GO2-13-138, License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-493, Revision 4, Option a
| ML13284A063 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/2013 |
| From: | Javorik A Energy Northwest |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GO2-13-138 | |
| Download: ML13284A063 (89) | |
Text
Alex L. Javonk ENERGY Columbia Generating Station P.O. Box 968, PE08 Richland, WA 99352-0968 Ph. 509.377.85551 F. 509.377.4150 aljavork@energy-northwest.com October 2, 2013 G02-13-138 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A
Dear Sir or Madam:
In accordance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR)
Section 50.90, Energy Northwest is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Columbia Generating Station (Columbia).
The proposed amendment incorporates Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-493-A, Revision 4, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions,"
Option A. The proposed amendment would revise the TS by adding requirements to assess channel performance during testing that verifies instrument channel setting values established by the plant-specific setpoint methodologies. The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the Federal Register on May 11, 2010 (75 FR 26294) as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). provides a description and analysis of the proposed changes including the requested confirmation of applicability and plant-specific verifications; technical analyses; regulatory analyses; and environmental considerations. No changes to any setpoint values are proposed. Attachment 2 provides the plant-specific evaluation identifying the list of instrument Functions to be annotated with the TSTF-493 Surveillance Notes. Attachments 3 and 4 provide markup pages of existing TS and TS Bases, respectively, to show the proposed change in accordance with TSTF-493, Revision 4, Option A. Attachment 5 provides revised (clean) TS pages.
Energy Northwest requests approval of the proposed license amendment within one year of the date of this submittal, with the amendment being implemented within 180 days of approval.
This letter and its enclosure contain no regulatory commitments.
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Page 2 of 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(1), "Notice for public comment," the analysis about the issue of no significant hazards consideration using the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 is being provided to the Commission in accordance with the distribution requirements in 10 CFR 50.4.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (b)(1), "State consultation," a copy of this application and its reasoned analysis about no significant hazards considerations is being provided to the designated Washington State Official.
If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Ms. L. L. Williams, Licensing Supervisor, at (509) 377-8148.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the date of this letter.
Respectfully, A. L, Javorik Vice President, Engineering Attachments: As stated cc: NRC Region IVAdministrator NRC NRR Project Manager NRC Senior Resident Inspector/988C AJ Rapacz BPAI1 399 (email)
WA Horin Winston & Strawn (email)
JO Luce - EFSEC (email)
- i. * .
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION .A Attachment I Page 1 of 8 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES
1.0 DESCRIPTION
The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) by applying additional testing requirements to applicable instrument Functions, listed in Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Improved Standard Technical Specifications (STS)
Change Traveler TSTF-493, Revision 4, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS [Limiting Safety System Settings) Functions," Attachment A, "Identification of Instrument Functions to be Annotated with the TSTF-493 Footnotes." Attachment A contains Functions related to those variables that have a significant safety function, as defined in Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR) Section 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A), thereby ensuring instrumentation will function as required to initiate protective systems or actuate mitigating systems at values equal to or more conservative than the point assumed in applicable safety analyses. These TS changes are made by the addition of individual surveillance Note requirements to applicable instrument Functions in accordance with Option A of TSTF-493, Revision 4.
This change is consistent with Option A of NRC-approved Revision 4 to TSTF-493. The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the FederalRegisteron May 11, 2010 (75 FR 26294).
2.0 PROPOSED CIHANGE Energy Northwest proposes to add TSTF-493, Revision 4, Option A TS surveillance Notes with no changes to setpoint values to Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) instrumentation Functions.
Energy Northwest has reviewed the model safety-evaluation (SE) referenced in the FederalRegister Notice of Availability published on May 11, 2010 (75 FR 26294). As described herein, Energy Northwest has concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-493, Revision 4, Option A, and the model SE prepared by the NRC staff for Option A are applicable to Columbia and support these changes to the Columbia TS.
Energy Northwest is not proposing variations or deviations from the TS changes described in TSTF-493, Revision 4 or the NRC staffs model SE referenced in the Notice of Availability. However, it should be noted that Columbia is based on the General Electric BWR/5 design. Some Columbia instrumentation TS requirements are similar to those provided in NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/4," and other Columbia instrumentation TS are similar to those provided.in NUREG-1434, "Standard.Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/6." Therefore, -theColumbia incorporation of TSTF-493, Revision 4, Option A, reflects changes based on the TSTF-493, Revision 4. Option A TS page markups provided for either NUREG-1433 or NUREG-1434, as appropriate. The plant-specific evaluation identifying the list o6 instrumentFunctions to be annotated with the TSTF-493
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Page 2 of 8 surveillance Notes provided in Attachment 2 identifies which STS was used in the evaluation.
3.0 BACKGROUND
The background for this application is adequately addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability published In the FederalRegisteron May 11, 2010 (75 FR 26294).
4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
The Technical Analysis for this application is described in TSTF-493 as referenced in the NRC Notice of Availability published in the FederalRegisteron May 11, 2010 (75 FR 26294). Plant-specific information related to the Technical Analysis is described below to document that the content of TSTF-493, Revision 4, Option A, is applicable to Columbia.
4.1 Use of the Term of "Limiting Trip Setpoint" The term "Limiting Trip Setpoint" (LTSP) is used for the setpoint value calculated by means of the plant-specific setpoint methodology documented in the Final Safety Analyses Report (FSAR) or a document Incorporated by.reference into the FSAR. The actual trip setpoint may be more conservative than the LTSP. The LTSP is the LSSS1 which is required to be in the TS by 10 CFR 50.36.
The LTSP is the least conservative value to which the instrument channel Is adjusted to actuate. The Allowable Value 2 (AV) is derived from the LTSP. The LTSP is the limiting setting for an operable channel trip setpoint considering all credible instrument errors associated With the Instrument channel. The LTSP Is the least conservative value (with an as-left tolerance (ALT)) to which the channel must be reset at the conclusion of pedrodic testing to ensure that the analytical limit (AL) will not be exceeded during an anticiipated operational occurrence or accident before the next periodic surveillance or calibration. It is impossible to set a physical instrument channel to an exact value, so a calibration tolerance is established around the LTSP. Therefore, an instrument adjustment is cohsidered successful if the LTSP as-left instrument setting is within the setting tolerance (i.e., a range of values around the LTSP). The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is the LTSP With margin added. The NTSP is as conservative as or more conservative than the LTSP.
1 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(11)(A) states: "Limiting safety system settings for nuclear reactors are settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions."
2 The Instrument setting "Allowable Value" Is a limiting value of an instrument's as-found trip (AFT) setting used during surveillances: The AV is more conservative than the Analytical Limit (AL) to account for applicable instrument measurement errors consistent with the plant-specific setpoint methodology. If during testing, the actual Instrumentation setting Is less conservative than the AV, the channel Is declared inoperable and actions must be taken consistent with the TS requirements.
,LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Attachment I Page 3 of 8 4.2 Addition of Channel Performance Surveillance Notes to TS Instrumentation Functions The determination to include surveillance Notes for specific Functions in the TS is based on these Functions being automatic protective devices related to variables having significant safety functions as delineated by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A). There are two surveillance Notes added to the TS regarding the use of TS AVs for operability determinations and for assessing channel performance. Evaluation of Exclusion Criterion (Section 4.3 below) discusses the principles applied to determine which Functions are to be annotated with the two surveillance Notes. The list of affected Functions is provided In Attachment 2 of this amendment request.
Surveillance Note I states:
uIf the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service."
Surveillance Note 2 states:
The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) at the bcompiletion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint Implemented in the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The Limiting Trip Setpoint and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and as-left tolerances are specified in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Setpoint calculations establish an LTSP based on the AL of the safety analysis to ensure that trips or protective actions will occur prior to exceeding the process parameter value assumed by the safety analysis calculations. These setpoint calculations als6 calculate an allowed limit of expected change (i.e., the AFT) between performances of the surveillance test for assessing the value of the setpoint setting.
The least conservative as-found instrument setting value that a channel can have during calibration without requiring performing a TS remedial action Is the setpoint AV.
Discovering an instrument setting to be less conservative than the setting AV indicates that there may not be sufficient margin between the setting and the AL. TS channel calibrations are performed to verify channels are operating within the assumptions of the setpoint methodology calculated LTSP and that channel settings have not exceeded the TS AVs. When the measured as-found setpoint is non-conservative with respect to the AV, the channel is Inoperable and the actions Identified, in the TS must be taken.
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Page 4 of 8 The first surveillance Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its AFT but conservative with respect to the AV. Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to perform in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service.
Verifying that a trip setting is conservative with respect to the AV when a surveillance test is performed does not by itself verify the Instrument channel will operate properly in the future. Although the channel was operable during the previous surveillance interval, ifit is discovered that channel performance is outside the performance predicted by the plant setpoint calculations for the test Interval, then the design basis for the channel may not be met, and proper operation of the channel for a future demand cannot be assured. Surveillance Note I formalizes the establishment of the appropriate AFT for each channel. This AFT is applied about the LTSP or about any other more conservative setpoint. The AFT ensures that channel operation is consistent with the assumptions or design inputs used in the setpoint calculations and establishes a high confidence of acceptable channel performance in the future. Because the AFT allows for both conservative and non-conservative deviation from the LTSP, changes in channel performance that are conservative with respect to the LTSP will also be detected and evaluated for possible effects on expected performance.
To implement surveillance Note 2 the ALT for some instrumentation Function channels is established to ensure that realistic values are used that do not mask instrument performance. Setpoint calculations assume that the instrument setpoint is left at the LTSP within a specific ALT (e.g., 25 psig +/- 2 psig). A tolerance band is necessary because It is not possible to read and adjust a setting to an absolute value due to the readability and/or accuracy of the test instruments or the ability to adjust potentiometers.
The ALT is normally as small as possible considering the tools and the objective to meet an as low as reasonably achievable calibration setting of the instruments. The ALT is considered in the setpoint calculation. Failure to set the actual plant trip setpoint to the LTSP (or more conservative than the LTSP), and within the ALT, would invalidate the assumptions in the setpoint calculation because any subsequent instrument drift would not start from the expected as-left setpoint.
4.3 Evaluation of Exclusion Criterion Exclusion criteria are used to determine which Functions do not need to receive the proposed footnotes, as discussed in TSTF-493, Revision 4. Instruments are excluded from the additional retquirements when their functional purpose can be described as (1) a manual actuation circUIt, (2) an automatic actuation logic circuit, or (3) an instrument function that derives input from contacts which have no associated sensor or adjustable device. Many permissives or interlocks are excluded if they derive input from a sensor or adjustable device that Is tested as part of bnothler TS function. The list of affected
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Attachment I Page 5 of 8 Functions identified in Attachment 2 of this amendment request was developed on the principle that all Functions in the affected TS are included unless one or more of the exclusion criterion apply. Ifthe excluded functions differ from the list of excluded functions in TSTF-493, Revision 4, a justification for that deviation is provided in .
4.4 Relationship to Previously Submitted License Amendment Requests Due to a previously submitted license amendment request, this submittal does not contain surveillance Notes for instrument Functions: Average Power Range Monitors (APRM), Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM), and Rod Block Monitors (RBM). In letter G02-12-017 dated January 17, 2012, from BJ Sawatzke (Energy Northwest) to NRC, "License Amendment Request to Change Technical Specifications in support of PRNM I ARTS / MELLLA Implementation," Energy Northwest proposed changes to the TS to reflect the Installation of the General Electric Hitachi (GEH) Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control (NUMAC) Power Range Neutron Monitor (PRNM) system and expansion of the operating domain resulting from the implementation of APRM/RBM Technical Specifications (ARTS) I Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis (MELLLA). This amendment request proposed changes to the APRM Functions in TS Table 3.3.1.1-1 (Function 2) and the RBM Functions in TS Table 3.3.2.1-1 (Function 1) to reflect the new PRNM system.
