IR 05000010/1985004
| ML17195A785 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1985 |
| From: | Chrissotimos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17195A784 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-85-04, 50-10-85-4, 50-237-85-09, 50-237-85-9, 50-249-85-08, 50-249-85-8, NUDOCS 8505080366 | |
| Download: ML17195A785 (13) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-010/85004(DRP); 50-237/85009(DRP); 50-249/85008(DRP)
Docket Nos.50-010; 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-02; DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. 0. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, IL Inspection Conducted:
February 16 through April 18, 1985 Inspectors:
T. M. Tongue S. Stasek C. D. Anderson Approved By: J(/
R1c~o Inspection Summary ri otimos, Chief Projects Section 2C Date Inspection during the period of February 16 through April 18, 1985 (Reports No. 50-010/85004(DRP); 50-237/85009(DRP); 50-249/85008(DRP)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced resident inspection of previous inspec-tion.findings, 10 CFR 21 reports, headquarters requests, operational safety, events, licensee event reports, maintenance, surveillance, refueling activi-ties, independent inspection, and report revie The inspection involved a total of 366 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors including 68 inspector-hours onsite during off-shift Results:
Of the eleven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000010 Q
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company
- D. Scott, Manager
- J. Wujciga, Production Superintendent
- R. Flessner, Services Superintendent T. Ciesla, Assistant Superintendent - Operations R. Zentner, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance
- J. Brunner, Assistant Superintendent - Technical Services R. Christensen, Unit 1 Operating Engineer J. Almer, Unit 2 Operating Engineer J. Kotowski, Unit 3 Operating Engineer J. Achterberg, Technical Staff Supervisor J. Doyle, Q.C. Supervisor D. Sharper, Waste Systems Engineer S. McDonald, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor B. Saunders, Station Security Administrator W. Johnson, Chemistry Supervisor J. Schrage, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- M. Luoma, Q.A. Supervisor
- R. Stobert, Q.A. Inspector
- W. Ahrens, Q.A. Inspector The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security personne ~'<Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on February 27, March 22, April 8, and April 18, 1985 and informally at various times throughout the inspection perio.
'Followup of Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
Inspectio~ Item (50-237/82-10-0l(DRP); 50-249/82-11-0l(DRP)).
ASME Component Load Capacity Data Sheets Changed By Suppliers At Other Station The licensee conducted a review of modification component data sheets and found no evidence of modification from the original specifica-tion The review was conducted by Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) personne (Closed)
Inspection Item (50-237/83-07-02(DRP); 50-249/83-06-02(DRP)).
Some Agastat (time-delay) Relays May Not Meet Environmental and Seismic Qualification This potential generic issue was reviewed by SNED personnel along with IE Information Notices 82-48 and 84-20 and an INPO notificatio The licensee found that the GP and GC series agastats may
- exhibit post mold plastic shrinkage and cracking and, electrical contact problem These series are not used in safety related applications at Dresde The ECR socket and EGR relays used at Dresden are environmentally and seismically qualifie (Closed)
Noncompliance (50-237/83-32-0l(DRP)).
Failure to Have a Proce-dure for the Control of Locked Valve The licensee has implemented Dresden Administrative procedure DAP 7-14 "Controls and Criteria for Locked Valves", which describes the criteria for selection of valves to be locked, controls for operating locked valves and issuing the associated key (Closed)
Noncompliance (50-237/84-18-02(DRP); 50-249/84-17-02(DRP)).
Two Examples of Inadequate Procedure The standby gas treatment procedures were revised to account for the 300 scfm flow through the nonrunning trai The battery surveillance procedures were revised to include inspections of the battery rack No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are CFR 21 Report Followup (Closed)
Inspection Items (237/82-01-PP(DRP); 249/82-01-PP(DRP)).
10 CFR 21 Report That Certain Battery Chargers Were Identified With Defect Power Conversion Products identified and reported several battery chargers that could blow existing fuses if they were operated at full power for 8 to 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> Their evaluation resulted in recommending changing from 200 to 300 amp fuse At Dresden, one 125 volt battery charger was identified as affected and the fuses were replaced under work request Number D 2522 (Closed)
Inspection Item (237/83-29-0l(DRP); 249/83-27-0l(DRP)).
