CNS-15-009, Errata Letter for 10 CFR 50.54(f) Submittal of Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (Ese) Report, Revision 2

Errata Letter for 10 CFR 50.54(f) Submittal of Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (Ese) Report, Revision 2

ML15317A013
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	11/05/2015
From:	Henderson K Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CNS-15-0096
Download: ML15317A013 (62)

Text

DUKEENERGYCatawba Vice President Kelvin Henderson Nuclear Station Duke Energy CN01VP / 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 o: 803.701.4251 f: 803.701.3221 10 CFR 50.54(f)

CNS-1 5-0096 November 5, 2015 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)

Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Numbers 50-413 and 50-414 Renewed License Numbers NPF-35 and NPF-52

SUBJECT:

ERRATA LETTER FOR 10 CFR 50.54(f) SUBMITTAL OF EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT, REVISION 2 Ladies and Gentlemen:

By letter dated October 22, 2015 (CNS-15-0083), Duke Energy Submitted the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Revision 2, in Response to NRC Request-For Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident for the Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2.

The letter referred to above inadvertently excluded pages 33 through 42 of the Enclosure.

Please find a complete Enclosure included in its entirety attached to this letter to replace the Enclosure in Duke Energy letter CNS-15-0083, dated October 22, 2015.

This document contains no new Regulatory Commitments.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter or require additional information, please contact Cecil Fletcher at (803) 701-3622.

Respectfully Submitted, Kelvin Henderson Site Vice President, Catawba Nuclear Station Enclosure

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNS-1 5-0096 Page 2 xc:

L. D. Wert, Jr., Acting Regionai Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 W. M. Dean, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop 13-HI6M 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G. E. Miller U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop 8 G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Stephen Wyman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop O-13C5 1-1-555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G.A. Hutto NRC Senior Resident Catawba Nuclear Station Justin Folkwein American Nuclear Insurers 95 Glastonbury Blvd., Suite 300 Glastonbury, CT 06033-4453

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT June 23, 2015 Revision 2 Duke Energy Catawba Nuclear Station Page Ilof 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE ........................................................................ 5 2.0 BRIEF

SUMMARY

OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES ................... 5 2.1 Maintain Core Cooling and Heat Removal FLEX Flow Path ............................... 6 2.1.1 Steam Generators Available Phase 1 ................................................... 6 2.1.2 Steam Generators Available Phase 2 ................................................... 6 2.1.3 Steam Generators Available Phase 3 .. ................................................ 6 2.1.4 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 1 .............................................. 6 2.1.5 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 2 .............................................. 6 2.1.6 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 3 .............................................. 7 2.2 Maintain RCS Inventory FLEX Flow Path .................................................... 7 2.2.1 Phase 1..................................................................................... 7 2.2.2 Phase 2..................................................................................... 7 2.2.3 Phase 3..................................................................................... 7 2.3 Maintain Containment FLEX Flow Path..................................................... 8 2.3.1 Phase 1..................................................................................... 8 2.3.2 Phase 2..................................................................................... 8 2.3.3 Phase 3..................................................................................... 8 3.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND EXPEDITED SEISMIC EQUIPMENT LIST (ESEL)................................................................................................ 8 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL..................................................... 8 3.1.1 ESEL Development....................................................................... 10 3.1.2 Power-Operated Valves ................................................................ 10 3.1.3 Pull Boxes ................................................................................ 10 3.1.4 Termination Cabinets ................................................................... 10 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators .................................................... 11 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections ............................................. 11 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation.............................................................................. 11 4.0 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS)........................................... 11 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee ................................................. 11 4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) ........................................ 13 5.0 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION (RLGM) .................................................... 15 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected.............................................................. 15 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS).............................. 16 6.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH................................................... 16 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used ......................................................... 17 6.2 IPEEE Screening Process .................................................................... 19 6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination............................................................. 20 Page 2. of 60

EpdtdSeismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL.................................. 20 6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach .............................................................. 20 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach ................................................................... 20 6.5.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information..................................... 22 6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings ........................................................ 23 6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process.................................................................. 23 6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays........................................................... 25 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)........................... 25 7.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS............................................................................. 26 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns ............................... 26 7.2 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out.................................. 26 8.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS............................................................. 26 8.1 Supporting Information..................................................................... 26 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications................................................... 28 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule .................................................. 28 8.4 Summary of Planned Actions............................................................... 28

9.0 REFERENCES

...................................................................................... 29 APPENDICES APPENDIX A Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX B Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX C CNS FLEX Flow Paths FIGURES Figure 4-1. CNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Form [4] ........................................... 122 Figure 4-2. CNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Form [4] ......................................... 123 Figure 4-3. CNS SSE (5% Damping) ..................................................................... 14 Figure 4-4. Comparison of CNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping) ...................................... 14 Figure 5-1. CNS RLGM (5% Damping).................................................................. 16 Figure 6-1. Comparison of CNS SSE and RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE........................................ 19 Page 3 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 Rev. 2 TABLES Table 4-1. CNS SSE (5% Damping) -Tabular Form [4]................................................ 13 Table 5-1. CNS RLGM (5% Damping) ................................................................... 15 Table 6-1. CNS IPEEE RLE (5% Damping) ............................................................... 18 Table 6-2. Unit 1 Components that Require Further Evaluations and/or Modifications ......... 24 Table 6-3. Unit 2 Components that Require Further Evaluations and/or Modifications ......... 24 Table 8-1. Summary of Planned Actions ............................................................... 28 Page 4 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I 1.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter [1]

requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS). The intent of the ESEP is to perform aninterim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [21.

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The CNS FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/Long-Term Subcriticality, and Containment Function are summarized below.

This summary is derived from the CNS Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [31 (as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [22], [23], [24], and [25]).

Conceptual sketches showing FLEX strategy flow paths are included in Appendix C.

Page 5 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 2.1 Maintain Core Cooling and Heat Removal FLEX Flow Path The FLEX flow path for maintaining core cooling and heat removal addresses plant operating conditions with or without steam generators available. Both scenarios are addressed below.

2.1.1 Steam Generators Available Phase 1 Phase 1 of the Maintain Core Cooling and Heat Removal Strategy relies on routing the Condenser Circulation Water (RC) inventory held in the RC piping through the steam generators. The steam generators route steam to the atmosphere via power-operated relief valves SV01, SV07, SV13, and SV19. Other piping used by both segments includes the piping downstream of the head vent valves and Valves CA178 and CA174 in the Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) system.

2.1.2 Steam Generators Available Phase 2 Phase 2 of the Maintain Core Cooling and Heat Removal Strategy introduces cooling water from the ultimate heat sink for use with the steam generators.

The water will be provided by diesel-driven portable pumps via any of a number of connection points to either the Nuclear Service Water System (RN) or the Steam Generator Wet Layup Recirculation System (BW) which vary depending on which equipment is available after the initiating event. The RN connection points will be fed by a high-capacity diesel-driven pump and will provide an uninterrupted water supply to the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump (TDAFWP) for steam generator makeup, as long as it is operational. Steam generator overfill will be controlled by starting and stopping the TDAFWP as necessary or manually throttling the CA flow control valves. The BW connection points would be fed by a low-capacity, low-pressure diesel-driven pump and include piping isolated by Unit 1 Valves 1BW51, 1BW52, 1BW53, and 1BW54 and Unit 2 Valves 2BW44, 2BW46, 2BW48, and 2BW50. These connection points would feed water directly to the steam generators.

2.1.3 Steam Generators Available Phase 3 Phase 3 of the Maintain Core Cooling and Heat Removal Strategy continues operation as Phase 2 with the addition of providing cooling for specific components in the system. Phase 3 starts when equipment arrives from the National SAFER Response Center (NSRC) to provide indefinite coping capabilities.

2.1.4 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 1 There are no necessary actions to provide coping during Phase 1. CNS has no means of providing borated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) makeup for Phase 1.

2.1.5 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 2 A low pressure pump will provide borated makeup to the RCS if the event were to occur during a refueling outage. This pump will be the same diesel-driven Page 6 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I low-pressure pump identified for connection to the BW system, as both of these strategies will not be performed at the same time. The suction supply for the portable pump will come from a new connection on the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) supply line for the Spent Fuel Pool between valves KF-2O1B and 103A on Units 1 and 2. The discharge from the portable pump will be into a new connection on the A Train Safety Injection System (NI) pump discharge piping that feeds the RCS hot or cold legs.

If the reactor vessel head is still installed when the event occurs, the reactor head vent valves will be powered using the motor control center back-feed strategy and portable diesel generators. The RCS depressurization will be initiated from the reactor head vent valves which will provide indefinite coping for depressurization. This method allows vapor to be vented in situations where voids may develop during the RCS cooldown/depressurization phase and allows the discharge of liquid inventory if required while injecting the required borated water.

If the reactor vessel head is not installed and fuel is still in the core when the event occurs, discharge of liquid inventory while injecting the required borated water will simply overflow out of the reactor vessel into the cavity/containment, keeping the fuel covered and cooled.

2.1.6 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 3 This strategy will be the same as that used for the Phase 3 strategy when the steam generators wereavailable with the exception that secondary side cooling will not be required.

2.2 Maintain RCS Inventory FLEX Flow Path 2.2.1 Phase 1 The CNS OIP identifies that a Phase 1 strategy is not required as the core is not in jeopardy of being uncovered until approximately 55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> after the initiating event.

2.2.2 Phase 2 The Phase 2 strategy for re-establishing reactor make-up water uses portable pumps to bypass the safety injection pumps, providing make-up water from the FWST to the safety injection pump discharge piping. The portable pump will be connected via connection points which will be installed by the end of each corresponding units' refueling outage.

2.2.3 Phase 3 Phase 3 of the Maintain RCS Inventory strategy relies on the use of a large diesel generator to power the residual heat removal system pumps. This diesel generator will also be provided by the NSRC.

Page 7 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I 2.3 Maintain Containment FLEX Flow Path 2.3.1 Phase 1 The CNS strategy for maintaining containment during Phase 1 relies upon passive cooling from the ice condenser. As the system is passive and does not rely on flow, a FLEX flow path was not established for Phase 1.

2.3.2 Phase 2 The Phase 2 Maintain Containment strategy has two portions. At least one train of hydrogen igniters will be re-powered. Additionally, forced air circulation will be required for containment cooling based on analyses (Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) - Ice Condenser Containment Response with FLEX Mitigation Strategies, Duke Energy Document No. DPC-1552.08-00-0280 [26]). This will be accomplished by operation of the H2 skimmer fans. Pressure inside containment is monitored by the containment pressure monitors 1NSPT5370 in Unit 1 and 2NSPT5370 in Unit 2.

2.3.3 Phase 3 The Phase 3 strategy utilizes forced air circulation for containment cooling based on analyses [26]. This will be accomplished by operation of the VX Containment Air Return fans, H2 skimmer fans, and two of the Lower Containment Ventilation Units.

3.0 Equipment Selection Process and Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL)

The complete ESELs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are presented in Appendices A and B, respectively. These lists were developed in Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic: Seismic - Catawba Nuclear Station Expedited Seismic Equipment List, ARES Corporation Report No.

030321.13.01-005, Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1211.00-06-0004 [17].

The selection of equipment for the ESEL followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2],

including the August 15 and November 14, 2013, NEI Questions and Answers.

3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event, as outlined in the CNS OIP in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [22], [23], [24], and

[25]. The OIP provides the CNS FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment Page 8 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 integrity consistent with the CNS OIP [3] and supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [22], (23], [24], and [25]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704 (2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions. Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704 (2].

1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the CNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [22], [233, [243, and [25].

2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [221, [23], [24], and [25] as described in Section 2.

3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components excluded per the EPRI 3002000704 [2]

guidance are:

• Structures (e.g., containment, Reactor Building, Control Building, Auxiliary Building, etc.)

• Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.

• Manual valves and rupture disks.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.

• Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in the ESEL.

Page 9 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 I I

3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the CNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [22], [23], [24], and [25] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&lDs) and Electrical One-Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.)

in branch circuits/branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc.

3.1.2, Power-Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power-operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that

"... functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g., RClC/AFW trips)." To address this concern, the following guidance is applied in the CNS ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power-operated valves:

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and are re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple Page 10 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 [

cables. The termination cabinets andi the internal connections provide a completely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNS OIP 1311 and subsequent updates [22], [23], [24], and [25] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 also notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either 'Primary' or 'Back-up/Alternate')."

Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports ... " are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, any active valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow paths are included in the ESEL.

3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment thatis not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation The ESEL only uses equipment that is the primary means of implementing FLEX strategy.

4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee The CNS GMRS used to select the ESEP Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) was included in the CNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. Digitized GMRS frequency and acceleration values from the CNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] are shown in Figure 4-1, which is Table 2.4-1 from [4]. The CNS GMRS is plotted in Figure 4-2.

Page 11 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 Table 2.4-1 UHRS and GMRS at Control point for Catawba (5% of critical damping

_________responlse spectra)

Freg (Hz) 1E-4 UHRS (g) 1E-5 UHRS (g) GMRS (g) 100 2.19E-01 6.91E-0'1 3.29E-01 90 2 21E-01 7.02E-01 3 34E-01 80 .2.262-01 7.252-01 3.45E-01

70. 2.40E-01 7.81E-01 3.70E-0i 60 2.75E-01 9.19E-01 4.33E-01 50 3.512-01 1.202+00 5.632-01 40 4,39E-01 I .482+00 6.982-01 35 4.67E-01. 1,,56E+00 7.352-01 30 4.82E-01 1 .58E+00 7.482-01 25 .4.792-01 1.54E+00 7.31E-01 20 4.66E-01 1.472+00 6.992-01 15 4.312-01 1.322+00 6.332-01 12.5 4.062-01 1.22E+00 5.892-01 10 3.74E-01 . 1.1IE+00 5.352-01 9 3.522-01 1 .03E+O0 4.982-01 8 3.29E-01 9.49E-01 4.61E2-01 7 3.05E-01 8.632-01 4.21 2-01 6 .2.77E-01. 7.72E-01 3.772-01 5 2.452-01 6.672-01 3.282-01 4 2.032-01 5.362-01 2.652-01' 3.5 1.80E-01 4.672-01 2.31E-01 31.56E-01 3.972-01 1.98E-01 2.5 1.272-01 3.162-01 1.582-01

2. 1.19E-01 2.902-01 1.452-01 1.5 9.492-02 2.26E-01 . 1.14E-01 1.25 8.03E-02. 1.892-01 '9.552-02

• 1 7.152-02 1.642-01 8.35E-02 0.9 6.96E-02 1.60E-01 . 8.142-02 0.8 6.732-02 1.552-01 7.872-02 0.7 6.362-02 1.472-01 7.442-02 0.6 5.762-02 1.332-01 6.742-02 0.5 4.902-02 1.132-01 5.74E-02 0.4 3.922-02 9.04E-02 4.592-02 0*35 3.432-02 7.912-*02 4.022-02 0:3 2.94E-02 6.782-02 3.442-02 0.25 2.452-02 5.652-02 2.872-02 0.2 1.962-02 4.522-02 2.292-02 0.15 1.472-02 3.392-02: 1.72E-02 0.125 1.222-02 2.832-02: 1.432-02 0.1, 9.79E-03 2.262-02 1.152-02 Figure 4-1. CNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Form [4].

Page 12 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 I CNS GMRS 0.8 i -__

0.7 '-,** -Ei .

'*0.3 - -i -

0 --2... . ._ _ .....,..-,-..

................ ... ....... k _ - -4 .* *_ . ... . .. . _ *._ __*.: G R 0.1 110 100)

Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-2. CNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Form [4].

The CNS Control Point is located at Elevation 544'-0", which is at the base of the mat foundation of the Reactor Buildings [4].

4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)

A description of the CNS horizontal SSE and spectral shape is included in Section 3.1 of the CNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. The SSE is tabulated as a function of frequency in Table 4-1 and plotted in Figure 4-3.

