IR 05000186/2013203
| ML13339A406 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Missouri-Columbia |
| Issue date: | 12/05/2013 |
| From: | Gregory Bowman Research and Test Reactors Licensing Branch |
| To: | Rhonda Butler Univ of Missouri - Columbia |
| Eads B | |
| References | |
| IR-13-203 | |
| Download: ML13339A406 (21) | |
Text
ber 5, 2013
SUBJECT:
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA - NRC ROUTINE INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-186/2013-203
Dear Mr. Butler:
From November 4 -7, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission)
completed an inspection of the University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor (Inspection Report No. 50-186/2013-203). The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on November 7, 2013, with you; Les Foyto, Associate Director, Reactor and Facilities Operations; John Fruits, Reactor Manager; and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records, observed various activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are being treated as non-cited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2.b of the Enforcement Policy. The NCVs are described in the subject inspection report. No response to this letter is required. However, if you contest the violations or significance of the NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 2.390, Public inspections, exemptions, and requests for withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact Johnny Eads at 301-415-0136 or by electronic mail at johnny.eads@nrc.gov .
Sincerely,
/RA P. Isaac Acting for/
Gregory T. Bowman, Chief Research and Test Reactors Oversight Branch Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-186 License No. R-103 Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-186/2013-203 cc: Please see next page
University of Missouri-Columbia Docket No. 50-186 cc:
John Ernst, Associate Director Regulatory Assurance Group Research Reactor Facility Columbia, MO 65201 Homeland Security Coordinator Missouri Office of Homeland Security P.O. Box 749 Jefferson City, MO 65102 Planner, Dept of Health and Senior Services Section for Environmental Public Health 930 Wildwood Drive, P.O. Box 570 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0570 Deputy Director for Policy Department of Natural Resources 1101 Riverside Drive Fourth Floor East Jefferson City, MO 65101 A-95 Coordinator Division of Planning Office of Administration P.O. Box 809, State Capitol Building Jefferson City, MO 65101 Test, Research, and Training Reactor Newsletter University of Florida 202 Nuclear Sciences Center Gainesville, FL 32611
ML13339A406 *concurrence via email NRC-002 OFFICE NRR/DPR/PROB NRR/DPR/PROB NAME JEads* GBowman DATE 12/3/13 12/ 5 /13
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Docket No. 50-186 License No. R-103 Report No. 50-186/2013-203 Licensee: University of Missouri - Columbia Facility: University of Missouri Research Reactor Location: Research Park Columbia, Missouri Dates: November 4-7, 2013 Inspector: Johnny Eads Approved by: Gregory T. Bowman, Chief Research and Test Reactors Oversight Branch Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY University of Missouri-Columbia University of Missouri Research Reactor Report No. 50-186/2013-203 The primary focus of this routine, announced inspection was the onsite review of selected aspects of the University of Missouri-Columbia (the licensees) 10 Megawatt Class I research and test reactor safety program including: 1) organizational structure and staffing, 2) reactor operations, 3) operator requalification, 4) maintenance and surveillance, 5) fuel handling, and 6) emergency preparedness. The review covered the period of time from the last U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection of these areas to the present. The licensees program was acceptably directed toward the protection of public health and safety, and generally in compliance with the NRC requirements. Two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements were identified. These violations are being treated as non-cited violations, consistent with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Organizational Structure and Functions The organizational structure and staffing were consistent with Technical Specification requirements.
Staffing was as required by the Technical Specifications and appeared to be adequate for safe operation of the reactor facility.
Reactor Operations Reactor operations were conducted in accordance with written procedure and were acceptable.
Operations shift turnovers and operator cognizance of facility conditions were acceptable.
Various daily and weekly meetings were being held to ensure proper planning and preparation.
The corrective action program implemented by the licensee was functioning as designed.
Operator Requalification Operator requalification was being completed as required by the requalification program and the program was being maintained up-to-date.
Operators were receiving their biennial physical examinations as required.
-2-Maintenance and Surveillance The work control program established and implemented by the licensee was being used to effectively complete maintenance activities at the facility.
The surveillance program currently in use by the licensee satisfied Technical Specification requirements.
Fuel Handling Fuel movements were conducted in accordance with Technical Specification and procedural requirements.
Fuel inspections were being completed as required.
