrative procedure requirements.
Included in the review were:
Control Room Log Daily Surveillance Log Shift Supervisor's Log Plant Recorder Traces Plant Process Computer Printout Station Event Reports daily during control room surveillance daily during control room surveil,lance daily during control room surveillance daily during control room surveillance daily during control room surveillance 12/1/80 through 1/31/81 The logs and records were reviewed to verify that entries are properly made; entries involving abnormal conditions provide sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, deficiencies, corrective action restoration and testing; records are being reviewed by management; operating orders do not conflict with the Technical Specifications; logs and event reports detail no violations of Technical Specification or reporting requirements; logs and records are maintained in accord-ance with Technical Specification and administ"ative procedure require-ments.
Several entries in these logs were the subject of additional review and discussion with licensee personnel.
No unacceptable conditions were identifie Plant Tour l.
During the course of the inspection, tours of the following areas were conducted:
Control Room Auxiliary Building Intermediate Building (including control point)
Turbine Building Diesel-Generator Rooms All Volatile Treatment Building Battery Rooms Relay Room Yard Area and Perimeter 2.
The following observations resulted from the tours:
a ~
b.
C.
d.
e.
Nonitorin instrumentation.
Process instruments were observed for corre ation between c annels and for conformance with Technical,Specification requirements.
Annunciator alarms.
Various alarm conditions which had een receive an acknowledged were observed.
These were discussed with shift personnel to verify that the reasons for the alarms were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Shift mannin
.
Control room and shift manning were observed or con ormance with 10 CFR 50.54 (K), Technical Specifica-tions and administrative procedures.
Radiation rotection controls.
Areas observed included contro point operation, pos ing of radiation and high radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Work Permits and Special Work Permits, personnel monitoring devices being properly worn, and personnel frisking practices.
E ui ment lineu s.
Valve and electrical breakers were verifie to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and plant lineup procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included
control" board indications daily, and field observations through the performance of partial equipment lineups of the Containment Spray, Safety Injection and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Systems on January 14.
E ui ment ta in
.
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests a
been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
g.
~Fi t ti
.
Fi dt ti dfi fighting qip-ment was observed for conformance with Technical Specifi-cations and administrative procedures.
~Securit
.
Areas observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, the site security plan and administrative procedures, included vehicle and personnel access, protect-ed and vital area integrity, escort and badging.
Plant housekee in controls.
Plant conditions were observed or conformance wit a ministrative procedures.
Storage of material and components was observed with respect to preven-
. tion 'of fire and safety hazards.
Housekeeping was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and air-borne'ontamination.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Ins ector llitnessin of Surveillance Tests a ~
b.
The inspector witnessed the'erformance of surveillance testing of selected components to verify that the surveillance test procedure was properly approved and in use; test instrumentation required by-the procedure was calibrated and in use; Technical Specifications were satisfied prior to removal of the system from service; test was performed by qualified personnel; the procedure was adequately de-tailed to assure performance of a satisfactory surveillance; and test results satisfied the procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly dispositioned.
The inspector witnessed the performance of:
Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) sampling in accordance with Primary Chemistry (PC)-14, Potentiometric Determination of Boron, Revision 4, August 20, 1980, performed January 28, 198 In-Service Testing RHR pumps in accordance with Periodic Test (PT)-2.2 Residual Heat Removal System,:Revision 24, October 3,'980, performed January 22, 1981.
c.
As a result of the above witnessing, the following item was identified:
Although the BASTs were determined to have a boron concentration within the Technical Specification limits, acceptance criteria was not includ-ed in the procedure.
Health physics personnel stated that accept/reject criteria was located in PC 1.2, Non-Primary Coolant Analysis, Schedule, and Limits, Revision 6, April 18, 1980; however no reference to PC 1.2 was included in PC-14.
The licensee has been in the process of reviewing plant procedures to ensure acceptance criteria is provided, where applicable, following the identification of several calibration procedures which did not in-clude accept/reject tolerances.
The review, which began in December, 1980 under Preventive Action Report (PAR) 128-80, has a scheduled com-pletion date of March '10, 1981.
The licensee representative stated that PC-14 would be revised to ref-erence PC-1.2 for acceptability of analysis results, and that PC pro-cedures would be included in the PAR 128-80 review.
