IR 05000220/1979014
| ML17053B142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1979 |
| From: | Architzel R, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17053B136 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-79-14, NUDOCS 7911010009 | |
| Download: ML17053B142 (10) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 79-14 Docket No. 50-220 License No.
DPR-63 Priority:
Category:
C Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard. West Syracuse, New York Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Station, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Scriba, New York Inspection conducted:
May 2-4, 1979 Inspectors:
Fi)R.
Archi Reactor Inspector Approved by:
P.(.
E.
C.
McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2, R08NS Branch Ins ection Summar
~h~l)
date signed elis l~v date signed Ins ection on Ma 2-4 1979 Re ort No. 50-220/79-14)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by a NRC regional based inspector (22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />) of the licensee's preliminary actions relat-ing to IE Bulletin 79-08 (Events at TMI-2), IE Bulletin 79-02 (Concrete Anchor Bolts),
and 79-07 (Seismic Analysis).
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DETAILS Persons Contacted The following technical and supervisory level personnel were contacted:
a J. Aldrich Supervisor - Training
- T. Lempges, General Superintendent
- Nuclear, Gener&ion
"T. Perkins, Nine Mile Point 1 Station Supe} intendent-
"C. Stuart, Superv'isor - Operations J.
Shea, Assistant Supervisor - Operations R. Zollitsch, Assistant Supervisor - Training
"Denotes those present at the exit interview.
Other licensee employees were also interviewed.
2.
IE Bulletin 79-02 Pi e
Su ort Base Plate Desi n Usin Concrete Ex ansion Bolts The inspector discussed the NRC's position regarding completion of the testing program for installed concrete expansion bolts.
Specifically the licensee was informed that inaccessible anchors must be retested prior to restart from an extended outage.
The inspector noted that alternative techniques to the 1 bolt test per anchor plate were acceptable; for example a sample -size sufficient to demonstrate with a 95 percent confidence level,that at most
percent of the installations were bad.
If a significant failure rate was observed during this testing, plant restart would be evaluated by the NRC in accordance with the licensee's planned course of action to correct the deficiencies.
The licensee stated that the unaccessible anchor bolts would be tested prior to re-start, and that the test program was scheduled to commence the week of'ay 7, 1979.
IE Bulletin 79-02 remains open pending implementation of the testing program and NRC evaluation of the results.
3.
IE Bulletin 79-08 Events Relevant to Boilin Water Reactors Identified Durin TMI Incident IEB 79-08 was issued on April 14, 1979 and a response was required by April 24, 1979.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated April 24, 1979 and examined certain areas of the response.
a.
~Trai nin The licensee routed copies of IE Bulletins 79-05,.05A and 79-08 to all licensed operators.
In addition, the chronology
~
~
of events as released by the Atomic Industrial Forum was followed.
The inspector discussed the events with operators from three shifts who were knowledgeable of the preliminary sequence of events.
Formal training had not yet been con-ducted and was scheduled following the completion of the refueling outage.
The inspector stated that formal training must be completed prior to restart from the refueling outage for.all licensed personnel.
In addition, the inspector discussed the preliminary sequence of events at TMI-2 with the assigned lecturer.
The licensee stated that formal operator training would be conducted prior to restart.
This item will be reinspected (220/79-14-01).
Directive to 0 erators The licensee responded to Bulletin Item 1.8 by instructing Operations Department personnel in the Operational (Night)
Orders of April 20, 1979:
1.
Not to override automatic action of Engineered Safety Features unless continued operation of Engineered Safety Features will result in unsafe plant conditions.
2.
Not to make operational decisions based solely on a single plant parameter indication when one or more confirmatory indications are available.
The licensee stated in the response that these issues would be included in the formal training program described in Paragraph 3.a above.
- No unacceptable conditions were iden-tified.
Valve Positionin The inspector reviewed selected l.icensee valve positioning requirements.
The inspector noted that positioning require-ments do not incorporate provisions or requirements to independently verify valve positions.
The inspector also noted that a potential existed for covering valve position lights with status tags, however, this was unlikely because the licensee utilizes reference tags of a small size on the control boards for remote devices.
The inspector reviewed the Master Systems Pre Start Up Check-list (Nl-OP-43).
Selected current Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (P8ID) were obtained by the inspector for use by the NRC in performing an in-office review of safety-related valve positioning requirement ~
~
The inspector requested a copy of the Valve Check-Off List (VCOL) for the Core Spray System and reviewed this List in conjunction with system lineup per PAID C-18007-C Revision 9, April 6, 1978 (Reactor Core Spray).
Several misnumbered valves were noted on the (undated)
sheet given to the in-spector.
A further review of this area indicated that the licensee was stockpiling out of. date VCOL s in the SSS Office.
The current Valve Lineup for the Core Spray System (Nl-OP-.2)
was dated February 6, 1978.
The oldest page was dated April 1,
1975.
The copy given the inspector preceded these dates.
During a review of other system checkoff lists, the*inspector noted that other out of date lists were being maintained.. In addition, during a review of completed checklists the inspec-tor noted that an undated (outdated)
VCOL for the Liquid Poison System had been used to line up the system on June 15, 1977 prior to restart from the 1977 refueling outage.
The approved. procedure Nl-OP-12, Liquid Poison Valve Lineup, was a-revision dated March 13, 1975.
Failure to control System Operating Procedures is an item of noncompliance (220/79-14-02).
The -.licensee'emoved old VCOL's from the SSS office prior to the completion of this inspection.
The remainder of system valve lineup checks and reviews of P8ID's remains to be completed and will be documented in a future NRC 'report.
IE Bulletin 79-07 Seismic Stress Anal sis The inspector performed a preliminary review of the licensee's response, dated April 25, 1979, to this Bulletin.
The licensee's response stated that the unapproved technique (algebraic summation of the co-directional spatial components)
had been utilized for the following systems:
reactor recirculation, shutdown cooling, emergency condensor returns, reactor cleanup, reactor drain, feedwater and control rod drive.
Th'e inspector questioned the licensee concerning reportability.of this item (error discovered in the transient or accident analyses or in the methods used in the analyses)
and noted that the IE Bulletin response did not take the place of a Licensee Event Report.
The licensee stated that a report would be filed.
This item (220/79-14-03) is unresolved pending NRC receipt and review of an LER.
Bulletin 79-07 remains
, open pending further NRC review and inspection.
Unresolved Item An item about which more information is required to determine acceptability is considered unresolved.
Paragraph 4 contains an unresolved ite.
Exit Interview I
At the conclusion of the inspection the inspector held a meeting (see Paragraph 1 for attendees)
to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
The item of noncompliance and the unresolved item were identifie (0