A comparison of the CNS GMRS plotted against the SSE is shown in Figure 4-4.

Table 4-1. CNS SSE (5% Damping) - Tabular Form [4].

Frequency Spectral Acceleration (Hz) (g) 0.33 0.06 2 0.36 6 0.36 35/PGA 0.'15 Page 13 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 Rev. 2 I l

CNS SSE 5% Damping 040

• 0.35 --

!i - -- i=

0.30

-- --SSE 0.20I

~0,0 V -

1.10 100 Figure 4-3. CNS SSE (5% Damping).

CNS GMRS vs SSE 0 .6 !  ! i i1 i ! i i *i

"* .4 . .. --* -*- - -SSE...

0.0 i -- i---- -- -"*'*!*-- s.

0.3 1........... .... 1- /: 10 -- - -=

• 100-..*

Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-4. Comparison of CNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping).

Page 14 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected The procedure for determining the RLGM for the ESEP is described in Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the spectral acceleration values for the 5%-damped SSE horizontal ground response spectrum by a scale factor. The scale factor is the largest ratio of spectral accelerations between the 5%-damped GMRS and the 5%-damped SSE ground response spectrum at frequencies from 1 Hz to 10 Hz, but not to exceed 2.0.

The ratio of the GMRS to the SSE over the 1 to 10 Hz frequency range is shown in Figure 4-4. The largest ratio of the GMRS to the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hz range is at 10 Hz. The ratio of the spectral accelerations is 0.535/0.28 = 1.91. Therefore, the RLGM is determined by multiplying the SSE ground response spectrum by 1.91. Digitized RLGM frequency and acceleration values are shown in Table 5-1.

The CNS RLGM is plotted in Figure 5-1.

Table 5-1. CNS RLGM (5% Damping).

Frequency Acceleration 0.333 0.115 0.5 0.172 1 0.344 2 0.688 3 0.688 4 0.688 5 0.688 6 0.688 7 0.637 8 0.596 9 0.562 10 0.535 11 0.509 12 0.487 13 0.468 14 0.452 15 0.436 17.5 0.404 20 0.378 22.5 0.357 25 0.339 27.5 0.323 30 0.309 35 0.287 100 0.287 Page 15 of 60 II

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv.

Rev. 2 I CNS RLGM 0.800 -*, T-*T " *7""

0.700

• _ ____i_--

, 0.5o0 O ..... ---.-

• - 0.300...

0.200 0.100i i i li 0.000 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 5-1. CNS RLGM (5% Damping).

5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)

The new ISRS for the ESEP were derived by scaling the CNS design-basis SSE ISRS (raw, unbroadened) by the RLGM scale factor of 1.91.

6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, in this case the 5%-damped RLGM spectral shape. The HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA. The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [21.

There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin [7].

2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959, Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities [8].

Page 16 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 Rev. 2 I I

6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used Seismic capacity screening was done using information from the CNS Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal [9] and supporting documentation (CNC-1535.00-00-0005 [181, Seismic Capacity Evaluations for the IPEEE and EPRI Seismic Margins Study]).

CNS used both a SPRA [10] and a SMA to address the IPEEE. The SPRA and SMA are described in the CNS IPEEE Submittal Report [9].

The SMA conducted for Catawba is documented in EPRI NP-6359 [19], Seismic Margin Assessment of the Catawba Nuclear Station. This SMA was a trial plant review to test the EPRI Seismic Margin Methodology. It was performed prior to the publication of NRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4 [6], and NUREG-1407 [5], Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, which provided the requirements for IPEEE. Consequently, it differed in some respects from most of the SMAs that were conducted for IPEEE. The Catawba SMA was equivalent to a full-scope SMA, as defined in NUREG-1407 [5], as it included a full-scope evaluation of relays, whereas NUREG-1407 [5] placed Catawba in the focused-scope category and only required a search for low-ruggedness relays.

The SMA documented in EPRI NP-6359 [19] was for Unit 2. During the IPEEE, Duke Energy conducted an additional SMA to extend the EPRI NP-6359 [19]

results to Unit 1 and all of the items on the IPEEE Seismic Equipment List in Unit 2. This SMA is documented in CNC-1535.00-00-0005 [18].

The SMA documented in CNC-1535.00-00-0005 [18] consisted of screening wallkdowns and anchorage calculations. The screening walkdowns used the screening tables from EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The walkdowns were conducted by registered professional engineers. Given the standards available at the time each of the two portions of the seismic review was done, the Seismic Review Team met the requirements and intent of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] and NUREG-1407 [5]. The walkdowns were documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) from EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. Anchorage capacity calculations utilized the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. Seismic demand was based on the Review Level Earthquake (RLE) selected for the Catawba Trial Plant Review, which was the Sequoyah 84th percentile site-specific spectral shape anchored to 0.3g PGA, which is similar to the NUREG/CR-0098 [11] response spectrum recommended in NUREG-1407 [5]. Frequency and acceleration values for the CNS IPEEE RLE are shown in Table 6-1. Figure 6-1 shows the EPRI NP-6359 [19] RLE compared to the SSE and RLGM response spectra.

Page 17 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I I

Table 6-1. CNS IPEEE RLE (5% Damping).

Freq. (Hz) Acc. (g) Freq. (Hz) Acc. (g) 0.25 0.20 3.78 0.729 0.28 0.027 4.23 0.752 0.31 0.033 4.74 0.772 0.35 0.041 5.31 0.792 0.39 0.048 5.94 0.817 0.44 0.055 6.66 0.839 0.49 0.063 7.45 0.806 0.55 0.077 8.35 0.727 0.62 0.093 9.35 0.644 0.69 0.110 10.47 0.566 0.78 0.128 11.72 0.511 0.87 0.148 13.13 0.473 0.97 0.167 14.7 0.445 1.09 0.184 16.46 0.424 1.22 0.201 18.43 0.410 1.37 0.220 20.64 0.398 1.53 0.251 23.11 0.382 1.71 0.301 25.88 0.363 1.92 0.374 28.98 0.341 2.15 0.470 32.46 0.320 2.4 0.546 36.34 0.308 2.69 0.589 40.7 0.301 3.01 0.635 46 0.300 3.38 0.689 _____ _ ____

Page 18 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe.

Rev. 2 I CN"S SSE and RLGM vs IPEEE RLE 0t

¢00 Frequeziy"(Hz)

Figure 6-1. Comparison of CNS SSE and RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE.

6.2 IPEEE Screening Process The equipment evaluations in the IPEEE were based on plant design information, including equipment qualification test and analysis reports. Failure modes considered were functional failures, including relay chatter, and anchorage failure. The original anchorage capacities were updated as needed based on the SMA walkdowns. Seismic interactions were addressed by the SMA walkdowns.

It is seen from Figure 6-1 that the RLE envelopes the RLGM at all frequencies greater than about 3.4 Hz. The RLE is less than the RLGM at frequencies below about 3.4 Hz. This may be disregarded as there are no CNS ESEL components in this frequency range. Therefore, any components whose SMA based HCLPF exceeds the RLE can be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

The screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL [71 are based on ground peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g. These both exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration of 0.69g. The anchorage capacity calculations were based on SSE floor response spectra scaled to the RLE, except for equipment in the Auxiliary Building for which new floor response spectra were generated for the RLE per EPRI NP-6359 [19]. Equipment for which the screening caveats were met and for which the anchorage capacity exceeded the RLE seismic demand can be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination because the HCLPF capacity exceeds the RLGM.

Page 19 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 I The results of the IPEEE capacity screening are noted in Appendix A for the Unit 1 ESEL and in Appendix B for the Unit 2 ESEL. For the components that were not screened out, HCLPF capacities were determined using the deterministic EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] CDFM methodology and RLGM spectral shape and/or anchorage evaluations.

6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination HCLPF capacities were determined by evaluating the function, anchorage, and seismic interaction failure modes. HCLPF functional capacities were determined using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. HCLPF anchorage capacities were determined using the CDFM methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. HCLPF seismic interaction capacities were determined by walkdown screening.

6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL The components were screened against EPRI NP-6041-SL [7], Table 2-4. ISRS were used for all components located above the basemat for the screening, and the screening levels of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] were increased by a factor of 1.5 (EPRI 1019200, Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update [20]). Thus, the accelerations for the screening levels are 1.2g and 1.8g instead of 0.8g and 1.2g.

The RLGM demand is screened against the unfactored screening level for components located at the basemat.

The raw, unbroadened SSE ISRS were amplified by a factor of 1.91 throughout the frequency range and were then clipped using the methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL, Appendix Q. The resulting clipped peaks ranged between 55%

and 100% of the original peak. The peak spectral accelerations of the North-South and East-West clipped peaks were averaged, as recommended in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7], Page 2-44. The resulting averaged peak spectral accelerations ranged between 96% and 100% of the maximum (North-South or East-West direction). Peak shifting was not performed for the CNS evaluations, since for all cases the evaluations utilized either the peak spectral acceleration or PGA.

HCLPFs for these components are shown in Appendices A and B3.

6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach Walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] for the Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]

describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria.

"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactiveor low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactiveenvironments, or possibly within Page 20 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 }

contaminatedcontainment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographicinspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurriedinspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiringan electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panelsfor detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not in tended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

If the SRT has a reasonablebasisfor assuming that the group of components are similarand are similarly anchoredj, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "~similarity-basis"should be developed before the wolkdown during the seismic capability preparatorywork (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets orpaneisfor this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedureshould be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurationswith the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondenceis found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedurefor inspection should be repeatedfor each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribedin criteriafor that component, potentialSI [Seismic Interaction1] problems, situationsthat are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend

'EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "... to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."

Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI11025287 [15]."

Page 21 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsiblefor the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidancefor sampling selection."~

6.5.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information Many of the components had been walked down previously during IPEEE evaluations and have documented SEWS recording the results. Credit is given to these walkdowns since they were performed by qualified Seismic Review Teams.

A walk-by of these components was performed and documented. The primary objective of a walk-by is to verify that the component and/or anchorage has not degraded since the original walkdown and to verify that the component is free of interaction issues that may have developed since the original walkdown.

Walkdowns were performed on all ESEL components which were not previously walked down during the IPEEE evaluations. Seismic Review Teams (SRT) were composed of SQUG-trained Seismic Capability Engineers (SCE). SRT members had B.S. Degrees in Mechanical or Civil Engineering and most were licensed Professional Engineers (PEs). Each SRT had at least one licensed PE. All SRT members had at least 7 years of engineering experience including designing and evaluating new and existing structures, systems, and components (SSCs) for nuclear facilities. The following table provides the qualifications of the ESEP SRT members.

,i ,*!, i,,*: *,*,***,:[

' : : :!**:* * '* ,* **, i: *; ,-"

• i ~!*:'***I:L 0 ***

Charles M. (Chiip) Conselman, P.E.

Paul Dorsh, P.E.

fProj ect jTechnical Manager Lead BS/Civil Engineering BS/Mechanical Engineering 25+

15+

Mike White Manager BS/Mechanical Engineering 20+ .

Jeff Martin, P.E. Senior Engineer BS/Mechanical Engineering 7+

Masonry block walls were evaluated as part of IPEEE and shown to meet the RLE demand. Therefore, they also meet the RLGM demand. Proximity of block walls to ESEL components was noted on the SEWS forms and the presence of block walls was considered in determining a HCLPF and identification of key failure modes.

Page 22 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 [

6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings All of the ESEL components included in the walkdowns and walk-bys completed to date were determined to have an existing capacity greater than the RLGM, with the exception of the components listed in Tables 6-2 and 6-3. These components require further evaluation and/or modification in order to have a capacity greater than the RLGM.

6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items not included in the previous CNS IPEEE evaluations were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The evaluations included the following steps:

• Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment not included in previous seismic walkdowns to evaluate the equipment-installed plant conditions;

• Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] as described in Section 6.2; and

• Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural failure modes (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functional failure modes.

All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in Expedited Seismic Evaluation Processfor Implementation of Seismic Risk Evaluations at Catawba NuclearStation, ARES Corporation Report 030321.13.01-003 (Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1211.00-06-0003),

Appendix D [21]. HCLPF results and key failure modes are included in the ESEL tables in Appendices A and B.

Page 23 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I Table 6-2. Unit 1 Components that Require Further Evaluations and/or Modifications.

ESEL EN Dsrpin Bldg E.Locat Recommendati PolmDsrpinAction Description ID _______ . ion on _________________Including PIP Numbers 19 lEAT Essential Area AU 5 FF- Move conduit The cabinet will likely impact a conduit Move conduit support for 7 C12 Terminal X 7 56 support. support during a seismic event. This clearance.

Cabinet 7 interaction has the potential to cause PIP# c-14-09014 (AR# 1897248) relay chatter. WO# 02169144 AR =Action Request AUX = Auxiliary PIP = Problem Investigation Process WO = Work Order Table 6-3. Unit 2 Components that Require Further Evaluations and/or Modifications.

bc Action Description ESLIDENBlg L.ati om Problem Description Including PIP ESLI I eciton Bd.E.aiendation on Numbers I I There are no Unit 2 components requiring I further evaluations or modifications.

Page 24 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 Rev. 2 I I

6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays Two types of relays (located in four cabinets) in the ESEL associated with the FLEX Phase 1 response required functional evaluations. Each relay was evaluated using the SMA relay evaluation criteria in Section 3 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7].

Specific seismic qualification test-based capacities were available for the relays in existing plant documentation. Relay capacity to demand evaluations were performed by comparing the test-based capacities with the in-cabinet seismic demand. The in-cabinet demand was determined by scaling the ESEP ISRS by the in-cabinet amplification factors from EPRI NP-6041-SL [71. In each case, the capacity exceeded the demand.

The ESEP relay functional evaluations are documented in Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Implementation of Seismic Risk Evaluations at Catawba Nuclear Station, ARES Corporation Report 030321.13.01-003 (Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1211.OO-06-0003), Appendix D, [21].

6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1 and Append ix B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables:

• For items screened out using the IPEEE evaluations, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per IPEEE."

• For items screened out using EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] screening tables, the screening levels are provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per EPRI NP-6041."

• For items where interaction with masonry walls controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Interaction - Block Walls."

• For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is noted as "Anchorage."

• For items where component function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Functional Failure."

• For items where relay function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Relay Chatter."

Page 25 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 [

7.0 Inaccessible Items 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns All ESEL items in Unit :1 were accessible for walkdowns except for hydrogen igniters 1EHMO035, 1EHMO039, and 1EHMO045 located in the Unit 1 Reactor Building. These igniters were judged seismically adequate based on similarity to the 65 igniters that were accessible and included in the walkdowns.

All ESEL items in Unit 2 were accessible for walkdowns except for hydrogen igniters 2EHMO041 and 2EHMO045 located in the Unit 2 Reactor Building. These igniters were judged seismically adequate based on similarity to the 65 igniters that were accessible and included in the walkdowns.

Accessibility to the igniters noted above was prevented due to unsafe access path. The SRT members judged that the igniters could be screened based upon similarity to the accessible igniters and the fact that all of the ignitors observed were properly anchored and in good material condition. Further effort to gain access was judged not to warrant the time and personnel exposure involved in construction of scaffolding.

7.2 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out There are no additional required walkdowns or evaluations.

8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 Supporting Information CNS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall CNS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. On March 12, 2014, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted to the NRC results of a study [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "... site-specific seismic hazards show that there clearly has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants." based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "... current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis ... "

Page 26 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 [

The NRC's May 9, 2014, NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [14]

concluded that the "... fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the G1-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in G1-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for CNS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12]; therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter (14] also apply to CNS.

In addition, the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of structures, systems and components (SSCs) inherently contain margin beyond their design level; (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs; and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. .This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

• Safety factors applied in design calculations;

• Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs;

• Bounding synthetic time histories for ISRS calculations;

• Broadening criteria for ISRS;

• Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications;

• Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis;

• Bounding requirements in codes and standards;

• Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel);

• Bounding testing requirements; and

• Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.