In G02-12-017, the following instrumentation Functions were annotated with the two TSTF-493 surveillance Notes:
- TS Table 3.3.1.1-1 Function 2, Average Power Range Monitors
- a. Neutron Flux - High (Setdown)
- b. Simulated Thermal Power - High
- c. Neutron Flux - High
- f. OPRM Upscale
- TS Table 3.3.2.1-1 Function 1, Rod Block Monitor
- a. Low Power Range - Upscale
- b. Intermediate Power Range - Upscale
- c. High Power Range - Upscale The following instrumentation Functions were excluded from the two TSTF-493 surveillance Notes:
- TS Table3.3.1.1-1 Function 2, Average Power Range Monitors
- d. inop (Interlock excluded from surveillance Notes)
- e. 2-Out-of-4 Voter (Automatic actuation logic circuit, which is excluded from surveillance notes)
- TSTable 3.3.2.1-1 Function 1, Rod Block Monitor
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Page 6 of 8
- d. Inop (Interlock excluded from surveillance Notes)
[The PRNM system does not contain a Rod Block Monitor, Downscale Function]
In letter G02-13-075 dated May 9, 2013, from BJ Sawatzke (Energy Northwest) to NRC, "Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement PRNM/ARTS/MELLLA," Energy Northwest submitted revisions to these proposed TS to accommodate the delayed installation schedule for this modification. The proposed revision retained the current Specifications with a revised Applicability of "pror to implementation of Power Range Neutron Monitor (PRNM) upgrade" and revised the Specifications proposed in G02-12-017 with a revised applicability of "after implementation of Power Range Neutron Monitor (PRNM) upgrade." Energy Northwest does not propose to add TSTF-493 surveillance Notes to the Functions associated with the-current Neutron Monitor System (NMS) APRM and RBM instrumentation or the current OPRM instrumentation since these instruments will be replaced by the PRNM system In Refueling Outage 22 (R22), which is scheduled for spring 2015. The Functions associated with the new Instruments will have the surveillance Notes applied as described above.
No other instrument Functions in this TSTF-493 submittal are associated with the PRNM modification.
5.0 BE~UL&I~BXAAEEflMM 5.1 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Energy Northwest has evaluated the proposed changes to the TS using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," and has determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), "Notice for public comment," the Energy Northwest analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
- 1. Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of,an Accident Previously Evaluated?
Response: No The proposed change adds test requirements to TS instrument Functions related to those variables that have a significant safety function to ensure that instruments will function as required to Initiate protective systems or actuate mitigating systems at the point assumed in the applicable safety analysis.
Surveillance tests are not an initiator to any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not significantly
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Page 7 of 8 increased. The systems and components required by the TS for which surveillance Notes are added are still required to be operable, meet the acceptance criteria for the surveillance requirements, and be capable of performing any mitigation function assumed in the accident analysis. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Does the Proposed Change Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously Evaluated?
Response: No The change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant, i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis but ensures that the instruments perform as assumed Inthe accident analysis. The proposed change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3: Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin of Safety?
Response: No The proposed change adds test requirements that will assure that TS Instrumentation AVs (1) will be limiting settings for assessing instrument channel operability and (2) will be conservatively determined so that evaluation of instrument performance history and the ALT requirements of the calibration procedures will not have an adverse effect on equipment operability. The testing methods and acceptance criteria for systems, structures, and components specified In applicable codes and standards (or altematives approved for use by the NRC) will continue to be met as described in the plant licensing basis including the'updated FSAR. There is no impact to safety analysis acceptance criteria as depcribed Inthe plant licensing basis because no change is made to the accident analysis assumptions. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
5.2 AppLICABLE REGULATORY REQUiREMIENSISCRITERIA A description of the proposed TS change and its relationship to applicable regulatory requirements were published in the FederalRegisterNotice of Availability on May 11, 2010 (75 FR 26294). Energy Northwest has reviewed the NRC staff's model SE published as part of the Notice of Availability and concluded that the regulatory evaluation section is applicable to Columbia.
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Attachment I Page 8 of 8
6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The proposed change would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, and would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does not involve (I) a significant hazards consideration, (ii)a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (lii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental Impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed change.
7.0 BEFEREJNCE
- 1. Owners Group Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler TSTF-493-A, Revision 4 "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions"
- 2. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 13, "Instrumentation and Control"
- 3. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A GDC 20, "Protection System Functions"
- 4. 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical Specifications"
- 6. 10 CFR 51.22, "Criterion for categorical exclusion; identification of licensing and regulatory actions eligible for categorical exclusion or otherwise not requiring environmental review"
- 7. Regulatory Guide 1.105, Revision 3, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation"
- 8. ISA-$67-04-1994, "Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation"
- 9. G02-12-017 dated January 17, 2012, from BJ Sawatzke (Energy Northwest) to NRC, "Ucense Amendment Request to Change Technical Specifications in support of PRNM / ARTS / MELLLA Implementation"
- 10. G02-13-075 dated May 9, 2013, from BJ Sawatzke (Energy Northwest) to NRC, "Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement PRNM/ARTS/MELLLA"
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Page 1 of 5 IDENTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENT FUNCTIONS TO BE ANNOTATED WITH OR EXCLUDED FROM SURVEILLANCE NOTES FOR APPLICATION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Instrumentation Functions Annotated with Surveillance Notes NUREG-1433 (except as noted below) Columbia TS Table 3.3.1.1-1, "Reactor Protection System Table 3.3.1.1-1, "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation" Functions Instrumentation" Functions
- a. Neutron Flux - High a. Neutron Flux - High
- 2. Average Power Range Monitors 2. Average Power Range Monitors - See Attachment 1
- a. Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Section 4.4
- b. Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High
- c. Fixed Neutron Flux - High
- d. Downscale [Average Power Range Monitors, Downscale is not Inthe Columbia TS]
- 3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High 3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High
- 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3
- 6. Drywell Pressure - High 6. Primary Containment Pressure - High NUREG-1434
- 8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High 7. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High
- a. Transmitter/Trip Unit a. Transmltter/Trip Unit
- 9. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil 9. Turbine Governor Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Pressure - Low TS 3.3.1.3, "Oscillation Power Range Monitor Instrumentation" Functions Oscillation Power Range Monitors - See Attachment I Section 4.4 Table 3.3.2.1-1, "Control Rod Block Table 3.3.2.1-1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation" Functions Instrumentation" Functions
- 1. Rod Block Monitor 1. Rod Block Monitor - See Attachment I Section 4.4
- a. Low Power Range - Upscale
- b. Intermediate Power Range - Upscale
- c. High Power Range - Upscale TS 3.3.4.1, "EOC-RPT Instrumentation" TS 3.3.4.1, "EOC-RPT Instrumentation" Functions Functions Trip Units [Trip Units are not part of the Columbia design for this function)
Turbine Control Valve - Fast Closure, Trip OR Pressure Turbine Governor Valve Fast Closure, Trip oil Pressure
- Low - Low NUREG-1434 Table 3.3.5.1-1, "Emergency Core Cooling Table 3.3.5&1-1, "Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation" Functions System Instrumentation" Functions
- 1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low 1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Subsystems Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Subsystems
- a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level I Level I
- b. Drywell Pressure - High b. Drywell Pressure - High
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Page 2 of 5 NUREG-1433 (except as noted below) Columbia TS
- a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level I Level I
- b. Drywell Pressure - High b. Drywell Pressure - High
- 3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System 3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System
- a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2
- b. Drywell Pressure - High b. Drywell Pressure - High
- c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 (Optional to Include surveillance Notes or not)
- f. HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) [HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) Is (Ifmechanical device, excluded from surveillance not part of the Columbia design for this function]
Notes) (ifvalve locked open, Function can be removed from TS)
- g. HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Bypass) (If f. HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Minimum Flow) mechanical device, excluded from surveillance Notes) (ifvalve locked open, Function can be removed from TS)
- 4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip 4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A System A
- a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level I Level I
- b. Drywall Pressure - High [Drywell Pressure - High is not part of the Columbia design for this Function]
- d. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 (Confirmatory) (Permissive)
- f. Accumulator Backup Compressed Gas System Pressure - Low
- a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level l Level I
- b. Drywell Pressure - High [Drywell Pressure - High is not part of the Columbia design for this function]
- d. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 (Confirmatory) (Permissive)
- e. Accumulator Backup Compressed Gas System Pressure - Low Table 3.3.5.2-1, "Reactor Core Isolation Table 3.3.5.2-1, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrumentation" Functions Cooling System Instrumentation" Functions
- 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2
- 2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 - 2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 (Optional to Include surveillance Notes or not)
- 4. Suppression Pool Water Level - High (Ifmechanical [Suppression Pool Water Level - High is not part of the device, excluded from surveillance Notes) Columbia design for this function]
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Page 3 of 5 Instrumentation Functions Excluded From Surveillance Notes NUREG-1433 (except as noted below) Columbia TS Table 3.3.1.1-1, "Reactor Protection System Table 3.3.1.1-1, "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation" Functions Instrumentation" Functions
- b. Inop (Interlock excluded from surveillance Notes) b. Inop (Interlock excluded from surveillance Notes)
- 2. Average Power Range Monitors 2. Average Power Range Monitors - See Attachment I
- e. Inop (Interlock excluded from surveillance Notes) Section 4.4
- 5. Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure (Mechanical 5. Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure (Mechanical device excluded from surveillance Notes) device excluded from surveillance Notes)
- 7. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High 7. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High
- b. Float Switch (Mechanical device excluded from b. Float Switch (Mechanical device excluded from surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes)
- 8. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure (Mechanical device 8. Turbine Throttle Valve - Closure (Mechanical device excluded from surveillance Notes) excluded from surveillance Notes)
- 10. Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position (Manual 10. Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position actuation excluded from surveillance Notes) (Manual actuation excluded from surveillance Notes)
- 11. Manual Scram (Manual actuation excluded from 11. Manual Scram (Manual actuation excluded from surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes)
Table 3.3.2.1,1, -Control Rod Block Table 3.3.2.1-1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation" Functions Instrumentation" Functions
- 1. Rod Block Monitor 1. Rod Block Monitor - See Attachment I Section 4.4
- d. Inop (Interlock excluded from surveillance Notes)
- f. Bypass Time Delay (Permissive or Interlock [Bypass Time Delay is not part of the Columbia excluded from surveillance Notes ifitderives Input design for this function]
from a sensor or adjustable device that is tested as part of another TS function.)
- 2. Rod Worth Minimizer (Not part of RPS or ECCS 2. Rod Worth Minimizer (Not part of RPS or ECCS excluded from surveillance Notes) excluded from surveillance Notes)
- 3. Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position (Manual 3. Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position (Manual actuation excluded from surveillance Notes) actuation excluded from surveillance Notes) 18 3.3.4.1, "EOC-RPT Instrumentation" 18 3.3.4.1, "EOC-RPT Instrumentation" Functions Functions Turbine Stop Valve - Closure (Mechanical component Turbine Trip Valve - Closure (Mechanical component excluded from surveillance Notes) excluded from surveillance Notes)
NUREG-1434 Table 3.3.S.1-1, "Emergency Core Cooling Table 3.3.5.1-1, "Emergemcy Core Cooling System Instrumentation" Functions System Instrumentation" Functions
- 1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low 1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Subsystems Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Subsystems
- c. LPCI Pump AStart . Time Delay Relay e. LPCI Pump AStart - LOCA/LOOP Time Delay (Permissive or interlock excluded from Relay (Permissive or interlock excluded from surveillance Notes.) surveillance Notes since it derives input from a sensor or adjustable device that is tested as part of another TS function)
- d. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (injection f. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) (Actuation logic excluded from Permissive) (Actuation logic excluded from
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Page 4 of 5 NUREG-1433 (except as noted below) Columbia TS surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes)
- e. LPCS Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass) g. LPCS Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Minimum (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) Flow) (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes)
- f. LPCI Pump ADischarge Flow - Low (Bypass) h. LPCI Pump ADischarge Flow - Low (Minimum (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) Flow) (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes)
- g. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from I. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes) 2.LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems 2. LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems
- c. LPCI Pump B Start - Time Delay Relay e. LPCI Pump B Start - LOCA/LOOP Time Delay (Permissive or Interlock excluded from Relay (Permissive or Interlock excluded from surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes since itderives input from a sensor or adjustable device that is tested as part of another TS function)
- d. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (Injection f. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) (Actuation logic excluded from Permissive) (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes)
- e. LPCI Pump B and LPCI Pump C Discharge Flow - g. LPCI Pumps 8 &C Discharge Flow - Low Low (Bypass) (Actuation logic excluded from (Minimum Flow) (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes)
- f. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from h. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes)
- 3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System 3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System
- d. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low (If d. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low mechanical device, excluded from surveillance (Mechanical device excluded from surveillance Notes) Notes)
- e. Suppression Pool Water Level - High (if e. Suppression Pool Water Level - High mechanical device, excluded from surveillance (Mechanical device excluded from surveillance Notes) Notes)
- h. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from g. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes)
- 4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip 4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A System A
- c. ADS Initiation Timer (Actuation logic excluded b. ADS Initiation Timer (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) from surveillance Notes)
- e. LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High d. LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes)
- f. LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure - High e. LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure - High (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes)
- g. ADS Bypass Timer (High Drywell Pressure) (ADS Bypass Timer (High Drywell Pressure) is not (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) part of the Columbia design for this function]
- h. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from g. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes)
- c. ADS Initiation Timer (Actuation logic excluded b. ADS Initiation Timer (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) from surveillance Notes)
- e. LPCI Pumps B &C Discharge Pressure - High d. LPCI Pumps S &C Discharge Pressure - High (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes)
- f. ADS Bypass Timer (High Drywell Pressure) (ADS Bypass Timer (High Drywell Pressure) Is not (Actuation logic excluded from surveillance Notes) part of the Columbia design for this function]
- g. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from f. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Page 5 of 5 NUREG-1433 (except as noted below) Columbia TS surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes)
Table 3.3.5.2-1, "Reactor Core Isolation Table 3.3.5.2-1, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrumentation" Functions Cooling System Instrumentation" Functions
- 3. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low (If 3. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low mechanical device, excluded from surveillance (Mechanical device excluded from surveillance Notes)
Notes) _
- 5. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from 4. Manual Initiation (Manual actuation excluded from surveillance Notes) surveillance Notes)
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Columbia Generating Station Technical Specification Markup Pages i.
