IR 05000219/1978029

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IE Insp Rept 50-219/78-29 on 781031-1103.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mods Performed During Refueling Outage,Qc Records,Procedures,Tests
ML19259A791
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 11/30/1978
From: Ebneter S, Feil R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19259A790 List:
References
50-219-78-29, NUDOCS 7901100306
Download: ML19259A791 (5)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

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Region I

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' Report No. 50-219/78-29 Docket No.

50-219 License No.

DPR-16 Priority Category C

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Licensee: __Jersev Central Power and Licht Concany Madisnn Avonne at Punch Bowl Road Morristown, New Jersey 07960 Facility Name:

Ovster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at:

Forked River, New Jersey Inspection conducted:

October 31, November 1-3, 1978 i

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Inspectors:

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x R.'A. Feil, Reactor Inspector date signed date signed

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date signed Approved by:

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. D. Ebneter, Chfef 9 Engineering Support date signed'

Section No. 1, RC&ES Branch Inspection Summary:

Inspection on October 31, November 1-3,1978 (Report No. 50-219/78-291 Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of modifications performed during refueling outage, consisting of review of QC records, procedures, tests and elated activities.

The inspection involved 22 inspector-hours on site by one I.3C region;al based inspector.

Resul ts :

No items of noncompliance were identified.

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Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)

79011065 06

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

  • Mr. J. Carroll, Station Superintendent
  • Mr. J. Sullivan, Chief Engineer Mr. D. Grace, Supervisor, Engineering Projects The inspector also interviewed other technical personnel during the course of the inspection, including personnel from General Electric Company.

denotes those present at the exit interview

2.

Facility Modifications The licensee performed some modifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 during the present refueling outage.

The following modifications were selected for review.

a.

Battery "A" ard "B" Room and Electric Tray Room The licensee installed a fire protection system to detect and extinguish a fire in the battery room, the electric tray room and the tunnel connecting the two.

The system is designed to limit any fire damage to no more than one battery bank or one cable tray.

Fire protection is by means of Halon stored in cylinders with 100% reserve located in the mechanical equip-ment room adjacent to the battery room. The system is designed to discharge at a concentration of 6% of the volume of the battery room, tunnel and electric tray room within 10 seconds after actuation.

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The inspector reviewed selected records and procedures for the review, installation and testing of the system.

In addition, the inspector observed the functional test of the system.

The test results show that the detectors functioned as required (test medium was cigarette smoke) and that the Halon concen-tration reached N 7% in s 10 seconds, was N 8% in 1 minute, s 6% in 5 minutes and N 4% in 10 minutes.

Minor discrepancies in record keeping were noted.

They were acknowledged by the licensee.

10 CFR 50.59 requirements were verified.

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b.

Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Relief Valve Installation and Loop Seal The licensee modified the discharge service water piping to the north pair of containment spray heat exchangers in order to maintain a flooded condition in the heat exchangers with a loop seal and installed relief valves on all four new heat exchangers.

The containment spray heat exchangers were replaced because of excessive corrosion.

The discharge service water piping for the north pair of heat exchangers was originally installed at an elevation lower than the top of the heat exchangers resulting in difficulty in main-taining a flooded condition.

The discharge piping has been rerouted to an elevation higher than the top of the units creating a loop seal.

This prevents air pockets from forming thus reducing shock and water hammer when the system is put into operation.

This also reduces the air-water interface which promotes corrosion.

The inspector reviewed selected records, PORC meeting minutes, tests and safety evaluations which complied wita the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 regarding an unreviewed safety question.

No anomalies were noted.

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c.

125 V DC System Modification The licensee is modifying the existing 125 V DC system by the addition of a new distribution system.

The new system will serve as the DC source for the Division A safety-related re-dundant load, which are now supplied by Battery System A.

The existing 125 V DC system consists of two 60 cell 125 V bat-teries, each with its own batteries and the two battery chargers with their associated distribution centers DC-A and DC-B, which are arranged to feed the safety-related DC loads associated with Divisions A and B, respectively.

The new DC distribution system consists of one 60 cell battery, designated as Battery C, two 100% capacity solid state battery chargers (one standby) and one Distribution Center C.

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The new DC Distribution System C is located in the existing 4160 V switchgear room.

There is no direct electrical con-

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nection between the existing and the new system, and there is no automatic or manual transfer of loads between them.

The inspector reviewed selected records, tests and safety evaluations to insure conpliance with 10 CFR 50.59.

No anomalies were noted.

d.

Isolation Condenser Pipe Break Instrumentation Monitorino The licensee is installing differential pressure transmitters across the existing differential pressure switches of the condensate lines of each loop.

Repeated inadvertent isolation of the Isolation Condenser has resulted in several reportable occurrences, The new installation will monitor the response of the condensate flow sensors upstream and downstream of the surge snubbers on the D. P. instrument lines to determine the source of the apparent high flow signal lhe modification does not affect the Isolation Condenser System.

The inspector reviewed available records, PORC meeting minutes and safety evaluations to determine compliance with 10 CFR 50.59 regarding an unreviewed safety question.

Na anomalies were noted.

e.

Recirculation Pumo Trio Modification The licensee is modifying the recirculation pump trip circuitry to provide better performance during an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) event.

The modification is being made in response to a letter from NRR indicating that the addition of a recirculation pump trip would significantly limit the consequences of an ATWS event.

The modification will result in an automatic trip of the five recirculation pumps in the event of a high reactor pressure or a low-low water level.

A rapid decrease in core coolant flow re:Ults and the resulting mismatch between coolant flow and core power generation will create increased moderator void generatio.

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The power will be reduced and under an ATWS event the peak containment pressure, prior to Boron ejection, will be reduced.

The inspector reviewed availtble records, procedures, tests and drawings. No anomalies were observed.

The PORC meeting minutes and the safety evaluation indicated that the modifi-cation was in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

3.

Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee's representatives (denoted in para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on November 3,1978.

The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The representatives acknowledged the inspector's finding..

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