IR 05000219/1978028
| ML19259A575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1978 |
| From: | Briggs L, Kalman G, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19259A568 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-78-28, NUDOCS 7901080075 | |
| Download: ML19259A575 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-219/78-28 Docket No.
50-219 License No. DPR-16 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Jersey Central Power and Liaht Company Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Morristown, New Jersev 07960 Facility Name:
Ovster Creek Unit 1 Inspection at:
Forked River, New Jersey Inspection conducted: October 17-20, 1978 Inspectors:
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// //'/78 L. BrJsg, Reacter Inspector date signed
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Fo/e It fh f7P
. Kal Reactor Inspector date signed
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date signed Approved by:
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E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on October 17-20, 1978 (Recort No. 50-219/78-28)
Areas Insoected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of Refueling Activities; followup on previous inspection findings; followup on selected IE Bulletins and Circulars; in office review of Licensee Event Reports; Licensee Event Followup; and Nonroutine Item Review. The inspection involved 44 inspector-hours on site by two regional based inspectors.
Results:
Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in six areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Infraction - failure to maintain required cleanliness in the dryer / separator pool, Paragraph 3.c).
7901080075-Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. Carroll, Station Superintendent
- E. Grownery, Operations Engineer T. Johnson, Instrument and Electrical Maintenance Supervisor D. Jones, Assistant Staff Engineer F. Kossatz, Maintenance Supervisor
- J. Molnar, Maintenance Engineer
- D. Ross, Manager, Generating Stations
- J. Sullivan, Chief Engineer
- Present at exit interview on November 18, 1973.
- Present at exit interview on November 20, 1978.
- Exit interview participation via telephone on November 20, 1978.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (Closed) Unresolved Item (219/78-25-01):
Defective hydraulic brake on 100 ton crane used during refueling operations. The inspector contacted the Whiting Crane Company inspector who con-ducted the Oyster Creek crane inspection prior to refueling. The crane inspector stated that, although the report stated that the brake was defective, it in fact was still operable. The problem was identified as hydraulic oil leaking on the brake shoes. The licensee had repaired the oil leak and cleaned the brake shoes but did not replace the brake shoes because replacements were not available at that time. Replacement' parts are now on site and repairs are scheduled prior to the completion of the refueling outage.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
3.
Refueling Activities a.
Scope The inspector verified that the fuel handling equipment and associated interlocks were tested in accordance with applicable procedures.
Fuel transfer activities were observed and it was
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ascertained that refueling prerequisites were met. Refueling floor housekeeping and fuel location status boards were checked against their respective requirements.
The safety evaluation which was completed by the licensee to establish, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that a Technical Specification amendment is not required for the subject core reload was reviewed.
b.
Documents Reviewed (1)
Procedure 205.6, Revision 0, September 18,1978, Fuel Shuffle (Refueling).
(2)
Procedure 119, Revision 2, September 1, 1978, Housekeeping.
(3) August 28, 1978 PORC meeting minutes.
(4) Reload Information and Safety Evaluation Report for Oyster Creek Cycle 8 Reload.
(5)
Refueling Floor Log.
c.
Findinos One item of noncompliance was identified in the refueling related inspection. The housekeeping on the refueling floor was not in compliance with procedure 119, Revision 2
" House-keeping." Procedure 205.6, Revision 0, " Fuel Shuffle (Re-fueling)," specifically identifies procedure 119 as the applicable housekeeping standard during refueling operations.
Numerous examples of failure to follow the housekeeping pro-cedure were noted on the refueling floor. A sampling of these discrepancies is identified below.
(1)
Parer, tape, and other debris were found ficating in the dryer / separator storage pool.
(2) Trash was found on the floor in saveral areas of the refueling floo (3) Work areas were not returned to a good housekeeping condition after completion of maintenance and tools and equipment were not stored in designated areas.
Paper component wrappers, tools, slings, and components were left lying around various areas of the refueling floor.
(4) Records of housekeeping inspections as required by procedure 119 could not be produced by the licensee.
This is an item of noncompliance (219/78-28-01).
4.
IE Bulletins and Circulars a.
Bulletins Licensee actions concerning the following IE Bulletins were reviewed by the inspector to verify that the Bulletin was forwarded to appropriate onsite management, that a review for applicability was performed, information discussed in and licensee's reply was accurate, corrective action taken was as described in the reply, and that the reply was within the time period doscribed in the Bulletin.