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 34) I Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION DA REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 1. Intenedite Range Monilors
- a. Neutron Flux.Hi-l 2 3 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 :;1221125 SR 3.3.1.1.3 divtions of full SR 3.3.1.1.5 Scale SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3,11.1,10")
SR 3.3.1.1.14 60,) 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 : 122/125 SR 3.3.1.1.4 divisions of full SR 3.3.1.1.10mo' scale SR 3.3.1.1.14
- b. Inop 2 3 0 SR 3.3.1.1.3 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14
- 2. Average Power Range Monitors a Neuron Flux. High, 2 2 SR 3.3.1.1.1 *20% RTP Sedown SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.14
- b. Flow Biased Simula&d 1 2 F SR 3.3.1.1.1 :50.58 W + 62% RTP Thernmal Power- High SR 3.3.1.1.2 and < 114.9% RTP SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.14 (a) With any onr rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
(b) Reserved (c) Reserved (d) If the as-found chnnel stpolnt is outside Re predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verity that ft is functiornig as required before returning the channel to service.
(e) The I channel setpont stell be reset to a value that is wthin the asleft tolerance around the Lifit Trip Setpoln (LTSP) at t completion of the surveillane otherwise, tw channe shelf be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the asdour and as-left tolerances apply to the actual aelpoint "mpelmentedin the survellance procedures (Nominal Trip Seqoint) to confirm channel performnance. The LTSP and the mthodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Licensee Corroled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.1.1-6 Amendment No. 440,460 225
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 34) I Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.A REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 2. Averge Power Rang.
- c. Fbxed Nouln Flux - 1 2 F SR 3.3.1.1.1 < 120% RTP High SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15
- d. Inop 1.2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.7 NA SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.14
- 3. Rector Vssel Steam 1.2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.8 < 1079 psig Donn PressurS - High SR 3.3.1.1.10"'*
SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15
- 4. ReactorVeselWaterLewl 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 >9.5 inches
. Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3 .3.1.1. 1 0(4M" SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15
- 5. Main Steam Iolation Valve 1 8 F SR 3.3.1.1,8 <12.5% closed 0osur SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15
- 6. Primary Contairment 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.8 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.1.1.10(1""
SR 3.3.1.1.14 (d) If the as-found channel setpolnt is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, than the channel shall be evaluated to verify that It is funconng as required before returning the channel to service.
(e) The instument channel seipoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left toloence around the LmitIN Trip Setpoint (LTSP) at the completion of the survellance; otherwise, the channel shell be declared inoperable.
Ss4)olnt more conservative than Me LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-fund and as-left tolerances apply to the actual uetpoint implemented in the surveillance procedures (Norrinal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performwae. The LTSP and the thodologles used to detarmine th as-found and the as-left tolences are specified in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.1.1-7 Amendment No. 440,460 225
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 3 of 34) I Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MOOES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 7. Scram DIshae Volue Water Level - igh
- a. Trarmltt/Trip Unit 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.8 s 529g9 Inches SR 3.3.1.1.tO") elevation SR 3.3.1.1.14 SW 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.8 !5 29 ft 9inches SR 3.3.1.1.10"00 elevation SR 3.3.1.1.14
- b. FloatSwltch 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.8 !529ft9Inches SR 3.3.1.1.10 elevation SR 3.3.1.1.14 5(0 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.8 5 529 ft 9 Inches SR 3.3.1.1.10 elevation SR 3.3.1.1.14
- 8. Turbne Throts Valve- >30% RTP 4 E SR 3.3.1.1.8 :7%dosed losure SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15
- 9. TwbuneGovernorValve 230%RTP 2 E SR 3.3.1.1.8 >1000psig Fast Closure, Trip Oil SR 3.3.1.1.10(d1*'
Preset" - Low SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15 (a) With any control rod wthdrawn from a core cell containing one or rore fuel assemblies.
(d) if the as-found channel seaqoint is ous Its proed~n as-found tolerance, the the chanrel shall be evaluated to verify that I is functioning as required before reluing the channel to service.
(e) The instnument channel sqoint shall be reset to a value that is within the s-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpo*nt (LTSP) at the completin of the survilance: otherwise, the channel shall be declared Inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are accepta*le provided that the as-fod and as4eft tolerances appfy to the achie satpoint implemrnted in the surveiance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to conm channel performance, The LTSP and the methodolcoes used to determine the as-found and the s-left tolerances we spectlled in the License Controlled Specifcations.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.1.1-8 Amendment No. 440,469 225
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 4Q of 34) I Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 10. ReactorModeSwitch- 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.13 NA Shudown Position SR 3.3.1.1.14 50 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.14 NA
- 11. ManualScram 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14 s' 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14 (a) With any contl rod widawn from a core cell oontairnng one or more fuel assembis.
Columbia Genecating Station 3.3.1.1-9 Amendment No. 44-,460 225
EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.2.a Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable 24 months Value shall be:
TTV - Closure: 5 7% closed.
18 months
- 1. For the TGV Function, if the s- channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shell be evaluated to verity that It is functioning as required before returnng the channel to service.
- 2. For the TGV Function, the instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance round the Limitin Trip Selpoint (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the ps-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint impemented in the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and metodo es used to determine the as-found and the as-left toerances are specified in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
SR 3.3.4.1.2.b Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Value shall be:
TGV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low:
? 1000 psig.
SR 3.3.4.1.3 Verify TTV - Closure and TGV Fast Closure, Trip 18 months Oil Pressure - Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 30% RTP.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.4.1-3 Amendment No. 449,440 226
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 1 of 66) I Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE I. Low Pressure Coolant lnjctlon-A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
Subsystemrrs
- a. Reactor Vessel 1,2, 3, B SR 3.3.5.1.1 a -142.3 inches 44'), 513) 3.3.5.1.2 Water Level - Low SR Low Low, Level I SR 3.3.5.1.4(")
- b. Drywl Pressure- 1,2.3 2() B SR 3.3.5.1.2
- 1.88 pslg High SR 3.3.5.1.4ft)
- c. LPCS Pump StWt- 1, 2,3, C SR 3 .3.5.1.5(g) Ž8.53 seconds LOCA Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.6 and Relay
- 10.64 seconds
- d. LPCl Pump A Start- 44), '5a' C SR 3.3.5.1.5 1g) > 17.24 seconds LOCA Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.6 and < 21.53 Relay seconds
- e. LPCI Pump A Start- 4(=), 5(0' i C SR 3.3.5.1.2 k 3.04 seconds LOCA/LOOP TIme SR 3.3.5.1.3 and Delay Relay SR 3.3.5.1.6 *; 6.00 seconds
- f. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3 I per valve C SR 3.3.5.1.2 a 448 pslg and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.4 < 492 pslg (Injection SR 3.3.5.1.6 Permissive) 4(0) 5(*) 1 per valve B SR 3.3.5.1.2 k 448 pslg and SR 3.3.5.1.4 *5492 psig SR 3.3.5.1.8 (a) When associated subsystem(s) am required to be OPERABLE.
(b) Also required to Initiate the associated diesel generator (DG).
(a) Also supports OPERABILITY of 230 kV offthe power circuit pursuant to LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2.
(M) l the ae-found channel stpoint is ousK ts predefined ao-found tolerence, te the channel shall be evaluated to verify that ItIs funcioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(g) The instrument channel setpot shell be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Liriting Trip Sotpoint (LTSP) at the compleWn of the surveiltance; otherw-se, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptabl provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual sstpoint lwnlemenwd in the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Sstpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and ft methodologies used to deteimine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.1-6 Amendment No. 4-9,4.7- 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 66) I Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.I REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- g. LPCS Pump 44'), 5(a' 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.2 k 668 gpm and Dischge Flow - SR 3.3.5.1.4 :; 1067 gpm Low (Minimum Flow) SR 3.3.5.1.6
- h. LPCI Pump A 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.2 > 605 gpm and Dischar- Flow - SR 3.3.5.1.4 s 984 gpm Low (Minimum Flow) SR 3.3.5.1.6 44'), 5('
- 1. Manual Initiation 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 44 .'aP
- a. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3, B SR 3.3.5.1.1 > -142.3 inches Water Level - Low 44), 05 ,) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low Low, Level 1 SR 3 .3.5.1.4"11) I SR 3.3.5.1.6
- b. Drywall Pressure - 1,2.3 B SR 3.3.5.1.2 51.88 psig Hi SR 3.3.5.1.4"x) I SR 3.3.5.1.6
- c. LPCI Pump B Start - 1,2.3, C SR 3.3.5.1.") z: 17.24 seconds I LOCA Time Delay 44e), 5(') SR 3.3.5.1.6 and Relay :5 21.53 seconds
- d. LPCI Pump C Start - 1, 2,3, I($) C SR 3.3.5.1.") > 8.53 seconds LOCA Time Delay 44), 54 SR 3.3.5.1.6 and Relay :5 10.64 seconds (a) When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.
(b) Also required to Initiate the assodiated DO.
(e) Also supports OPERABILITY of 230 kVW ofte power circuit pursuant to LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2.
(f) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside Its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to veriy that i ýs functioning as required befo returing the channel to service.
(g) The instrunment channel setpoint shall be ret to a value that is wfthin the es0 tolrance,around the Limiting Trip Setpont (LTSP) at the cornpleion of ti surveillance; otherwise, the cannel shall be declere inoperable.
Setpoklt more conservative than the LT$P are acceptable provided that the asfound and as-left tolerances aply to the actual setpolnt oimpemented in ft surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performnce. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are speciie Inthe Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Genomfing Station 3.3.5.1-7 Amendment No. 44W,4-7 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 66) I Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 2. LPCI B and LPCi C Subsystems
- a. LPCl Pump B Start - 1, 2, 13.
142, I C SR 3.3.5.1.2 > 3.04 seconds LOCAJLOOP Time SR 3.3.5.1.3 and Delay Relay SR 3.3.5.1.6 < 6.00 seconds
- f. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3, I per valve C SR 3.3.5.1.2 a448 psa Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.4 and (Injecton SR 3.3.5.1.6 !;492 psig Pernmive) 4(9), 5() 1 per valve a SR 3.3.5.1.2 >448 pslg SR 3.3.5.1.4 and SR 3.3.5.1.6 s 492 psig
- g. LPCl Pumps B &C 1,2,3, 1 per pump E SR 3.3.5.1.2 > 605 gpm Discharge Flow - SR 3.3.5.1.4 and Low (Minimum flow) SR 3.3.5.1.6
- 984 gpm
- h. Manual Initiation 4(), 5(8) 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA
- 3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System
- a. Reactor Vessel 1, 2, 3, 4 (b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 ; -58 inches Water Level - Low 4(*) 5(s) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.5.1.409)
- b. DrywllPressure - 1,2,3 4 (b) B SR 3.3.5.1.2 :5 1.88 psig High SR 3.3.5.1.4")
SR 3.3.5.1.6 (a) When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.
(b) Also required to initiate the associated DG.
(f) If the as-found channel setpoint is oubtsd Its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is funcboing as requied before relurning the channel to service.
(g) The instrument channel selpoint shall be reset to a value that is wihin the as-left tolerance Wound the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) at the completi of the surveillance;-othese, the channel shall be declared Inoperable.
Selpoints more conservatwe than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and asleft tolerances apply to the actual selpoint implemented in the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setoint) to confirm channel pe-formance. The LTSP and the used to determine the as-found and the as-lft tolerances are specified in the Licensee Cntrofled Speciicatons.
