IR 05000244/1981021
| ML17258A336 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1981 |
| From: | Kister H, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258A335 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-81-21, NUDOCS 8112010450 | |
| Download: ML17258A336 (26) | |
Text
Report No. 50"244/81-21 Docket No. 50-244 U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I License No.DPR-18 Priority Category Licensee:
Rochester Gas and El 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Facility Name:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclea Inspection at:
Ontario, New York Inspection conducted:
October 1-31, 1981 inspectors:
R R.
P.
Z erman, Senior Resident Inspector da e signed date signed Approved by:
H.
Kister, f, React r Projects Sec ion 1C, Divisson of Re 'dent 8t Project Inspection date signed d te s'gned Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on October 1-31 1981 Re ort No. 50-244 81-21)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite, regular, backshift, and weekend inspection by the ress ent inspector (112.hours).
Areas inspected included plant operating records; surveiillance testing; maintenance; implementation of Three Mile Island Lessons Learned; operator training for loss of all AC power and/or natural circulation cooldowns; IE Bulletin responses; periodic and special reports; and accessible portions of'he facility during plant tours.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified during this inspection.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
'li20i0450 Siiii3 i 6 P~DR PDR ADOCK 05000244
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DETAILS
- 1.
Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory level personnel were among those contacted:
E.,Beatty, Operations Supervisor J. Bodine, QC Engineer L. Boutwell, Maintenance Sup'ervisor C. Edgar, I
C Supervisor D. Filkins, Supervisor Health Physics and Chemistry D. Gent, Results and Test Supervisor G. Larizza, Technical Engineer T. Meyer, Nuclear Engineer R. Morrill, Training Coordinator J.
C. Noon, Assistant Plant Superintendent C. Peck, Operations Engineer B. Quinn, Health Physicist B. A. Snow, Plant Superintendent S. Spector, Maintenance Engineer R. Wood, Supervisor of Nuclear Security The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Review of Plant 0 erations a ~
b.
General The inspector reviewed plant operations through direct inspection through-out the reporting period.
Activities in progress included routine full power operations.
Shift Lo s and 0 eratin Records Operating logs and records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative procedure requirements.
Included in the review were:
Control Room Log Daily Surveillance Log Shift Supervisor's Log Plant Recorder Traces daily during control room surveillance daily during control room surveillance daily during control room surveillance daily during control room surveillance
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Plant Process Computer Printout Station Event Reports daily during control room surveillance 10/1/81 through 10/31/81 The logs and records were reviewed to verify that entries were being properly made; entries involving abnormal conditions provided sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, deficiencies, corrective action restoration and testing; records were being reviewed by management; operating orders did not conflict wi.th the Technical Specification or reporting requirements; logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical Specification and administrative procedure requirements.
Plant Tour During the course of the inspection, tours of the following areas were conducted:
Control Room Auxiliary Building Intermediate Building (including control point)
Service Building Turbine Building
,
Diesel Generator Rooms Battery Rooms Screenhouse Yard Area and Perimeter 2.
The following observations resulted from the tours:
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b.
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Monitorin instrumentation.
Process instruments were observed for correlation between c annels and for conformance with Techni-cal Specification requirements.
Annunciator Alarms.
Yarious alarm conditions which had been re-ceive an ac now edged were observed.
These were discussed with shift personnel to verify that the reasons for the alarms were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
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df conformance with 10 CFR 50.54 (K), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedure ~
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g, Radiation rotection controls.
Areas observed included control point operation, posting of radiation and high radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Work Permits and Special Work Permits, personnel monitoring devices being properly worn, and personnel frisking practices.
E ui ment lineu s.
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to e sn t e posstion or condition required by Technical Speci-fications and plant lineup procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included control board indications daily and field observations through the performance of partial equipment lineups of the 'B'iesel Generator and the Auxiliary Feedwater System on October 16 and 20, respectively.
E ui ment ta in.
