IR 05000237/1998012
| ML17191A658 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17191A657 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-98-12, 50-249-98-12, NUDOCS 9805220027 | |
| Download: ML17191A658 (12) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
- Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
9805220027 980511 PDR ADOCK 05000237 G
PDR REGION Ill 50-237; 50-249 DPR-19; DPR-25 50-237/98012(DRS); 50-249/98012(DRS)
Commonwealth Edison Company Dresden Generating Station Units 2 and 3 6500 North Dresden Road Morris, IL 60450 March 16 - April 27, 1998 D. E. Jones, Reactor Inspector Brent Metrow, Illinois Department Of Nuclear Safety Inspector R. A. Winter, Reactor Inspector J. A. Gavula, Chief Engineering Specialists Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Dresden Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-237/98012(DRS); 50-249/98012(DRS)
- This inspection included a review of the implementation of the inservice inspection program for the Unit 2 refueling outage 15. In addition, this inspection reviewed the installation of the emergency core cooling system suction strainers. The report covers on-site inspection by regional inspector Maintenance:
The strainer modification had good supervisory oversight and was proper1y performed and controlled. (Section M1.1)
Overall the inservice inspection program was implemented in an effective manner..
(Section M1.2)
The system leakage test met ASME Code requirements and was effectively implemente<;j using lessons learned. (Section M1.3)
In general, the licensee's inservice inspection program implementation met ASME,Section XI requirements. (Section M3.1)
- Non.destructive examination was perf9rmed in accordance with appiicable procedures by qualified NOE personnel. (Section M5.1)
- *
Engineering:
Corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence of problems that resulted in violations, inspector follow up items, and licensee event reports were implemented and effectiv (Section EB)
M1 M Report Details II. Maintenance Conduct of Maintenance Suction Strainer Installation Inspection Scope (37828. 62703)
The inspector reviewed various aspects of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
suction strainer installation, under Dresden Design Change Procedure 9600317,.
modification number M12-2-96-006. This included a review of selected procedures and documentation associated with the work, and discussions with quality control personnel, and engineer * Observations and Findings Radiation control measures and confined space control measures for torus entry were observed to be in place and appeared to be appropriate. The movement of a new strainer through the torus hatchway was witnessed. Although clearances were limited, no problems were encountered during the move. The strainers were installed by bolting to the existing flange which required the drilling of additional holes. Foreign material exclusion (FME) controls included the installatiol"! of a blank flange over the ECCS suction penetrations which. served as FME control and as a drill guide for the new holes required on the flange. Following installation, the strainers were inspected for debris after an ECCS pump run in accordance with procedure DTS 1600-36, revision 3,
"Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Suction Strainer Inspection Criteria." The inspector observed the installed strainers including the bolted flange Conclusions The strainer installation activities were properly performed and controlled. Supervisors provided good oversight of modification activitie *
M1.2 lnservice Inspection (ISi) Inspection Scope (73753 and 73755)
Inspectors observed ISi examinations and reviewed ISi examination data packages to assure appropriate examination was performed and data was recorded as required by the ASME Code.
b.