Columbia GenemOng Station 3.3.5.1-8 Amendment No. 41,469 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 4 of 66) I Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION Al REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 3. HPCS System
- c. Reactor Ve"sel 1,2,3, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 < 56.0 Inches Water Level - High, 4 (), 5 (0) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 8 SR 3.3.5.1.4Cf)( I SR 3.3.5.1.6
- d. Condensate Stor"a 1,2,3, 2 0 SR 3.3.5.1.2 a 448 ft I Inch 4(o). 5(C)
Tank Level - Low SR 3.3.5.1.4 elevation SR 3.3.5.1.6
- a. Suppression Pool 1,2,3 2 0 SR 3.3.5.1.2 <466 ft Water Level - High SR 3.3.5.1.4 11 inches SR 3.3.6.1.6 elevation
- f. HPCS System Flow 1 2 3 I E SR 3.3.5.1.2 > 1200 gpm and Rate - Low SR 3.3.5.1.04(fg) 1512 gpm I (Mk Flow)
Rmm SR 3.3.5.1.6
- g. Manual Initiation 44), )s 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 44, 5)
- 4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A
- a. Reactor Vessel ~ 3(d) 1.(d, 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 > -142.3 inches Waer Level - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low Low, Level I SR 3 .3.5.1.4() I SR 3.3.5.1.6
- b. ADS Initiation Timer 1,2(d), 3(d) 1 G SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 115.0 seconds SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.6 (a) When associated subsystem(s) awe requiod to be OPERABLE.
(c) When HPCS is OPERABLE for oompllance with LCO 3.5.2, 'ECCS - Shutdown,' and aligned to the condenSate storage tank while tank water level is not within the limit of SR 3.5.2.2.
(d) With actor stam domeprsurie > 150 psig.
(f) If the as-found channel selpoint is outside s predefined as-found tolerance, Ohn the channel shall be evaluated to verify that I Isfunctoning as required before returning the channel to service.
(g) The instument channel setlpont shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared Inoperable.
Setpokft mo conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as4ound and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setlpoint implemwoed in the surveilance procwdres (Nomina, Trip Setpolnt) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified Inthe Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.1-9 Amendment No. 4.6,460 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 5 of 66) I Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.I REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 4. ADS Trip System A
- c. Reactor Vessel 1 , 2 (d), 3(d) I F SR 3.3.5.1.1 Z 9.5 Inches Water Level - Low, SR 3.3.5.12 Level 3 (Permissve) SR 3.3.5.1.4"t SR 3.3.5.1.6
- d. LPCSPump 1,2(),3(0) 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.2 >119psigand Discharge Prssure SR 3.3.5.1.4 :5 171 psig
- High SR 3.3.5.1.6
- e. LPCIPumpA 1 , 2 (d), 3 (d) 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.2 ;t116psigand Diechrge Pressure SR 3.3.5.1.4 < 134 psig
- High SR 3.3.5.1.6
- f. Accumuaor Bacwp 1 , 2 (d), 3 (4) 3 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 k 151.4 psug Compressd Gas SR 3.3.5.1.4ft)
System Pressure - SR 3.3.5.1.6 Low
- g. Manual nitiation 1 , 2 (d), 3 (d) 4 G SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA (d) With reactor stearn dome preuwe > 150 p1g.
(f) If the as-ound channel setpoint is outside ft predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evakuated to veify that 4 is functioning as required before retunlng the chane to service.
(g) The insnment channel seint sh"a be reset to a vl that wIthin the as4eft tolerance around the Limiting Trip Stpoint (LTSP) at the completion of the swysiltance; olhlews, the charnel sha be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative Ow the LTSP are acceptable provided that th as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpolnt implemented in the surveullance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm ohannel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Licees Controlled Specmcatkos.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.6.1-10 Amendment No. 466,469 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 66 of 68) I Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 5. ADS Trip System B
- a. ReactorVessel 1 , 2 (d), 3(d) 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 >-142.3 Inches Water Level - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low Low, Level I SR 3.3.5.1.04x)
- b. ADS lnitiation Timer 1 , 2 (d), 3 (d) 1 G SR 3.3.5.1.2 <115.0seconds SIR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.6
- c. ReactorVessel 1 , 2 (d),3 (d) I F SR 3.3.5.1.1 >9.5 inches Water Level - SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.4"0)
(Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.6
- d. LPCIPumpB &C 1,2d),,3() 2perpump G SR 3.3.5.1.2 >116psigand Discharge Pressure SR 3.3.5.1.4 : 134 psIg
- High SR 3.3.5.1.6
- e. Accumukto Backup 1 , 2 (d), 3 (d) 3 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 >151.4pelg Compressed Gas SR 3.3.5.1.4"';)
System Pressure - SR 3.3.5.1.6 Low
- f. Manual Initiation 1, 2e,3() 4 G SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.
(f) If te as-found channel setpoint is outside Its prefined awlfound tolerance, then the channel shall be evalated to verity that it is functioning as recuied before returnin the channel to service.
(g) The insturnent channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) al the completion of the surveillance; othervwse, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpolnts more conservati*e than the LTSP are acceptable pmrvided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoW implemeted in te surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpolnt) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Lcensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.1-11 Amendment No.
RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page I of 1)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrumentation CONDITIONS REQUIRED REFERENCED CHANNELS PER FROM REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 1. Reactor Vessel Water 4 B SR 3.3.5.2.1 > -58 Inches Level - Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3 .3.5.2.3(ab)
SR 3.3.5.2A
- 2. Reactor Veel Water 2 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 < 56 inches Level - High, Level 8 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.3")
- 3. Conrdenate Storage Tank 2 0 SR 3.3.5.2.1 ' 447 ft 7 inches Level - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 elevation SR 3.3.5.2.3 SR 3.3.5.2.4
- 4. Manual Initiation 2 C SR 3.3.5.2.4 NA (a) Ifthe as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be eveluated to verify that itis lutctloning as reqired before returning the channel to service.
(b) The Instrument channel setpolnt shall be reset to a value that is within the as-lef tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpomnts more congervative then the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implieented in the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel peformane. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances ar specfed in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.2-4 Amendment No. 440,240 226
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Columbia Generating Station Technical Specification Bases Markup Pages (for reference only)
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The RPS Initiates a reactor scram when one or more monitored parameters exceed their specified limit to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding and the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) and minimize the energy that must be absorbed following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This can be accomplished either automatically or manually.
The protection and monitoring functixo of the RPS have been designed to ensure safe operation of the reactor. This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RPS, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters, and equipment performance. The L86SS 9F# definod in.
Spec~ificrtion as the Alkiowablo V.aluas, which, in ceRjunctiop with the LCOp.Gtabih 018 thrOch"ld for P* c"oti'e 6ystom ":tie to "prov#n, 096.60dIR9 aiccoPabbl iqM t6, incuding Safety Limits (SLrs), durig Design SaseiE A~cidenlte (DB&Ac)
Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include LSSS for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as 'Where a LSSS is speiOi for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process varable at which a protective action is Initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a safety limit (SL) is not exceeded.
Any automatic protection action that occurs on reachirg the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection cnnels must be chosen to be mote conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the sei at which the automatic protetive action would actually occur.
The Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1 is a predetermined setting for a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL. would not be exceeded. As such, the LTSP accounts for uncertainties in seftt the channel (e.g., calibration),
uncertaWities in how the channel might *ctayperform (e.g.,
repeatabi*ty), changes in the point of acto of the channel over time (e.g., drift durin surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may In&unce
- ts actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the LTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded. Therefore, the LTSP meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref. 13).
Columbia Generating Station B83.3.1.1-1 Revision 74 1
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. Operable is defined in Technical Specifications as "...bein cap of performing its safety functim(s)." Relying solely on the LTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly meictive requirement If it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-fourd" value of a protection channel setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance probems, as well as reports and correc*ive tions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protection channl with a set that has been found to be different from the LTSP due to some ddft of the setting may stlll be OPERABLE because drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpolnt methodology for calculating the LTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as-found" setting of the protection channel. Therefore, the channel would still be OPERABLE because it would have perfornmed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the channel within the established as4eft tolerance around the LTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval. Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip sepoInt must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statiical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as-found criteria).
However, there is also some point beyond which the channel may not be able to perform its function due to, for example, greater than expected drift. This value needs to be specified In the Technical Specifications in order to define OPERABILITY of the channels and is designated as the Allowable Value.
If the actual setting (as-found setpoint) of the channel is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, the channel is OPERABLE but degraded. The degraded condition wilg be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel selpoint to the LTSP (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channel response. If the channel is functioning as required and expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel Is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
Revision Z~ I 83.3.1.1-2 Generating Station Columbia Generating Station B83.3.1.1-2 Revision 74 1
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The RPS, as described in the FSAR, Section 7.2 (Ref. 1), includes sensors, relays, bypass circuits, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of a reactor scram. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of dependent and independent parameters. The Input parameters to the scram logic are from instrumentation that monitors reactor vessel water level; reactor vessel pressure; neutron flux; main steam line isolation valve position; turbine govemor valve (TGV) fast closure, trip oil pressure low; turbine throttle valve (TTV) position; primary containment pressure and scram discharge volume (SDV) water level; as well as reactor mode switch in shutdown position and manual scram signals. There are at least four redundant sensor input signals from each of these parameters. Most channels include equipment (e.g., pressure switches) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When a setpoint is exceeded, the channel outputs an RPS trip signal to the trip logic.
The RPS is comprised of two independent trip systems (A and B), with two logic channels in each trip system (logic channels Al and A2, B1 and B2), as shown in Reference 1. The outputs of the logic channels in a trip system are combined in a one-out-of-two logic so either channel can trip the associated trip system. The tripping of both trip systems will produce a reactor scram. This logic arrangement is referred to as one-out-of-two taken twice logic. Each trip system can be reset by use of a reset switch. If a full scram occurs (both trip systems trip), a relay prevents reset of the trip systems for 10 seconds after the full scram signal is received. This 10 second delay on reset ensures that the scram function will be completed.
Two pilot scram valves are located in the hydraulic control unit (HCU) for each control rod drive (CR0). Each pilot scram valve is solenoid operated, with the solenoids normally energized. The pilot scram valves control the air supply to the scram inlet and outlet valves for the associated CRD. When either pilot scram valve solenoid is energized, air pressure holds the scram valves closed and, therefore, both pilot scram valve solenoids must be de-energized to cause a control rod to scram.
The scram valves control the supply and discharge paths for the CRD water during a scram. One of the pilot scram valve solenoids for each CRD is controlled by trip system A, and the other solenoid is controlled by trip system B. Any trip of trip system A in conjunction with any trip in trip system B results in de-energizing both solenoids, air bleeding off, scram valves opening, and control rod scram.
Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.1.1-3 Revision 73
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The backup scram valves, which energize on a scram signal to depressurize the scram air header, are also controlled by the RPS.
Additionally, the RPS System controls the SDV vent and drain valves such that when both trip systems trip, the SDV vent and drain valves dose to isolate the SDV.
APPLICABLE The actions of the RPS are assumed in the safety analyses of SAFETY References 2, 3,4, and 66. The RPS Initiates a reactor scram when ANALYSES, LCO, monitored parameter values are exceeded to preserve the integrity of the and APPLICABILITY the "a-pitFmnedelogy and listed in Table 3.3.14 1 to prc.... the OoW4ý-f cladding, the RCPB, and the containment by minimizing the energy that must be absorbed following a LOCA.
RPS Instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of Reference 6. Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis are retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.
Permissive and interlock setpoints allow the blocking of trips during plant startups, and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not satisfied, but they are not explicitly modeled in the Safety Analyses.
These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are consistent wfth the safety analysis, before preventive or mitigating actions occu. Because these permsves or interlocks are only one of multple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.
The OPERABILITY of the RPS is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual Instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1.
Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels per RPS trip system, with their setpoints set within the G",.cfld Allowable Vl*eethng tolerance of the LTSPs, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time, where appropriate.
Allowable Values for RPS instrumeUdion, Functions are specified in Table 3.3.1-1. LTSPs and the methodologies for calculation of the as-left and as-found tolerances are described in the Licensee Controlled Specifications Manual. Pwn~fien spoaioi~d Inthe Table. NeWm inrp iar--4-poc~fied in the selpoint cGlculoiNc6. The LTSPs.pemi"a setjE~4s setelste are selected to ensure that the actual setpoints remain conservative with repect to the as-found tolerance band
-he
- ewaW
-b,-* etween successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.
3.3.1.14 Revision ~ I 5B83.3.1.1-4 Generating Station Columbia Generating Station Revision 74 1
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 GPOrOAio W&t a tri cotpoin lose coeorewative th4An Ubho noAnoi~ tip selpo~it, but within 149 AlowpablAa we~u, is seseptabla. A chAnol ic Perable if its actual trip esoitpis~I not w~ith its rOquirod Allevvable Vatwe.After each calsibrto the trip setpoit shall be lWlt within the as-left bandl around the LTSP.