Page 27 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I I

8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications Tables 6-2 and 6-3 identify items where modifications will be made to enhance

• the seismic capacity of the plant.

8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule Plant modifications will be performed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [13] (endorsed by the NRC in their May 7, 2013, letter [16]), which states that plant modifications not requiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 2016 and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31, 2014.

8.4 Summary of Planned Actions The actions listed in Table 8-1 will be performed as a result of the ESEP.

Table 8-1. Summary of Planned Actions.

Action Equipment Equipment

1. ID Description Action Description 'Completion Date 1 N/A N/A Perform seismic walkdowns, generate Completed March 2015.

HCLPF calculations, and design and implement any necessary modifications for Unit 2 items as detailed in Section 7.2.

Note that this action is complete as of March 2015.

2 N/A N/A Complete modifications of Unit 1 Not !ater than the end of the components listed in Table 6-2. second planned Unit 1 refueling outage after December 31, 2014.

3*N/A N/A Complete evaluations!/modifications of Completed March 2015.

Unit 2 components listed in Table 6-3.

Note that this action is complete as of March 2015.

4 N/A N/A Submit a letter to NRC Summarizing The expected date for the results of item 1 and confirming Unit 1 letter is 60 days after implementation of the plant modifications the Spring 2017 outage which associated with items 1 through 3. is the second refueling outage after December 31, 2014. The expected date for Unit 2 would be no later than December 31, 2016, which is two years after the December 31, 2014, date.

Page 28 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 I I

9.0 References

[1] Letter from E. Leeds and M. Johnson, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al.,

"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012.

[2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance:Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013, EPRI 3002000704.

[3] CNS Overall Integrated Plan, Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses With Regard To Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events, EA-12-049"; Enclosure, Overall Integrated Plan (attachments 1 through 5), dated February 28, 2013, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[4] Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Additional Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 31, 2014, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[5] Proceduraland Submittal Guidancefor the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407.

[61 USNRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities- 10 CFR 50.54(f),"

June 28, 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

[7] A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI NP-6041-SL.

[8] Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities,Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, July 1, 1994, EPRI TR-103959.

[9] CatawbaNuclear Station IPEEE Submittal Repb~rt, July 1994, Duke Energy, York, SC.*

[10] CatawbaNuclear Station Unit 1, ProbabilisticRisk Assessment, September 1992, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[11] Development of Criteriafor Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, published May 1978, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-O098.

Page 29 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 I I

[12] Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States," March 12, 2014.

[131 Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations," April 9, 2013.

[14] Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.

[15] Seismic Evaluation Guidance:Screening, Prioritizationand Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February 2013, EPRI 1025287.

[16] Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to J. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

• Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013.

[17] Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic: Seismic - Catawba Nuclear Station Expedited Seismic Equipment List, Rev. 0, ARES Corporation .Report No. 030321.13.01-005, Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1211.00-06-0004.

[18] Seismic Capacity Evaluationsfor the IPEEE and EPRI Seismic Margins Study, Revision 3, Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1535.00-00-0005.

[19] Seismic Margin Assessment-of the Catawba Nuclear Station, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April 1989, EPRI NP-6359.

[20] Seismic FragilityApplications Guide Update, December 2009, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI 1019200.

[21] Expedited Seismic Evaluation Processfor Implementation of Seismic Risk Evaluationsat Catawba Nuclear Station, Revision 2, ARES Corporation Report 030321.13.01-003, Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1211.00-06-0003.

[221 First Update to CNS Overall Integrated Plan, Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy);

Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 28, 2013, Duke Energy, York, SC.

Page 30 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 I I

1231 Second Update to CNS Overall Integrated Plan, Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy);

Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; "Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2014, CNS-14-020, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[24] Third Update to CNS Overall Integrated Plan, Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy);

Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 28, 2014, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[25] Fourth Update to CNS Overall Integrated Plan, Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy);

Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; Fourth Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 26, 2015, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[261 Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) - Ice Condenser Con tainment Response with FLEX Mitigation Strategies, Revision 2, Duke Energy Document No.

DPC-1552.08-00-0280 Page 31 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I Appendix A Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 32 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESELand HCL.PF Rtesulta EIE ghn Devcrition tadO El. uNortan Dsoired Waibdywno Lovution Operating State OpeoratingStute or Waliv-by Rv:roeoinCRotes HCLPF" Key Failurt Modese 1 1NC25OA Reactor Head Vent Valve CV1i 600 080De825Rod Cloned Open Walkdownt >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-gRAS 2 1ttCi53A Reactor SoadVolts Valve Cvi 600 d4 06g2760 Rd closed Opet Walkdowcn >tlGM Smenacedper EPHI00-6841 102 tog Cosned Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 4 ONE$ Pressudztergafety Valve cvi g37 102 Deg Closed Functional Walk-by >RLGM SCreened per IPEEE 4 iNC2 PressurizerSafety Valve CVi 637 102 leg Closed Functional Walk-by vRLGM Screened per IPEES 6.. .. _5iNC .4A... ... Pressu.rzer..PouwerOp~eratedR~eief.Valve"..... . ... . .......... .. . .. 6I......

65. _ 565 Deg Cloned Fanctional Walk-by >RI/iM Screened HonIPSEEE 7 iNcKli VroessudzerReliefT~ank1 Ct/i 554 HRDog Fo~nctinnal Fauntional Walkdowno >RLGM Screened pet EPRIRP-H041 229 Deg38 Rod Open Cloned Walkdownn ... . . .........

.... . .. . 3_"

M.. ........... Screened perPRIp- ...... . ...

3 265 leg 53 Had Closed Open Walk-by Included in IPEEE,pg 5. >RLGOM Screenedper FPEEE H0 IAXARFD cottainmoent Air Return Fan SAinte Cv1 599 265508g53 Rad OHf On Walk-by >RLGIM Screened per I/PEEE iS1 1A(ARF4 Coo~tajonentAir Retort Fan S6Dape C~ti 599 253088g49 Had lonsed Open Wallk-by Included in IFEEE,0035. >RLSM Screened per IPSEEE 12 18VXCARF containmoentAir Return Fan 08 Ct/i 569 293 leg ARRad Ott On Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 23 it/lIA HydrogenSkimmeerFan IA tsolation CVi 658 2H0 DegA S5 ad Cloned Open Walkdowun 8.29 FunctioneelFailure 24 itatHOFA HydrogenSkimmer Fan 1A CVi 652 266 Dog5480ad Off On Walkdowny 0.44 Anckorage 15 50028 Hydrogenikimmrerran is Isolation Valve CVi 658 285 Deg45 Had Cloned Open Walkdowno 0.29 Functional Failure 16 IVERSFO HydroenvSkiotmer Fan 18 CV- 6s2 272 leg 49 tad Off On Walkdawno 0.44 Anvhorage 17 ONDiR Residual Heat Renmoval A Trait Isolation Valve CV1 568 176 Deg 25 Had cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM Screenedper IPEEE 58 iNO2A Residual Heat ReonovalA Train Isolation Valve CVi 567 176 Ded 50 Had Cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM Svreened per IPEEF 19 1NDPUA Reaidual Rent Removal Pump :IA AU11 S22 3G-54 Functional Functional Walk-ky >RLGM Screenedpor PErEE 20 1NHSHAPMP Residual Heat RemtovalPaumpMechaniral Seal Hear ExhavtugerIA ASS 5g22 FF-5S Functional Functional Walk-by tale-of-the-boo wvith1N03PUA vRIGM Screened pet IPlEEg 21 i1lC6X040S Residual Hent RennovalPomp 14 Motor Cooler ASS 522 G0-53 Functional Functional Walk-k3 Role-nf-tke-bvvoix w Sh10

• PUA >RlGtd Screened per tP666 22 1NDHXA Residual Heat RemovalHeat Evchanger tA ASS 5RHO li-Ri Fanctional Functional - Walk-by vRLGM Screened per IFEEE 24 iSFiOiB FW/Systemn/KFSystett Isolation Valve AUX 584 JJ-52 Closed Open Walkdownn >RIGM Screened per EPHINP-g04I 24 SFWTE0S RefuelirgWater Storage Tankl(FWST) Yard Intact Intact Walbdowno ,30 Anchorage 25 ilKcHXA Contponeot CoolingHeat Exrhanger IA ASS 577 Functional Functienal Walk-HR >RLOM Screened pmr FEES 66-58 Functional Functional Walk-by vRLGM Screened per IPEEE 27 1KCPHXA1 Contponent CoolingPuttp lA1 Motor Cooler AUX 560 Functional Fonctional Walk-by Rule-of-the-boo wnith1KCP/ UA1 >RLGM Screenedper FPEEE 28 OHcog6A Residual SeatRemnoval Heat Exchanger 1AItolation Valve AUX 590 Cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM Screenedper IPEEE 29 iRNg3A NudearServiveWatertoStandbysvdearServiceWateraond lincharge AiX 581 00-60 Closed Open Walk-by vRLGM Screened per PErEE Isolation Valve 35 18N250A Rudear ServiceWater to SCAPUTD IsolationValve ASS 587 Li-SR Cloned Open Walk-by

>RLGM Screened per IPEEH 32 /AWLCv'U IA lowverContaitnmett Ventilation Unit 1LCVU-I-SI RW 585 16 leg Functional Fanctional Walbdowne >RLGM Screenedper EPRINF-6041 Page 33 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESELand HCLPFResults ESEL NdoriTnal Desired Walkdlown 10 CIN Description OperatingSitote Opertitog 1t00e or Wolic-by Srcrveeig Notes 0 BldS CL Lcoativo H4aPF Icy Failorme Mode*"

30 1DWLCVU iD Lower ContainmtentVentilation Unit (LCeU-1D) tixi ins 344 Den Functinonl Functional Walbdown >RFLGM Screened per EP51RINP-6041 33 1BB24 SteanmGenerotor 1C Blowdown FlowControl Vaolve TB1 578 iL-29 Open Closed Walkdown >RLGSM irreened per EPSINP-60541 34 1BI36 SteoamGenerator 1D BlowdownFlow control Vaice TB1 583 1L-29 Open Closed Walkdown >RLGSM screened per EPSINP-604i 35 1Be69 iteamsGenerator IA SlowdownFlowControl Voive Tel 5ea 11.-29 Open Closed Walkdown >GM Screened per EFPINJP-6041 an 1nS7a itearn Generaotor1n elowdownFlowControl Vaive Tem sea 11.-29 Open Closed Walkdown >RLGM icreened per FF51NP-604il 37 1cA174 Condensor Circulating Water System,Isolation Valvo AUX 544 CC-is closed Open WoNk-by >RLGM Screened per IPFEE 3e iCA257 SCAPUTD Feedwater sofety Volvo AUX 534 VA-Si closed Fuectional Walkdowo >SLGM Screened per EFRiNF-6041 39 1CA~lSA Nuclear Service Water System Train IA Isolation Voice ASX i55 ne-il Closed Open Walk-bV >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 40 1CAPUTD Torbine DrivenAuxiliaryFeed Water Pump ASS i3i A-iB1 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLiM Screened per [PEFF 41 iCAHXS~l Torbine DrivenAuxiliaryFeed Water PumnpLube OilCooler ASS 551 DD-53 Functional Functinonl Walk-by lRule-of-the-lbox with 1CAPUD >RLGM Screened per IPFEEP 42 lCAe4 AuxiliaryFeedwater to SteamtGenerotor IA*Isioltion Valce ASS 55S ne-is Open Throttled Walltdown >RLGM Screered per EPRINP-6041 43 1CAS2 AuxiliaryPeedwaterto iteoamGenerator in Isloltion Valve AUS 546 Cc-ia Open Throttled Walkdown >RFIGM Screened per SPRIl NP-604i 44 1CA48 AuxiliaryFeedwater to SteameGenerator i(C Isolation Volvo ASS 551 10-53 Open Throttled Wolkdowo >RLGM Screened per CPSINP-6041 45 lcA36 AuxiliaryFeodwoter to Steom Generotor SD Isolation Volvo AUX 5i4 BB-49 Open Th1rottled Walkdown N/A N/A -WAternate 45 1SV2 Stea Genoerotor1DSafey Volvo Dn1 e18 tE-4 Closed Punctinonl Walk-bS >RLGM Screened per IP6CC 47 lSV3 SteoamGenerator iD Safety Voice 041 608 EE-44 closed Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP6CC 48 15V4 iteam Geneerotor10 Safety Valve DH1 519 EE-44 Closed Functionol Wolk-by >RLGM Screened per IP5CC 49 iSVS Steow Generator SDSafety Voice DH1 518 CE-44 Closed Functional >RFLGM Screened per IPtEE i0 15V6 Steam Generatorl1D SfetyeValve 041 6iS CE-44 closed Functinonl Walk-bV >RLGM Screened per IP6CC i1 1SMC Sooea Generotor iD Mominteanm Isolation Volvo 041 615 DD-44 Open Closed Walk-by >RFLGM screened per PIPES 52 15V8 Steoa Venerator 1c Safety Voice SDll 515 6E-52 closed Functinonl Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP0CC 0H1 618 1E-52 closed Functional Walk-bV >RLGM Screened per IPECC 54 1SV1O iteamnGenerotor iC Safety Voice 041 sin CC-i2 closed Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP6CC 55 ISVll Steam Generator 1c Safety Valce 041 618 CF-i2 closed Functional Walk-by >RlG~M Screened per PEEE 5n lSV12 SteamnGenerotor 1CSafety Volvo ens sin EE-i2 closed Functional Wal1k-by cRLGM Screened per IP6CC 57 15M3 iteom Generotor IC:Mole SteamtIsolation Voice DH1 515 DD-52 Open closed Walk-by cRLGM Screened per [PEEE 58 15V14 Steaw Generator iBnSafetyVoice lDH1 619 EE-53 Closed Functional Walk-bV >RSLGM -Screened per IP6EE 59 lSVIS Steow Generator in Safety Voice 0H1 6i8 EE-53 Closed Functional Walk-by >RFLOM Screened per IPEE6 43 1SVIS Steaw Generator in SafetVVoice 041 6in EE-53 closed Functional Walk-by >RLGM screened per PEEE 41 DSVi7 Steaw Generator iB SofetyVolce Del 518 66-53 closed Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP6CE 62 15V18 SteantGenerator 1BSafetyValve DH11 618 EC-53 Closed Functional Wal1k-by Screened per IPEEE