Emergency Preparedness The emergency preparedness program was conducted in accordance with the emergency plan.
Training for all facility personnel was being conducted annually as required.
Emergency response equipment was available and was being maintained and inventoried as required.
Emergency drills were being conducted annually as required by the emergency plan and critiques were held following the drills.
Support organizations were actively participating biennially in the emergency drills.
REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Status The University of Missouri-Columbia (the licensee) continued to operate the 10 Megawatt (MW)
research and test reactor in support of isotope production, silicon irradiation, reactor operator training, and various types of research. During the inspection, the reactor was operated continuously, following the weekly maintenance shutdown, to support laboratory experiments and product irradiation.
1. Organization and Staffing a. Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure (IP) 69006)
To verify that the licensee was complying with the requirements specified in Section 6.1 of the Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) Technical Specifications (TS), Rev. 15, authorized by Amendment No. 35 to the renewed facility operating license, dated February 9, 2012, the inspector reviewed selected aspects of the following:
- MURR organization and staffing
- Management and staff responsibilities outlined in the TS
- MURR administrative procedure AP-RO-110, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 17, issued February 8, 2012
- MURR control room logbooks for the period from October 2012 through October 2013 b. Observations and Findings The inspector noted that the organizational structure had not changed since the last inspection in the area of reactor operations (refer to NRC Inspection Report No. 50-186/2012-203). The Reactor Manager continued to report to the Facility Director through the Associate Director for Reactor and Facilities Operations.
Likewise, the Health Physics Manager continued to report to the Facility Director through the Associate Director for Regulatory Assurance.
Through a review of selected reactor operations logs for the period from October 2012 through October 2013, and through interviews with operations personnel, the inspector determined that the licensee continued to operate with five crews on a four shift rotation. This allowed time for the extra crew to have additional training and procedure review on a rotating basis. Each operating crew on shift was staffed with two or three licensed individuals and one or more operator trainees. Operations shifts continued to be scheduled for a period of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
TS Section 6.1.i required that there be two facility staff personnel at the facility during reactor operation. The inspector verified that staffing during reactor operations satisfied this requirement.
-2-c. Conclusion The MURR organizational structure and staffing were consistent with the requirements of TS 6.1.
2. Reactor Operations a. Inspection Scope (IP 69006)
To verify that the licensee was operating the reactor, communicating plant information, and implementing the corrective action program (CAP) in accordance with TS Section 3 and procedural requirements, the inspector reviewed selected portions of the following:
- Selected MURR console watch logbooks from 2013
- MURR control room logbooks for the period from October 2012 through October 2013, and the associated forms including: FM-43, Nuclear and Process Data; FM-55, Startup Nuclear Data; and FM-56, Reactor Routine Patrol; and FM-57, Long Form Startup Checksheet
- MURR procedure AP-RO-110, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 17, issued February 8, 2012, and the associated forms, FM-57, Long Form Startup Checklist, and FM-58, Short Form Startup Checklist
- MURR Reactor Operations Annual Report for the period from January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2012.
b. Observations and Findings (1) Reactor Operation The inspector observed facility activities on various occasions during the week including a reactor start-up, routine reactor operations, and the handling of samples and sample manipulating tools. Written procedures and checklists were used for each activity as required. It was noted that the reactor operators followed the procedures and were knowledgeable and professional in the conduct of their duties. Health physics personnel provided coverage as needed/required.
(2) Staff Communication During the inspection, the inspector attended operations crew shift turnover meetings. These turnover briefings were held at 6:30 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. each day. The status of the reactor and the facility were discussed on each occasion as required. All operators of the relief crews reviewed the appropriate logs and records and were briefed on the upcoming shift activities and scheduled events before assuming the operations duty. Through direct observation and records review, the inspector verified that the content of shift turnover briefings held during each shift change was appropriate and noted that shift activities and plant conditions were discussed in detail.
-3-(3) Corrective Action Program The inspector reviewed the licensees CAP, which had been developed to provide staff members with a formal process to identify deficiencies and bring safety issues, as well as other issues of concern, to managements attention for resolution. The inspector attended the weekly CAP meeting where the status of issues was discussed. When issues were identified, each one was screened for safety significance, evaluated to determine the cause and its contributing factors, and assigned to a responsible manager for resolution. Corrective actions were developed and implemented consistent with the significance of the issue and according to an established schedule.