Selecteddequipment, for which tagging requests ad been sn teated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
Fire rotection.
Fire detection and fire fighting equipment was o serve or conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.
h.
Securit
.
Areas observed for conformance with regulatory require-ments, t e site security plan and administrative procedures, in-cluded vehicle and personnel access, protected and vital area integrity, escort and badging.
Plant housekee in controls.
Plant conditions were observed for con ormance w>t a msnsstrative procedures.
Storage of material and components was observed with respect to prevention of fire and safety hazards.
Housekeeping was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Ins ector Witnessin of Surveillance Tests a ~
b.
The inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance testing of selected components to verify that the surveillance test procedure was properly approved and in use; test instrumentation required by the procedure was calibrated and in use; Technical Specifications were satisfied prior to re-moval of the system from service; test was performed by qualified personnel; the procedure was adequately detailed to assure performance of a satisfactory surveillance; and test results satisfied the procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly dispositioned.
The inspector witnessed the performance of:
Periodic Test (PT)-16.4, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Recirculation Flow Endurance Test, Revision 0, October 7, 198 J
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A portion of the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> endurance test on the 'A'FW pump was observed on October 9, 1981 PT-2.8, Component Cooling Water Pump System, Revision 12, July 29, 1981, performed October 13, 1981.
PT-,5.40, Process Instrumentation, Reactor Protection Channel Trip Test (Channel 4), Revision 24, October 14, 1981, performed October 15, 1981.
PT-16, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Revision 31, September 2, 1981, performed October 27, 1981.
4.
Ins ector. Witnessin of Plant Maintenance and Modifications a ~
During the inspection period, the inspector observed various maintenance and'roblem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications:
com-pliance with administrative and maintenance procedures; compliance with applicable codes and standards; required gA/gC involvement; proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers; personnel quali-fications; radiological controls for worker protection; retest requirements; and ascertain reportability as required by Technical Specifications.
In a similiar manner the implementation of design changes and modifications were reviewed.
Compliance with requirements to update procedures and drawings were verified and post modification acceptance testing was evaluated.
b.
The inspector witnessed the following maintenance activities:
Troubleshooting spurious alarm indicating low NPSH to the main feedwater pumps.
Repair of turbine-driven AFW Pump service water strainer pressure switch and associated solenoid operated bypass switch.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
0 erator Trainin
- Natural Circulation Cooldown and Loss of All AC Power References:
(a)
NRC Generic Letter 81-04, Emergency Procedures and Training for Station Blackout Events, dated February 25, 1981.
(b)
NRC Generic Letter 81-21, Natural Circulation Cooldown, dated May 5, 198 N If I
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On October 15, 1981, the inspector observed an operator training class discussion on the implementation of plant emergency procedures for both a natural circulation cooldown and a loss of all station AC power.
The information was well presented, highlighting the concerns of each generic letter.
The discussion on natural circulation cooldowns emphasized the need to adequately cool the fluid in the reactor vessel upper head region in order to prevent possible void formation.
The methods to ensure adequate upper head cooling included running CRDM fans, if available; or providing sufficient soak time prior to depressurization, if the CRDM fans are not available.
In addition, methods for detecting void for-mation outside the pressurizer were stressed.
The newly implemented emergency procedure E-4.3, Loss of All A.C., Revision 0; October 13, 1981 was discussed.
The instructor reviewed actions necessary to maintain the reactor coolant inventory and heat removal capability with the limit-ed equipment available.
Methods for restoring primary AC power sources were address-ed, as well as the use of possible alternative power sources, such as, the Technical Support Center and Security diesel generators.
During the development of procedure E.4.3, the licensee determined that the only reactor coolant system wide range pressure transmitter, PT-420, (0-3000 psig) re-ceives power from AC supplied Instrument Bus 'D'nd will not be functional until AC power is restored.
Although narrow r ange pressure indication (1700-2500 psig)
would still be available, no indication of RCS pressure below 1700 psig would exist.