>RSISM Page 34 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL.and IHCIPF Results ESEl S~onnlal Desired Walkdowvn III kEtt Devunipti~n Ps~da El. lutoyno Operatingsta~e Ope'ra~lo Stote or Walk-ky Screening NoteS ISCIPP* Ken PailareModera 63 EMS5 Steam Generator SBMole Steam lsolation Value Dlii 615 DD-54 Open cloned Walk-ky >RLGM Screened per IPEE 64 IS5V20 Steam Generator IA Safely Vaive DHt 616 EE-44 Closed Punctional Walk-by 061GM Screened per [PEEE 65 iSV2I SteamGlenerator IA Safety S/aloe DHs 658 EE-44 Closed Functional Walk-by* >RLGM Screeneedper IPEER 66 ESV22 Stean, Generator IA Safety Valve DHS 618 EE-44 Closed Punctional Walk-by >R1GM Screened per IPEER 67 1SSV23 SteamlGeneratorIA Safety Valve DH1 tlS8 EE-G4 Closed Fanctional Walls-by >RLGM Screened per PEEE 68 IS/VZ4 Steam Generator lA Safety Value - . DH11/ 618 ER-44 Closed Funsctional Walk-by v6LGM Screened per [PEER 69 1GM7 Steam Generator IA Main Steam looietion Value Del 615 OD-43 Open Closed Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 75 ES/i Poner Operated R11ene Valve-Steam GoeneratorID DH61 601 PP-44 Closed Open *Walk-by >ELaM Screened pet PFEBE 71 ESV7 PowrerOperated ReliefValve -SteamlGenerator 1C Dlii 661 PP-53 Cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM ScreenednorlIPfER 72 15VE Power Operated RteliefValve-Steans Genetator 1.6 DHS 661 FF-53 Closed Open Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPERE 73 ESISV Power Operated Reliefyalvee-Steam Generatorl1A DHD 6111 PP-Ge Cloned Open Walk-by >RIGM Screened yerlPEEE 74 1SA2 iCAPUTDSteam Peedisolation S/aloe DC!. 626 PP-SI Cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPREEE 75 ESA145 1CApUTD Trip Throttle Valve(Stop Valvel ASS 534 A.A-Si Open Throttled Walk-by Ruale-ef-the-boxwith DCAPUD >RLGM Screened per IPEtE 76 1SA144 SCAPUTD Control Valve ASS 531 AA-5S Open Throttled Walk-by Rule-of-the-bee witb SCApUD v>RLSM Screened per IPEER 77 iNS/lXt Residual SeatRemoval Heat Exchanger 1B AUS 565 KlI-SD Intact Intact Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEER 78 51N454 AcuvmolatorTank IA lsolatiovValve CS/i 560 46 Dog 47 Rad Open Closed Walk-by >RLGM Screened peerfEEE 78 1NIBS6 Accomulator Tank 16 Isolation Valve 0/1 565 E37Deg4? Road Open Closed Walk-6y >RL1GM Screened per IPEEE 80 SNI76A AccumulatorTank IA Isolation S/alan CS/i 560 226 Deg 47 Rad Opeo Closed Walk-by >61LGM Screened per IPEER 81 1NI880 Atcumulator Took SAIvolationValue CS/i 580 SE Deeg47aRd Open Cloned Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 82 NSPISXIA Contaimnent Spray Heat Evekaeger 1A "AUX 577 LL-52 Intact Intact Walk-by " 11>RLM Screened perlPEtE 83 1N1HXB Containment Spray Heat Exchanger1B ASS 577 LL-S2 Intact Intact Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 84 iHLPIP Hot LegParticulate Sample Panel ASS 543 PP-S4 Intact intact Walkdownl vELGM Screened per EpRI P-6541 85 iNMHStl7 Reactor Coolant Rot tegSample Heat EnukangerlA ASS 543 Rne238 Intact Intact Waibdoen >RLGM Screened per EPRINIP-6041 86 t.NM/IIID8 Reactnr Coolant Hot lee SampleHeat Exckanger 16 AUX 545 Smn218 Intact Intact Walkdown vERLGM Scr*eenedper EPRINP-6541 87 iPSS PrimarySample SinE16 - ASS 541 PP-Sd lntaut Intact Walbdowne 8/A 11/A- Alternate 88 iEMP4tlA A Train KCRadiationMonitor ASS 577 86-57 Intact Sntart Walkdowvn 5.15. Anchorage 89 1K11gB AuxiliaryBu/itldn Noen-EsnentialReturn Header Isolation Value ASS 567 HH-57 Open Cloned Walk-by >R1GM Screened per PEEE 50 1tC3A EeactorBildineg1/o-EssentiaLRetain Header Isolation Valve ASS 567 HH-57 Open Cloned Walk-ky >S1GM Screened per tPEER 9i SRCSSB AooiliaryBuildingNon-EnventlalReturn Header IsolatinonValve ASS 585 JJ-55 Open Closed Walk-by >R1GM Screened per IPEEE 92 i/KC2SSA Reactor BuildingNon-Ersen~olRetomaHeader IsnoatiovValve ASS 566 HH-SS Open Closed Walk-by v-RI/M Screened per IPEEt 93 IKCTKlA Component CoolingSorge Tack 1A ASS 594 NNl-S9 - Intact Intact Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Page 35 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEI.and HCLPFResults dEEL Noromal Desired Walkdowon ID SIN Desocription lids EL location Operating State Operating State or Walk-by Screnoing Note$ HO-Pl" KeyFailure Moden' 94 1KFHXA FuelPool Cooling CeatExchanger t-A AUX 577 NN-52 Intact Intact Waikdowrn >RLGM - Soreoned per EPRINP-C04l as 1KFHXB FoelPool Cooling Heat Exchtanger16 AIX 577 NN-52 Intact Intact Walkdownc >RISM Soeeened per EPERI NP-604l 96 1NVHX0009 Let town Heat Exchlanger AUX 977 66-*53 Intact Intact Walkdown 0.30 Anohorage 97 iRS~llA Nuclear Setnice Water PunmpIA Isolation Vaice 6N6 603 PlanA Open Cloned Wnik-by >RLGSM Screened per IPEEE 96 2R1511A NuloearServiieWater Paup 2Aisolation Volve 696 601 52S71Y Open Cloned Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 99 1CPJ48B NudearlercicoWaterScpplyCrossoverlsolationValve ASX 681 Pp-5a Open Closed Walk-by >R[GM Screened perIPEEE 1SS 2RN48B Nociear ServiceWater SapplyCronsorer IsolationValve AUX 515 PP-60 Open Cloned Wolk-by Indluded in IPEEE,pg720. >RtL6M Soreenedp*er IPEtE Sill 1RNSFA NuclearlercireWaterStrolnerlB RNB SIC Putmphouse Intact Intact Walk-by >OLGM Screenedp*er IPdEE 902 2RNSrA Noclear ServiceWater Strainer 2B 696 6O Pautphoane Intact Intact Walk-by >RlLGM Screenedper IPEtE 593 1RN5IA Unitl1 Nuear ServiceWatertNon-Essential Eetarn HeaderlIsolationValve AIX 566 NN-55 Open Cloned Walk-by >RLGSM Screened per IPEEE 104 2RN51lA Unit2 Naclear ServiceWater Non-Ensential Reater HeoderlIsolation Valve AUlS 586 MM-I8 Open Cloned Walk-by Included in IPEEE,pg720. >RtLGM Screened or ]PlEE 10OS 166536 NucdearSeraice Water Cronnoveer Isolatlon Voive AUX 566 1L-56 Open Closed Wolk-by >RLGM Screened par IPEER 506 1RN57A lintel Generator CoolingWater InolationValve ASS 561 PP-53 Open Cloned Walk-by Inciuded in ]PEEE,pg 720. >5L6M Screened per IPEtE 167 16N586 Unit 1 NuclearService Water Header B Retuor to SNSWPInolationValce ASS Ill PP-CS Cloned Cloned Walk-by >ILISM Screened per P666 106 1RN2ggA A Diesel GeneratorCooling WaterlIsolation Valve DIA 565 El-SC Cloned Cloned Walk-by IncludedninPtEE, pg 24. >ILIM SCreenedp+erIPlEE 109 1EMIA EnnentialMotor Control Center, 600 VAC AUX 577 PP-54 Punctional Functional Walk-by >RIGM Screened per IPEEt ill SEMSB EnnentialMotor Control Center, 6W(VAC All 566 PP-SC Punctional Punctional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per [P86E 151 1EMXC Ensential Motor Control Center, 600 VAC AUXS 577 66-10 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 152 lEtatD EnnentialMotor Control Center, COO VAC ASS 1660 6-50 Punctional Functional Walk-by >lLISM Screened per IPEEE 153 SIMXE Ensential Motor Control Center, 6110SAC DISA 566 CC-39 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 114 IEMXG EsnentiolMotor Control Center, C0OVAC ASS 594 PP-SC Functional Functional Walk-by >RILGM Screened per PIttE 113 IEMXI Motor Control Center, SWo VAC,singlephace, normal peowertoorce Per AUX 577 EE-54 Fntlonoal Ponctiocnal Walk-by >RIGM Screened per IPEEE Hydrogen Igniter Group A 116 1EMSJ Essential Motor Control Center, 6CW SAC AUX 569 66-56 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 117 1EMSK Essential Motor Controi Center,CWX)VAC AUX 177 B6-47 Fonctional unoctional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEE 116 1EMSL EnnentialMotor Control Center, 600 AC AlX 560 66-47 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGSM Screened par IPEEE 119 1EMIM Ensential Motor Control Center, C00VAC ASS 577 CC-S3 Functional Funetional Walbdowne >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalin 126 SEMIN EnnentialMotor Control Center, 600 VAC AUX 566 CC-S3 Functional Puncticonl Walbdowon >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls 125. 1EMWS MotorControlCenter,480VAC, singlephaoe, Emergency powernsourcefor AUX 577 66-40 Functionai Functionol Walk-by >RLGM ScreenedperlPEdE Hydrogen Igniter Groap A 5-27 lETA dssentlallnwitchgear,41C0 VAC AOX 177 AA-49 Farictional Funrtional Walk-by >REGM Screened per IP666 129t SMIR NlonnolMotor Control Center, C00VAC ASS 560 663-49 Punctional Punctional Walk-by >RetGM Screenedper iPEEE Page 36 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP} Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPFResuiks ESEL Ndormal Desired Walhdowno IS EIN Description 8ldg EL. location Opo~ratingState Operating State or WalS-hy Screening Nlotes HCLPFP OnyVailuro *odyco 124 1MXb BlackoutMotor Control Center, 600 VAC AUX 577 BE-49 Functional Functiona[ Walhdow~n >RLGM Interaction - BlochWalls 128 5100W48430 Transtet SwitchIinigle Pole Sooble"rhnal, Hydrogen Ignltet Soop A AUX 577 R8-48 Functional Fonctionot Wolkdooan >R1GM Interaction-Blotit Walls 129 OXFMROO13 Transfortoer, 480 VAC- 120 VAC,IlydrogenIgniter SroopA AUS 577 88-ta Functional Functional Walhdowot >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalso tsa 1VREGO013 Voltage Regulator,Hydrogen igniter Groap A AUX 577 88-48 Fonctional Functional Walkdowno >R1GM lnteraction- BockWalls 131 1O.ATES Essential AreaTermninalCabinet AUS 577 EE-54 Funotlonal Functional Walkdowcn 0.32 Anchcorage 132 2ELCP0278 Hydrogen Igniter SroopA Control Panel ASS 577 B8-4a Dle-Energloed Energized Walkdowan >RLOM lnteraction.- ock Walls 133 iDGL3A DiesellGeneratorLoadSequencing Panel AUlS 558 88-43 Functional Functional Walkc-by >RLGM Screened perIPlEEE 134 1ELCP0357 SWO1,Hydrogen Igniter On/Oft switch {Alt.Sourcel located on panel 1ELCP03S7 AUS 577 B8-48 Functional Functional Walkdnown >RLGM interaction - BlackWAIlt 13S 1MC7 Main ControlRoomcPanel Alit 594 88-56 Functional Functional Walkdaowa 0.38 Interaction - Control 80oom Calling 138 1EHM0003 Group2AlIgniter BOx CV1 882 88 Dug48lgad De-Energited Energized Walhdowao 8.33 Anchorage 157 1EHMCO05 Scoup2.8Igniter Boo Cvi 562 178 Dog 55 Rod De-Enecgioed Energioed Walkcdown 0.33 Anchorage 138 1EHM5307 Scoop2.8 Igniter Boo CVi 582 277 Dog 46 Rad De-Fnergited Energized Walbdownt 1.33 Anchorage 138 IEI4MOSIS Stoop 2AIgniter Boo CV1- 562 0 Dog48 Rod DO-Energited Enetgined Walbdocco 8.33 Anchorage 140 1EHMOe71 Group 2.8Igniter Boo COV1 555 103 Dog 35 Rod De-Energiced Energized Walkdowcn 0.33 Anchorage 141 1E9M4311 Scoop3A Igniter Boo iVi 601 324 Deg 209Re4 De-Energiaed Energized Walhdowcn 0.29 Functiaonl Pailure 142 1EHIMW13 Group 3A IgrniterBoo CVI 5911 325 Deg 48904d De-Energioed Energized Walkdowcn 0.33 Anchorage 143 1EHMO015 Group 3.8 Igniter Boo CV1 842 335 Dog45 Rod De-Eneagloed Energized Walkdaocn 0.29 FunctionalPailure 144 -1.EMC8117 Snop 3A Igniter Boo CVI 601 SS Deg 18 Rod De-Enecgined Energiced Walbdovac 0.23 PunctinonlPailure 145 1EHM0519 Group 3A igniter Boo CVI 590 2 Dog51804d De-Eoergioed Eoergized Walkdowun 03nhrg 148 3EH101521 Group 3A Igniter Bon CVI 842 18 Dog 41 Rad De-Eeergized Energiced Walhdacwn 0.29 Functinonl Pailure 347 SEHMO023 Sroop4A Igniter Boo CVI 590l 53 Deg 49 Rod De-Energized Energiged Walbdacwn 0.33 Anchorage 143 1E9105625 Scoop4A Igniter Boo CVi 590 217 Dog 51804d De-Enetgloed Energined Walkdownn 0.33 Anchorage 145 1E11O02)7 Groap 4Algniter BOo CV1 530 24SDeg $1 Rd De-Ennrgiced Energioed Walhdoown 5.33 Anchorage 150 1E81M5023 Groap 4A Igniter Boo CVi 590 91 Dog 51 Rod De-Energized Energioed Walkdewn 0.33 Anchorage 151 1EHMO031 Scoop4A Igniter Bon CVI 803 10 Oeg 129Re4 De-Energized Energined Waikdown g,29 Functional Poilure 152 E1EHM5033 Scoop4A Igniter Boo CVi 641 113 Beg32 Rod De-Energited Energioed Walbdowun 0.29 PunctionolFailare 153 1EgMl035 Grnop 5A Igniter Boo CVi. 801 133 gog30 Rod De-Energiced Energined Walcdnown 0.25 Functinonl Follate 154 1E4M4037 Group 5A Igniter Boo Cvi 590 148 Seg55 Rod Se-Energized Energioed Walhdowon 0.33 Anchorage 155 1EHMO0039 Oroup5A Igniter Box Cvi 842 161 Deg41 Rod CDe-Energlzed Energized Walkdowcn 0.29 Fanctional Pailure 158 iEHM0434 Oroup5A Igniter Boa Cvi 801 258000g21 Rod De-Energlzed Energized Walhdowcn 0.29 Fonctional Pailure 157 1EHM5043 Group 5A Igniter Boa Cv1 590 372 Dog Si1Re4 De-EneagLoed Energized -Wolkdowno 0.33 Anchorage Page 37 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESELand HCLPF Results ESEL Nort-crl Desired Woibdeown 1D E1N lescription tidg EL Location Operating State Operating State or Walk-by Screening Notes H40,PF* KeyFallate Mode*'