Columbia Gemneaing Station 8 3.3.1.1-5 Revision 74 1
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
T-ee)9Wi6nLTSPs are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., differential pressure switch) changes state.
The analytical limtsare derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytical limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors.p.eag *i.e * ,--w-----e--
oxcptdrit rdca~ro~.The trip~eetPaisLTSPs amdo*.odkfrm tho anal;14cGWMi, GOFrected
"-e"b for proce96 and all inct~rurn kunc~,tainges, then determne accounting i*r"k*" "l for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift), The LTS derived in this manner provide adequate protection because all-instrumentation uncertainties, Instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels th must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for. "&Wd p...... ffc are tiakn into account.
The OPERABILITY of plot scram valves and associated solenoids, backup scram valves, and SDV valves, described in the Background section, are not addressed by this LCO.
The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions specified in the Table that may require an RPS trip to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident or transient.
To ensure a reliable scram function, a combination of Pfunctions is required in each MODE to provide primary and diverse initiation signals.
The only MODES specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1 are MODES I and 2, and MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. No RPS Function is required in MODES 3 and 4 since all control rods are fully inserted and the Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block (LCO 3.3.2.1) does not allow any control rod to be withdrawn. In MODE 5, control rods withdrawn from a core cell containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, are not required to have the capability to scram. Provided all other control rods remain inserted, no RPS Function is required. In this condition, the required SDM (LCO 3.1.1) and refuel position one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) ensure that no event requiring RPS will occur.
The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.
Revision ~ I B 3.3.1.1-8 Generaft Station Columbia Generating Station B 3.3. 1.1 -6 Revision 74 1
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
Condition A, B, or C, and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition D will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.
E.1. F.. and G.1 If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions In an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In addition, the Completion Time of Required Action E.1 is consistent with the Completion Time provided in LCO 3.2.2, -MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)."
,tu If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed In trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and are, therefore, not required to be inserted. Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.
SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS REQUIREMENTS instrumentatlee Function are located In the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1.
The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that, when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the RPS reliability analysis (Ref. 11) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.
CoumIaIIII ..
Generat.. ing Stat .... I l I " iiiiiion.B.3..1.1-23Revisio .. .. II Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.1.1-23 Revision ;4 1
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3. 1.1 .1 Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This assessment Is the comparison, where possible, of the channel status or indication to the status or indication of an independent instrument measuring the same parameter. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift on one of the channels or something even more serious.
A significant deviation could Indicate gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumntation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, It may be an indication that the Instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are calibrated to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance. LCO 3.2.4, "Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Gain and Setpoint," allows the APRMs to be reading greater than actual THERMAL POWER to compensate for localized power peaking. When this adjustment is made, the requirement for the APRMs to indicate within 2% RTP of calculated power is modified to require the APRMs to indicate within 2% RTP of calculated MFLPO. The Frequency of once per 7 days is based on minor changes in LPRM sensitivity, which could affect the APRM reading between performances of SR 3.3.1.1.7.
A restriction to satisfying this SR when < 25% RTP is provided that requires the SR to be met only at 2 25% RTP because it is difficult to accurately maintain APRM indication of core THERMAL POWER consistent with a heat balance when < 25% RTP. At low power levels, a high degree of accuracy is unnecessary because of the large Inherent margin to thermal limits (MCPR and APLHGR). At > 25% RTP, the Surveillance is required to have been satisfactorily performed within the last 7 days in accordance with SR 3.0.2. A Note is provided which allows Columbia Generating Station 8 3.3.1.1-24 Revision Z3 I
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.1.1.8and SR 3.3.1.1.13 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
For Function 2.b, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST includes the adjustment of the APRM channel to conform to a calibrated flow signal.
This ensures that the total loop drive flow signals from the flow unit used to vary the setpont are appropriately compared to an injection test flow signal to verify the flow signal trip setpoint and, therefore, the APRM Function accurately reflects the required setpoint as a function of flow. If the flow signal trip setpoint Is not within the appropriate limit, the APRMs that receive an Input from the inoperable flow unit must be declared inoperable.
The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.8 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 11. The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.13 is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
SR 3.3.1.1.9andSR 3.3.1.1.10 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the Instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to the LTSP within the as-left I tolerance to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations I consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
Note I states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.
Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and the 1130 MWD/T LPRM calibration against the TIPs (SR 3.3.1.1.7). A second Note is provided that requires the APRM and IRM SRs to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Testing of the MODE 2 APRM and IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE I without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or moveable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE I if the associated Frequency is not met Columbia Generating Station 8 3.3.1.1-27 Revision Z3 I
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) per SR 3.0.2. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.
The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.9 is based upon the assumption of a 184 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.10 is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval for Functions I through 4, 6, 7, and 9 through 11 in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift In the setpoint analysis.
A Frequency of 24 months is assumed for Functions 5 and 8 because the position switches that perform these Functions are not susceptible to Instrument drift.
Numerous SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.10 functions are modified by two Notes as Identified in Table 3.3.1.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel perkforce for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside it as-found toerance but conservative with respect to the AllowaNe Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returing the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program wil ensure required review and documentation of the condition. The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the channel be within the as-left tolerance of the LTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the LTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedure (i.e., nominal trip setpoint, or NTSP), the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpolnt. This will ensure that suftent margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analyticat Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the asleft tolance of the LTSP, then the channel shall be decLared inoperable. The second Note also requires that LTSP and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
SR 33111 The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High Function uses an electronic filter circuit to generate a signal proportional to the core THERMAL POWER from the APRM neutron flux signal. This filter circuit is representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics that produce the relationship between the neutron flux and the Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.1.1-28 Revision 74 1
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.2.
- 2. FSAR, Section 5.2.2.
- 3. Columbia Generating Station Calculation NE-02-94-66, Revision 0, November 13, 1995.
- 4. FSAR, Section 6.3.3.
- 5. FSAR, Chapter 15.
- 6. 10 CFR 50.36(cX2)(ii).
- 7. FSAR, Section 15.4.1.
- 8. NEDO-23842, 'Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal in the Startup Range,- April 18, 1978.
- 9. FSAR, Section 15.4.9.
- 10. Letter, P. Check (NRC) to G. Lainas (NRC), *BWR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.
- 11. NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specication Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System,' March 1988.
- 12. License Controlled Specifications Manual.
- 13. NEDO 32291-A, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.
- 14. Regulatory Guide 1.105, Revision 3, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation.' I Columbia Generating Station 8 3.3.1.1-31 Revision 74 1
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.1.2.7 Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies the performance of the SRM detectors and associated circuitry. The Frequency considers the plant conditions required to perform the test, the ease of performing the test, and the likelihood of a change in the system or component status. The neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION (Note 1) because they cannot readily be adjusted. The detectors are fission chambers that are designed to have a relatively constant sensitivity over the range, and with an accuracy specified for a fixed useful life.
Note 2 to the Surveillance allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability. The SR must be performed in MODE 2 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of entering MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with the 18 month Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels. Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency Is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e., satisfactorily performing the CHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrumre channel functions as required by verifying the as-left and as-found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
REFERENCES None.
Columbia Generating Station B83.3.1.2-8 Revision Z3 I
Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation B 3.3.2.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels, or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limits.
The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure Is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on reliability analysis (Ref. 3).
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpolnt methodology. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as-left and as-found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodoogy.
The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval In the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
3.3.2.2-5 Revision~3 I B
Generating Station Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.2.2-5 Revision 73 1
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The EOC-RPT instrumentation initiates a recirculation pump trip (RPT) to reduce the peak reactor pressure and power resulting from turbine trip or generator load rejection transients to provide additional margin to the core thermal MCPR Safety Limit (SL).
The need for the additional negative reactivity in excess of that normally inserted on a scram reflects end of cycle reactivity considerations. Flux shapes at the end of cycle are such that the control rods may not be able to ensure that thermal limits are maintained by Inserting sufficient negative reactivity during the first few feet of rod travel upon a scram caused by Turbine Governor Valve (TGV) Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low, or Turbine Throttle Valve (TTV) - Closure. The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity at a faster rate than the control rods can add negative reactivity.
The protection functions of the EOC-RPT have been designed to ensure safe operation of the reactor during load rejection transients. This is achieved by specifying Wlmting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly moritored by the EOC-RPT, as well as LCOs on other system parameters and equipment performance.
Techrical Spec*cations are requred by 10 CFR 50.36 to include LSSSs for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "When a LSSS is spcified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Lit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit Is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the Safety Limit (SL) is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual se"s for automatic protection charnels must be chos to be more cosevAive than the Analytical Unit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective actior would actually occur.
The Limiting Trp Setpoint (LTSP) is a predetermined setting for a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process vari-,e reaching the Ansaytcal Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the LTSP accounts for uncertanities B 3.3.4.1-1Reisin 7:
lColumbaenraIn Staion I
CvkunWa Generating Station 8 3.3.4.1-A Revision 74 1
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) in setting the channel (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the channel might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the channel over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the LTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded. Therefore, the LTSP meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref.7).
The Allowable Value specified in SR 3.3.4.1.2.b serves as the LSSS such that a channel is OPERABLE If the trip setpoint is found not to exceed the Allowable Value. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the trip setpoint by an amount prmi equal to the expected instrument loop uncertaintes, such as dilfL during the survillance interval. In this manner, the actual setting of the device wi still taet the LSSS definition and ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval.
Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. Operable is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." Relying solely on the LTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were aWied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as found" value of a protection channel setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Techrc Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actios requivd by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protection channel with a setting that has been found to be different from the LTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE because drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifay accounted for in the setpoint methodolg for calculating the LTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as found" setting of the proitection channel. Therefore, the channel would still be OPERABLE becauge it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the channel within the established as-left tolerance around the LTSP to account forfuther drift during the next surveillance interval. Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions staed in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-lf criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as-found criteria).
Columbia Generating Station B83.3.4.1-2 Revision 74 1
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
However, there is also some point beyond which the channel may not be able to perform its function due to, for example, greater than expected drift. This value needs to be specified in the Technical Specifications in order to define OPERABILITY of the channels and is designated as the Allowable Va.
If the actual setting (as-found setpoint) of the channel is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, the channel is OPERABLE, but degraded. The degraded condition will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel selpoint to the LTSP (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channel response. If the channel is functioning as required and expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
The EOC-RPT instrumentation as described in Reference I is comprised of sensors that detect initiation of closure of the TTVs, or fast closure of the TGVs, combined with relays, logic circuits, and fast acting circuit breakers that interrupt the power to each of the recirculation pump motors. The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip relays) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpolnt is exceeded, the channel outputs an EOC-RPT signal to the trip logic. When the drive motor breakers trip open, the recirculation pumps coast down under their own inertia. The EOC-RPT has two identical trip systems, either of which can actuate an RPT.
Each EOC-RPT trip system is a two-out-of-two logic for each Function; thus, either two TTV - Closure or two TGV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low signals are required for a trip system to actuate. If either trip system actuates, both recirculation pumps will trip. There are two drive motor breakers in series per recirculation pump. One trip system trips one of the two drive motor breakers for each recirculation pump and the second trip system trips the other drive motor breaker for each recirculation pump.
APPLICABLE The TTV - Closure and the TGV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low SAFETY Functions are designed to trip the recirculation pumps in the event of a ANALYSES, LCO, turbine trip or generator load rejection to mitigate the neutron flux, heat and APPLICABILITY flux and pressurization transients, and to increase the margin to the MCPR SL. The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the turbine trip and generator load rejection, as well as other safety analyses that assume EOC-RPT, are summarized In References 2 and 3.
Columbia Generating Station B83.3.4.1-3 Revision 7-3 1
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
To mitigate pressurization transient effects, the EOC-RPT must trip the recirculation pumps after initiation of initial closure movement of either the TTVs or the TGVs. The combined effects of this trip and a scram reduce fuel bundle power more rapidly than does a scram alone, resulting in an increased margin to the MCPR SL. Alternatively, MCPR limits for an inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR are sufficient to mitigate pressurization transient effects. The EOC-RPT function is automatically disabled when THERMAL POWER, as sensed by turbine first stage pressure, is < 30% RTP.
EOC-RPT instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of Reference 4.
Permissive and interlock setponts allow the blocking of trips during plant start4ps, and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not satisfied, but they are not explicitly modeled In the Safety Analyses.
These permissives and interlocks ensre that the stating conditions are consistent with the safety analysis, before preventive or mitigating actions occur. Because these permissives or interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.
The OPERABILITY of the EOC-RPT is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumention channel Functions. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels in each trip system, with their setpoints set within the 8pr.ifi*d A *a* *aa V.u-A a of
$ýR A4eetting tolerance of the LTSP where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Channel OPERABILITY also includes the associated EOC-RPT breakers. Each channel (including the associated EOC-RPT breakers) must also respond within its assumed response time.