The licensee has recently initiated Engineering Work Request 3130 to supply PT-420 from a more reliable instrument bus fed from the station batteries.
The inspector will follow licensee actions concerning ERR 3130.
(81-21-01)
Im lementation ot Three Mile Island TMI Lessons Learned a.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions on requirements resulting from the NRC staff investigations of the TMI accident.
b.
Each item is categorized by the number assigned in NUREG 0737.
3.3.3.3
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Reference:
IE Inspection Report 81-04 Plant administrative procedures were determined to adequately implement the li-censee's overtime policy.
With one exception, the overtime policy was found in substantial agreement with the requirements of NUREG-0737.
The length of breaks between work periods were not addressed in the licensee's submittals listed in the above reference, or in plant administrative procedures.
The licensee has subse-quently issued revisions to the below listed procedures requiring at least an eight hour break (including shift turnover time) between all work periods for Operations Department personnel, and at least an eight hour break between assignments of main-tenance personnel as the lead individual in the performance of safety-related wor I
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Based on the inspector's review of the procedure revisions, the licensee appears to have satisfied the requirement and associated commitment as addressed in the referenced inspection report.
Administrative (A)-52.9, Over time Work Policy, Revision 1, June 10, 1981.
A-52.10, Overtime Work Policy for Health Physicists, I
& C Technicians and Maintenance Personnel, Revision 1, October 14, 1981.
II.B.4.2.B Trainin for Miti atin Core Dama e -
Com lete Re uirement References:
.'(a)
H. Denton (NRC) letter to All Power Reactor Applicants and Licensees, dated March 28, 1980.
(Enclosure 3)
(b)
NUREG-0737 Licensees are required to develop a training program to teach the use of installed equipment and systems to control or mitigate accidents in which the core is severly damaged.
The training program should be. completed by October 1, 1981.
Licensee Commitment References:
(a)
J. Maier (RG&E) letter to D. Crutchfield (NRC),
dated December 15, 1980.
(b)
J. Maier (RG&E) letter to D. Crutchfield (NRC),
dated March 13, 1981.
The licensee representative stated that the training program would be completed as required.
Ins ection Findin s Based on the inspector's review of training department records, the licensee appears to have satisfied the above requirement and associated commitment.
II.E.l.l Auxiliar Feedwater S stem Evaluation - Short Term
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References:
(a)
(b)
D. Eisenhut (NRC) letter to L. White, Jr.
(RG&E), dated October 22, 1979.
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Verify that with the automatic throttling of AFW system flow, sufficient initial flow to the steam generators is assured for adequate decay heat removal.
The as-built plant should be capable of providing the required AFW flow for at least two hours from one AFW pump train independent of any alter-nating current power source.
Confirm flow path availability of an AFW system flow train that has been out of service to perform periodic testing or maintenance.
Provide redundant level indications and low level alarms in the control room for thePAFW system primary water supply.
Perform a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> endurance test on all AFW system pumps.
Following the pump run, the pump should be shutdown and cooled down; then restarted for a one hour run.
Automatic initiation of the motor driven AFW pumps should be powered from the emergency buses; testable; and designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of AFW system function.
Reevaluate the AFW system flowrate design bases and criteria.
Licensee Commitments References:
(a)
L. White, Jr.
(RG8E) letter to D. Ziemann (NRC),
dated-November 28, 1979.
(b)
L. White, Jr.
(RGSE) letter to D. Crutchfield (NRC), dated July 14, 1980.
The licensee representative responded to each short term item, individually.
The dischange valves on the motor driven AFW pumps are automatically throttled to 200-230 gpm'upon pump start to conserve auxiliary feedwater and help limit primary cool, down.
Only the flow from one AFW pump (200 gpm) is needed to remove decay heat.
Data Was submitted supporting acceptable performance of the turbine-driven AFW pump, when run independent of AC power for two hours, on April 17, 1981.