10 CFR 21 Report That Certain General Electric HEA Electrical Relays Displayed Misoperatio The licensee conducted a review of all safety-related HEA relays and found 3 spare units with dates corresponding to those in the 10 CFR 21 repor Tests of those units were under work request D 31419 and all showed satisfactory performanc No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Headquarters Request The resident inspector was requested to review the potential generic problem of installing GNB (formally Gould) batteries with end and side gaps between the battery cells and rack stringers that were greater than those seismically qualifie The inspector was also asked to measure the gap Dresden station was informed of the end gap discrepancy by CECo Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED)
in a letter dated November 26, 1984, based upon a verbal response from GN The station then reduced the end gaps on the 24/48V batteries for both units 2 and The 125 and 250V batteries for both units are of a different rack configuration and are to be
upgrade The schedule for these modifications is at present undeter-mined and will be made an open inspection item (237/85009-0l(DRP);
249/85008-0l(DRP)).
Following discussions with the resident inspectors, the licensee reduced the side gaps on the Units 2 and 3 24/48V batteries to an acceptable siz The resident inspector was also requested to inspect station battery operation and maintenanc The visual inspection did not note abnormal gassing or sediments except in the case of the Unit 2 125V batter Considerable sediment has collected in the bottoms of some cell jar This battery is scheduled to be replaced this fal In the meantime, a temporary modification will be installed to use the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) batter Battery installation and construction was also inspecte As previ-ously noted, the 24/48V gap sizes are adequate and the 125V and 250V racks are to be upgrade The cell spacing material is acceptable for the 24/48V battery design but the 125V and 250V current design uses three metal prongs as spacer Each unit has two 125V chargers and two pairs of 24/48V charger Each unit has one 250V charger plus there is one that is shared by the two unit This configuration is allowed for this vintage plant per the FSAR.
The inspector reviewed certain battery surveillances for technical specification requirements and for incorporation of IEEE standard Several discrepancies between IEEE standard 450-1975 and the proce-dures were noted and discussed with the license This will be an unresolved item (010/85004-0l(DRP); 237/85009-02(DRP); 249/85008-02(DRP)).
The inspector will continue this inspection in the next inspection perio No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from February 16 to April 18, 198 The inspectors verified the oper-ability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of Units 2 and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
- During the inspection period while Unit 2 was in a refuel outage, the inspectors verified that surveillance tests were conducted, containment integrity requirements were met, and emergency systems were available as necessar Unit 2 ended its refueling outage on 4/14/8 Throughout the entire inspection period, Unit 1 remained in a longterm shutdown condition with all fuel removed from the vesse The inspectors verified that all applicable requirements for Unit 1 were met during this perio The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control During the inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and verified that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrate Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control System 24/48V Battery 125V Battery 250V Battery Portions of the DC Distribution System Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray Battery for upcoming Unit 2 tie-in Low Pressure Coolant Injection System (Loop A)
Core Spray System (Loop A)
Unit 3 Low Pressure Coolant Injection System Core Spray System Isolation Condenser High Pressure Core Spray ECCS Keep Fill System 24/48V Battery 125V Battery 250V Battery Portions of the DC Distribution System Units 2/3 Standby Gas Treatment System
- The inspectors reviewed new procedures and changes to procedures that were implemented during the inspection perio The review consisted of a verification for accuracy, correctness, and compliance with regulatory requirement The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barrelin These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Followup of Events During the inspection period, the licensee experienced an event which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7 The inspectors pursued the event onsite with licensee and/or other NRC official The inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements and that correc-tive actions would prevent future recurrenc The specific event is as follows:
February 27, 1985, Unit An unusual event was declared when a small amount of oil was discovered in the Unit 1 intake cana The oil, from an oil storage tank bunker, had migrated (due to rain) to a nearby storm sewer which discharges to the intake cana No significant quantities of oil were released to the rive No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective-action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification LER Unit 2 (Closed)
80-022-0 Control Rod Drive Scram Discharge Piping Did Not Meet Seismic Requirements as Described in the FSA The licensee's immediate analysis showed that the piping met the criteria of IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-1 New seismic supports were designed, fabricated and installed as require During the refueling outage of 1984 and 1985, the final modification per IE Bulletin 80-17 for the integrated scram/instru-ment volumes was installed.
(Closed)
84-019-0 Indications Detected During Inservice Inspectio Indications were noted in sixteen reactor water cleanup weld Weld over-lay was applied to one and the others were corrected by piping replacemen A regional specialist inspected portions of the replacement (reference Inspection Report 237/85004).