158 GAIniter 1F4C045 Be Crep CVS 6 2 24 Deg 41 Red De-Energized EnergizedWldufl09FntalFile 159 SEHMW45 Group 5A Igniter tax CV1 7142 06Dg2 u eFerle trj Walkdeewn 0.29 Functional Failure 150 1EHMWOS5 Group 7A Igniter RaX 0V1 724 498 Deg24 Rad De-Energiaed Foergized Walkdowne 0.20 Functional Failure 161AEGMOtO goter Goup oe Ci 7 4 914Dee 24 Rad De-Fnergized Fnergized Wldeo09Fntoe oit se0 lEHMro6G Group 7A Igniter Roe CV1 714 28e 4ta D-orjednrgedWalkdowne 0.29 Functional Failare 162 t-i ERMW3 Inite Grup BooCt/i 660 100 Drg 2t ted Ge-tnergized Energiaed Wlden02 odea elr 1ea 1ERMC(156 Group 7A- Igniter tea CV1 te7514 g4 ~d Oeteted nrie Walkdownn 0.29 Functional Failure 062 1FRM0q615 CreepRAnIgniterBoe Cvi 666 208 Sea t4 tad De-Energized Energized Walkdaown 0.29 Functional Failure itt 1EHM6443 Greup 6A-2 Igniter uee CO1 666 321 Deg 46 Rad De-FEnergiced Energizod Walkdaown 0.29 Functional Failure 167 1EHM10155 CreepRA-2Igniter Ron cv. tee 157Org 4GGad De-Energiand Energiaed Walkdoeun 0.29 Functional Failare itR 1EHM10157 CreepRA-2Igniter too CVi 666 259 Dega4sRed De-Energiaed Enerrized Walkdowun 0.29 Functional Failure 169 1FHM84O7 Creep40 trniter Roe CV1 t53 21t Deg 32 tad De-Energioed Energiaed Walkdowun 0.29 Functional Failure 170 lERMOOO9 Creep RAIgniter Roe CVi tG0 41 lDeu32 Rad De-Energiaed Energiaed Walkdaown 0.29 Functional Failare 171 IAFWPTCF AueiliaryFeedwtaterPomp Turbine Control Panel (ELCF0245) AUX 540 CC-53 Functional Functional Walk-by >RtLGM Screened per [PEtEE 172 lEDt PownerSupplyforSoelenoidcvalvelSAsV002 and othercvalves, 125VOC AGX 577 B0-4t Functienal Functional Walk-by >RLGM Sareened per IPttE Distribution Ceoter, 020VDCDistributioo Center, compartments FOIA.F01G, Fell 173 1EATC2S Essertial Area TenrminalCabinet AUX 577 65-SO Functional Functional Walkdowno 0.37 Anehorage 174 tOSPOS Sulid State Proteetion System Cabinet. Control Panel, Control Cabinet AGX 594 CC-G5 Functional Functional Walkdoear 0.30 Interaction - Control 6RoomCeiling 175 1EATC2]O EssentialArea Tenoinal Cabinet AUX 077 60-53 Functional Functional Walkdowun >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls 176 lMC1 Main Control RoamFaonel AGO 504 05-53 Functional Functional Waikdowcn 0.00 Interaction -Control RoermCeiling 177 1MCOO Main Control teem Panel AGO 594 et-O6 Functional Functional Walkdowne 030 Interaction - Cootrol RoomCeilinra 170 1MC2 Main Control teen Panel AGO 5094 A-56 Functional Functional Walkdowcn 0.30 Interaction - Control PeonmCeiling 179 iMC4 Main Control Roan Fanel AGO 594 B6-56 Functional Functional Wolkcdown 0.00 Interaction - Cuntrol RonmCeiling log SMC5 Main Control Roan Panel AGO 599 66.56 Functional Functional Walkdown 0.30 Interaction - Control Roan Ceiling 101 1PCC1 PLCCabinet AGX 594 06-55 Fonctional Functional Waiimdowun 0.30 Interaction - Control teem Ceiling 102 1PCC2 PLCCabinet AGX 594 06-54 Functional Functional Walkcdowun 0.30 Interaction -Control teen Ceilirg 183 1PCC3 PLCCabinet AGO 094 66-55 Functional Functional Walkdeown 0.30 Interaction - Central teen Ceiling 184 1FCC4 PLCCabinet AGO 594 00-54 Functional Functional Wallrdown 0.30 Interaction -Control GoomCeilieg 105 1FCCS PLCCabinet AugO G94 CC-05 Functional Functional Walb<down 0.30 Interaction - Control Soon Ceiling 1GO 1PCC6 PLCCabinet AGO 594 CC-54 Functional Functional Waledewn 0.30 Interaction - Control Roan Ceiling 187 IPCC7 PLCCabinet AGX 594 CC-55 Functional Functional Waledowne Page 38 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station UnitS tSEL and HCLPFResults ESE Fionmal esirend Waibdowon IS F_11[ Oercr iytion Bldg EL L~~~ Oarnraing Stare* Opcrar.ngSrtrat or Walk-by SnreenoungNaote HICS.pp CoyFola(treMadone 188 lPcCS PLCCabinet AUE 594 CC-54 Furnctironl Functinoal Walkrdown 0.S0 Interaction -Control Room Ce~irin 189 SRVI/S FrocnssCabinet ASS 577 CC-53 Functinonl Functional Waikdownr >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls 590 1MW8 Main Control Sioon,Panel ASS 594 RB-SR Functional Fundtional Walkdown '0.30 Interaction - Control Room Ceiling 191 1T5055509 Control Panel Yard 598 505484 Functional Functional Walkdowrn 8.29 Anchorage 192 5TB12X0519 Wide Range Neutron FluxSignal Processor TermninalBo ASS 577 AA-51 Fonctional - Functional Walkdowna >IILM Screened per EPRtlNP-5041 193 1T0OX0537 Wide Range Neutron FluxnAmplifier Terminal Boo ASS 577 AR-Si Functional Functiuonl Waibdownt >RLGM Screened per EPRlINP-t04l 194 1TBOXOSRR WidetRangeNeutron FluxPowerSupply TerminalBox ASS 537 AR-SI Functional Functional Walikdown >RLGM Screened per EPRIlSP-6541 195 STBOX05R7 Wide Range Neutron FluxPowereSupplyTerinlal Boo ASS 577 AR-Si Functional Functional Waikdown >RILut Screened per EPRIBP-6041 1-96 SEPA 125 VDCPower Fanelbtord ASS 554 DD1-55 Energized Energized Walk-by >RLISM Screened per IPEtE 197 SEATCS2 EnnentialAreaTeneinal Cabinet ASS 572 PP-SR Functional Functional Walkrdowno 0.29 Modification 1.98 1TuOX0522 Central Panel VIA 55R BB-45 Functional Functiaonl Walkdown C>RLGM Screened per EPRItJP-6041 199 ISguTCS Control Panel ASS 577 FF-OS Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls 2110 IEIA Vital120V/ACInverter ASSX S54 5D-55 Energized Energized Walkdown SEWSincloded in PEEt, pg 392. However, tRverter >RL1GM Interaction - BlockWA011S replaced since Originalenaluation.

201 SEIB Vital 120YAC inverter ASS 554 CC-S5 Energioed Energiled Walidnoon SEWSincloded In PEEE,pg552. Hlowever,inertter >RI.SM Interaction- BloctkWalin replaced snounoriginal eualoation.

2027 SEIC Vital 120 VACInoerter ASS 554 CC-55 Energi~ed Energized Waikdown SEWSIncluded in IPEEE,pg392. llowevnr, inverter >RLGM Interaction - FinockWalls replaced since original evaluation.

203 11ID Vital 120 VACInverter ASX 554 BB-55 Eneegized Energized Walfidowne SEWSincluded in FPEEE, pg 392. Howeveer,inuerter >RLSM Interaction - BlockWalls0 replaced snoce original eoaluatioo.

254 1EIIPD 120 I/ACPowterPanel ASS 554 08-55 Energized Energized Walk-by cRIGM Screeoed per IPEEE 2115 SI£ipO 520V/AC power Fannl ASS 554 CC-SS Enetgized Energized Wall-by cLGSM

> Screened per FREEE 206 1ERPA 120 VACPower Panel ASS 554 DD-55 Energized Erergized Walk-by >RLGSM Screened perlPEEEl 257 1ERPC 120 I/ACPower Panel ASS 554 CC-59 Energized Energized Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP1111 205 SCATCSI EssentialArea TerminalCabinet ASS 560 tI-St Functinnal Functional Waikdowan Ou29 RelayClatter 2ug 1EDF 125 VOCPanel, 025VDCDlstributian Center, romepartmentso FOI.5,F0il ASS 550 BB-4Ri tEergized Energized Walk-by >RLOM Sorneeredper IPFEEE 210 JISFPB Control Cabinet ASS 594 00-55 Functional Functional Walbdowo 0.30 interaction - Control Roam Ceilirg 211 StASA Auctioneerirg Diode Assembily ASS 577 fB*-Si Fonctinoal Functional Wanikdowan >RISM Interaction - BlockWall 212 SERVO AuctiuneedingfDiodedoAsembly ASS 560 B8-5S Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Interaction - BlockWall 213 SEBA 125V/DCBattery ASS 554 00-54 Functional Functional Walkdawn SEWSincluded in IPE1EE, pg 4514.Rowever,battery rack 08>RGM interaction- BlockWalit modified sirne original evalaation.

254 11108 125 VDCBattery ASS 554 CC-5S Functional Functional Waibdowct SEWSincloded inIPEEE,pg 404. Howecer, battery rack >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls modified tince original evaluation.

215 11181 125 I/DCBattery ASS 554 CC-54 Functional Funutinnal Walbdown SEWSincluded in IPEtE,pg 404. Hloaweer,battery rack >81GM Interaction - Black Walls mtodifiedsince original evaluation.

Page 39 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL Nionral Desired Waltidowve IDS EIt DescrIption fikdg EL Location Operoting State Operating State or Walk-by Screening tNtote HCLpFF KeyFailureModle~t 210 stao 125 VOCBattery AUS 554 08-55 Functional Fuoctional Walkdowe SEWS included in PEEE,pg 484. Hoowecer,battery rant >RLGM Interaction - BlackWalls modified since original evaluation.

217 SECA 525Voc Battery Charger AUX 554 D0-55 Functonal Functional Walkduwn SEWSincluded in IPEEE,pg 389. However, charger >RLGM Interaction - BludsWalls replaced since original evaluation.

9 218 SECB 12sVDc BatteryCharger ASS 554 CC-S4 Functional Functional Walkdnwn SEWSincluded in IPEtE, pg 38 . Hiowever,charger >RLGM Interaction - Bisock Walls replaced since odigioal evaluation.

210 1ECC 125VDcBattery Charger ASS 554 CC-5t Functional Functional Walkdlown SEWSincluded in IPEtE, pg 389. However, chargec >RLGM Interaction - BlunkWails replaced since original evaluation.

220 1ECD 125 VvCBattery Charger ASS 554 BSS4 Functional Functional Walkduaas SESlvlincludedie PEtE, pg389,However, charger >RLGM Interaction -Block Wagls replaced since onginal evaluation, 222 SEDA 225VOCSintributico center, cotnpartemeots WZc,FOSS,P028,P53B,FO2A,P03A ASS 554 DD-50 Functional Functional Walk-by >BLGSM Screened per IP00E 222 iEDR 125 VDCfDistributinonCenter,tuonpartmnentsFO2B,FO3B,0024, F03A ASS 554 CC-54 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLOM Screened per IEEt 223 SEDC 125 VOCDistribution Center, compartments F0SC,FOSS,FO2RS, FO3B,FO2A,FS3A ASS 554 CC-5S Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 224 SODS 125 VSC DistributionCenter, comportments FOSC,FORS,FO2B,FO2A,FO3A ASS 544 88-54 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGSM Screened per IPEEE.

220 SCAFTS04I2 SCAFUTD FlowTransmitter AUXS 546 BB-51 Functional Furctional Walkdown >BLGM Screened per EFRINF-6041S 228 1CFLTSglO Steam Glenerator WlideBargeLevelInstrumeot ANS 568 28 Seg83 Bad Functionol Functional Walkdown 0.06 Functional Failure 227 SCFLCS82O 50eamGenerator Wide Barge Levelinstrument ASS 507 168 Dog 59 Rad Foectiuonl Functional Waikdown 0.08 Functiuona Failure 228 1CPLT5635 Steam GeneratorWide Range Levellnstrument ASS 585 210 Deg 59 Bud Functional Functionul Waikdown 8.88 Functional Failure 229 SCPL'5645 Steam Generator Wide Range LevelInstrument ASS 568 335 Seg59 Bud Functional Functional Walkdown 0.86 Fvnctional Failure 230 1NCPT512.0 812Wide Range Pressure Instrument ASS 506 CC-SO Functional Functiotal Walkdewn > RIGM Screened per EFRISF-6l04S 221 SNCPT5140 812Wide Runge Pressure Instrument Aug 588 SO-Si Functional - Functional Walkdown >R[GM Screened per tPRI NP-6041 232 SCFLT543S Steam Genecator Narrow Rarge Level Instrument ASS 575 1 Seg09 Bad Functional Functional Walkdown .886 Functional Failure 233 1CFLTSS2S Steam Generator Narrow Range Level Instrument ASS S569 200 Deg 59 Bud Functional Functional Walkdewn 0.86 Functioral Failure 234 1CFLT5555 Steam Generator Sorrow Range LevelIvstrumeet ASS 575 205 Dorg59 Bad Functional Functional Walkdown 0.88 Functionel Failure 235 SCFLTSIWO Steam Generator Narrow Range Level Instrument ASS 088 315 Deg 59 Bad Fvnctional Functional Walkdown 0.86 Functional Failure 236 1NCLT5571 Pressurizer Level Instrument CVI 570 104 DogS57Bud Functiunul Functionul Walkdown 0.20 Functional Failure 237 ISMFT5080 Steam Generator Pressure Instrument ASS 582 00-46 Functional Functional Walkdowun >RLGM Screened per EF81NP-v041 238 1SMFT5S10 Steam Generator Pressure Instrument ASS 582 00-52 Functional Functional Walkduow >RLGM Screened per EFRINP-6041 239 1SMPT5140 Steam Generator Pressure Instrument ASS 582 DD-52 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened pee FF81NP-8045 240 1SMtuTS170 Steam Generator Pressure Instrument ASS 582 50-46 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGSM Screened per SF81NPF6041 241 SNCRDSSW0 1A SCLoop Hot LegWide BangeTemperature CVS 567 20 Deg 25 Bad Functional Functional Walkdowu >RIGM Scrented per EF81NP-v041 242 1NCRDS860 1ANCLoopCold Leg WideRange Temperature CVS 587 51Soeg28Red Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPBlNP-6041 243 SNCBO587S 1B NCLoop But Leg Wide Range Temperature CV1 567 585 Dog 18 Bad Functional Functional Walkdolwn >RLGM Screened per £PRI F-ti045 Page 40 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL and NCLPF Results P041. Riorro Desired Woildoloy ID EIN Description 61ds EL Locaotion Operoting Stote Operating State or Walls-by Svreenin.g Notes HOLPP* my Failure Modeoa 244 SNCRDS860 lBNC Loop ColdtLgWideRange Temoperature 001 567 l24 Deg 28Rd Fusnctional Functional Waldeown >RLUM Screened per EpRINP-6041 245t iNCRO5900 1<CtC Loop PlotLeg Wide PoogeTemperatore CVI. 567 204 tes 20 Pod Functional Functional Walkdown >PIUM Screened per OPPINP-PO4l 246 1NCRD5910 lc:NC Loop Cold Leg Wide RangerTemperature CV1 567 240 Degl23 Rod Funotional Functieonl Walkdowcn >-RLUM Sreened per EPRINP-S041 247 1NCRII592O 2DNC Loop Not Leg Wide RangeTeorperature 6 4 o 26Rd ,V F>Roo on~niWldw -LUM Screened per EPRINP-PO4l 246 1NCPO5930 ID NCLoop Cold Le0 Wide Range Temperature CVI 567 306 Deg 28 tad Functional Functionaol Walkdown c-SLUM Sgeeened per Ep~I66-6541.

249 1EATC7 EssentialArea Teneinal Cabinet AUXS 577 PP-OS Punctional Funttional Walikdowon >RLGM Interaction -BlockWalls0 250 1TBOXO691 SR/ItN31/36Neotron FlossAmrplifier AUX 582 CC-51 Funotional Functional Walhdown >RSLUM Screened per EPSINP-P041 251 1TBOXOOO9 631,/35Neutron riux Amplifierlsolation Transfonmer AUX 579 CC-Si Functioona Functional Walkdowcn >-RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 252 itil* DoterCore Nuclear instroeent Cabinet Rook$AUX 59N cc-se Punctional Ponotioool Walldoowo 0.36 interoction - Conrrol RiooroCeiling 253 SNCLTP630 6VUS Plenuo {Upperflange)level Channel S AUX 562 AA-49 Functionol Functional Walkdown >RIUM Screened per EPRINP-P041 254 1NCI.T6400 PVUIS Sorrow orageLevel Channel S AUX 592 AA-49 Functional Functional Walkdowo c-SLUM Screened per EPPINP-6541.