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IEB 78-02, Terminal Block Qualification. The licensee has determined that there are no unprotected terminal blocks used in the Oyster Creek containment in systems required to perform in a LOCA environment.
During a tour of the drywell area the inspector made spot checks and did not observe any unprotected terminal blocks. All terminal blocks observed were in galvanized, saaled enclosures.
The inspector did not identify any unacceptabie conditions.
IEB 78-04, Environmental Qualification of certain Stem
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Mounted Limit Switches Inside Reactor Containment.
A review of Burns and Roe (B&R) Specification Number 51 and s.everal B&R prints, series 3130 through 3144, verified the licensee's response and action on IEB 78-0 *
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As further verification of the licensee's response the inspector toured the drywell area. No stem mounted limit switches, other than those identified in the response to IEB 78-04, were observed.
Discussions with the licensee, personal observation, and document review indicate that safety-related valve position limit switches are enclosed in the casing of the limitorque valve operators which were qualified by Franklin Institute Research Laboratories (report Nos. F-C3441 and F-C2232-01).
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
IEB 77-05 and Supplement 77-05A, Electrical Connector
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Asscmblies, dated November 8 and November 15, 1977, respectively. The inspector reviewed the test data from the Wyle Laboratories Report No. 42921-1. A visual in-spection of installed connectors, was conducted on a sampling basis, to verify that they were the same type tested at Wyle Labs.
Based on the above review and dis-cussions with licensee representatives, the inspector concluded that the connectors tested were of the type installed.
During the physical verification of connector assemblies the inspector noted that the bell housing of several connectors were only finger tight. The bell housing is required to be tight to form the moisture seal of the connector, this item was pointed out to the licensee.
The licensee immediately initiated a Job Order (No.
0667E-QA Na. 2039) to tighten all connector bell housings prior to startup from the current refueling outage.
This item is unresolved pending completion of J0 No.
0667E and subsequent review by RI (219/78-28-02).
During the review of the Wyle Lab report the inspector noticed that the pressure and temperature ramp took approximately two minutes to go from 175 F to 327 F.
IEEE Std 323-1974, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, Table A2, provides testing guidance which specifies a ramp time of 0 to 20 seconds from 135*F to 280 F.
This Bulletin remains open pending further NRC review and evaluatio.
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IEB 77-06, Potential Problems with Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies, November 22, 1977.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to IEB 77-06 and directly observed that drywell electrical penetrations were being maintained with a positive nitrogen pressure.
During a reviu of the licensee's response the inspector noted that insulation resistance tests were discussed in
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various paragraphs.
The inspector questioned the licensee as to their schedule for insulation testing of penetrations.
The licensee stated that since IEB 77-06 response was issued a GE document, G-EN-8-37, which recommends that insulation resistance and Hypot testing not be conducted on a routine basis, was required.
The licensee has committed to submitting a revised response to IEB 77-06, concerning resistance testing of electrical penetrations, by November 17, 1978.
This item is unresolved pending submission of the corrected response to IEB 77-06 (219/78-28-03).
b.
Circulars Licensee actions concerning the following IE Circulars were reviewed to verify that the circular was received by licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that action taken or planned is appropriate.
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IEC 78-09, Arcing of General Electric Company NEMA Size 2 Contactors. The licensee stated that the circular addressed the 200 line style of UE contactors and that Oyster Creek uses the 100 line style. The licensee also stated that the electrical department is performing an evaluation of the 100 line style to insure that a similar problem does not exist.
The inspector reviewed the Preventative Maintenance Check Sheets used to document inspection and proper operation of all safety relate.d switchgear using the 100 line style contactors.
All documentation was in order.
The inspector had no further questions on this ite IEC 78-08, Environmental Qualification of Safety Related
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Electrical Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants.
On August 9, 1978, a meeting was held with licensee representatives to discuss the review of IEC 78-08 (details in inspection report 50-219/78-17). At that time the licensee comitted to performing a complete review of IEC 78-08, and the fourteen required references, by October 15, 1978.