Based on a review of a sample of CAP documents the inspector found that the licensee had taken corrective actions as necessary or had assigned a responsible manager to take the needed actions.
c. Conclusion MURR reactor operations, as well as shift turnovers and operator cognizance of facility conditions during startup and routine operation, were acceptable. Various daily and weekly meetings were being held to ensure proper planning and preparation for operations activities. The CAP was functioning as required by procedure.
3. Operator Requalification a. Inspection Scope (IP 69003)
The inspector reviewed selected aspects of the following to ensure compliance with the Operator Requalification Program - University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) dated January 7, 1997, and clarified by a memorandum dated March 30, 2001:
- Current status of operator licenses
- Change Review Sheets for 2012 and 2013
- Medical examination records for the past 2 years
- MURR operator requalification program training and examination records for 2012 and 2013 including:
- Annual Operating Test Records
- MURR Operator Active Status Log
- Annual On-The-Job Training Requirement/Checklists
- MURR operational task forms documenting five different evaluated tasks completed by each operator every year
- Annual Requalification Tasks related to the Facility and Reactor notebook listing jobs that all operators were expected to complete
- Annual Requalification Tasks for Abnormal and Emergency Conditions notebook listing abnormal and emergency activities that all operators were tested on and expected to complete
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- Annual On-The-Job Checklist - OJT Progress Report 2013 report for 2013.
- Written Examination Forms for 2012 and 2013 documenting the facility-administered biennial exam completed by each operator b. Observations and Findings There were a total of 10 qualified senior reactor operators (SROs) and 5 qualified reactor operators (ROs) on staff at the facility. The licensee indicated that there were seven people in training to become operators and there was one open position. The inspector noted that, of the 15 qualified operators at the facility, 3 were managers (3 SROs). The inspector verified that the requalification program was being maintained up-to-date and RO and SRO licenses were current.
MURR operator active status logs and records also showed that operators maintained active duty status as required.
A review of the logs and records showed that training was being conducted in accordance with the licensees requalification and training program. Procedure reviews and examinations had been documented as required. Information regarding facility changes and other relevant information had been routed under the crew review process and licensed operators acknowledged their review of this information. The inspector verified that quarterly reactor operations, reactivity manipulations, other required operations activities, and Reactor Supervisor activities were being completed as required and the appropriate records were being maintained. Records indicating the completion of the annual operations tests and supervisory observations were also maintained.
Biennial written examinations were being completed by the operators as required. The inspector reviewed the last biennial requalification examination, which had been administered in 2013. It was noted that the exam was similar in its level of difficulty as compared to NRC-administered examinations. The inspector also reviewed the biennial requalification examination that was scheduled to be given for the next requalification cycle.
The inspector also noted that all operators were receiving biennial medical examinations within the allowed time frame as required.
c. Conclusion Operator requalification was being conducted in accordance with the operator requalification program requirements. Operators were receiving their biennial physical examinations as required.
4. Maintenance and Surveillance a. Inspection Scope (IP 69006, 69010)
To verify that the licensee was meeting the requirements of their preventive maintenance program and complying with TS requirements concerning the surveillance program, the inspector reviewed selected aspects of:
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- Selected MURR compliance procedures
- Maintenance Day List forms for 2012 and 2013
- Various Preventive Maintenance Requirement Cards
- Entries in the Completed CPs and Datasheets notebook
- Selected Compliance Check Procedure data sheets and records
- Various Worklist for Maintenance Shutdown forms used in 2012 and 2013 and developed prior to each weekly maintenance shutdown and kept in the Maintenance Day Book
- MURR Reactor Operations Annual Report for the period from January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012 b. Observations and Findings (1) Maintenance The inspector reviewed the work control program, which was organized through the computer program known as Maximo. The program was designed to ensure that all maintenance activities (including periodic surveillance activities), were screened, planned, and completed as scheduled; that post maintenance testing was conducted; and, that the entire process was documented appropriately. As noted previously, all these activities were discussed and coordinated through the Maintenance Meeting held each week. The program appeared to be effective.
(2) Surveillance Various periodic surveillance items including verifications, calibrations, and testing of various reactor systems, instrumentation, auxiliary systems, and security systems and alarms, were reviewed by the inspector. The licensee used compliance procedures (CPs) to conduct these surveillances and followed the same established schedule each year.