(Closed)
84-024-0 Unit 2 517' Elevation Turbine Building/Reactor Building Interloc Revision 2 adequately addresses the common secondary containment of Units 2 and (Closed)
84-025-0 kV Feed Breaker Failur The supplement addresses the generic considerations and potential consequences that were missing in the original LE (Closed)
85-001-0 Bus 23-1 to Bus 23 Breaker Protective Relayin Four wires were found to be disconnected in the breake These wires were reconnecte Other similar breakers were checked for similar prob-lems but none were note The licensee's review of the incident and the manner in which the wires were disconnected led the licensee to the conclusion that this was not done with malicious inten (Closed)
85-002-0 Reactor Building/Turbine Building 517' Interlock Door failur Revision 2 adequately addresses the common secondary con-tainment of Units 2 and (Closed)
85-003-0 Inadvertent Group 2 Isolatio A shift foreman did not verify if jumpers still existed on the Group 2 isolation relays during a modification tes The shift foreman was reinstructed and now realizes the importance of verifying the installation of the jumper (Closed)
85-004-0 Unit 2 Reactor Scram While the unit was shutdown for refueling, two scrams were experienced while switching the power supply for the reactor protection system (RPS) without defeating two scram signal A procedure will be written to ensure all prerequisites for transferring RPS power supplies are complete (Open)
85-005-0 Inadvertent Group II Isolatio This LER will remain open until the licensee's investigation of the root cause is complete and
- a supplemental report is submitte (Closed)
85-006-0 Reactor Scram During Undervoltage Tests of the RPS Channel B ECCS Power' Suppl The cause was determined to be erroneous design by the architect engineer that resulted in power supplies to both RPS channel trips on low reactor water level coming from the same sourc The licensee redesigned, rewired and functionally tested the modificatio In addition, a schematic review was conducted of their work performed by that architect enginee *
(Closed) 85-007-0 Rod Block Surveillances Missed For Seven Days While the Reactor Was in the Refuel Mod Upon discovery, the licensee immed-iately performed the surveillances and has added a module to the routine training program to assure there is no recurrenc (Closed)
85-008-0 Reactor Scram From Tripping of the +/-B' RPS MG Se The MG trip was due to thermal overload relays tripping earl The relays were replaced and a routine surveillance was performe The reactor was in cold shutdown when the scram occurre (Closed)
85-009-0 Late Standby Liquid Control Operability Surveillanc The surveillance was not performed immediately on the 2B pump when the 2A pump was removed from servic The test was performed and the pump was found operable about 10 to 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> late (Closed)
85-010-0 Fire Watch Not Established Within 1 Hou The door to the 125 V battery room was found propped ope It was open for approxi-mately 102 minutes, while draining water from a portion of the fire header during maintenanc The shift foreman will be admonished and a review of technical specification fire watches will be reviewed during operator training session (Closed)
85-011-0 Reactor Vessel Not Vented With Vessel Below Minimum Pressurization Temperatur The duration of the event was approximately 53 minute The cause was attributed to a lack of procedure steps while replacing the vessel head and vent pipin The evaluation showed that the event significance was minimized because no condensate or control rod drive pumps were running, the mode switch was in shutdown, and the control rods could not be move The licensee is changing the head replacement proce-dure DMP 200-1 (Open)
85-012-0 Unit 2 Reactor Scram Caused by the RPS Syste This will remain open until a supplement is issued to address the second scram that occurred 14 minutes after the firs Both were due to switching the power supply to the reactor protection system without having the relay contacts adequately blocked.
. (Closed)
85-013-0 Channel A A'IWS Trip on Reactor Vessel Low Level During Vessel Hydrostatic Tes The trip was caused by a leaking instru-ment isolation valv The Hydrostatic Test procedure (DOS 201-2) will be modified to have leve*l detector cells bypassed during hydrostatic test (Closed)
85-014-0 Reactor Scra While in the shutdown mode, a jumper was placed on the scram discharge volume hi level relay instead of the required main steam line closure bypass rela The cognizant engineer was instructed to pay closer attention to detail when performing functional tests.
R
LER Unit 3 (Closed) 84-012-0 Reactor Scram from IRMs Not Being Fully Inserted in a Timely Manne The licensee determined that additional training was appro-priate for the new operator involved and additional training would be provided to all operators and shift supervisors on the even (Closed) 84-016-0 Reactor Scra The licensee submitted the supple-mental report to show the correct S-1 valve nomenclatur (Closed)
85-002-0 Unit 3 Reactor Scra The cause was determined to be from vibration of a reactor protection system (RPS) instrument rac A 150-200 pound inservice inspection standard was dropped in the vicinity of the rack and is the suspected cause of the vibratio The resident inspectors were on site at the time of the scram and observed the licen-see's action This scram is documented in Inspection Report 84-20/26/23 paragraph (Closed)
85-003-0 HPCI Room Cooler Inoperabl The fan belts were found broken and replace A surveillance will be revised to include operability verification of the fan (Closed) 85-004-0 Reactor Vessel Low Low Water Level Isolation Due to Set Point Drif The switches were recalibrated, tested and placed back in servic The licensee will be replacing the switches during the up-coming refueling outage.