Observations and Findings The inspectors observed the following nondestructive testing (NDE) activities:
Ultrasonic testing (UT) of reactor recirculation system welds PS2-TEE/202-4B and PS2A/202-1 *
Magnetic particle testing (MT) of main steam welds 20-3, 20-K5A, 6-K8 and 8X- *
UT of in-vessel core spray piping.*
The inspectors found that the NDE data packages were properly reviewed by the licensee and the Authorized Nuclear lnservice Inspector (ANll). Ultrasonic indications recorded on the data sheets were evaluated using additional UT examinations. The inspector also reviewed certifications for equipment and consumable materials associated with these examinations. The NDE data packages, and equipment and consumable material certification records were found to be complete and accurat On March 8, UT indications we.re found on two reactor studs No. 52 and No. 81. On April 13, during the licensee review of WR 970067351, it was discovered that the wrong
.reactor stud, No. 91 instead of No. 81, had been removed from the reactor flange. The licensee evaluated the reactor flange assuming the flawed stud was not installed and *
concluded that allowable limits were met. The evaluation was submitted to the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for review. Pending further inspector review of the licensee's root cause investigation and subsequent corrective action(s),
this is an unresolved item (URI 50-237/98012-01 (DRS)). Conclusions NDE was performed in accqrdance with applicable procedures. The ISi data evaluation and review was timely and accurate. Overall, the ISi program was implemented in an effective manne M1.3 Class 1 and 2 Pressure Testing Inspection Scope (73753. 73755. 73052) The inspector observed and reviewed ASME Code, Class 1 system pressure tests for the Unit 2 refueling outage 15. The inspector also interviewed inspection personnel involved in the VT-2 examination of Class 1 system Observation and Findings System leakage testing and visual examination (VT-2) of the pressure retaining boundary of the reactor vessel are conducted each refueling outage. Leaks arid
- abnormal conditions are corrected prior to reactor startup. The licensee staff demonstrated knowledge/understanding of the regulatory requirements as evidenced by the thorough preparation and execution of the visual examination. A "Hydro Meeting" was conducted which addressed lessons learned and also included an ALARA briefing which covered radiological conditions and dress requirements. For the inspection, a walkdown isometric drawing was provided to each inspector for the assigned area to be inspected. The inspection of the reactor vessel head area in the refueling cavity was performed by making a visual inspection from the cavity area prior to the placement of the drywell head, thereby giving the VT-2 inspector greater access to the lower edge of the vertical insulation wall surrounding the vessel head. In addition, the inspector observed portions of the inspection of the control rod drive syste Conclusions The system pressure test was effectively implemented using lessons teamed. The inspectors determined that ASME Code requirements had been met for the system
- leakage tes M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M program and Procedure Beyjew Inspection Scope (73051: 73052)
The inspector reviewed and evaluated the ISi program for compliance with technical specifications, ASME Code and NBC requirement Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed the licensee's third ten-year ISi program plan, "Dresden Station 3rd Interval lnservice Inspection Plan," effective March 1, 1992 through and including February 28,2002. All ISi procedures reviewed were found to be in accordance with ASME Code,Section V and XI, 1989 Edition requirements. Examinations were performed in accordance with the Unit 2 Technical Specifications, the ASME Code,Section XI, 1989 Edition, and Generic Letter 88-01. Where ASME requirements were determined to be impractical, specific relief requests were submitted to NBB in writin The licensee requested relief from ASME Code requirements for the inspection of longitudinal welds in pipin The licensee had procured the services of an ANll from Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co. of Hartford, Connecticut. The ANll reviewed procedures, personnel qualifications, instrument and material certifications, and examination result The NBC inspector's review indicated that the ISi program was acceptable.
- Conclusions The inspectors verified that ISi activities were being conducted in accordance with the appropriate procedures and ISi program.* The licensee's ISi program implementation met ASME Code Section XI, 1989 Edition requirements. The inspector noted the relief requests were approved by Nuclear Reactor Regulation, properly documented, and incorporated into the ISi progra MS Maintenance Staff Training and Quallflcatlon M ISi Personnel Qualifications Inspection Scope CZ3753)
The inspector reviewed ISi personnel qualifications of licensee and contract personnel performing the ISi activities observed in Section M * Observations and Fjodjngs Qualification of personnel performing NOE work was verified. NOE personnel were knowledgeable of procedural requirements and proficient in the performance of NO Personnel performing NDE were found to have proper qualifications which had been reviewed and accepted by the licensee staff and the ANl Conclusions ES E E NDE was performed in accordance with applicable procedures by qualified NDE personne *
Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (Closed) Violation 501237/249-94016-08: Two examples of inadequate post modification testing were identified. Incorrect acceptance criterion was based on engineering judgement rather than referring to design documents. The subsequent instrument loop accuracy calculation showed actual test results were acceptable. For the second modification, stand-by gas treatment relay contacts were not isolated and individually tested. The test description did not require all parallel relays and corresponding contacts be isolated to assure that test results were not masked. Dresden reperformed the test specifically to assure that the new relay's contacts functionally performe Dresden performed additional training regarding specifying clear and complete testing requirements. The corrective actions for the violations addressed the issues identifie (Closed) Inspection Follow up Item 50-237/249-95003-01: Completion of 480 VAC breakers-Information Notice (IN) 91-78. The IN identified a condition in which control power could be lost to safety equipment and power available indicating lights would remain lit. The modification was not performed because Dresden's style of fuseholders have a lower probability of failure than the fuseholders at the plant where the IN
originated. The licensee trained the operators that the existing indicating lights monitor the trip circuit only. Sufficient analysis and action was taken by the licensee to resolve this ite E (Closed) Violation 501237/249-97006-03: digital volt across 3A 24/48 Vdc battery without authorization-gear unattended. Licensee personnel left unattended a digital voltmeter connected to 24/48 Vdc battery in Unit 3A effectively creating an unauthorized temporary alteration. The Electrical Maintenance department briefed personnel regarding details of this event and procedure OAP 05-08. Maintenance Department refresher training and continuing training programs will discuss the requirements of OAP 05-08. The corrective actions for the violation addressed the issue E8.4. (Closed) Violation 50/23m49-97008-01: PIF corrective action proc;:ess failed. PIFs written to address issues related to discrepancies were not entered into the PIF syste The PIF process was changed to an electronic process where the PIF number is assigned when the originator writes the problem description. The electroni.c process also features *online electronic tracking of initiation, supervisor approval, due dates, and
' completion. The corrective actions for the violation adequately addressed the issue E (Closed) Violation 50/237/249-97010-02: Failure to provide an adequate Oob)
evaluation. A decontamination technician received unnecessary radiation exposure, an unplanned intake and external contamination while performing decontamination activities in the Unit 2 torus. The licensee addressed the problem by training on
.
conservative decision making, the STAR (Stop, Think, Act, Review) guideline and three-way communication. Future site-spec:;ific training will provide more in-depth training for
- decontamination laborers and supervisor *
E (Closed) LER 3-95-020-00: Potential trip of motor control center due to inadequate work package preparation. A review revealed that three MCCs were required to have trip
- settings changed. Two of the three were changed correctly; however, the superseded Relay Setting Order (RSO) was mistakenly attached to the work package for the other one. Although the work package also included the new RSO and Dresden updated the breakers with an RMS-9 trip unit, the superseded trip setting was not caught. The *
licensee has sufficiently resolved this issue by revising DAP-11 and training personnel on the circumstances of this even *E (Closed) LER 3-95-021-00: Yarway Reactor Water Level Switch Failure. Level switch 3-263-728 tripped outside the Technical Specification's limit. A root cause analysis identified that acceptance limits were more restrictive than inherent instrument capabilities, sub-component failures (a mercoid switch) and excessive drift. Dresden has replaced the Yarways increasing the reliabilit E (Closed) LER 3-95-023-00: Unsupported cable in panel 903-33 could have rendered safety related relays inoperable during a seismic event due to inadequate modification package. The root cause was personnel error for not securing cables in a panel which did not follow normal shop practice. Licensee actions included immediately securing the cable within the panel, walking down similar panels and revising procedure *
E <Closed) LER 3-96-005-00: Unit 3 diesel generator auto-start due to electrical maintenance department personnel error. The diesel auto started when the workers mistakenly used a procedure attachment that showed a similar cubicle but did not list the cubicle they were working on for terminal point locations for continuity mea~urements. The licensee corrective actions have sufficiently.addressed this issue by training personnel on the details of this event, on using STAR and on procedural complianc V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The insp.ector presented the inspection results to a member of licensee management.at the conclusion of the. inspection on April 27, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented and did not identify any of the potential report input discussed as proprietary.
- PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Commonwealth Edison:
G. Abrell, Regulatory Assurance, NRC Coordinator R. Benoit, Pressure Test Coordinator B. Casey, ISi Coordinator B. Geir, IWI Coordinator M. Heffley, Dresden Site Vice President A. Lintakis, Engineering Programs Supervisor
- T. Loch, Design Engineering Lead Structural R Peak, Program Engineering Superintendent *
F. Spangenberg, Regulatory Assurance Manager P. Swafford, Plant Manager Illinois Pepartment of Nuclear Safety (IPNS)
B. Metrow, IONS Inspector C. Settles, Resident Inspector US NRC:
B. Dickson, Resident Inspecto K. Riemer, Senior Resident Inspector D. Roth, Resident Inspector IP 37828 IP 62703 IP 73753 IP 73051 IP 73052 IP 73755 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF MODIFICATIONS MAINTENANCE OBSERVATION INSERVICE INSPECTION INSERVICE INSPECTION-REVIEW OF PROGRAM INSERVICE INSPECTION-REVIEW OF PROCEDURES INSERVICE INSPECTION-REVIEW OF DATA
..
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED or DISCUSSED Opened 50-~37/98012-01 URI Wrong reactor head stud removed Closed 50-237/249-94016-08 VIO Inadequate post modification tests for modification P12-3-93-614 and for modification M12-0-90-025 50-237 /249-95003-01 IFI The status of the review and resolution* of Information Notice 91-78, "Status Indication of Control Power for Circuit Breakers Used In Safety-Related Applications,"
50-237 /249-97006-03 VIO Licensee left unattended a digital voltmeter connected to 24/48 Vdc battery creating an unauthorized temporary alteratio /249-97008-01 VIO The PIF process did not ensure that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and correcte /249-97010-02 VIO A decontamination person received unnecessary radiation exposure, an unplanned intake and externa contaminatio LER Potential Trip of Motor Control Center due to inadequate Work Package Preparatio LER Yarway Reactor Water Level Switch Failure 3-95-023-00 LER Unsupported cable in Panel 903-33 could have rendered Safety Related Relays Inoperable during a Seismic Event due to Inadequate Modification Packag LER Unit 3 Diesel Generator Auto-start due to Electrical Maintenance Department Personnel Erro LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Core Spray Piping Ultrasonic Examinations Final Report, March 1998 In Vessel Visual Examination (IWI) Examination Summary Report, March 1998 Procedure Revision NDT-C-50
NDT-C-55
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NDT-C-63
NDT-8-1
DTS-0040-05
VT-2-1
GE-UT-702
GE-UT-703
GE-UT-511
GE-UT-706
GE-ADM-1001
GE-UT-207
GE-UT-300
GE-UT-304
GE-UT-309
GE-UT-311
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Closure Studs Ultrasonic Inspection of Welds Using Refracted Longitudinal Wave Technique Referencing, Stamping, and Surface Preparation Procedure When Perfonning Liquid Penetrant, Magnetic Particle, and Ultrasonic Examination Magnetic Particle Examination For A.S.M.E.Section XI Class IWB and IWC Components For Nuclear Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Hydrostatic/System Leakage Test VT-2 Visual Inspection Perfonned for Section XI GERIS 2000 UT of Reactor Vessel Welds GERIS 2000 UT of Nozzle Inner Radius and Bore Procedure For Automated Examination of the Core Spray Piping welds Internal to the RPV Flaw Sizing With the Geris 2000 System Linearity Checks on UT Instruments Automated Planar Flaw Sizing Manual UT Exam of Reactor Vessel Welds Manual UT Planar Flaw Sizing-Rx Vessel Manual UT Planar Flaw Sizing-Nozzle Inner Radius Manual UT Exam of Nozzle Inner Radius and Bore
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ALA RA ANll ASME Com Ed OAP DCP(s)
DOP ECCS FME IN ISi IWI LER MT NOE NRC NRR PIF RCS RSO SBGT STAR UT LIST OF ACRONYMS USED As Low As Reasonably Achievable Authorized Nuclear lnservice Inspector American Society of Mechanical Engineers Commonwealth Edison Company Dresden Administrative Procedure Design Control Package(s)
Dresden Operating Proce_dure Emergency Cqre Cooing System Foreign Material Exclusion Information Notice lnservice Inspection lh Vessel Visual Examination Licensee Event Report Magnetic Particle Test -
Nondestructive Examination Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Reactor Regulation Problem Identification Form Reactor Coolant System Relay Setting Order Stand-BY Gas Treatment Stop_-Thii1k-Act-Review Ultrasonic Examination 11