The inspector will follow the licensee's actions on the subject PAR.
Followu on Immediate Action Letter (IAL 80-54 The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee regarding 1)
the method used for estimating noble gas release rates during accident conditions, and 2) training and refinements in the emergency response area.
The following number/letter designations (
) correspond to the items of the IAL.
(l.a)
A Radector III (Jordan)
High Range Dose Rater Meter has been installed in a lead cave one foot from the plant vent.
Procedure PC-23.3, Estimation of Noble Gas Release Rates from the Plant Vent During Accident Conditions, has been revised to provide more detailed information regarding the method to be followed for estimating the release rate from the plant vent when the existing monitor goes offscale.
In. addition, pertinent specifications on the high range meter have been incorporated in PC-23.3.
These include meter range, energy response, calibration frequency and power source.
(2.a)
The licensee has procured six new portable air samplers with
an approximate flow rate of 1.5 C.F.N. to allow for rapid field measurement.
Silver zeolite cartridges will be used with the samplers to provide a more accurate determination of the airborne radioiodine concentration in the presence of noble gases.
Procedure SC 1.7B, Determination of Iodine or Particulate, has been revised to reflect the method of operation for the new samplers.
(2.b)
, Procedure SC-1.3A, Site Radiation Emergency (Shift Supervisor and Control Room),
has been revised to further define instruc-tions-for the use of Attachment II to the procedure.
Attach-ment II provides the method for initially projecting off-site doses based on the type of accident and safeguards equipment in operation.
Procedure SC-13, Estimating Off-Site Doses, has been revised to include a table for use in correlating the projected whole body and thyroid doses to the emergency categories used by the State of New York.
(2.c)
Appropriate train'ing/retraining in the functional areas of the emergency plan and implementing procedures was performed as follows:
On January 20, 1981, training was conducted for 24 personnel that.may be required to 'perform duties at the Emergency Survey Center.
On January 21, 1981, training was conducted for 17 personnel that may be required to perform duties at the Technical Support Center.
On January 23 and 26, 1981, training was conducted for 44 personnel that may be required to perform duties as a radiation team member.
Over a several week period during December, 1980 and January, 1981, training was conducted for all shift personnel that may be required to perform duties in the control room.
The Inspector observed the training session for radiation monitoring team members held on January 26.
The discussion which lasted approx-imately four hours covered the following topics:
classification of radiation emergencies Emergency Survey Center familiarization Survey Equipment Room Familiarization field data collecting and sample calculations
The inspector considered the presentation thorough and in suffi-cient detail to satisfy the aims of the session.
I 3.
During,the review of previous training records. in the area of emer-gency preparedness, the inspector noted that an emergency drill was last performed on, October 26, 1979.
This is contrary to Site Con-tingency Procedure (SC)-1, which requires that an emergency drill be performed annually, and represents an item of noncompliance with
CFR 50, Appendix E (244/81-03-01).
The.licensee representative stated that the scenerio for. the radiation emergency drill was being developed and that the drill would be sched-
'led for February.
The inspector will follow'he licensee's actions, and document the findings from the drill in a future IE Inspection'eport.
Followu.on IE Bulletins (IEB)
The inspector reviewed facility records, interviewed licensee personnel and observed facility equipment/components to verify that:
.
licensee management received and reviewed the bulletins in accor-dance with administrative procedures; information discussed in the licensee's bulletin response was accurate:
corrective action was taken as discussed in the reply', and, the licensee's response was within the time period required.
IEB 80-24, Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment
~cto er 7,
1980 Indian Point 2 Event).
There are two open cooling water. systems in containment.
One is the service water system and the other is the containment fire system.
To date, there has been no leakage in containment or repair necessary with either system.
(Subsequent to the date of this report, water leakage was experienced in the
'C'ontainment Fan Hotor Cooler.
Details will, be included in IE Inspection Report No. 81-04).
The containment has two sumps, 'A'nd 'B'ach with redundant level detection systems which provide, indication in the control room.
Sump A contains two sump pumps.
Sump B does not contain a pump; however significant leakage would quickly overflow this sump to Sump A.
The physical location of the two sumps makes Sump A the primary point for leakage inside containment to normally accumulate.
A suction is taken from Sump B when in post-accident recirculation and would not normally be a collection point for leakage with the exception of
that experienced during periodic RHR valve exercising (RHR suction valves MOV 850A and MOV 850B).