Maintaining a set schedule from year to year helped the licensee ensure that all surveillance items were completed as required. The data recorded in the logbooks and on the CP records indicated that the verifications and calibrations had been completed on schedule and in accordance with licensee procedures. The licensee recently started tracking and scheduling of the surveillance activities using the Maximo database. The results reviewed by the inspector were noted to be within the TS and procedurally prescribed parameters.
c. Conclusion The work control program established and implemented by the licensee was being used effectively to complete maintenance activities at the facility. The surveillance program currently in use by the licensee satisfied TS requirements.
-6-5. Fuel Handling a. Inspection Scope (IP 69009)
To ensure that the licensee was handling and moving fuel appropriately and completing fuel inspections as required by TSs 3.8, 4.1, 4.3, and 5.5, the inspector reviewed selected aspects of the following:
- Fuel status board located in the control room current through November 5, 2013
- Selected fuel element inspection sheets for 2012 and 2013
- MURR fuel status map sheets developed by the Assistant Reactor Manager - Physics
- Selected fuel movement sheets developed prior to fuel movements that were typically completed on the weekly scheduled maintenance day and for fuel inspections
- MURR procedure OP-RO-250, In-Pool Fuel Handling, Rev. 15, issued November 17, 2011
- MURR procedure RP-RO-100, Fuel Movement, Rev. 11, issued September 19, 2012
- MURR procedure RP-RO-300, Receipt, Inspection and Accounting of Unirradiated Fuel, Rev. 3, issued May 22, 2013 b. Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed the fuel movement process and verified that fuel was moved according to established procedure and in accordance with the specific fuel movement sheets developed by the Assistant Reactor Manager - Physics for each core loading. The inspector reviewed selected fuel movement sheets for 2013. They had been developed and used for core refueling, partial core refueling, fuel storage rearrangement, loading of spent fuel into a shipping container, performing end-of-life inspections of fuel elements, and transferring new unirradiated fuel from storage to the pool. The inspector noted that proper radiation control and security precautions were required by the applicable procedure. The inspector also compared the location of fuel elements in the reactor core with the information maintained on the fuel status board in the control room, on the current MURR fuel status map through November 5, 2013.
No problems or anomalies were noted.
c. Conclusion Fuel movements and inspections were conducted in accordance with TS and procedural requirements.
-7-6. Emergency Preparedness a. Inspection Scope (IP 69011)
The inspector reviewed selected aspects of the following to verify compliance with the Emergency Plan for the University of Missouri Research Reactor Facility, latest revision issued March 30, 2012:
- Assistance to be provided by offsite support groups
- Letter of agreement with the City of Columbia dated April 18, 2011
- MURR operator requalification program training and examination records documenting emergency preparedness training of operators
- MURR control room logbooks for the period from January through October 2013
- Documentation of the 2013 emergency drill conducted on June 17, 2013 including the associated critique
- MURR Emergency Procedures Manual, Rev. 72, updated October 29, 2013, containing MURR emergency procedures, EP-RO-001 through EP-RO-020 b. Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed the E-Plan in use at the reactor and verified that the E-Plan was reviewed annually as required. The emergency procedures manual (containing E-Plan implementing procedures) was also reviewed annually and revised as needed to ensure effective implementation of the E-Plan.
Through records review and interviews with facility emergency organization (FEO) personnel (i.e., MURR emergency responders), the inspector determined that they were knowledgeable of the proper actions to take in case of an emergency. Training for FEO staff members had been conducted annually as required and documented acceptably. The inspector also observed an Operations emergency planning tabletop exercise for the training crew. The training was of high quality focusing on operator actions during an emergency.
Emergency training for operators was completed and tracked through the operator requalification program.
The inspector verified that the letter of agreement with the City of Columbia was being maintained with the latest version, dated April 18, 2011. The agreement verified that the City of Columbia fire department would provide support for the facility and would be available during an emergency. Communications capabilities with support groups were acceptable and had been periodically tested. Emergency call lists had been revised and updated as needed and were available in the control room, the front lobby, and in the various controlled copies of MURR emergency procedures manuals as required. The inspector also verified that emergency equipment was available and was being inventoried quarterly as required.