Allowable Values are specified for each EOC-RPT Function specified in the LCO. LTSPs and the methodologies for calculation of the as-left and as-found tolerances are descbed in te Licensee Controlled SpecificationsNirtiul 4ip GetpOi1#c aF@ cp9GAfd in tho cotpoint Ga..... The ..... LTmna
- s. are selected to ensure the setpoints remain conservative with respect to the as-found tolerance band do-no3 -exeedtheillJ..wb,, Valu, between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. After each calibrato the trip setpoint shal be left within the as-left band around the LTSP*;perea.n with a trip s-tpoint less eoneer~Iiti-o then ! nom ina! trip 604POmnt, but Within 46c Allowaible Value, iSOccePtaOle -A chaRnnol RciOPoeablo if its 3ctual trip setpoint i6 not 4&
.... -9 19w........... __. LTSPs-T--p*a-eiRed are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., TGV Columbia Generating Station B83.3.4.1-4 Revision 74 1
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 digital-electro hydraulic (DEH) pressure), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the Columbia Generating Station .
- B 3.3.4.1-5 Revision K- I
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) associated device (e.g., trip relay) changes state. The analytical limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytical limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The LTSPs are then determined account for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The LTSPs t4p.e;eit-denved in this manner provide adequate protection because all instrumentation uncertainties-, process effects, calibration tolerance, instrument drift, and severe environrmwt errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.a&d Pmcocc6 @ffecte are takn intoe aceount.
The specific Applicable Safety Analysis, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.
Alternately, since this instrumentation protects against a MCPR SL violation with the instrumentation inoperable, modifications to the MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2) may be applied to allow this LCO to be met. The MCPR penalty for the condition EOC-RPT inoperable is specified in the COLR.
Turbine Throttle Valve - Clse Closure of the TTVs and a main turbine trip result in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TTV - Closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from closure of these valves. EOC-RPT decreases reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.
Closure of the TTVs is determined by measuring the position of each throttle valve. While there are two separate position switches associated with each throttle valve, only the signal from one switch for each TTV Is used, with each of the four channels being assigned to a separate trip channel. The logic for the TTV - Closure Function is such that two or more TTVs must be closed to produce an EOC-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER > 30% RTP. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function. Four channels of TTV - Closure, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an EOC-RPT from this Function on a valid sigral. The TTV - Closure Allowable Value is selected to detect imminent TTV closure.
Columbia Generating Station B83.3.4.1-6 Revision 73
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
§R 3.3.4,1.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpolnt methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on reliability analysis (Ref. 5).
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency for SR 3.3.4.1.2.b is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration Interval, In the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
A Frequency of 24 months is assumed for SR 3.3.4.1.2.a because the TTV position switches are not susceptible to instrument drift.
SR 3.3.4.1.2.b for the TGV Fast Closure function is modified by two Notes. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpomnt is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.
Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions inthe setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to retunng the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to servic the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the channel be within the as4eft tolerance of the LTSP. Where a selxoint more conservative than the LTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (NTSP), the as4eft and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is mirntained. If the as-left Columbia Generating Station 8 3.3.4.1-10 Revision 74 1
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the LTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable. The second Note also requires that the LTSP and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the Licensee Controlled Specificatons.
SR 3.3.4.1.3 This SR ensures that an EOC-RPT initiated from the TTV - Closure and TGV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 30% RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated Into the actual
.setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure), the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during an in-service calibration at THERMAL POWER z 30% RTP to ensure that the calibration is valid. If any bypass channef's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at ;! 30% RTP either due to open main turbine bypass valves or other reasons), the affected TTV - Closure and TGV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are considered Inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed In the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met and the channel considered OPERABLE.
The Frequency of 18 months is based on engineering judgement and reliability of the components.
SR a.3.4.1.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as a part of this test, overlapping the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, to provide complete testing of the associated safety function. Therefore, if a breaker is Incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel would also be inoperable.
Revision 274 B 3.3.4.1-11 Generating Station Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.4.1 -11 Revision 74 1
EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.6.1.5.
- 2. FSAR, Section 5.2.2.
- 3. FSAR, Sections 15.2.2, 15.2.3, 15.2.5, and 15.2.6.
- 4. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)ii).
- 5. GENE-770-06-1-A, "Bases for Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals And Allowed Out-Of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," December 1992.
- 6. Licensee Controlled Specifications Manual.
- 7. ReguMory Guide 1.105, Revision 3, "Setintsfor Safety-Related Instrumerntation. I Columbia Generating Station 8 3.3.4.1-13 Revision 74 1
ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure Is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the required channels of this LCO.
A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days Is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 3.
A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as-left and as-found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for Instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration Interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.4.2.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers, included as part of this Surveillance, overlaps the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. Therefore, if a Columbia Generating Station B83.3.4.2-7 Revision Z3 I
ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel(s) would be inoperable.
Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.4.2-8 Revision:?3 I
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the ECCS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate responses from the systems to ensure that fuel is adequately cooled in the event of a design basis accident or transient. This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the ECCS, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance.
Teclial Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include LSSSs for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS Is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions wiN correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a Safety Limit (SL) is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.
The Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) specified in the Licensee Controlled Specifications is a predetermined setting for a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the LTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the channel (e.g.,
calibration), uncertainties in how the channel might actually perform (e.g.,
repeatability), changes in the point of action of the channel over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the LTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded. Therefore the LTSP meets the deinition of an LSSS (Ref. 6).
The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1 serves as the LSSS such that a channel is OPERABLE if the trip setpoint is found not to exceed the Allowable Value. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the trip setpoint by an amount primarily equal to the expected instrument loop uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will still meet the LSSS definition and ensure tht a SL is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval.
Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.5.1-1 Revision
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. Operable is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." Relying solely on the LTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as found" value of a protection channel setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protection channel with a setting that has been found to be Wifent from the LTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE because drift is to be expected. This expected drift wxold have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint rrmWedology for calctuating the LTSP and thus the automatic protective ction would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as found" setting of t protection channel. Therefore, the channel would st be OPERABLE beciau It would have performed Its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the channel within the estabRished asleft toernc around LTSP to account for further drft during the next surveillance interval. Note that, although the chanel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be lef adjusted to a valm within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assmptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as-found criteria).
However, there is also some point beyond which the channel may not be able to perform its function due to, for example, greater than expected drift. This value needs to be specified in the Technical Specifications in order to define OPERABILITY of the channels and is designated as the Allowable Value.
if the actual setting (as-found setpoint) of the channel is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, the channel is OPERABLE, but degraded. The degraded condition will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the LTSP (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channel response. If the channel is functionn as required and expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
Station II iB .3.JI 1- Revision*
Columblliai _* ingi GeneratJ_
Columbia Generating Station B83.3.6.1-2 Revision
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) level is monitored by two redundant differential pressure switches and drywell pressure is monitored by two redundant pressure switches per DG, which are, In turn, connected to two level switch and two pressure switch contacts, respectively. The outputs of the four divisionalized switches (two switches from each of the two variables) are connected to relays whose contacts are connected to a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. The DGs receive their Initiation signals from the associated Divisions' ECCS logic (i.e., DG 1 receives an initiation signal from Division I ECCS (LPCS and LPCI A); DG 2 receives an initiation signal from Division 2 ECCS (LPCI B and LPCI C); and DG 3 receives an initiation signal from Division 3 ECCS (HPCS)). The DGs can also be started manually from the control room and locally in the associated DG room. The DG initiation signal is a sealed in signal and must be manually reset. The DG initiation logic Is reset by resetting the associated ECCS Initiation logic. Upon receipt of an ECCS initiation signal, each DG is automatically started, is ready to load in approximately 15 seconds, and will run in standby conditions (rated voltage and speed, with the DG output breaker open). The DGs will only energize their respective Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses if a loss of offsite power occurs (Refer to Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1).
APPLICABLE The actions of the ECCS are explicitly assumed in the safety analyses of SAFETY References 1, 2, and 3. The ECCS is Initiated to preserve the integrity of ANALYSES, LCO, the fuel cladding by limiting the post LOCA peak cladding temperature to and APPLICABILITY less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits.
ECCS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of Reference 4. Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.
Permissive and interlock setpoints allow the blocking of trips during plant startups, and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not satisfied, but they are not expl modeled in the Safety Analyses.
These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are conseistent with the safety analysis, before preventive or mitigating actions occur. Because these permissives or Interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered as rorinal values without regard to measurement accuracy.
l I I 3. .6. Revision 7.&
Gen raingIII ColumbialIL-IIIL II II Station Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.5.1-8 Revision 74 1
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
The OPERABILITY of the ECCS instrumentation is dependent adl-upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints set within the setting tolerance of the specified Allowable Valu'.LTSPs, where appropriate.
The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem must also respond within its assumed response time. Table 3.3.5.1-1, footnote (b), is added to show that certain ECCS instrumentation Functions are also required to be OPERABLE to perform DG Initiation.
Allowable Values are specified for each ECCS Function specified in the TableTable 3.3.5.1-1. LTSPs and the methodologies for calculation of the as-left and as-found tolerances are described In the Licensee Controlled Specifications.- Nominal trP cctpoint WSo Spocied in the 6otPOint oaln irlaqenA- The LTSPs no.iqal Betpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints remain conservative with respect to the as-found tolerance band do n -ceed #%-Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. After each calibration the trip setpoint shall be left within the as-eft bend around the LTSP. LTSPs Oporation with a t.ip tm cpe litorl
"'U~e............a.OW.............t, .
A lewable Value. is aGGcptablo;_. A ebaan.li inpoalo if its.cta ti seetpaet is Pot wfthin Ar, roquircel Allowable Value. Trip sstpeints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g.,
reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip relay) changes state. The analytical limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytical limits, corrected for P(96866 and ail inctrument uncort~taioci, e~eep! d0if and ealib~ation.To tiip ratpeints are d~onod-froml tho analyice Iirr~s, Qarroctd for prFOGoe w-Rtwrnent kncRt9ainti966, including d(10t nd Malibratin calibration,
-9n- ýAll process, and some of the instrument errors. The LTSPs are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift).
The kip 6ttSLTSPs derived In this manner provide adequate protection because aelistrumentation uncertainties* -*.o.o.
And ,of,,,
are taken Wkto a "URIt, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50,49) are accounted for.
Some functions have both an upper and lower analytic limit that must be evaluated. The Allowable Values and the trip setpoints are derived from both an upper and lower analytic limit using the methodology described above. Due to the upper and lower analytic limits, Allowable Values of these Functions appear to incorporate a range. However, the upper and
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Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.5.1-9 Revision 74 1
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 lower Allowable Values are unique, with each Allowable Value associated with one unique analytic limit and trip setpoint.
In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS (or DG) initiation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident or transient. To ensure reliable ECCS and DG function, a combination of Functions is required to provide primary and secondary initiation signals.
Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.5.1 -10 Revision:?Z I
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
H.1 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the associated feature(s) may be incapable of performing the intended function and the supported feature(s) associated with the inoperable untripped channels must be declared inoperable immediately.
SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each ECCS REQUIREMENTS instrumentetien Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.1-1. I The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed In an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> as follows: (a) for Functions 3.c, 3.f, and 3.g; and (b) for Functions other than 3.c, 3.f, and 3.g provided the associated Function or redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability.
Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Survelilance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probebility that the ECCS will initiate when necessary.
SIR 3.3..1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK Is normaly a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It Is based on the assumption that Instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it Is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate property between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
Revision ~a I Generating Station B 3.3.5.1-34 Revision 74 1 Columbia Generating Station 8 3.3.5.1-34
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.§.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analyses of Reference 5.
SR 3.3.5.1.3. SR 3.3.5.1.4. and SR 3.3,5.1.5 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequencies are based upon the assumption of a 92 day, 18 month, or 24 month calibration interval, as applicable, in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. For SR 3.3.5.1.3 there is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument chrnel functions as required by verifying the as-left and as-found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
SR 3.3.5.1.4 for designated functions is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.5.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel perormance assumptioms in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels wil be evaluated under Vte plant Correcti Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.5,1-35 Revision
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition. The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the Staio 03
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Is IonIIIII Columbia Geeatn Columbia Generaft Station B 3.3.5.1-36 Revision
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) channel be within the as-left tolerance of the LTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the LTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (i.e., nominal trip setpoint, or NTSP), the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the LTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable.
The second Note also requires that LTSP and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the Licensee Controlled Specifications SR 3.3.§,1.§ The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.1, LCO 3.5.2, LCO 3.8.1, and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage (except for Division 3 which can be tested in any operational condition) and the potential for unplanned transients if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.
