IR 05000219/1978036
| ML19282B306 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1979 |
| From: | Briggs L, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19282B307 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-78-36, NUDOCS 7903130011 | |
| Download: ML19282B306 (6) | |
Text
'
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
$
Region I Report No.
50-219/78-36 Docket No. 50-219 License No.
DPR-16 Priority Category C
--
Licensee:
Jersey Central Power and Light Company Madison Avenue at Punchbowl Road Morristown, New Jersey 07960 Facility Name:
Oyster Creek Inspection at:
Forked River, New Jersey Inspection conducted: December 19-22, 1978 Inspectors:
[
M
/
4/7f
,
L.E.BriggsffeactorInspector date signed date signed date signed
.
/ j / u cu.-
[),
, / 7 /7</
<~ L Approved by:
~
E. C, McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date' signed Section No. 2, RO & N5 Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on December 19-22, 1978 (Report No. 50-219/78-36)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of organization and administration, Licensee Event Followup and IE Circular Followup.
The inspection involved 27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br /> ensite by one NRC regional based inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
7903130011 Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
.
.
,
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. Carroll, Station Superintendent B. Cooper, Group Shift Supervisor K. Fickeissen, Technical Engineer E. Growney, Operations Engineer
- J. Molnar, Maintenance Engineer W. Stewart, Training Supervisor
- J. Sullivan, Chief Engineer The inspector also contacted and interviewed other members of the technical, engineering, and operating staff.
- present at.the exit interview.
.
2.
Organization and Adainistration The inspection covered licensee onsite and offsite organization con-formation to Technical Specifications.
a.
Onsite Organization: The onsite organization (watch standing and management) was reviewed and compared to the descriptions in the FSAR and Technical Specifications.
No discrepancies were noted.
b.
Authorities and Responsibility:
Discussions with the licensee indicated that the authorities and responsibilities of the various job functions have not changed from those described in the FSAR and Technical Specification and Procedure 101.0, Organization and Responsibility.
No discrepancies were noted.
c.
Shift Crew Composition: The licensee's shift crew composition and manning schedule were compared to the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
No discrepancies were noted.
d.
Onsite Safety Review Committee: The organization and composi-tion of the PORC was compared to Technical Specifications and the PORC implementing procedure.
The membership of the PORC was found to be consistent with the referenced documents.
.
g a
e.
Offsite Safety Comittees: The inspector reviewed the minutes of the GORB and ISRG Meetings for 1978. The frequency and scope of the meetings complied with the Technical Specification requirements. Records pertaining to qualifications of individual members of the G0RB and ISRG were not available at the site for review. This item, qualification of offsite comittee members, will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Licensee Event Followup LER 78-33/1T, December 14, 1978, Reactor Startup on Less Than
--
5 Second Period.
Inspection of this event included:
Review of Control Room Operators Log for December 13-15, 1978;
--
Review of Group Shift Supervisors Log for December 13-15,
--
1978; Review of on-line computer printouts for rod position during
--
startup; Review of recorder traces for Source and Intermediate range
--
monitoring instruments; Review of radiochemistry logs prior to and after the event for
--
100 percent power levels; Review of off-gas and stack release rates prior to and sub-
--
sequent to the event for 100 percent power level; Review of applicable procedure, Approach to Critical,
--
Revision 0, September 22, 1977; Discussion of incident in detail with Technical Engineer;
--
Interview of personnel on shift at the time of the event;
--
Review of training records for sessions covering IEC 77-07 and
--
subsequent training quizzes relating to peak Xenon startups and rod shadowing effect.
Review and discussion of Rod Worth Plots for the first 6
--
groups in rod pull sequence; and, Review of special Hot Rod Worth Plot for rod No.10-43 (first
--
rod in group 9) calculated by special computer program. The value at notch 12 correlated with value calculated for 2.8 second period experienced. The Xenon effects were not incorporated due to program limitations.
The above interviews and document review indicated that licensee actions concerning IEC 77-07 were appropriate and that operating personnel were informed of problems relating to peak Xenon startup conditions.
It was further determined that the trainee on the panel was following the appropriate procedure under direct supervision of a licensed S.R.0.
The SR0 was exercising caution in that rods were only being withdrawn to half the notch position allowed by the approved rod pattern and the Rod Worth Minimizer System, with wait periods of one to two minutes between rod withdrawals.
During the interview with the supervising SR0, the following sequence of events were recalled.