Periodic test and maintenance procedures concerning the AFW system were revised to verify the system has been properly realigned for operation.
Final verification of proper realignment of the system is performed by Operations personnel, following the initial realignment by test personne l 4 )" 4 "
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Additionally, a new valve position verification procedure was developed to assure proper valve lineup on a regularly scheduled basis (monthly).
The performance of the procedure is in addition to the valve verification steps included in the Periodic Test procedures.
A redundant condensate storage tank level indication and low level alarm would be added to the single existing train as required.
Endurance tests of the two standby and three main AFW pumps would be per-formed as required.
Automatic initiation circuits of the motor driven AFW pumps are safety grade and designed so that no single failure would result in loss of AFW system function.
The AFW system flowrate design bases and criteria was reevaluated recon-firming the 200 gpm minimum flow stated in the FSAR.
Based on the inspector s review of the following documentation, discussions with licensee personnel and field observations, the licensee appears to have satisfied the above requirement with the exception of performance of the 'B'otor driven AFW pump endurance test.
This test has been tentatively scheduled for November, 1981.
R.
E. Ginna FSAR Engineering Work Request (EWR) 2843, Safety Analysis and Design Criteria for Condensate Storage Tank Instrumentation, Revision 1, October 3, 1980.
L. White, Jr.
(RG&E) letter to D. Crutchfield (NRC), dated May 22, 1980.
L. White, Jr.
(RG&E) letter to D. Crutchfield (NRC), dated May 28, 1980.
D. Crutchfield (NRC) letter to J. Maier (RG&E), dated March 17, 1981.
J. Maier (RG&E) letter to D. Crutchfield (NRC), dated June 8, 1981.
PT-16, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Revision 31, September 2, 1981.
PT-16.3, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Recirculation Flow Endurance Test, Revision 0, February 13, 1981, performed April 17, 1981.
Periodic Test (PT)-16.4, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Recirculation Flow Endurance Test, Revision 0, October 7, 1981, performed October ll, 1981 for 'A'FW Pum I
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System Procedure-30.4, Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve and Breaker Position Verification, Revision 13, July 2, 1981.
Maintenance Procedure(s)-11.5 series associated with maintenance of a portion of the AFW system.
II.E.1.2 Auxiliar Feedwater S stem Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication Re uirements References:
(a)
NUREG 0737 b)
IEEE Standard 279-1971 Automatic initiation signals and circuits shall satisfy safety-grade requirements.
Safety-grade indication of AFW flow to each steam generator shall be provid-ed in the control room.
Licensee Commitments References:
(a)
IE Inspection Report 80-14 (b J. Maier (RG&E) letter to D..Crutchfield (NRC),
dated September 22, 1981 The licensee stated that the design configuration, operation and indication for the AFW system satisfied the above requirements.
It was further stated in the above letter that there are no bypasses associated with the automatic initiation of the AFW pumps from a safety injection or low-low steam generator level signal.
Bypass of the automatic start of the motor-driven AFW pumps from both main feed-water pump breakers being open may be defeated during startup and shutdown when the unit is off line.
Alarm of the bypassed function is annunciated in the control room.
The defeat function is automatically bypassed when the turbine is latched.
Ins ection Findin s Based on the inspector's initial findings documented in IE Inspection Report 80-14, recent observations of AFW instrumentation upgrade in the control room, and review of the following documentation, the licensee appears to have satisfied the above requirement and associated commitment.
Westinghouse drawings 10905-317, Revision
10905-114, Revision
10905-441, Revision66 Foxboro Test Report T3-1013, E-10.Series Differential and Gauge Pressure Transmitters Engineering Work Request - 1869, Auxiliary Feed Pump Instrumentation Upgrad lh II
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7.
Site Contin enc Procedure Review During the inspection period, several Site Contingency (SC) procedures were reviewed.
The following comments were discussed with the licensee represen-tative as a result of the above review.