(Closed)
85-005-0 Loss of Undervoltage Protection on Bus 34-This resulted from personnel taking Unit 3 emergency diesel generator (E D/G)
out of service while conducting a test on the Unit 2 E D/ For a period of about 4 1/2 minutes, all low pressure ECCS capability would have been lost if there had been a loss of offsite powe The equipment would have responded if offsite power was availabl This event along with several others was the subject of an enforcement meeting on March 25, 1985, and is addressed in a special inspection report, (50-237/85010(DRP); 50-249/
85009(DRP)).
Followup on this issue will be through the inspection findings in that report.
. (Closed) 85-006-00 and 0 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Room Cooler Inoperabl The service water valves were found shu This LER along with several others was the subject of an enforcement meeting on March 25, 1985, and is addressed in a special inspection report, (50-237/
85010(DRP); 50-249/85009(DRP)).
Followup on this event will be through the inspection findings in that repor (Closed) 85-007-0 Torus (Suppression Pool) Water Sample Line Valves Found Ope This LER along with several others, was the subject of an enforcement meeting on March 25, 1985, and is addressed in a special inspection report, (50-237/85010(DRP); 50-249/85009(DRP)).
Followup on this event will be through the inspection findings in that repor *
(Closed)
85-008-0 Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatically Starte The start was caused by vibration of the auto-start relay from modification work on the relay cabine This was expected and assessed by management personnel prior to allowing the work to begi (Closed) 85-009-0 Torus Primary Upper Sightglass Isolation Valve Left Partially Ope This condition existed for approximately one hour and was promptly correcte In addition, from a previous similar event, the licensee had implemented changes such that no flow path to secondary con-tainment existed and the sightglass and associated piping outside the normal primary containment boundary have been statically tested to acci-dent pressur Initially, licensee personnel considered this to be nonreportable; however, after discussions with the resident inspectors, it was agreed to be reportable because the sightglass and associated piping is not seismically qualifie The preceding LERs have been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, and when the incidents described meet all of the following requirements, no Notice of Violation is normal-ly issued for that ite The event was identified by the licensee, The event was an incident that, according to the current enforcement policy, met the criteria for Severity levels IV or V violations, The event was appropriately reported, The event was or will be corrected (including measures to prevent recurrence within a reasonable amount of time), and The event was not a violation that could have been prevented by the licensee's corrective actions for a previous violatio No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with. approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Routine Maintenance Control Rod Drive J-6 Scram Outlet Valve Maintenance Unit 3 Low Pressure Coolant Injection Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Divider Repair Containment Cooling Service Water C and D pumps Examination and Repair No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by technical speci-fications for Unit 2 Core Spray Pump Operability and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instru-mentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activity:
Unit 2 Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray Battery Discharge Test for upcoming Unit 2 tie-in No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Refueling Activities The inspectors verified that during the outage periodic te~ting of refuel-ing related equipment was performed as required; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by Technical Specifications; verified that good housekeeping practices were maintained in the refueling area; and verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with appli-cable requirement The inspector participated in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) required reactor vessel hydrostatic test walk-dow Several leaks were noted by the inspector and licensee personnel to be corrected prior to unit start u *
The inspectors observed portions of the shutdown margin tests, control rod scram time tests, the initial and subsequent criticalities, and ascension into the power rang No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Independent Inspection - Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) Drill The inspector observed licensee activities in the control room and the technical support center (TSC) during an emergency dril The drill progressed from the unusual event to the general emergency stat This was done in preparation for the upcoming exercise scheduled for later this mont No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Report Review During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Monthly Operating Reports for January, February and March 198 The inspectors confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.A.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.1 No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.
Open Inspection Items Open inspection items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompli-ance, or deviation An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.
Meetings Enforcement Conference An enforcement conference was held on March 15, 1985, with licensee personnel to discuss recent events, their seriousness and possible enforcement action The meeting is discussed in a special inspection report, (50-237/85-0lO(DRP); 50-249/85-009(DRP)).
.).,
..
- Regulatory Performance Improvement Program (RPIP)
The licensee provided a status report on the RPIP at a meeting on March 7, 198 A summary of the meeting is discussed for all operating CECo stations in a special repor The Dresden report number is (50-10/85-005(DRP); 50-237/85-012(DRP); 50-249/85-0ll(DRP)).
1 Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
informally throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on April 18, 1985, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The inspector also discussed the likely infor-mational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar The licen-see acknowledged the findings of the inspection.
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