255 iMif9 Moin Control floor Ponel AtX SS, Cc-Se Fuooc-ional Funotional Wolkdowcn 0,36 lnterac-tion-Control R~oorCelling 256 151LTS266 Containment $unrp evel 661 5S2 20 DegS5ORd Funedloonl Functional Walkdownt >61GM Screened perPEFlINp-6041 257 511IL5261 Containmventilctop Level RX11 550 2 Deg4S Pod Funtilonal Functional Walkdowe c-PLUM Screened per EPRINP-6041 259 iNILTS262 CootainmoentfiompLevel 661 560 4 Dog45 Rod Fuontional Funotional Walidcown c-PLUM Screened per"EPPINP-6t4i 253 1N11T5263 ContainmoentSc-sp Level 661 565 2 CDop45 Pod Functlonal Punctional Wollodowo c-PLUM Screened per EPRINP-P04l 260 1NI6T5264 ContainmenotSump Level 661 669 0 Degsf5 Rod Funcotional Functional Walkdowo c-SLUM Screened per EPRlNP-P041 261 SNIMT5260 ContainmrentSumrpLevel AUX 077 CC-47 Functionaol Puectional Walkdowne >RLUM Scroonedper EPRINP-6641 262 iNSgPT537S Contanoernto Pressc-e Train A AU*t 561. Cc-Si Punctionol Fonctional Wniikdo'n c-SLUM Screened per EPSINP-6541 PIHCPF c-hoesof c-RLUM ildioote thot the HCLPFenceeds the ReciewoLeVelUround Motion (0.25g), hut that a spec-fic-HCLWvoauewoo nnt calcuolatedc-loverho vowyonent was screened ont frose hsrtherevaluation.

ic PFuicreMv400. oredofhoed asifolowss Ry Scrmooed por IPE*E- Indicates thot tire ompvonentwoo ec-oloated lnthe IP*EE008thorefore meets the RL~icIderoced. .

Ucreeoned per EPRIfiP-U041- Indiscatesthat the componeot meeto the screening criteria vf EPP616P-6641, Tahie 2-4 osedthot eeit heranohorage, romapchatter, nor lnteractinos liwi: the reported HLPF.

lontesoctsov-OlvokWalls - lndivcstescholthe compoesovis, Soar-ed 00cr 0 *iios "ail.

-o¢ *tir Mo61c-lowol woo eoloosed in IPLEPand lhIerenore tle bloc-hrecol}

woee tire SLUMderond *he SonctSloni* and avohoosge *iOPPS.oceed lice repor~d 0C1PFcvaine.

luteraotinn - Control Soow Ceiling- lodigotenthat the component Is 1ocatedin thn cont rol roam, the oontrol room cegiig woe eraluated in thio report and hns o HICLPF of O,5g. the functioeal and aevhoe'age RCL.PSnyc-eed the reported 4CLPFooilue, Anchorage -Indicaotesthat anciroroge iotihe governing faicuremode for the vomponenr.

ForsctinoralPaiunre-Fulvrltes thntfvc-tivonl loilure is the gsoroeg~uPoiunce rondo fr the romponnot.

Reloy Chatter - lndicates thct relay ohatterinthe govervivo fi81curmode lor the romponeot.

Modlfikatvon - lndivatesthrat tire repvtted HC-PFcolon10ronditional en tihe rooditicatlonos reported on the 56665, N/A - Alteroate - indic-atesthat an5atoroate approach li~e.prvodcdral modification) has keen inc-orpvrated to oaootplish the desired caompooeet/oystro inoc-tion 00oppnsedto increosiog the seismic-oapac-ir01 rho compoonat.,

Total items: 259 Page 41 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 I

2 Rev.

Appendix B Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 42 of 60

,Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESL ln~mal Doomed Waibdocan or Is tINS Deoncr/ptico* aids EL Lacatcon Operating State Opetating State Walk-by Screening Sates HCLPF* Ke-yFaiklre Mode"*

1 2NC250A Reactor Head Vent Voice 0/2 6100 38Deg25 Rod Closed Open Waibdaown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-5541 2 2NC253A Reactor Head VestValee 0/2 600 43 Deg27 Rad Cloned Open Walkdowan O>RLOM Screened per EPRIHP-6541 3 2Nd1 Prenssurier Safety Valve 0/2 637 502Beg 37 Rad C/oced Fanctional Walk-by Includedin IPEtE. pg 718. >R1GM Screened per IPEEt 4 2NC2 Safetyf HeliefVa/ae 0/2 637 SIOS eeg 37 Rod Cloned Funational Wa/k-by Included in IPEEE,pg 758. >RLGM Screened per IPEtE 5 2NC/ Safety/ye//ef Va/ne CV2 637 206 Deg 37 aad Cloned Functinnal Walk-by Included in IPEEE,pg 718. >RLDM Screened per IPEtE 6 2NC34A PressurizerPower Operated ye~ieyyalve CV2 635 105 Deg39SRed Clnosed Cloned Walk-by Included in IPEEE,pg718. >RLOM Screened per IPEEE 7 2NCTK1!C Pressuricer teliefTank 2 0/2 554 90ODeg Fundt/neal Functional Walkdowon 0.75 Screened per PELR HP-k60OS 8 25V1A fOC Letdowntta Regenerative H{eatExchanger Islan/tonaVa/ve CVI. 554 226 Cog38804d Open Cloned Walkdouon >81GM Screened per IPEEE 9 2ARFD2 Air ReturnaFan antper2 0/C2 59S 265 Deg53 Rad Closed Open Walk-by >RLGSM Screened per IPEtE 55 ZARPFD4 Air Retain Fon Damoper4 0/2 595 292 8e0048Red Cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM Screeoed per IPEtEE 11 2AVXCARF 2AContainmoentAirgReturnPan ICARF-2Al CV2 5/35 265 Dog OHf On Walk-ky aR/GM Screenoedper IPEEt

12. 2BVXCARF 28ContainmnentAirRetarnFan (CARF-2B) 0/2 585 293 Cog Off 0n Wa/b-b3 >RLGM Sareened per IPEtE 13 iVEHSFA 62 Sk~innterEonA 0/2 045 2.68 Dog OHf On Walidaown 0.34 Anchaorge 14 2W/HOFB 62 Skinmmer Fan 8 CV2 645 220 Dog Off 0n Walkdownt 0.44 Anchorage iS 2W/iA 62 Ski/amer Fan A Damper 0/2 658 263 0e0649gad Cloned Open Walbdowno 0.28 Functionol Pailore 56 2/V9128 H23bicnmmer FanRDanmper CV2 659 233 Deg46 Had Cloned Open Walkdowno 0.29 Functlonal Pa/lore 17 2ND56 Residual Heat RenmocalATtain Ito/at/onValve 0/2 572 220 Deg 33 Had Cloned Open Walk-by Included in IPEEt,pg 1356, >RLGM Screened per IPEtE 16 2ND2A Ren/dualHeat RenaovalA Teain lsolationVa/an 0/2 567 176 Deg 55 Rod Cloned Open Walk-by /ncludedin IPEtE,pg 1316. >RLGM Screened per tPEEk 33 2NDSPSA Residoal Heat Removal Pomp 2.4 AIIX 522 FPP-O Fonti/anal Fanctianal Walk-by 0R1GM Screened per IPEEE 20 2NDHXAPMP Residual Heat Removal Pump Meabanical Seal Heat txchanger2A AUX 522. FF-HS Fonctianal Fonct/anal Wa/k-by Rule-of-the-ban with 2NDPUA >R1GM Screened per IPEEE 21 20CH540 RenidualHeat Remnoal Pump2A Motor Cooler AUX5 522 PF-kS Funntineal Fond/aonal Walk-by fule-of-the-box wintb2NDPUA >RL6M Screened per IPEtEE 22 2NDHX5A RenidoalHeat Removal Heat txcbanger1A A/IS 560 11-62 Fondtinnal Fonntional Walkdown >RLOM Screened per EPRINIP-g041 23 2EF10iB PW Syotem/EFSystemlnolan/annHalve AUXS 583 JJ-62 Cloned Open Walkdown >RLGM Screencedper EFRIfiP-So41 24 2FVWEH1 Refne/lingWafen Storagetaob lpFct-) Vord intact lna/3d Waikdoono D,830 Anchorage 25 2ECPUAS Component Coo//ag Pomp 2Ai AUX 577 Et-SO Fund/aonal Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP0EE 26 2KCXHXA Compnnent CoolingPomp 2Ai Motor Cooler AUXH 577 fE-58 Fundtianal Fandtional Wa/k-by Ru/e-o-f-te-bao wc/tb2KCPUAS >RLGM Screened per JPEtE 27 2KCIIXA Component Coaling Heat Excanager2A AUX 577 66-59 Foodtianal Funct/anal Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEtE 26 2K0O5HA Residual Heat RemnovalHeat Excbanger 1A Isolatian Va/ca AUS 535 LL-Hi Closed Open Wa/k-by >RLGM Screened per IPEtE 239 2052555 Nudoot Sero/ceWatef to SCAPP*tIno/ationValve PAUS 504 KK&-53 Cloned Open Walk-bay 061GM Screened per IPEtE 30 2AWL0VU 2A LaowerContainm/entVent//at/on On/f(IcVU-2A) 0/2 565 16 Dog Off On Walkdown >R1GM Screened per 01PR/NP-H041 31 2D///L0/U 2/SLower Containment Vent/lotion U/n/f110VU-2D)I 0/2 505 344 Dog oHf On Walkdownn >R1GM Screened per EPRINP-6041i Page 43 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL Normal Oeciked Walkdowo or IS E1N Descriptiora Bldg El. Locatica Operating Stole Operating State Walk-by Screening Notes HCLPFF Key FoiSereMode**

32 28854 Steam Generator BlowdownFlowControl Vaive TB2 581 21.-29 Open Closed Waikdown >yLGM Screened per EPRINP-B0SS 33 25855 Steam Generator BlowdowinFlow ControlValve TB2 581 2K(-29 Open Consed Walkdowan cRIGM Screened pertPRI NP-5542 54 288S9 SteamnGenerator BiowdownFlowcontrol Valve TB2 583 21.-5 Open Closed Walkdown >RLGM Soreened per EP~IINP-6045 35 28BBP Steam Generator Blowdown FlowControl Volve T82 583 2M-29 Open Cloned Walkdown >RLGM Screened perEPRI NP-6041 36 2CA174 CondenserCircuiating WaterSystem Isolation Valve AUS 545 CC-Si Closed ,Open Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-SINS 37 2CA516A NunlearSerciceWaterSyotemTrain2AlsolationValve ASS 555 88-02 Closed Open Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 38 2CAS57 2CAPUTDFeedwater Safety Valce ASS 540 B8-63 Closed Open Walkdown >RISM Screened per EPRINP-SI4S 39 2CAPUJTD Turbine Srcen AnxiliaryPeedWater Pomp ASS 531 AA-63 Functional unoctional Walk-by >tLGsM Screened per IPEEE 40 2CAIISO4 Torbine OnicenAoniiiaryFeed Water Pomp LotteOil Cooler ASS 535 A4-62 Functional Functional Walk-by Soule-fo-the-boa witS 2 CAPSTD aSISM Screened per IPEEB 41 2CAS4 AnoiliaryFeedwater to steam Generator 2A ASS 557 BB-64 Open Throttled Walkdown N/A N/A -Alternate 42 20852 AooiliaryFeedwater to Steam Generator 2B ASS 550 DD-S2 Open Throttled Waikdown >RLGM Screened per EPSINP-SINS 43 2CA48 AnxilioryFeedwaterto Steam Generator 2C ASS 551 SD-Si Open Throttled Walkdowo oRLGM Screened per EPRINP-SINS 44 2CA3S AuxiliaryFeedwater to Steam Generator SD AUXS 554 BB-SS Open Throttled Waikdowo N/A N/A- Alternate 45 25V5.9 Power Operated ReliefValce- Steam Generator 2A DHS 594 FF-75 Closed Open Waik-bp >RIGM Screened per IPEEE 48 25V33 Power Operated Relief1aloe-SteamGenerator2SB OHS 835 FF-S0 Closed Open Walk-by >51GM Screened perIPSEEE 47 231/7 Power Operated DeliefValve- Steam Generator2SC DH2 535 PP-Si Consed Open Walk-by >01GM Screened per PEEt 48 2SVS Power Operated ReliefVoice-Steam Senerator20 082 635 FF-S9 Closed Open Walk-by >RLSM Screened per IPEEP 49 2553 Steam Generator SDSafety Valve 082 613 EE-69 Closed Functional Walk-by Inndded in IPEtE, pg 725. >RLGM Screened per IPEPE 55 25V3 SteamGenerator2DSatetyValve OH2 61.5 FE-SN Closed Functional Walk-ky lncluded inIPEEE,pg 721. >RLGM Screenedper]PfEEE 55 2SV'5 Steam Generator 2DSafety Valve DH2 615 EE-69 Closed Functional Walk-ky lncluded in lPEEE,pg721. >RLGM Screenedp*erlyPEEE 52 23511 Steam Generator 2DSatety Valve DH2 615 EE-69 Cnosed Functional Walk-ky lncludediniPEEE, pg72S. >RLGM Screenedp*erlIPEEE 53 2SV6 SteamwGenerator2DSafety Valce 032 615 EE-69 Cloned Funntional Walk-ky lnduodedinlPEEE,pg721. cRLGM Screenedp*erlIPEEE 54 SSMS Steam GeneratorSD Main Steam IsolationValve O82 615 DD-69 Open Cloned Walk-ky >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 55 2SVN Steam Generotor2SCSafety Valve 082 555 tt-SS Closed Punctional Walk-ky Included in IPEE, pg 721. >RLGM Screened per IPECE 56 25V5 Steam Generator2CSafety Valve D82 615 EE-Si Closed PFunctonal Walk-ky lnduoded in IPEEE, pg722. >RLGM Screeeed perIPEtEE 57 SSV5G Steam Generator2C Safety Valve 5112 815 E£-51 Closed Functional Walk-by lncludedin IPSE8s,Pg722. >R1GM Screened perlIPEEk 58 231/11 Steam Generator2C Safety Valve DH2 815 00-81 Closed Functional Walk-ky lncluded inlIPEEE,pg722. >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 59 23V/.2 Steam Generator 2C Safety Valve DH2 815 EE-65 Closed Functionat Walk-by lncloded in IPEEE,pg722. >8LGM Screened per IPEEE SO 2SM3 Steam Generator 2lMain Steam Isolation Vaive OH2 555 DD-SS Open Closed Walk-by >RLISM Screened per IPtEE 51 2SV1/4 Steam Generator 2BSafety Valve 5H2 555 BE-SO Cloned Functional Walk-by lnciudedin IPEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per IPOEE 82 23V55 Steam Generator 25 Safety Valve D85 815 EE-SS Closed Functional Walk-ky lnciuded is PEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per [PEEE Page 44 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Regults ESEL N~ormali Desired Waibdown or IO Sill Descripstion Bldg* EL Locotice Opecating Sltat OpcsotinySscrte Woikoby Screening. NOtes HCLPFP Ke-yPalkre Modece