-8-The documentation of the drill conducted during 2013 was reviewed. It was noted that emergency drills had been conducted annually as required by the E-Plan. Critiques were held following the drills to document the strengths and weaknesses identified during the exercise. Action items were developed to correct the problems noted. Emergency preparedness and response training for emergency support organizations was being completed prior to the drills (typically during the meetings held to prepare for the drills.) Through drill scenario and record reviews, off-site emergency responders were noted to be participating in drills biennially as required.
The inspector, accompanied by the Reactor Manager, visited the Fire Station 7 of the Columbia Fire Department and toured the emergency response facilities that would be available in case of an emergency. It was noted to be well equipped and staffed to handle any problem that might arise at the MURR facility. During the visit, the inspector conducted a short tabletop exercise to assess the knowledge and training of fire support personnel. The emergency responders were well trained in actions to take in case of an emergency at MURR.
c. Conclusion The emergency preparedness program was conducted in accordance with the Emergency Plan. Training was being conducted annually as required.
Emergency response equipment was available and being maintained and inventoried as required. Emergency drills were being conducted annually as required by the Emergency Plan with support organizations participating biennially.
7. Licensee Reports to the NRC a. Inspection Scope (IP 69006)
To verify that the licensee was complying with the requirements specified in TS 6.1.h.(2), the inspector reviewed selected aspects of the following:
- MURR equipment maintenance procedure EMP-12, Drive Mechanisms (semi-annual) preventive maintenance, revisions dated October 25, 2012 and May 30, 2013
- MURR equipment maintenance procedure EMP-12A, Reg. Blade Gearbox (bi-annual) preventive maintenance, dated October 25, 2012
- MURR equipment maintenance procedure EMP-12B, Regulating Blade Drive PM (quarterly/semi-annual) preventive maintenance, revisions dated October 25, 2012 and May 30, 2013
- Letter from the licensee to the NRC regarding a deviation from TS 5.4.a dated April 2, 2013
- Letter from the licensee to the NRC regarding a deviation from TS 3.2.a and TS 3.4.c dated June 4, 2013
- Letter from the licensee to the NRC regarding a deviation from TS 3.2.b dated July 10, 2013
-9-b. Observations and Findings (1) Event Which Occurred on March 4, 2013 TS 5.4.a states All instruments, as required by these specifications, shall be calibrated on semi-annual intervals.
On March 4, 2013, while reviewing a list of the completed maintenance items and compliance procedures performed that day, the Surveillance Programs System Specialist discovered that reactor compliance procedure CP-27, Power Level Interlock Static Scram, was not completed with the prescribed TS periodicity. Compliance procedure CP-27 was previously completed on July 2, 2012, which would have required the semi-annual calibration to be performed no later than March 2, 2013.
Compliance procedure CP-27 was not completed within the required time frame.
Upon discovery, the reactor staff immediately took corrective actions and verified that the power level interlock static scram was operable and the required calibration was completed on March 11, 2013. Since the equipment was verified to have remained operable throughout the interval and the surveillance was completed satisfactory within 9 days of the required interval, the event had minimal safety significance.
The licensee also implemented additional corrective actions to preclude recurrence. All compliance procedures have been entered and are being tracked with the computerized maintenance management software Maximo. A work order is automatically generated at the beginning of each month for each compliance procedure that is required to be completed during that month.
Based on the minimal safety significance and the completed corrective actions to restore compliance and prevent recurrence, the inspector determined that this item be treated as a minor violation. The minor violation was discussed at the exit meeting and is not the subject formal enforcement action.
(2) Event Which Occurred on May 7, 2013 TS 3.4.c states that the reactor shall not be operated unless the following rod run-in functions are operable. Each of the rod run-in functions shall have 1/N logic, where N is the number of instrument channels required for the corresponding mode of operation. The rod run-in function table in TS 3.4.c stipulates that two rod run-in functions, <10% withdrawn and bottomed, associated with the regulating rod be operable for reactor operation.
On May 7, 2013, the reactor was operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor Operator noted that the trace on the Wide Range Monitor strip chart recorder was wider than normal. Shortly after the indication was noticed a Channel 4, 5, or 6 Downscale annunciator was
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received. Investigation revealed that the regulating blade would not move in the outward direction and the reactor was immediately shut down by manual scram.