- 2. FSAR, Section 6.3.
- 3. FSAR, Chapter 15.
- 4. 10 CFR 50.36(cX2Xii).
- 5. NEDC-30936-P-A. "BWR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part 2,"
December 1968.
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.105, Revision 3, "Setpokit for Safety-Related Instrmentaion.
Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.5.1-37 Revision 74 1
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the RCIC System instrumentation is to initiate actions to ensure adequate core cooling when the reactor vessel is isolated from its primary heat sink (the main condenser) and normal coolant makeup flow from the Reactor Feedwater System is insufficient or unavailable, such that RCIC System initiation occurs and maintains sufficient reactor water level such that initiation of the low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) pumps does not occur. A more complete discussion of RCIC System operation is provided in the Bases of LCO 3.5.3, "RCIC System."
This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terrm of parameters directly monitored by the RCIC, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance.
Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include LSSSs for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settfngs for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than to Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.
The Limiting Trip Setpoit (LTSP) specified in the Licensee Controlled Specifications is a prermie setting for a protection channel chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the LTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the channel (e.g.,
calibration), uncertainties in how the channel might actually perform (e.g.,
repeatability), changes in the point of action of the channel over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may inf.uence its actual perfornance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the LTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded. Therefore the LTSP meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref. 3).
Col Genertl
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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES Background (continued)
The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1 serves as the LSSS such that a channel is OPERABLE if the trip setpoint is found not to exceed the Allowable Value. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the trip setpoint by an amount primarily equal to the expected instrument loop uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will still meet the LSSS definition and ensure that a SL Is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval.
Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment requied for safe operation of the facility. Operable is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s).' Relying solely on the LTSP to define OPERABILITY in Techniical Specification would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY lirit for the "as found" value of a protection channel setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protection channel with a setting that has been found to be different from the LTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE because drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the LTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as found" setting of the protection channel. Therefore, the channel would still be OPERABLE because it would have performed its safety function and the only correcive action required would be to reset the channel within the established as-eft tolerance around LTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval. Note that, although the channel Is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assu"mions stated In the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as-found criteria).
However, there Is also some point beyond which the channel may not be able to perform its fucto due to, for example, greater than expected drift. This value needs to be specified in the Technical Specifications in order to define OPERABILITY of the channels and is designated as the Allowable Value.
Columbia Generating Station 8 3.3.5.2-2 Revision 74 1
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES Background (continued)
If the actual setting (as-found setpoint) of the channel is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, the channel is OPERABLE, but degraded. The degraded condition will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the LTSP (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channel response. If the channel is functioning as required and expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel Is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
The RCIC System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.
Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level -
Low Low, Level 2. The variable is monitored by four differential pressure switches. The switch contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic arrangement. The logic can also be initiated by use of a manual switch and push button, whose two contacts are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic. Once Initiated, the RCIC logic seals in and can be reset by the operator only when the reactor vessel water level signals have cleared.
The RCIC test line isolation valve is closed on a RCIC initiation signal to allow full system flow.
The RCIC System also monitors the water levels in the condensate storage tanks (CST) since this is the initial source of water for RCIC operation. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon receipt of a RCIC initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless the pump suction valve from the suppression pool is open. If the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. Two level switches are used to detect low water level in the CST.
Either switch can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close (one-out-of-two logic). To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are Interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other automatically closes.
The RCIC System provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the high water level (Level 8) trip (two-out-of-two logic), at which time the RCIC steam supply valve closes (the injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valve).
The RCIC System restarts If vessel level again drops to the low level Initiation point (Level 2).
LRevision 7.
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Genera"t'ing Station"' *,,,,*,, ,,, B,,,=.3,.5.2-,,3, Columbia Generating Station B83.3.5.2-3 Revision 7-3 1
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE The function of the RCIC System, to provide makeup coolant to the SAFETY reactor, is to respond to transient events. The RCIC System is not an ANALYSES, LCO, Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken in the safety and APPLICABILITY analysis for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, however, the RCIC System, and therefore its instrumentation, meets Criterion 4 of Reference 1. Certain Instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.
Permisve and interlock setpoints allow the blocking of trips during plant startups, and restoration of trips when the permissive conditions are not satisfied, but they are not explcitly modeled in the Safety Analyses.
These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are consistent with the safety analysis, before preventive or mitigating actions occur. Because these permissives or interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are gerally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints set within the setting tolerance of the specified Allowable, VauesLTSPs, where appropriate.
The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time.
Allowable Values are specified for each RCIC System instrumentation Function specified in theT4able Table 3.3.5.2-1. LTSPs and the methodologies for calcution of the as-left and as-found tolerances are described in the Licensee Controlled Specifications. Nemi..al' *p 6etPo9inte are spocified in !he setpoln4 ealewuktionc-. The LTSPs AeMi~ial e+GeR46 am selected to ensure that the setpoints do Pot ecm-.d the Ailwabl. Vaku.-femain conservative with respect to the as-found tolerance band between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. L.,,,w
..er-.ie-4 wi;h-e
- L. .4vww=
tF'p 69tPOI~..i966.................t.............-. 61-.-lfit. 1311 M.* A.
A10A!Ioahl ValIn.. is ernmnabl. A GhaAROlei~ez paorabl ifA itf cual LA&o
,-t-.,,t i* notw-thin -its ^l"owa blo Vlue, -After each calibration
.aquird the trip setpoint shag be left within the as-left band around the LTSP.
LTSPsT*p -etpe-nt-,ae are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip relay) changes state. The analytical limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytical limits, corrected for calation, process, and some of the instrument Revision 7~
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.2-4 8B83.3.5.2-4 Generating Station Revision 74 1
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 errors. The LTSPs are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). prcces aRnd -1l ntR'.mOnt u8ncortaintiE;,
exoopt drift and calibratiln. The tr coetp*intc aro derived from the an"htic FAtm$, cwawred fQr prococo and- all inctrumonnt ,ncrtaintioc, including d-f -.nd cGaUbfa*P,. The LTSPstip-set derived in this manner provide adequate protection because al-instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, B 3.......... .Reviion....
ColumbWJa Generating Station Columbia Generating Station B83.3.5.2-5 Revision 74 1
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.
Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint metholology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as-found criteria).
The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, since this Is when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for Applicability Bases for the RCIC System.
The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.
- 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low. Level 2 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that normal feedwater flow Is insufficient to maintain reactor vessel water level and that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the RCIC System is initiated at Level 2 to assist in maintaining water level above the top of the active fuel.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four differential pressure switches that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is set high enough such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the RCIC System flow with high pressure core spray assumed to fail will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Level 1.
Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.
II_ lll l 3.3l.lllllllll.2- Revision ;.a ColumIaZ*_*__GeneratiniStation Columbia Generaft Station B83.3.5.2-6 Revision 74 1
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1, which performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction source to the suppression pool).
Alternatively, Required Action D.2.2 allows the manual alignment of the RCIC suction to the suppression pool, which also performs the intended function. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the RCIC System piping remains filled with water. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as In the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the RCIC suction piping), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.
E.1 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the RCIC System may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable immediately.
SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RCIC System REQUIREMENTS instrumentatop Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.2-1.
The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Functions 2 and 4; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Functions I and 3 provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 2) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance.
That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will initiate when necessary.
0R3.3,5.2.1 Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This assessment is the comparison, where possible, of the channel status or Indication to the status or indication of an independent Instrument measuring the same parameter. Significant deviations Columbia Generating Station 8 3.3.5.2-11 Revision 74 1
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious.
A significant deviation could indicate gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.5.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 2.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.5.2.3 Is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.5.2-1.
The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-ound setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value.
Evaluation of channel perfonance will verify that the channel will Columbia Generating Station 8 3.3.5.2-12 Revision 74 1
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded, after returning the channel to service the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.
The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the channel be within the s-4eft tolerance of the LTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the LTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures (i.e., nominal trip setpoint, or NTSP), the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as,4eft channel setting cannot be returned to a setting w~h the as-left tolerance of the LTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable. The second Note also requires that LTSP and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.36(cX)(2Xii).
- 2. GENE-770-06-2-A, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications,* December 1992.
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.105, Revision 3, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Insumentation." I Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.5.2-13 Revision Z4 I
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.6,1 .1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the Instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside Its limit.
The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.6.1.2 and SR 3.3.6.1.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoirt methodology.
The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.2 is based on reliability analysis described in References 10 and 11. The 184 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6,1.3 is based on engineering judgment and the reliability of the components.
SR 3.3.6.1.4 and SR 3.3.6.1.5 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrumen channel functions as required by verifying the as-left and as-found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology.
Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.6.1-32 Revision 74 1
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel wifl perform the intended function. Any setpotnt adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based upon the reliability analysis of References 4 and 5.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION Is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. There is a plant specific prWam which verifies that the instrument channel functions as requied by verifying the as-left and as-found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval In the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing, performed on SCIVs and the SGT System in LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3, respectively, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.
Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.6.2-9 Revision 74 1
CREF System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.7.1,2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analyses of References 5, 6, and 7.
SR 3.3.7.1,.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter widin the necessary range and accuracy. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by veifyn the as-left and as-found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpolnt analysis.
SR 3.3.7.1.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.7.3, "Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System," overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
Revision ~4 I Generating Station Columbia Generating Station 13 3.3.7.1-8 B 3.3.7.1-8 Revision 74 1
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP REQUIREMENTS Instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1.
The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains initiation capability. Initiation capability is maintained provided the following can be initiated by the Function (i.e., Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage) for two of the three DGs and 4.16 kV ESF buses: DG start, disconnect from the offsite power source, transfer to the alternate offslte power source, if available, DG output breaker closure, and load shed. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.
SR 3.3.8.1.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustments shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 31 days is based on plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift that demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 31 day interval is rare.
SR 3.3.8.1.2 and SR 3.3.8.1.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. There is a plant specific program whch verifies that the instrument channel functions as required by verifying the as-left and as-found setting are consistent with thoe established by the setpolnt methoxology. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpolnt methodology.
The Frequencies are based on the assumption of an 18 month or 24 month calibration interval, as applicable, in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
Columbia Generating Station B 3.3.8.1-8 Revision 74 1
RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is only required to be performed while the plant is in a condition in which the loss of the RPS bus will not jeopardize operation (the design of the system is such that the power source must be removed from service to conduct the Surveillance). In addition, if the plant will be shutdown in MODE 4 or 5 for an extended period of time it is acceptable to postpone the Surveillance until the plant is ready to go back to MODE 2 or 3. Performance of the SR immediately after shutdown would jeopardize the reliability of shutdown cooling during a time of high decay heat load. However, prior to restart it is reasonable to perform the surveillance to provide further assurance of the operability of equipment before returning to MODE 1. The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is intended to Indicate an outage of sufficient duration to allow for scheduling and proper performance of the Surveillance if it has not been performed in the last 184 days. The 184 day Frequency and the Note in the Surveillance are based on guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-09 (Ref. 3).
SR 3.3.§.2.2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. There is a plant specific program which verifies that the instrument channel functions as requred by verifying the asleft and as-found setting are consistent with those established by the setpoint methodology. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency Is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval In the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
Performance of a system functional test demonstrates a required system actuation (simulated or actual) signal. The logic of the system will automatically trip open the associated power monitoring assembly circuit breaker. Only one signal per power monitoring assembly is required to be tested. This Surveillance overlaps with the CHANNEL CALIBRATION to provide complete testing of the safety function. The system functional test of the Class I E circuit breakers Is included as part of this test to provide complete testing of the safety function. If the breakers are Incapable of operating, the associated electric power monitoring assembly would be inoperable.
