IR 05000010/1977029
| ML19338C980 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1977 |
| From: | Barker J, Little W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19338C978 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-77-29, 50-10-77-29, 50-237-77-26, NUDOCS 8009120724 | |
| Download: ML19338C980 (4) | |
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pV U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
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Report No. 50-010/77-29; 50-237/77-26
Docket No.50-010; 50-237 License No. DPR-2; DPR-19 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Lresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
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Inspection at: Dresden Site, Morris, IL Inspection Conducted: September 20-22, 1977 NM b'
y Inspector:
J. L. Barker A q. w, >hief m
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Approved by:
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Little C Nuclear Support Section Inspection Summary Inspection on September 20-22, 1977 (Report No. 50-010/77'29; 50-237/77-26)
j Attas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of preparations for a refueling outage, pre-fuel handling activities, fuel handling activities, and ;zeparation for startup following a refueling outage.
The inspection
involved 22 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector and included inspec-tion efiirt conducted during offshift hours.
Results: Of the four areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in three areas; one apparent item of noncompliance
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(Deficiency '- failure to adhere to procedure during refueling operations -
Paragraph 4) was identified in one area.
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l DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- B. Stephenson, ' Station Superintendent
- A. Roberts, ' Assistant Station Superintendent
- B.
Shelton, Administrative Assistant
- C. Sargent, Technical Staff Supervisor N. Scott, Lead Operating Engineer i
E. Budzichowski, l'ait 1 Operating Engineer J. Kolanowski, Unic 2 Operating Engineer J. Dolter, Nuclear Engineer
- C. Readanz, Quality Assurance Coordinator
- Denotes those present at exit inte-Jew.
The inspector also contacted sixteen (16) other licensee employees,
they included three refueling foremen, one shift foreman, six nuclear station operators, and six fuel handlers.
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2.
Preparation for Refueling
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The inspector verified that station refueling procedures contained both functional and administrative controls governing new fuel receipt and inspection, fuel transfer and core verification, fuel sipping operations, and recycled fuel inspections. He also verified that the new fuel was received and inspected. in accordance with the licensee's procedures.
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The inspector reviewed the following procedures:
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DFP 800-1 Master Refueling Procedure, Units 2 and 3
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DFP 800-2 New Fuel Receiving DFP 800-4 Transfer of New Fuel From Either the New Fuel Storage Vault or the New Fuel Inspection Stand to the Fuel Pool DFP 800-7 Fuel Handling Inside.the Reactor DFP 800-9 Fuel Movements from the Spent Fuel Storage Pool to the Reactor DFP 800-10 Fuel Movements from the Reactor to the Spent 'Fuel
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Storage Pool
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DFP 800-12 Replacement of LPRM Strings DFP 800-13 Stuck LPPM Removal
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DFP 200-15 Neutron Source Removal and Reinstallation DFP 800-18 Placement of Sipping Head for In-Core Sipping DFP 800-22 Unit 2/3 Reactor Level Instrumentation, Head Off DOA 800-1 Irradiated Fuel Damage While Refueling DOA 800-2 Evacuation Signal While Fuel Handling No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Pre-Fuel Handling Activities The inspector verified diat surveillance testing involving technical specifications requirements, refueling machine operation, fuel storage area ventilation, refueling interlocks, crane
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testing, refueling deck radiation monitors, and communication systems had been completed prior to fuel movement in the vicinity of the reactoc.
The inspector reviewed licensee surveillance procedures DOS 800-1, " Refueling Interlock Check," DOS 800-3, " Source Range Instrumentation kesponse During Refueling," DOS 800-5, " Service
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Platform Rod Block Functional Test," DOS 800-6, " Surveillance of the 2/3 Reactor Building Crane Prior to Operation in Restricted
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Move," and DOS 700-6, "SRM Functional Test."
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Fuel Handling Activities
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The inspector observed activities on the refueling deck and in the control room during both the day and evening shifts to verify that refueling operations were being conducted in accordance with technical specifications sad approved procedures. He specifically audited core tonitoring, containment integrity, fuel insertion and
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removal, fuel accountability, core internals storage, refueling deck housekeeping, vessel water level, reactor mode switch position, and control blade checks. He also verified that the individual directing fuel handling activities holds a senior operator license and was present directly supervising fuel handlers when work was
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being done that could affect core reactivity and that a licensed -
operator was present in the control room and in constant direct communications with a member of the fuel handling crew when work was being done that could affect core reactivity.
The inspector noted that personnel (those visiting the refueling area, not fuel handlers) were in the refueling work area with loose materials in their pockets (i.e., identification badges,
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change, wallets, keys, etc.) and were not tapeing monitoring badges and pencils to their person. This increases the possibil-ity of dropping objects into an open reactor vessel anc is not in accordance with DFP 800-1, " Master Refueling Procedure, Units 2 and 3."
This item, failure to adhere to an approve procedure, is considered an item of noncompliance.
The licenses took corrective action to correct the noncompliance and to prevent future recurrence before the inspector lef t the station.
A new procedure DAP 11-13, " Control of Work Over the Open Reactor Vessel with the Reactor Head Removed," was implemented to give stronger management control, ar.d all operating engineers, maintenance supervisors, and contractor personnel supervisors were instructed to indoctrinate their personnel in proper attire to be worn around the refueling work area.
The inspector had no further concerns.
5.
Preparations for Startup Following Refueling Outage Concerning Unit I startup on September 21, 1977, the inspector verified that systems that were disturbed or tested during the refueling outage were returned to an operating status prior to plant startup and that plant startup procedures require adherence to the licensee's Technical Specifications and commitments, as they pertain to startup testing and power operation prerequisites.
The inrpector reviewed licensee procedures DGP l-1, " Normal Unit Startup" and DGP 1-SI, " Master Startup Checklist."
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Exit In te rview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 22, 1977, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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