-63 2SV16 SteasmGenerator 26 Safety Vaice DHl2 015 EE-P0 Closed Fanctional Walk-by included In IPEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 64 2SV17 StevemGenerator 2B SofetyVoice D62 615 EE-OS Closed Functional Waik-bsy Incloded in IPEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per IPESE 65 2SV1B Steae Generator lOSofety Voice 082 655 EE-65 Closed lounctisoia Woik-Icy lnciuded irsipEEE,pg 722. cRLGM ScreesnedpeeIPSEE 66 2SMS SteamsGenerator 26 Moin Steam Isiolaton Volvo 062 615 D0-65 Open Closed Waik-bV >RL6GM Screened per IPEEE 67 25V20 Steam Generator 2A*SafetyVaice 062 615 0E-76 Closed Ponctional Wails-by incloded is IPEEE,pg 722. vOLGM Screened perIPEEE 60 2SV21 Stoos G~enerator2A10fety Voice 062 615 EE-75 Closed Punctional Wolk-by i~ccided in iPSEE,pg 722. cBlGSM Screened per FPEES 69 25V22 Steam Generaolr 2ASafetyVaice 01H2 015 EE-70 Closed Funetional Wallk-by Incloded in IPEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 70 2SV23 Steam Genrartor 24 Safety Voice DH2 615 EE-78 Closed Punctional Walk-try Included is IPEEE,pg 722. cRLSM Screened per IPEEP 71 25V24 - SteamsGeneraonrlA SafelyValve 0112 01.5 EE-70 Closed Functionol Walk-by insioded in tPEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per IPEEO 72 25M7 SleonmGenerator 2AMole Stearm Isolotion Voice 0112 615 00-76 Open Closed Wolik-by >RLGM Screened per IPOEE 72 25A144 2CApUITD Control Vaice ASS 031 66-63 Opec Tlhrottled Wollk-by ICAPUD Rcle-of-tlse-bsoxcwith >RLGM Screene=dper iPEEE 74 23A145 2EAPITDTriplThrothe Voice (Stop Voice) AUlS 554 00B-63 open Throttled Walk-by Buie-of-thse-bovcwithSCAPUDO >RLGM Screened peerPSEE 75 2SA2 2CAPUTDSteamsPeedIssolatonVoice 002 062 FP-OS Ciosed Open Walk-by Included in IPESE,pg 725. >OLGM screened peerPEEE 76 2NDHSB SesidoolHeat Remnovallent Eochangerl2B ASS SOS LL-02 Punctionol Functionai Walkdowrn >BLGSM Screened per EPRIOP-O04S 77 2NI046 AeccumulatorTank 2A solation Valve CV2 560 46 Degs55Rd " Open Closed Walk-by lndcudedin lPEEE,pg719. >RLGMc Screened perelPEEE 78 2N5658 Accsnrclator Tank 2gIsolationyValce CV2 608 136 Deg 55Red Open Closed Wolk-Isy IncrludediniPSEE~spg7l9, >RLM ScreenedporlIPEEE 79 2NI70A ArcomulaosrTank2C IsolatioonVlce CV2 5OS 222Dog 45 Rad Open Cloned Wailk-bV lncludedin IPEEEpg 719. OLGM

>R Srreenedpele PEEE 60 2Ni88g AcrosnoulatrTonk 2DsolatiiooyVoloe CV2 SgO 312 DegO45Bd Open Closed Walis-by Inlcudedl}nlPEEE,pg 79. >RLGM ScreenedperIPoEEE 81 2N50110 Containmeot Spray Heal Exchsanger2A ASS 565 11-02 Intac Intat Walkdowno cBLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 62 235601B ContaicnmentSpryV Heot Exchranger20 ASS SOS 11.g2 bntacS intact Waibdownb >0LGM ISreenedper EPSINP-g041 03 2N1MHXO7 ReactorCoolant lint Leg Sample Heat ExchangerA ASS 543 OW248 Intact mInta Walkdown 0>BLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 04 2NMH1508 ReactorCoionan~ctHoegSample HeatExchanger B AUS 543 Rm248 intact intact Walkdownn >ROLGM Screenedper EPRI N~P-6054 85 2EMP4OA A Train tc PazdiotiorsMonitor ASS 077 11-69 in~toct mInta Woikdsnwn 0.31 Anchrosage 06 2KC26 Acxi~iaorBuildingNon-EssentiaiReturn Header isolation Valve ASS 500 PP-SO Open Closed Walk-by ->cLGM Screened per IPEES 87 2KCSA Reactor BuildingNon-EssenlialReturn Header Isolation Voice AUX 580 PP-57 Open Closed Walk-by >R1GM Screened pee IPESO 68 2KC538 Ausoiiry OoiidinglNon-Essen~al OReturHeader isolation Valve ASS 504 110-59 Open Closed Walk-by >01DM Screened pee IPESE 09 2g1C230A Reactor Budiding-Non-EnsentliaRntons Header isolatIon Voice ASX 580 0H-59 Open Closed Waikdocwn >RLGM Screened peeSPRINP-O041 95 2K(CTKA ComeponentCooiingSurge Tank/A AUS 094 NN9-S9 Intact intact Walkdnown >RLGM Screened per EPBI NP-O04I 91 23V4050 Let DowsnHeatEchanger ASS 577 OlK-HI Intctd intact Waibdowco 5.30 Anchsorage 32 2Rf506A PoelPool Oral Eoxchanger 2A ASS 577 3N-01 Intact intact Walkdowns >RLGM Screened per EPRI Np-O041 93 2KF060 Purl Pool Oral Exchanger 28 ASS 577 NN1-62 Intact intact Walkdown, >0LDM Sraeened per EPRINp-6134L Page 45 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 F.SEE.and HCLPF Results 00CC Normal 0ee,'re Wultdown or ID EIN De, eription Bldg EL. Looationt Oporating State Operating State Wollabv Screeni~g Notes HCLPF toy Failure Mdode' 94 2R8g32A 2A ieoselGererator CoolingWater Isolation Voleo D2A 564 DD-75 Closed Closed Walkn-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 95 2MC1 Main Control Room Panel AUXS 594 AAN-57 Functional Functional Walkdown 0.35 Interaction - Control Room Ceiling 96 2MC10 Main control Room Panel ASS 594 B0-50 Functional Functional Walkdeow 0.50 Interottion - Control eoom ceiling 97 2MC2 Main Control RoomPonel ALIX S94 Ad-SO Functional Fonctional Walkdowen 0.30 Interaction -Control ReoomCeiling 98 2MC4 Main control Room Panel - ASS 594 00-58 Functional Fonctionaol . Walbdown 0.30 Interaction -control Room coiling 99 2MC5 Mole Control Room Panel AUX 594 B0-50 Fuectional Functieonl Walbdowno 0.30 nteraoction-Control Room Ceiling 100 2PCCS Proresn Control Cabinet 1 Protection Sot I Cabinet AUX 594 B5-59 Fonctional Functional Walkldowno 0.30 Interaotion- Control Room Ceiling 101 2PCC2 Proness ControlCabinet 2 Protection Sot 2 Cabinet ASS 594 B0-60 Functional Functional Walkdown 0.30 Interaction - Control Room Ceiling 102 2PCC3 Protons control Cabinet 3 Protection Set 3 Cabinet AUS 594 BR-59 Functional Punctional Waibdowna 0.30 Interaction - Control Room Ceiling 103 2MC8 Mole Control SeemPanel ASS 594 08-50 Functional Functional Walkdownt 0.30 Interaction - Central Room Ceiling 104 2PCC4 Protest Control Cabinet 4Protection Set 4 Cabinet ASS 594 RB-60 Punctional Functional Walkdown 0.30 interaction -Control RonrmCeiling 105 2PCC5 Procrss Control Cabinet 5Protection Set 5 Cabinet ASS 594 CC-SO Punctional Functional Waibdown 0.90 Interaction -ContmolRoom Ceiling 3.00 2PCC6 ProneunControl CabinertS Protection Set S Cabinet ASS 594 CC-O0 Functional Functional Walbdowno 0.30 Interaction - Control RoomCeiling 107 2PCC7 Proeses Control Cabinet 7 Protection Set 7 Cabinet ASS 594 CC-S9 Functional Functional Walkdown 0.30 Interaction - ControlSoomCeiling I0O 2PCCO Protest Control Cabinet 0 ProteotioneSet 8 Cabinet AUlS 994 CC-ES Functional Funttional Waikdown 0.30 Interaction - Cantrol RoomCeiling 109 2RV05 RVSISProcess ContmolCabinet ASS 577 CC-Si Functional Functional Walbdowno >RLGM Interaction - BlonkWalls 110 2TBOOSO69 SR/IS N31/N35SNeotron FluxnAmplifier Terminal Son ASS 580 CC-63 Punctional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Sgreened per EPRINP-604tJ.

111 2TBOXSOS9 SR/ISN31/35 Neutron PleaAmplifier Isolation Transtortner Terminal Boo ASS 500 Cc-S3 Functional Functional Walkdown >RIGM Soreened per EPRINP-6041 112 25151 Onter Care Nuatear Instrument Cabinet Rackb ASS 594 CC-SO Functional Functional Walkdowne 0.30 Interaction - Control Ream Ceilrng 113 2T5O05519 Wide Range Neutron FloeSignal Proessor Tnrminol Boo ASS 577 AA-63 Punctional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-O041 134 2TBOXO537 Wide Range Neatron FluxAmoplifier Terminal Boo ASX 577 AA-63 Functional Functional Walbdown 0RLGM Screened per EPSINP-6041 115 2TROXO5S6 Wide SangeNeutron Plan ~ownerSupplyTenninal Boo ASS 577 AA63 Fnnctional Futlctional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRt14P-g041 116 2TRO50S87 Wide Range Neutron PlanPaowroupply Terminal Boa ASS 577 AA4-03 Functional Functional Walkdown OSRLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 117 2MTSWSO00 Transfer Swaitch(SinolePole DoubleThrow), Hydrogen Igniter Group A ASS 577 CC-RN Functional Functional Waikdown ORLOM Interaction - B1ockWalls 110 2XPMRSO13 Transformer, 490 VAC- 12g VAC,HydrogenIgniter Groap A ASS 577 CC-O5 Energized Energized Waibdowno >R1GM Interaction - BtnocWalls 119 2V5E65013 Voltage Regulator, Hydrogen Igniter StoopA ASS 577 CC-OS Energized Energized Wallkdowne 0R1GM Interaction - Bloock Walls 320 2SATC8 EssentialArea Terminal Cabinet ASS 577 ES-60 Functional Functional Waikdown 0.32 Anchorage 323 2S5CPS278 Hydrogen Igniter Group A Control Panel AilO 577 CC-Os Do-Enertized Estergied Waibdeowo 081GM lnterantlon -BlockWalsa 122 20GL0A Diesel Generator Nto.lA LoadSequencer SelayLoadingRelay ASS 555 80-71 Functional Functional Walkdown 081GM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 123 2E1CP0357 SW01, Hydrogee Igniter On/Off switch letr.Source) located an panel 2EL.CP0357 ASX 577 CC-OS Functional Functional Walkdown >RLOM Interaction - BlockWalls 124 2MC7 Malt Control Room Panel ASS 594 BB-56 Punctional Functional Walkdown 0.30 Interaction - Control Room Ceiling Page 46 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station ReV. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL.and HCEPFResults Ema Normal -Deo;ired Wu~rdownoor iD Ein Drmription Bldg tE. Location Operating State Operntiegsgtae Wolk-Izy Screening Eloteno HCI.PF* to KFaiilure Mode*

126 2EHM4003 Group 24 igniter Box CV2 352 88 Dog 48 Rod DeEneorgized Energized Walkdown 0.33 Anchorage 326 2tEHM1005 Greoup2Algniter~o 00/ 562 1780Deg5lRed De-Snerginod tnergized Wallkdowvo 0.33 Anchrorage 127 2EHMOB07 Group 2Aigniter Boo 002 562 277 Dog46 Rod De-Energized Energized Walkrdown 0.33 Anchorage 128 2EHM0009 Group ZAigniter Boo CV2 562 5 Dog46 Rod ge-Energized tnergized Wolkdowan 0.33 Anchorage 129 2EBM50I71 Group 24 Igniter Box 012 555 103 Dog 35 god Se-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.33 Anrchorage 330 2EBMOW11 Group SAlIgniterBoxo CR2 601 324 Deg 20 Rod De-Energized Energized Walkrdowon 0.29 Functional Failure 131 2EBMWO3 Group 3AIgniter Boo 012 590 - 32e Dog 40 Rod De-Beergized Energized Wallzdow~n 0.33 Anchorage 132 2E11M4015 Group 3A Igniter Boo 01'2 642 335 Beg41 Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdownn 0.29 FunCtionalFailure 133 2EHMdl017 Group 3A gniter Box 02 633 85 Begl1O ad De-tuergized Energized Walzdowon 0.29 Functional Failure 134 2EBM4013 Group 3A Igniter BOo 012 533 20De051 Rod Be-Energized Energized Walkdowuo 0.33 Anelhorage 335 2EB14rD21 Droop 34 Igniter Boo 012 64.2 10 Deg 41 Bad De-Energized Energized Walrduown 0.29 Fnuntional Failure 136 2EBMO023 Group 4A Igniter Boo 002 595 53 Dee 50 Rod De-Eneegized Energized Walkndowno 0.33 Anchorage 537 2E9M4025 Group 4AIgniter Boo 002 595 214 Dog 40 Bud De-Energiond Energized Wazlndown 0.33 Anchorage 130 2E11M4087 Group 44 Igniter Boo 012 330 245 Beg51 Bud Do-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.33 Anchoroge 539 2E1IM5029 Group 44 Igniter Boo 002 5911 91 Beg31 Rod De-Energioed Energized Wolkdoezn 0.33 Anrchorage 140 2EHMO031 Group 44 Igniter Boo 012 603 50 Beg13 Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdown Fonctinonl Failure 0.29 141 2tEIMO33 Grnop 44AlgniteoBoo 012 643. 13.40Dog04 Sod Io-tEnergiond Energioed Wolludnon Enenninnal Failuro 0.23 142 2EH1M4035 Greup SAIgniter Boo 012 601 140 Dog 30 Bad Be-Energized Energized Walhdowno FountionolFailure 0.29 143 2ERM19237 Group 9AIgniter Boo 00CV 590 146 Dog 51 Bud ge-Ernorgized Energized -Wolludozun Anulhorage 0.33 144 2EBM0039 Group 5AIgniter Boo 012 642 161 Dge 41 Bad Do-Energized Energized Walkdowng Funotional Foalore 0.23 145 2ElIMGI4I Group 04 ignior Bon 0V2 601 216 Beg21 Rod Do-Energized Energined Walkdoeun 0.29 Functional Failune 146 2EHM3043 Groop 5A Igniter BOo 002 590 0730De051Bad Be-Energized Eoergized Walkdowun 0.33 Anchorarge 147 2EIIM[454 Group 5A IgninerBon 002 642 206 Deg 4I Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.29 Function*alFoilure 140 2EBMG059 Group 74 Igniter BOx 012 734 3DBDog 24 Bed Oe-Energized Energized WaOkdounn 0.29 Fnuntional Failure 149 2EHM400g Group 7A igniter ROn 01V2 714 49 Dog24 Bed Do-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.29 Fuontlonal Failure 130 2EHMO0G3 Group 74 Igniter Boo 002 754 140 Dog 24 Bad Do-Energized Energized Waihdownn 0.29 Funrtionol Failure 151 2EH1MG365 Group 7A Igniter Boo 012 714 210 Dog 24 Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdowno 0.29 Functional Failure 132 2EBM0053 Group 64-1 Igniter Boo 012 666 108 Deg 48 Red Do-Energined Energized Walkdeown 0.29 Fuontional Failure 153 2EBM4005 Group 8A-1 Igniter Boo 002 666 137 Deg 46 Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdowno 0.29 Functional Failure 334 2EHM4057 Group 6A-3 Igniter Boo 012 666 206,Dog 46 Bad Be-Energized Energized Walkndowun 0.23 Functionol Failure 155 2EHM1G247 Group 64-2 Igoiter Boo 012 666 321 Dog 46 Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdowun 0.29 Fnuntionel Failure Page 47 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL.and HCLPF Results SELNormal Dsirked Walkdiownor I0 tIN Description RId4 EL [ovatian Operatieg State Operatiny State Walk-by Screening Nates HCLPF' KoyFuillre Mode**

156 2EHM3O49 Graup gA-2igniter Boa CV2 666 11 Deg46 Rod De-Energiaed Energized Walirduwn 0.29 Funztional Failure 157 2EHM5451 Droup 6A-2 igniter Boo CV2 606 59 Deg46 Rad De-Energized Energized Walkdownz 0.29 Functional Failure 158 2EHM0067 Group BAigniter Ban CV2 653 218 Dog 30 Rad De-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.29 Functional Failure 559 2EHMWR9 iGroup8Aigniter Baa CV2 653 41 Dog32 Bad Do-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.29 Functional Failure i6S 2AWFrPCF AuxiliaryFeedwater PumnpTurbineControl Panel (ELCP0245) ASS 543 CC-ti Functiaonl Functiornal Walkdown >RIGM Interaction -Block WalI 161 2EDE 125 VOCDistribuationCenter, cuonparttmentsESIA,FouG, Foil ASS 577 BB-68 Functional Functional Walk-by aRLGM Screened per IPEEE 162 2EATC23 EssentialArea Terminal Cabinet AUX 577 CC-65 Functional Functional Walkdownl 0.37 Anchorage 163 2SSPSA SolidState Pruteation Systent Cabinet, Control Panel, Central Cabinet ASS 504 CC-59 Functional Functional Walkdownn 0.30 Interaction -control Route Ceiling 164 2EATc21 Essential Area Terminal Cabinet AUS 577 BB-62 Funational Functional Walkdown aRIGM Interaction - BlockWalls 165 2EP'A 125 VDICPower Panelboard ASS 554 DD-55 Energized Energized Walk-by >RL0M Screened per IPEtE 106 2EATc12 EssentialArea Terminal Cabinet ASS 577 FF-S9 Functional Functional Waikdown B.29 RelayChatter 167 2TBO05522 Control Panel ODA 556 BB-69 Functional Functional Walkdownr >RLGM Screenredper EPRINP-6041 168 2SMTC1 Control Panel AdS 577 00-59 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls 269 2EIA Vital 120VrAC Inverter AUS 554 DD-59 Energized Energized Waikdown SEWSincluded inIPEEE,pg 1474. However, inventor OBLGM Interaction - BlockWaills replaced since odginol enaloatiun.

