IR 05000219/1978031
| ML19259A566 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1978 |
| From: | Briggs L, Jernigan E, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19259A564 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-78-31, NUDOCS 7901080060 | |
| Download: ML19259A566 (6) | |
Text
.
.
'
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
.
Region I Report No.
50-219/78-31 Docket No.
50-219 License No. DPR-16 Priority Category r
--
Licensee: Jersey Central Power and Licht Comoany Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Morristown, New Jersey 07960 Facility Name: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 Inspection at: Forked River, New Jersey Inspection conducted:, November 7-9, 1978 Inspectors:
ffYAbdn hkOAM'f5
//
/[2 A tb4 L. Brigys Rdactor' Inspector
- "89"
'
uhW72 44 E. Jernigan, Reac' tor Inspector date signed date signed Approved by:
8 6. h 04%
( 2.11 l 7 7 E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, R0 & NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on November 7-9, 1978 (Report No. 50-219/78-31)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of Licensee Event Followup, Review of previously reviewed Licensee Event Followup, Part 21 report review and followup and a facility tour.
The inspection involved 39 hours4.513889e-4 days <br />0.0108 hours <br />6.448413e-5 weeks <br />1.48395e-5 months <br /> on site by two regional based inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 7901080060 (Rev. April 77)
.
.
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. Behm, Quality Assurance
- J. Carroll, Station Superintendent R. Dube, Site QA Supervisor S. Fuller, Quality Assurance E. Growney, Operations Engineer P. Moore, Mechanical Engineer R. Pinelli, Mechanical Engineer W. Popow, Outage Manager
- J. Sullivan, Chief Engineer The inspector also talked with and interviewed other members of the technical, engineering and operating staff.
- Present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Event Followup The inspector performed an on site review of selected Licensee Event Reports (LER) to verify the following:
The report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical
--
Specifications; Events are a,ccurately reported as to safety significance and
--
actual occurrence of events;
--
That corrective action taken was as stated in the report; and, That operations subsequent to the event were not in violation
--
of regulatory or license requirements.
The following LER's were reviewed:
,
.
.
LER 78-04/3L, Failure of Area Radiation Monitor Power Supply.
--
The inspector reviewed the events and corrective action taken on this item by discussions with the licensee and a review of associated documents.
The licensee had conducted a training session for I&C personnel on May 3, 1978 concerning adjustment and calibration checks of replacement power supplies.
In addition, procedure No. 621.3.001, ARM / Process Radiation Monitoring Calibration and Test, was revised on June 8, 1978 to incorporate power supply calibration tests.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
LER 78-15/lT, Isolation of Both Isolation Condensers when
--
A and E Recirculation Pumps were not tripped during a reactor scram.
Since the occurrence of this event, plant modification No. 202-76-1 has been incorporated in the plant design.
This modification is to protect against an Anticipated Transient Without a Scram (ATWAS), and will trip all recirculation pumps on high pressure or low level at the same setpoint that the isolation condenser system initiates.
This modification will insure that the event described in LER 78-15 cannot recur.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
LER 78-ll/3L, Failure of containment spray emergency service
--
water pumps to start within the specified time.
Document review verified that the licensee had reset the load sequence timer to the conservative end of the time b'and.
As a further measure to prevent recurrence the licensee has revised Pro-cedure No. 607.3.002, Containment Spray System Automatic Actuation Test, to require that the subject timer be reset to the conservative end of the time band during the performance of each surveillance test.
No macceptable conditions were identified.
3.
Follo'up on Corrective Action Associated with Previously Reviewed Licensee Event Report LER The inspectors reviewed licensee corrective action related to Licensee Event Report previously reviewed by inspectors.
This was accomplished to verify that the licensee was meeting corrective
.
.
.
action commitments outlined in the Safety Evaluation Report.
The LER reviewed and the inspection findings were as follows:
LER 78-21/lP: The inability of the licensee or vendor to
--
obtain a boat sample of the cracked sparger pipe precluded establishing the absolute cause of failure.
However, based on the licensee / vendor evaluation the probable cause of failure has been established. This analysis indicates the crack mechanism to be stress corrosion cracking resulting in a mechanical type failure.
The corrective action is outlined in the Safety Evaluation Report. The repair is to assure structural integrity of '.he sparger and core s The repair consisted of a clamp (bracket) pray performance.
fabricated of 304 solution annealed stair less steel.
This bracket is held in place by four 3/4-inch bolts that are pre-loaded and locked in place at three points by Class A type locking cups.
Structural evaluations considering normal operation and accident conditions have shown that the bracket will limit the opening of the crack to 1/16-inch or less and remain in place.
The Report further shows that the bracket will not interfere with the core spray distribution pa.ern from system I or II and will not allow water from the crack to directly impinge on spray from the sparger nozzles.
The inspectors observed the initial fit-up of the bracket and final machining to obtain design clearance and dimensions.
Final installation documentation will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Review and Followup Part 21 Reoort/ Records The inspectors reviewed the licensee Part Zi Report No. 78-071-000.
This review was conducted to determine whether the report satisfied the reporting requirements and corrective action was appropriate.
The procurement records and associated documentation were reviewed for structural steel and steel tubing, used for seismic conduit supports.
This steel was designated to be used in battery room
"C".
The inspectors found that the licensee purchase orders (N-19080/N-19311) to stipulate Part 21 complianc.
-
c.,
The initial shipment of steel was received and installed by the licensee prior to disclosing the d*viation.
However, upon dis-covery of the departure from P.O. requirements the steel was re-moved and replaced by conforming material.
Review and discussions with responsible site personnel disclosed that the licensee corrective action was adequate.
The licensee removed the questionable material before plant safety was affected.
According to the licensees Part 21 evaluation procedure, this matter meets Part 21 reporting requirements.
Procedural require-ments have been met.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
However, this will be further reviewed by the NRC.
5.
Facility Tour a.
Scope The inspectors conducted a tour, accompanied by a licensee representative, of the control room and selected portions of the facility. The following items were observed and discussed:
Proper control room manning;
--
Various annunciators and related TS requirements;
--
Current plant status and problems; and,
--
General plant cleanliness.
--
One unresolved item was disclosed during the tour as discussed below.
b.
CRD Water Quality Modification During this (1978) outage the licensee installed a cross connection between the condensate pump discharge piping and the CRD pump inlet piping. A flow valve (V-2-124) was in-cluded in this modification to reduce water velocity in the
.
.
,
,
.
,
CRD hydraulic system.
The design criteria for this modi-fication is ANSI B31.1,1977 Edition. The inspector ob-served that the valve body and inlet nozzle to be an integral casting.
However, the outlet nozzle consisted of a weld neck flange attached to the outlet part of the valve casting.
The inspector noted the presence of apparent mismatch between the two components in the root area of the weld.
The weld did not appear to have consumed the machined weld land.
Insufficient weld penetration was evident.
Data supporting compliance with the design requirements was not available during this inspection. Although the valve had been re-leased for fit-up it had not been released for use by site QA. The data supporting compliance with modification design requirements will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC in-spection.
This item is considered to be unresolved (50-219/78-31-01).
6.
Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is re-quired in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.b of this report.
7.
Exit Interview
,
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (see Detail 1 for attendees) at the conclusion of the inspection on November 9, 1978. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that time.
.