All rods in group 8 were pulled to. notch 24. A wait period of about 1.5 minutes (1 minute 24 seconds by computer printout) was observed prior to pulling rod 1 of group 9.
Counts increased from 425 CPS to 450 CPS on the SRM recorder during pull of the last rod in group 8 with no increase observed during wait period (verified by recorder trace).
Rod 1 of group 9 was subsequently pulled. At notch 04 the supervising SR0 noted a decreasing reactor period and turned the Emergency In/ Notch Over-ride switch to the Emergency In position, probabl The highest notch noted by the SR0 was notch 04 (y around notch 06.
due to SRM and period montioring which is not in the same general location as rod notch position). Actual position reached notch 10 as shown by computer printout. The SR0 also stated that he could not under-stand how the rod would reach notch 10 when he had gone to the Emergency In position by at least notch 6.
Further investigation revealed that the Emergency In switch was defective in that' the manual stop tab was bent, allowing contacts to open when the switch was moved to the mechanical stop in the Emergency In position.
It was probable that the tab was bent by the SR0 when he turned the switch.
The inspector observed the testing of the switet ar.d its disassembly and repai.
The licensee, as a result of this event, plans to take corrective steps to preclude recurrence.
These steps and their adequacy will be reviewed during a subsequent RI inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
LER 76-26/1T, Unplanned and Unmonitored Radioactive Release to
--
Discharge Canal. The inspector reviewed the sub,iect LEP.,
discussed it with the licensee and reviewed records of the reported event and corrective actions taken. All items reviewed correlated with the events and action in the submitted LER.
In addition, the inspector physically verified that the relief valve piping had been rerouted to a drain basin which drains to the high conductivity tank which in turn discharges to the radwaste facility and effectively prevents recurrence of the reported event.
No unacceptable conditions werr ldentitid 4.
IE Circulars Licensee an!ons concerning tre following IE Circulars were reviewed to verify receipt, review for applicability, and that action taken or planned is appropriate.
IDd 78-06, Potential Comnon Mode Flcoding of ECCS Equipment
--
Rooms at BWR Facilities.
This item was evaluated and completed, as discussed in IE inspection report No. 78-21, with the exceptior of the installation of new auto-closing butterfly valves in interconnectirg drain line:..
Prior to completion of the 1978 refueling outage Job Order 1642M was executed and valves V-24-35 through J8 were replacd with Keystone type 122 auto-closing butterfly valves.
The inspector reviewed the above J.0. and its asso.iated documentation to verify satisfactory completion, and had no further questions on this item.
--
IEC 77-09, Improper Futa Coordination in BWR Standby Liquid Control System Control Circuits.
The inspector discussed this item with the licensee and reviewed associated documentation and prints to verify that control circuits at this facility did not have a problem as described in IEC 77-09. The main power circuit (starter) is fused with a 10 amp dual element time delay fuse with the individual squib bus firing circuit containing 2 amp slow blow fuses. This arrangement prevents losing the main starter circuit if a fault develops in the explosive valves.
No unacceptable conditions were identifie.
.
,
IEC 77-15, Degradation of Fuel Oil Flow to the Emergency
--
Diesel Generator. The inspector reviewed Electro-Motive print numbers 8428653 and 8428666 and performed a physical inspection of the diesel generator fuel oil transfer system including day tank and fuel filter arrangement. The existing system is as shown on the referenced prints and did not exhibit conditions similar to IEC 77-15.
The fuel oil transfer pumps are controlled by electrical float switches that energize and de-energize the transfer pumps and are not mechanical shutoff valves as described i n IEC 77-15. Maintenance is performed by a service organization on an anrual basis and no problem relating to reduced fuel oil tramfer capacity has been experienced.
No umcceptable conditions were identified.
IEC 77-16, Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Trip Lock-out
--
Features. The inspector reviewed Electro-Motive print No.
MP45, physical schematic for the licensee's diesel generators.
From this review, discussions with the licensee, and previous diesel generator test results, it appears that the loss of field trip described in IEC 77-16 was removed prior to September 4, 1969.
It was noted, however, that the subject diesel generators do have several automatic trip functions still active in the Emergency Mode of operation and included the following:
Mechanical Overspeed
--
DiffGrential Current
--
Leading VARS
--
Reverse Power
--
--
The subject of diesel generator trips during emergency mode of operation is being generically reviewed by the NRC.
The inspector had no further questions or, this iten.
-
5.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (See Detail 1 for attendees) at the conclusion of the inspection on December 22, 1978.
The inspector sunmarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that time.