The regulating blade is constructed of stainless steel with a total length of approximately 30 inches. The blade is driven in both the inward and outward directions by its associated drive mechanism. The regulating blade drive mechanism consists of a servomotor, a reduction gearbox, a lead screw assembly and an overload clutch. The overload clutch allows slippage of the lead screw should the regulating blade become bound within the blade gap. The regulating blade may be operated from the control console in either one of two modes (manual or automatic). In the automatic control mode, the regulating blade controls reactor power by comparing one of the nuclear instruments with the power level set by the reactor operator. If a mismatch occurs, a signal is generated which repositions the regulating blade to minimize the discrepancy between the power setting and the actual power level. In the manual mode, this function is bypassed.
Following this event, the licensee investigated the problem and found that the ball plunger for the overload clutch had loosened and slightly backed out which prevented the movement of the servomotor from being transferred to the lead screw assembly, thus preventing the regulating blade from being able to drive in the outward and inward directions. The ball plunger has a locking element that is made of nylon that will eventually wear if it is repeatedly removed and reinserted. It appears that this wear had caused the ball plunger to loosen.
The regulating blade and its associated run-in features are not part of the reactor safety system. When a reactor scram or run-in occurs, the regulating blade is automatically shifted to manual control to prevent it from operating to maintain power. The basis for the run-in features associated with the regulating blade is to assure termination of a transient which, in automatic operation, is causing a rapid insertion of the regulating rod. The regulating blade <10% withdrawn rod run-in is not required to prevent reaching a Limiting Safety System Setting.
The licensee took various corrective actions. The reactor was immediately shutdown when the regulating blade was found to be inoperable. The overload clutch was inspected and the ball plunger was replaced. After those repairs were made, the applicable sections of compliance procedure CP-14 and the functional test portion of form FM-57 were completed satisfactorily to verify proper operation. The regulating blade drive mechanism semi-annual preventive maintenance procedure was revised to ensure that the ball plunger will be renewed and either thread-lock fluid or retaining compound applied on a semi-annual basis. The event was also entered into the MURR Corrective Action Program system as CAP No. 13-0023. Thus, any additional improvements or corrective actions can/will be tracked and addressed.
The inspector reviewed the event. It was noted that the licensee
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identified the problem, evaluated the situation, and took corrective actions. The NRC was notified as well. The inspector verified that the corrective actions had been completed by the licensee as indicated. The inspector concluded that failure to operate the reactor with the regulating blade and all the rod run-in functions in an operable condition was a violation of the requirements of TS 3.4.a and TS 3.4.c and that this was a Severity Level IV violation.
However, as indicated above, the inspector determined that the problem had been identified by the licensee and reported to the NRC as required.
Although similar to previous events involving regulating blade inoperability, it was determined that this event could not have been reasonably prevented with correction actions from previous events. As such, the event was considered non-repetitive. Corrective actions had been identified and completed as well. As a result, the licensee was informed that this non-repetitive, licensee-identified, and corrected violation would be treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.b of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-186/2013-203-01). This issue is considered closed.
(3) Event Which Occurred on June 11, 2013 TS Section 3.2.b states, Above 100 kilowatts the reactor shall be operated so that the maximum distance between the highest and lowest shim blade shall not exceed one inch.
On June 11, 2013, while conducting a hot reactor startup, the Reactor Operator noted, immediately after stabilizing reactor power level at 5 MW, that the heights of the shim control blade B and D were at 21.90 inches and 23.10 inches withdrawn, respectively. This 1.20 inch difference in shim blade height created a deviation from TS 3.2.b.
Section 3.3 of Addendum 3 to the Hazards Summary Report (HSR)
provides an evaluation of the power peaking factors in the MURR 6.2 kilogram core. The basis for this TS is to provide a restriction on the maximum neutron flux tilting that can occur in the core to insure the validity of the power peaking factors described in Section 3.3 of Addendum 3 to HSR.
Following this event, the licensee completed a detailed safety review of the event which was submitted to the NRC on July 10, 2013. The licensee reported that a detailed simulation of the initial June 10, 2013 startup core configuration leading to this event using modified MONTEBURNS (ORIGEN coupled with MCNP5) and MCNP5 models confirm that the hot spot peaking factor at the time the TS deviation occurred was well below the hot spot peaking factor used in the MURR safety limit analysis and as such the unbalanced shim blade heights did not create a safety hazard to the reactor.