Although not intended, SC-1.1A, Ginna Station Event Evaluation and Class-ification, paragraph 3.14.3, appears to classify a number of off-normal conditions, including a reactor trip or malfunction of pressurizer heaters or spray valves, as an Alert level as descr'ibed in NUREG-0654.
SC-1.1A, paragraph 3.15.1, does not accurately describe the electrical transient on the facility following a loss of offsite power.
In general, the technical guidance in SC-l.lA appears redundant to other sources of information, such as Technical Specifications and plant emer-gency procedures, and is not in a format: which can be easily used by an operator as a reference in classifying an off-normal event.
SC-l.lA, paragraph 3.81, states that with a plant vent reading of 1.1E3 cpm simultaneous with a 1R/hr reading on an area radiation monitor, declare a
plant radiation emergency in accordance with SC-1.2, Plant Radiation Emer-gency.
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SC-1.2 makes no mention of a plant vent reading, and states that when one or more area radiation monitors reach their alarm setting, declare a plant emergency.
The alarm settings are usually less than 100 mr/hr.
The licensee representative stated that in order to provide improved control of SC procedure content a pre-PORC committee will be formed to review all future procedure change requests for SC series procedures.
In addition, a task force will be assembled to perform a one-time review of all existing SC procedures to correct existing procedural deficiencies.
The inspector will follow action taken by each of the above groups.
(81-21-02)
8.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations; the report included the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting in-formation were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action was adequate for resolution of identified problems; determination whether any information in the report required classification as an abnormal occurrence; and the validity of the reported information.
Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector.
Monthly Operating Report for September, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identifie I / IIV
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Fol 1 owu on IE. Bulletins IEB The inspector reviewed facility records, interviewed licensee personnel and observed facility equipment/components to verify that:
licensee management received and reviewed the bulletins in accordance with administrative procedures; information discussed in the licensee's bulletin response was accurate; corrective action was taken as discussed in the reply; and, the licensee's response was within the time period required.
IEB 79-27, Loss of Non-Class-1-E Instrumentation and Control Power System BBus Bursng Operation The licensee's response, dated February 26, 1980, described the four instrument buses which supply AC power to safety and non-safety related instrumentation and control systems.
Included in the response were the normal and backup power sup-plies for each bus and a broad categorization of load s supplied from each bus.
Inspector review determined that plant procedures did not provide the operator with sufficient detail concerning the effect a loss of an instrument bus would have on the plant, or the appropriate actions which would be required following the loss of specific loads; unique to which bus was unavailable.
The licensee representative stated that emergency procedures would be developed by February 5, 1982, providing the required actions for the loss of each instrument bus.
The inspector will review the completed procedures.
(81-21-03)
IEB 79-04, Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan
~ngineer ng Corporation The licensee response dated April 30, 1979 indicated that two (2), six (6) inch and four (4), three (3) inch diameter Velan swing check valves are installed in the low head and high head safety injection systems, respectively.
The six inch and three inch valves were determined to weigh 450 and 85 pounds respectively, rather than the 225 and 60 pounds originally designated in Velan drawings.
The six inch valves were included in sections of pipe which have already been re-analyzed and modified as part of the seismic upgrade program.
The following Gilbert drawings were used as input for the design modification, and included the actual 450 pound weight.
C-381-354, Sheet 2, Revision
C-381-354, Sheet 3, Revision
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As a result of discussions with the licensee it was determined that the fol.lowing Gilbert drawings had not been revised to reflect the correct 85 pound weight.
The licensee representative stated that the correct weight would be reflected in the drawings and used in the seismic reanalysis.
Based on the close proximity of these valves to supports, and the results of a generic klestinghouse review, the additional 15 pound weight does not result in significant load increase.
C-381-355, Sheet 3, Revision
C-381-355, Sheet 2, Revision
C-381-355, Sheet 1, Revision
This bulletin is closed.
10. Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the 4nspection scope and finding ~
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