Procedure S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, is performed at least daily to ensure leakage in containment would be detected.
The pro-cedure includes various leakage detection methods including the interval be-tween sump pump actuations, dew point increase, and condensate collection system operation.
Administrative Procedure (A)-25, Reporting of Unusual Plant Conditions, and A-25.1, Ginna Station Event Report, have been revised to include a
24-hour report and a 14 day written report to the NRC as a special licensee event report for service water leaks inside containment.
Alarm Response Procedures AR/C-18, Containment Sump 'A'ump Auto Start, and AR/C-19, Containment Sump 'A'i Level, have been revised to recommend that continued power operation be limited to seven days and added surveil-lance measures be instituted in the event that either the detection or removal systems become inoperable.
Procedure AR/C-20, Containment Sump
'B'i Level.,
has been revised to instruct the operator to take the follow-ing actions:
observe level indications for both sumps check for increase in system leakage in accordance with Procedure S-12.4 check Sump 'B'uction valves closed submit Trouble Report to have Sump B pumped out at next refueling-complete Procedure A-25.1 The component cooling water system is the only closed cooling water system inside containment.
There is no history of any leaks inside containment associated with the component water system.
This bulletin is closed.
The four containment recirculation fans each have butterfly isolation valves on the service water inlet and outlet lines located outside of the containment building.
These valves are not presently tested for leakage.
Engineering Work Request (EWR) 3258 has been developed to determine a means to modify the system to allow testability of the isolation valves.
The inspector will follow the licensee's actions regarding EWR 3258.
Licensee Event Re orts (LER's)
The inspector reviewed the following LER's to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information was required, and whether generic implications were in-volved.
The inspector also verified that the reporting requirements of Tech-
nical Specifications and administrative and operating procedures had been met; appropriate corrective action had been taken; the event was reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee; and continued operation of the facility was conducted within the Technical Specification limits.
80-09: iesel Generator (DG) declared inoperab'le-October 3,
1980.
During routine surveillance testing the 'A'G was stopped when it was noted that the barring device used for rotating the shaft during over-haul was engaged and being severely damaged.
The 'B'G was run contin-uously as required by Technical Specifications.
Following the above event, the licensee discovered the barring device for the 'B'G engaged on October 7, 1980.
Further discussion can be found in IE Inspection Report 80-11 and paragraph 2 of this report.
80-10:
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System piping leak-November 25, 1980.
During a unit shutdown a pinhole leak was found in the weld of a therm-qwell on the RHR return line in the Auxiliary Building.
RHR was continued through alternate discharge to the reactor coolant system.
The area was roped off and an air sample tak'en with no increase in activity noted.
The initial weld was determined to have been of poor quality and was repaired in accordance with Procedure EN-274.
80-11:
Bus 17 breaker from 'B'iesel Generator failed to close-December 980.
During routine surveillance testing the Bus 17 breaker did not close.
Bus 16 breaker from 'B'G was then closed, and on a second attempt the Bus 17 breaker closed successfully.
The test was repeated with electri-cians observing breaker operation.
The breaker was successfully tested five times with no problems noted.
81-01: iesel Generator jacket cooling line leak-January 6, 1981.
Dur-ing routine surveillance testing a 'leak was discovered from a broken bushing on the jacket cooling water return line to the expansion tank.
The 'A'G was run continuously during the repair period.
Cause of the failure is be-lieved to have been from personnel stepping on the line while working in the area.
81-02:
'C'afety injection Pump failure to start-January 9, 1981.
During rout>ac surveillance testing the pump did not start from the Bus 16 breaker.
Following examination of the breaker for proper positioning, the breaker was fully racked-out and racked back in.
Operation of the pump was then perform-ed successfully.
It is believed that the breaker may have been in an off-set position rather than fully racked-in.
Training in proper breaker align-ment and reporting rack-in problems prior to repositioning the breaker will be emphasized in the operator requalification progra Review of Periodic.and S ecial Re orts Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 and 6.9;3 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report includes the information required to be report'ed by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information are con-sistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action is adequate for resolution of identified-problems; determination whether any information in the report should be classified as an abnormal occurrence; and the validity of reported information.
Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector.
monthly. Operating Reports for November and December, 1980.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding ~ '