To verify that a complete review was performed and that documentation existed to substantiate the licensee's determination, the inspector reviewed the following:
JCP&L Inter-office memo, Review of References IE
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Circular 78-08, October 13, 1978; Wyle Laboratories Report No. 42921-1;
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GE drawings, series 3050, sheets 1 through 62; MPR Trip Report, December 1,1977;
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Internal JCP&L Memo to " Art Herty;"
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GE Test Report, G-EN-8-18, November 6, 1973;
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GE Test Report, G-EN-8-16, February 17, 1978;
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Licensee's Response to IEB 77-06 and supplemental
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response dated December 19, 1977;
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Licensee's Response to IEB 78-02; Systematic Evaluation Program Report - Environmental
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Qualification of Electrical Equipment, February 24, 1978; GE Certification of Compliance, February 21, 1967,
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with attached test results by United Aerotest Lab-oratories, Job No. 68988; B&R Specification, S-2299-52;
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B&R Penetration Termination Sheets for service TH,
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V(A),V(B),V(C),C,T,RP,andR-TIP;
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GE Installation Instructions for Penetration Seals,
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216X752G1, G2, G4, G6-16, and Gl9-G22; MPR Associates Inc. Document, Qualifications of
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Electrical Connectors for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. MPR-577, March 1978; and, Ogden Technology Laboratories, Inc., Test Letter,
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Report No. 68988-5, May 17, 1967.
In addition the inspector, accompanied by licensee rep-resentatives, conducted a tour of the Drywell Area to physically observe the actual electrical components referenced in the above documents.
Based on the above document review, discussions with the licensee, and the tour of tt.e drywell, the inspector concluded that the licensee is pirfor:ning a thorough review of all references listed
.'a IEC 78-08. Two items are currently being verified by the licensee during this refueling:
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Terminal Block Enclosures. All terminal blocks observed by the inspector were enclosed in galvanized boxes; however, the licensee is again physically inspecting to insure that no aluminuca enclosures are being used.
ASCO valves (8302 and 8314 series) are being evaluated
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by the licensee for environmental acceptability.
The two items identified above will be reviewe.d by RI after completion of the licensee's review and evaluation.
5.
In Office Review of Monthly Statistical Reports The inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Statistical Reports for the period August - September 1978 to verify that reporting requirements were being met.
No items of noncompliance were identifie.
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6.
NRC In Office Review NRC:RI in office review of the following LER's has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified.
LER Dated Subject 78-04/03L May 5, 1978 Failure of area radiation monitors power supply 78-05/03L May 26, 1978 SBGTS filter AP high 78-06/03L May 26, 1978 Failure of chromate transfer pipe due to freezing 78-07/03L June 6, 1978 Incorrect readings of offgas monitor due to water accumulation 78-08/03L June 22,1978 Failure to perform diesel generator and station batteries surveillance within the required interval 78-09/03L June 29,1978 Setpoint drift of 1 reactor high pressure scram sensor 78-12/03L July 31, 1978 Setpcint drift of SBGTS area radiation monitors 78-13/03L August 11, 1978 Low reactor water level scram switches less conservative than TS limit 7.
Licensee Event Followup The inspector discussed with the licensee the recent problem of Core Spray Sparger Cracking identified on October 17,1978, in prompt Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 78-21.
The licensee was in the process of determining the extent of cracking and an acceptable rr:ans of repair. The inspector reviewed tao (2) videotapes of the Core Spray Sparger.
The initial film showed indication of a 180 circumferential crack in the 31/2 inchs 304 stainless steel pipe.
The subsequent film showed that the crack was definitely through wall when the licensee pressurized the pipe with air and observed bubbles coming through the crac.
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At the completion of this inspection the licensee was performing a Safety Evaluation of this item and the intended repair.
LER 78-21 remains open and will be further reviewed subsequent to licensee evaluation and repair.
8.
Ponroutine Item Review Potential for Loose Plunger Arms in GE Model CR 105 Breaker Auxiliary Contact Mechanisms The licensee was informed of the problem described above on August 16, 1978, at which time he committed to a physical examination and any corrective action during the 1978 refueling outage.
At the time of this inspection the licensee had completed and documented actionr. taken on the above item.
Preventive Maintenance Check Sheets were completed for all safety related switchgear which included tightening of all screws in the switchgear and insuring that all auxiliary contacts had free movement.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
2.
Unresolved Itcms Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph 4.a.
10.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (See Detail 1 for attendees) on October 18, 1978, and at the conclusion of the inspection on October 20, 1978. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that time.