Although a deviation from TS 3.2.b did occur, the hot spot peaking factor calculated for the core configuration and conditions at the time of this
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event is well below the highest hot spot peaking factor used in the MURR safety limit analysis.
The licensee took various corrective actions. When it was discovered that the height difference between the shim control blades was greater than one inch, the shim control blades were adjusted to restore compliance. The reactor startup was paused a 5 MW to verify all reactor parameters were normal and to obtain permission from the Assistant Reactor Manager - Operations to continue with the hot reactor startup.
The Associate Director of Reactor and Facilities Operation, the Reactor Manager, and the Assistant Reactor Manager - Operations met with the Operations crew that was on shift when the event occurred to discuss the specifics of the event and to counsel the group. Senior licensee management also met with all of the Reactor Operations Staff to ensure that all individuals are aware of the severity of the event. In addition, a procedure change was completed to revise procedure OP-RO-211, Reactor Startup - Hot, such that only a Senior Reactor Operator can perform a hot reactor startup.
The inspector reviewed the event. It was noted that the licensee identified the problem, evaluated the situation, and took corrective actions. The licensee also submitted a report to the NRC. The inspector verified that all the corrective actions had been completed by the licensee as indicated. The inspector concluded that the failure to maintain the maximum distance between the highest and lowest shim blade to less than the required one inch was a violation of the requirements of TS 3.2.b and that this was a Severity Level IV violation.
However, as indicated above, the inspector determined that the problem had been identified and reviewed by the licensee and reported to the NRC as required. Appropriate corrective actions had been completed.
As a result, the licensee was informed that this non-repetitive, licensee-identified, and corrected violation would be treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.b of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-186/2013-203-02). This issue is considered closed.
c. Conclusion Two NCVs were identified. However, they were identified by the licensee and appropriate corrective actions were taken. These issues are considered closed.
8. Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were reviewed with the licensee on November 7, 2013.
The inspector discussed the findings for each area reviewed. The licensee acknowledged the findings. The inspector noted that proprietary material was reviewed during the inspection but none is included in this inspection report.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Personnel Director R. Dobey Health Physics Manager J. Ernst Associate Director, Regulatory Assurance Group L. Foyto Associate Director, Reactor and Facilities Operations J. Fruits Reactor Manager A. Gaddy Compliance Specialist G. Gunn Assistant Reactor Manager - Training C. Herbold Assistant Reactor Manager - Operations M. Kraus Safety Associate and CAP Coordinator D. Kutikkad Assistant Reactor Manager - Physics D. Rathke Access Control Coordinator Other Personnel J. Pasley Assistant Fire Marshall, Fire Station 7, Columbia Fire Department INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 69003 Class I Research and Test Reactor Operator Licenses, Requalification, and Medical Activities IP 69006 Class I Research and Test Reactor Organization, Operations, and Maintenance Activities IP 69009 Class I Research and Test Reactor Fuel Movement IP 69010 Class I Research and Test Reactor Surveillance IP 69011 Class I Research and Test Reactor Emergency Preparedness ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened NCV 50-186/2013-203-01 NCV Failure to operate the reactor with regulating blade and all the rod run-in functions in an operable condition as required by TS 3.4.a and 3.4.c.
NCV 50-186/2013-203-02 NCV Failure to maintain the maximum distance between the highest and lowest shim blade to less than the required one inch as required by TS 3.2.b.
Closed NCV 50-186/2013-203-01 NCV Failure to operate the reactor with regulating blade and all the rod run-in functions in an operable condition as required by TS 3.4.a and 3.4.c.
-2-NCV 50-186/2013-203-02 NCV Failure to maintain the maximum distance between the highest and lowest shim blade to less than the required one inch as required by TS 3.2.b.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED 10 CFR Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations CAP Corrective Action Program CP Compliance Procedure E-Plan Emergency Plan FEO Facility Emergency Organization HSR Hazards Summary Report IP Inspection Procedure IR Inspection Report LSRO Lead Senior Reactor Operator MURR University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor MW Megawatt NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission POD Plan of the Day (meeting)
RAC Reactor Advisory Committee RO Reactor Operator RUR Reactor Utilization Request SRO Senior Reactor Operator TS Technical Specification