Columbia Generating Station B83.3.8.2..6 Revision,74 I
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TSTF-493, REVISION 4, OPTION A Columbia Generating Station Revised (Clean) Technical Specification Pages
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 4) I Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- a. Neutron Flux - High 2 3 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 <5122/125 SR 3.3.1.1.3 divisions of full SR 3.3.1.1.5 scale SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3 .3.1.1. 1 0(d"e)
SR 3.3.1.1.14 5 (a) 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 < 122/125 SR 3.3.1.1.4 divisions of full I SR 3 .3.1.1. 10 (dxe) scale SR 3.3.1.1.14
- b. Inop 2 3 G SR 3.3.1.1.3 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14 sw) 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14
- 2. Average Power Range Monitors
- a. Neutron Flux - High, 2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1
- 20% RTP Setdown SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3,3.1.1.14
- b. Flow Biased Simulated I 2 F SR 3.3.1.1.1 < 0.58 W + 62% RTP Thermal Power - High SR 3.3.1.1.2 and : 114.9% RTP SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.14 (a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
(b) Reserved (c) Reserved (d) If the as-found channel setpoint Is outside Its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(e) The Instrument channel setpolnt shall be reset to a value that Is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpolnt (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared Inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpolnt implemented In the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified In the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.1.1-6 Amendment No. 440,.9 225
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 4) I Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 2. Average Power Range Monitors
- c. Fixed Neutron Flux - 1 2 F SR 3.3.1.1.1 < 120% RTP High SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15
- d. Inop 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.7 NA SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.14
- 3. Reactor Vessel Steam 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.8 1079 psig Dome Pressure - High SR 3.3.1.1.1010')
SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15
- 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 >9.5 inches
- Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10(&)()
SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15
- 5. Main Steam Isolation Valve 1 8 F SR 3.3.1.1.8 ! 12.5% closed
- Closure SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15
- 6. Primary Containment 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.8 < 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3 .3.1.1. 1 0 (dXe)
SR 3.3.1.1.14 (d) If the as-found channel setpoint Is outside Its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that It Is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(e) The Instrument channel setpolnt shall be reset to a value that Is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpolnt (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpolnt implemented In the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified In the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.1.1-7 Amendment No. 440,460 225
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 3 of 4) I Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 7. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High
- a. Transmitter/Trip Unit 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.8 _<529 ft 9 inches SR 3 .3.1.1.1 0 (dXe) elevation SR 3.3.1.1.14 5%a) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.8 _529 ft 9 inches SR 3 .3.1.1.1 0 (aXa) elevation SR 3.3.1.1.14
- b. Float Switch 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.8 < 529 ft 9 inches SR 3.3.1.1.10 elevation SR 3.3.1.1.14 5(8) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.8 529 ft 9 inches SR 3.3.1.1.10 elevation SR 3.3.1.1.14
- 8. Turbine Throttle Valve - > 30% RTP 4 E SR 3.3.1.1.8 s 7% closed Closure SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15
- 9. Turbine Governor Valve > 30% RTP 2 E SR 3.3.1.1.8 Ž1000 psig Fast Closure, Trip Oil SR 3 .3.1.1.I0(ddX°)
Pressure - Low SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15 (a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
(d) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it Is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(e) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented Inthe surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified In the Ucensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.1.1-8 Amendment No. 44.9,469 225
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 4 of 4) I Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 10. Reactor Mods Switch - 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.13 NA Shutdown Position SR 3.3.1.1.14 5(a) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.14 NA
- 11. Manual Scram 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14 5(s) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14 (a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.1.1-9 Amendment No. 440,4*9 225
EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.2.a Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable 24 months Value shall be:
TTV - Closure: 5 7% closed.
-.- ---- ---- NO TE ---..
.-.-.-..-.--..--....... 18 months
- 1. For the TGV Function, if the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
- 2. For the TGV Function, the instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
SR 3.3.4.1.2.b Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Value shall be:
TGV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low:
> 1000 psig.
SR 3.3.4.1.3 Verify TTV - Closure and TGV Fast Closure, Trip 18 months Oil Pressure - Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is Ž: 30% RTP.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.4.1-3 Amendment No. 44-.4* 9 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 1 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
Subsystems
- a. Reactor Vessel 3, 41,(a),2,59(a)
B SR 3.3.5.1.1 Ž -142.3 inches Water Level - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low Low, Level 1 SR 3.3.5.1.4(g)
- b. Drywell Pressure - 1,2,3 B SR 3.3.5.1.2 < 1.88 psig High SR 3 .3.5.1. 4((g)
- c. LPCS Pump Start - 1, 2, 3, 1(e) C SR 3.3.5.1.5()(g) _ 8.53 seconds LOCA Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.6 and Relay *510.64 seconds l(e)
- d. LPCI Pump A Start - 4ea), 5)(a C SR 3.3.5.1.5('O(g) ; 17.24 seconds LOCA Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.6 and *21.53 Relay seconds 4I2Z 3, 1
- e. LPCI Pump A Start - 4(?), 5(8) C SR 3.3.5.1.2 _>
3.04 seconds LOCA/LOOP Time SR 3.3.5.1.3 and Delay Relay SR 3.3.5.1.6 < 6.00 seconds
- f. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3 1 per valve C SR 3.3.5.1.2 > 448 psig and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.4
- 492 psig (Injection SR 3.3.5.1.6 Permissive) 4 (e), 5 (a) I per valve B SR 3.3.5.1.2 > 448 psig and SR 3.3.5.1.4 < 492 psig SR 3.3.5.1.6 (a) When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.
(b) Also required to Initiate the associated diesel generator (DG).
(e) Also supports OPERABILITY of 230 kV offsite power circuit pursuant to LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2.
(f) l1 the as-found channel setpoint Is outside Its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(g) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that Is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpolnt (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared Inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented In the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified Inthe Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.1-6 Amendment No. 460,47-2 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 6) I Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 1. LPCi and LPCS Subsystems
- g. LPCS Pump 4(a), (a) 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.2 > 668 gpm and Discharge Flow - SR 3.3.5.1.4 < 1067 gpm Low (Minimum Flow) SR 3.3.5.1.6
- h. LPCI Pump A 1,23, 4(a), 5(8) 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.2 > 605 gpm and Discharge Flow - SR 3.3.5.1.4 < 984 gpm Low (Minimum Flow) 1,2,3, SR 3.3.5.1.6 I. Manual Initiation 4(') 5(a) 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 1 23
- a. Reactor Vessel 2(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 > -142.3 inches Water Level - Low 4ea), 5(8) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low Low, Level I SR 3.3.5.1. 4 (0)(g)
- b. Drywell Pressure - 1,2,3 B SR 3.3.5.1.2 < 1.88 psig High SR 3.3.5.1. 4 (f)(g)
SR 3.3.5.1.6 1(s)
- c. LPCI Pump B Start - C SR 3.3.5.1.5()(g) > 17.24 seconds I LOCA Time Delay 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6 and Relay *21.53 seconds
- d. LPCI Pump C Start - C SR 3 .3.5.1. 5 (f(g) 8.53 seconds LOCA Time Delay 4(8), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6 and Relay < 10.64 seconds (a) When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.
(b) Also required to initiate the associated DG.
(e) Also supports OPERABILITY of 230 kV offsite power circuit pursuant to LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2.
(f) If the as-found channel setpoint Is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(g) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpolnt (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpolnt implemented in the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified inthe Ucensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.1-7 Amendment No. -. ,4.74. 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- e. LPCI Pump B Start - 4,2,'53P) 4(ea). 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 > 3.04 seconds LOCAILOOP Time SR 3.3.5.1.3 and Delay Relay SR 3.3.5.1.6 < 6.00 seconds
- f. Reactor Vessel 1,2.3, 1 per valve C SR 3.3.5.1.2 _ 448 pslg Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.4 and (Injection SR 3.3.5.1.6 < 492 psig Permissive) 4(a), 5(a) 1 per valve B SR 3.3.5.1.2 Ž 448 psig SR 3.3.5.1.4 and SR 3.3.5.1.6 *492 psig
- g. LPCI Pumps B & C 1,2,3, 1 per pump E SR 3.3.5.1.2 605 gpm Discharge Flow - 4(), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.4 and Low (Minimum flow) SR 3.3.5.1.6 < 984 gpm
- h. Manual Initiation 1,2,3, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 4(a), 5(a)
- 3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System
- a. Reactor Vessel 1,2, 3, 4 (b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 > -58 inches Water Level - Low 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low, Level 2 SR 3 .3.5.1.4((g)
- b. Drywell Pressure - 1,2,3 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.2 < 1.88 psig High SR 3 .3.5.1.4 0(g) I SR 3.3.5.1.6 (a) When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.
(b) Also required to Initiate the associated DG.
(f) If the as-found channel setpolnt is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(g) The Instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-4eft tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.1-8 Amendment No. 466,460 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 4 of 6) I Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 3. HPCS System
- c. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 < 56.0 inches Water Level - High, 4(a), 5 (a) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 8 SR 3.3.5.1. 4 (f)(g) I SR 3.3.5.1.6
- d. Condensate Storage 1,2,3, 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.2 >_448 ft I inch Tank Level - Low 4(c), 5(c) SR 3.3.5.1.4 elevation SR 3.3.5.1.6
- e. Suppression Pool 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.2 :5 466 ft Water Level - High SR 3.3.5.1.4 11 inches SR 3.3.5.1.6 elevation
- f. HPCS System Flow 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.2 > 1200 gpm and 4(a), 5(8)
Rate - Low SR 3.3.5.1.4("g)
< 1512 gpm I (Minimum Flow)
- g. Manual Initiation 4(a), 5(8) 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA
- 4. Automatic Depressurizatlon System (ADS) Trip System A
- a. Reactor Vessel 1, 2 (d), 3 (d) 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 > -142.3 inches Water Level - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low Low, Level I SR 3.3.5.1. 4 (t)(g) I SR 3.3.5.1.6
- b. ADS Initiation Timer 1, 2(d, 3 (d)
I G SR 3.3.5.1.2
- 115.0 seconds SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.6 (a) When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.
(c) When HPCS is OPERABLE for compliance with LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - Shutdown," and aligned to the condensate storage tank while tank water level is not within the limit of SR 3.5.2.2.
(d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.
(f) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it Is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(g) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpolnts more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpolnt Implemented In the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpolnt) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.1-9 Amendment No. 466,469 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 5 of 6) I Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 4. ADS Trip System A
- c. Reactor Vessel 1, 2(d), 3 (d) 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 Ž9.5 inches Water Level - Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 3 (Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.04 ((g)
- d. LPCS Pump 1, 2(d), 3(d) 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.2 Ž 119 psig and Discharge Pressure SR 3.3.5.1.4 *171 psig
- High SR 3.3.5.1.6
- e. LPCI Pump A 1, 2(d), 3(d) 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.2 2 116 psig and Discharge Pressure SR 3.3.5.1.4 <134 psig
- High SR 3.3.5.1.6
- f. Accumulator Backup 1, 2(d), 3(d) 3 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 Ž 151.4 psig Compressed Gas SR 3 .3.5.1.4((g)
System Pressure - SR 3.3.5.1.6 Low
- g. Manual Initiation 1, 2(d), 3(d) 4 G SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 160 peig.
(f) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside Its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that It is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(g) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that Is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpolnt (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpolnts more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual selpoint Implemented In the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified In the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.1-10 Amendment No. 466,469 225
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 6 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 5. ADS Trip System B
- a. Reactor Vessel 1, 2(d), 3 (d) 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 Ž-142.3 inches Water Level - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low Low, Level I SR 3.3.5.1. 4 (f)(g)
- b. ADS Initiation Timer 1, 2(), 3 (d) I G SR 3.3.5.1.2 < 115.0 seconds SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.6
- c. Reactor Vessel 1, 2 (d), 3 (d) 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.1 Ž 9.5 inches Water Level - SR 3.3.5.1.2 Low, Level 3 SR 3 .3.5.1.4 (f)(g)
(Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.6
- d. LPCI Pumps B &C 1, 2(), 3 (d) 2 per pump G SR 3.3.5.1.2 >116 psig and Discharge Pressure SR 3.3.5.1.4 s 134 psig
- High SR 3.3.5.1.6
- e. Accumulator Backup 1, 2 (d), 3 (d) 3 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 Ž151.4 psig Compressed Gas SR 3 .3.5.1. 4 ((g)
System Pressure - SR 3.3.5.1.6 Low
- f. Manual Initiation 1, 2 (d), 3 (d) 4 G SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.
(f) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that Itis functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(g) The Instrument channel setpolnt shall be reset to a value that Is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpoints more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented In the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.1-11 Amendment No.
RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 1 of 1)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrumentation CONDITIONS REQUIRED REFERENCED CHANNELS PER FROM REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 1. Reactor Vessel Water 4 B SR 3.3.5.2.1 -a-58 inches Level - Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3 .3.5.2.3(a)(b)
- 2. Reactor Vessel Water 2 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 *<56 inches Level - High, Level 8 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3 .3 5 23 (a)(b) I SR 3.3.5.2.4
- 3. Condensate Storage Tank 2 D SR 3.3.5.2.1 _ 447 ft 7 inches Level - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 elevation SR 3.3.5.2.3 SR 3.3.5.2.4
- 4. Manual Initiation 2 C SR 3.3.5.2.4 NA (a) If the as-found channel setpoint Is outside Its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(b) The Instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Limiting Trip SetpoInt (LTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable.
Setpolnts more conservative than the LTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the surveillance procedures (Nominal Trip Setpoint) to confirm channel performance. The LTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified In the Licensee Controlled Specifications.
Columbia Generating Station 3.3.5.2-4 Amendment No. 460,24-9 225