170 2510 Vital120 SIACrooerer ASS 554 CC-SO Energized Energized Walkdawn SEWSincluded in PEEt, pg 1475. Bowever, invertor >RLOM Interaction - BlockWalls 171 2EIC Vital120 VACInverter ASS 554 CC-SO Energized Energized Walkdown SEWSincluded in PEEE,pg1476. However, invertor >RLGM Interaction - BlnckWalls

- replaced since original evaluation, 47 7 172 2EID Vital120 VACinverter ASS 554 BB-59 Energized Energized Walkduwn SEWSincluded in IPEEE,pg 1 . However, inventor >RBL0M lnteraction- BlnckWalls replaced since original evaluation, 173 2EBPD 120 VAC FuwerPanel ASS 554 BB-59 Energized Energized Walk-by aRLGM Screened per IPEEE 174 2ESFB 120 SACFowerpanel ASS 554 CC-SO Energized Energized Walk-by aRLGM Screened Per IPEEE 175 2ERPA 120 VACPower Panel ASS 554 00-SO Bnergized Energized Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 176 2RPFC 120VAC Power Panel AUS 554 CC-SO Energized Energized Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 177 2SATC12 EssentialArea TerminalCubinet AUS S6B IlJ-SB Functional Functional Walkdown 0.29 Relay Chatter 17B 2EOF 125 VDICPanel, 125 SSCDistribution Center, compartments FOIA,FOil ASS 565 BB-68 Energized Energized Walk-by >BLGM Screened per PEEE 179 25SP5B Control Cabinet ASS 504 DD-SO Fonctional Functional Walkrdown 0.30 Interaction- Cuntrul Rnnm Ceiling 100 2EADA Auctinonering DiodeAssembly ASS 577 BB-63 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Interaction - BlockWail lBS 2EADB Anctinneerirg DiodeAssembly ASS ORB 80-63 Punctional Functional Waikdown >RLGM Interaction - BlockWall lBS 2ERA 125 VOCBattery ASS 154 00-60 Functional Functional Walhdown SEWSincluded in IP5EE,pgl1454. Howeaer°battery rack >RLGM Interaction -SBockWalls modified since original evaluation, 103 ZEOB 120 i/DC Battery ASS 554 CC-SR Functional Functional Waibdown SEWS included in FPREE, pg 1455. However, battery rack >Rl.CM Interaction -Black Wails modified nieceodiginaleaalaationi.

6 184 2EBC 125 SOCBattety ASS 554 CC-tiO Functional Functional Walkduwn SEWSincluded in FREEE, pgl45 . However, battery rack >RLGM Interaction -Black Wails modified since original eraluation.

Page 48 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESELand HCLPFResults EsEL Nosrral Desired Wolbdowoneo IS EliN Description Bldg EL Location Operating, State Operating State Walk-fly Screening,Notes HCLPFF SeyFuilure Mode'*

185 2EnD 125 VDCBattery AUX 554 8B-59 Functional Funrtional Walkdowsn SEWSinriuded in IFEEE,pg 1457. However, battery rack >RLGM Interaction - Blork Walls modified since otiginal evaluation.

1BS 2ECA 125 SDCflattery Charger ASS 554 DD-59 Functional Functiornal Walkdaown SEWSincluded in IPEtEEpg 1464. Ilowever, charger >15GM Interaction - BlankWalls replaced since original evaluation.

187 lECt 125 SECBattery Charger ASS 554 CC-6B Functional Functional Walkrdowso SEWSincluded in IPSEEtpg 1465. Howeeer, charger >REIM Interaction - BlockWalls replaced since anginolevaluation.

588 2tCC 125 SOCBattery Charger ASS 554 CC-59 Functional Functional Waibdeono SEWSincluded in IPEltE,pg 1466. However, charger eBRLGM Interaction - tiods Walls repinced snice original evaluation.

159 2ECS 125 SDCBattery Charger ASS 554 BlB-6O Functional Functional Walkdowno SEWSInclu~dedin PEEE,pgl1467. However, chtarger eBLGM Interaction - BlockWalls replaced nieceoriginal evaluatioe.

1958 ZEDA 125 SOCDistribution Center, coerpartmenets F0SC,FOLD,FS2B, FOSS,FS2A,FS3IA ASS 554 DD-55 Functional Functional Walk-ky nRLGM Screened per IPSEEE 155 2EBe 525SOClinttibution Center, conepacrtments FD2B,FO3B,FB2A,POSA ASS 554 CC-SO Functional Functional Wulk-by >BISM Screened per FPEEE 192 2tEDC S25VC Distribution Center, compartments F01C, POSB, P025,P835,PO2A,FE3A AUSX 554 CC-SB Functional Functional Walk-ky >REIM Screened per FPEES 193 2EDD 125 SECBistributionCenter, coerpartmenots PS1C, FOSD,F02B, Fg2A,FOSA ASS 544 SB-B- Functional Functiooal Walk-ky >RLGM Screened per FEEt 194 2EMXI Motor Control Center, 60 SAC,dsiglepkase, noenalpower source for AUX 577 FE-O4 Functional Functional Walk-ky >RLGM Screened per FPEEE BydrogenIgniter DroopA lBS 2EMXS Motor Central Center, 480 SAC,single phone, Enrergenry power souurcetoe ASS 577 BB-45 Functional Functiunal Walk-ky >BLGM Screened per FPEEE Sydrogeo cignierStooupS 2

19S EtutD Essential Motor Contfro Center, 600ovac ASS 560 85-55 Ponctional Functional Walk-ky >RLGM Bcreenedper IFESE 197 2EMXK Essential Motor Control Center, SW0VAC ASS 077 5B-67 Fonctional Functional Walk-by >RBLGM Screened per PEEE 198 2EMXC Essential Motor Conttol Center, S00SAC ASS 577 sn-Sd Functional Functional Walk-by >RIGM Screened per FPEEE 299 2EMXL Essential Motor Control Center, SW0SAC ASX SSS 88-67 Functional Functional Walk-by >BLGM ScreeneS per FPEES 280 2EMSA Essential Motor Control Center, SW0VAC AUX 577 FF-SO Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened yen IPSEEE 201 2EMWJ EsseNetialMotor Control Center, 6W0SAC ASS 668 GG-58 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened par [PE55 202 2EMSH Esseetial Motor Control Center, SW0SAC ASS 894 FF-58 Functional Functional Walk-ky >RLGM Screened per IFEES 202 2EMSE Esoential Motor Control Cenrter,60WSAC I2A 556 EE-70 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened reF FPEEE 204 2EMSB S00SACEssential MCC ASS 560 FF-58 Functional Functional Walk-by >nLGM Screened pen' FEES 2025 2EMSM 550VACEssential MCC ASS 077 CC-SC Functional Functinonl Waikdowrn 55GM loneracgnin- Block Walls 2BS 2EtdXt 550SACEssential MCC AUX 569 CC-f1 Funntional Functional Wulkidown 0.32 Anchorage 2E7 2CTA 41S0 EssentialSecitckgear ASS 577 AA-64 Functional Functional Walk-ky >BLGM Screened per IPEEF 208 2TBOSS008 TenrminalBoaxforTransmitter2FWL15000 SYRD 598 SO0X53' Functional Functional Walbdowne 0.29 Anckorage 289 2NdSPT5370 Containment Pressure Train A ASS 581 CC-63 Functional Functional Waikdowne >RLGM Screenedper EFR1SF-SI41 220 2T6O05535 TermninalBoxofor2CMu77l&2CM878 TB2 574 2L.-17 Functional Fuyctional Walkdowsn >tRLGM Screened per EFRINP-6041 211 2CAFTOS4S 2CAPUTD Disckarge Flows ASS 546 6B-62 Functional Functional Walkdoant >RLGM Screened per SF5I NF-6041 Page 49 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station ,Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESRLand HCLPF Results 555EL Normal Desired - Walhdowts on ID SIN Description R]dg SEL Location Opercatingstate Opetutingl State Walk-by ScroetningNotes HCLPF* Soy Faihlre Mode**

212 2CFLTSS1D 2Asteam Geoerator Wide Raoge LevelChattel 8l AN2 ss6 as8 Deg 59 Rad Funttional Functional Walkdton 0.88 Functional Failure 213 2CFCT5620 28eSteamGeeneratorWide RanegeLevelChattel 92 RN? 565 149 DegS59Red Fonctional Fanctional Walhdown 0.86 Functitonl Failute 214 2CFLTS63R 2C Steam Generator Wide Ratge LevelChattel t3 AN2 567 205 Deg 59 Rad Fusnctional Futctiotal Walbdown 0.86 Functional Foliate 215 ?CFLTS640 20 Steam Generator Wide Range Level Chattel 114 AN? 567 327 Deg59 Rtd Founcional Funtionlal Walhdtwn 11.86 FooctitooalFailate 216 2NCPT5.2l0 NCLoop?2Hot Leg Wide Range Prettore Chattel 81 ASS 556 CC-Sd Functional Fanctional Walkdown >RLGM Seteeted per SF61NP-g04S 217 2NCFT5140J 2C NCLoopHot LegWide Range Pressore Chattel 114 ASS 566 cC-6a Fuctitonl Faunctional Walkdown >RLGSM Streened pet tEPRINP-t04S 258 2CPL55490 2A Steam Getetator Narrow Range LevelChannel#4d AN? 575 002 DeoR te Rd Fuoctitonal Fauntional Walkdown 0.86 Functional Failloe 259 ZCPLTSS20 28 Steam Genetator Narrow Range Level Chatnel#4d AN? 565 3130Dog59 Rod Fonctiteal Functional Walkdown 0.86 Functional Foliate 2212 2CFLTSSW0 ZCSteamGeneraton Narrow Range LevelClnannel#4 AN? 575 255 Doeg 59 Rod Fonctional Functional Walkdown 12.86 Funttional Failure 221 2CPLT5580 20 steam Generator Narrow Range LevelChtannel#t4 AN? 568 315 Deg 59 Rod Foodtional Fonctional Walkdowne 0.86 Functional Failure 222 2NCLT5717 FrotsurizerLevel-LowlTeoperature CV2 571 113 Dog 56 Rod Functional Fonrtitonal Walhdown 11.29 Funttional Failure 223 25MP15080 2ASbteamGeneorator Steam Ste Pressure Channel S 582 D0-89 Fauntional Fundtional Walkdown oRLGM Screened per SF61NFP-8041 224 2SMPT5SSS 28 Steam DecoratorSteam Ste FressureChaonel 1 ASS 582 110-62 Functional Functional Walkdown Screeted per EFRINP-RO4S 225 25MPT5543 2C Steam Gceneator Steam Lioe Prescore Charnel 1 ASS 585 DD-82 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per SF111 NF-5104t 225 25MPT5270 20 Steam Geoerator Steam lice PrenscureChaonel S ASX S8O 00-89 Fonctional Functional Walkudowe >RLGM Screened per SF81NP-6543 237 2RATC7 EssenoialArea Terminal Cabinet ASS 577 FF-s9 Functional Fonctional Walkdown >RLGM Interaction - Blodt Walls 228 2MSR Normal Motor Control Center, S00VAC ASS se0 8B-65 Fonctional Functional Walkdown vRLDM interaction - RiockWalls 229 2MXC, BiaackoutMotor Control Cretnte,6116VAC ASS 577 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM interaction - elochWalls 230 2NCIIS5850 2A NCLoop Hot Leg Wide Range Temperatore C52 567 20 l eg 28 Rod Fonctional Ponctinaal Walkdown Screened per RFRINF-SS41 231 2NCRD5865 2A NCLoop Cold LogWide RangeTemperature CV2 587 51 Dog28 tad Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per SF81NP-ROS1 23? 2NCRD5870 2B NCLoop Rot Leg Wide Range Temperature CV2 567 160 Deg 18 Rod Functionol Functional Walkudown Screeted per RFRINP-ROSS 233 2NCR0NSS 28 NCLoop Cold LegWide Range Temperatune CV2 567 224 Dog 28 Rod Fuinctional Functional Walkdown >RLOM Screened per SF61Np-654L.

?S4 2NCRDSW00 2C NCLoop HostLeg Wide RangeTemperature CV2 567 204 Deg 20 Rod Functional Founctional Walkdown >RL1GM Screened per EFRINF-6045 235 25CRD5950 2C NCLoopCold LegWide Range Temperature CV2 567 243 Dog 29 Rod Functional Functional Walkdown >RLOM Screened per EPRINF-6045 236 2NCRSN92S 20 NCLoop Rot Leg Wide Range Temperature CV2 567 340 Deg 20 Rod Functional Functional Walkdown Screened pen SF81NP-6041 237 2NCRD5930 20 NCLoop Cold LogWide RongeTemperature CV? 567 389 Dog 28 Rod Functional Functional Walkdowan Screeted per tFRI NF-6045 238 2NCLT6550 SSVUS Plenum lUpperRaege) LevelChattel 1 ASX 582 AR-Rd Functional Functional Walkdown >RLOM Screened per SF61NP-6045 239 2NCCI5450 RVLUS Narrow Range LevelChannel S ASS 582 AA-Sd Fotctional Functional Walhdown >RLGM Scwetned per SF81NP-S04S 240 2N1LT5260 ContaintmentSump Leaed 502 552 21 Dog 58 Rod Functional Functional Waihdown >RLGM Screened per SF61NP-Sa4s 241 2NILT5261 Containmeot Sump Level 15(2 558 2 DogSNRod Fonctnonal Punctional Walhdown >RL1GM Screened per SF61NP-6045 242 2NILS5262 Contaioment Sump Level 5(2 580 3 Deg 45 Rad Punctional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screeted per EPRINP-g0d?

Page 50 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP} Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESELand HCLPFResults ESEL Nennol Oeaired Wa~lkdowva or 10 6165 Qeneriptiot hldg EL. Iocatiorn Opecatntn*Stont Ope Laoogsea; Weitek-a Snin{l totev 11C1P12 to5 felurrtvMorO'*

243 25IL75263 ContainmenrtSumnpLevel R112 566 2 eslo 54 Rad Functional Funotienal Waikdown >01GM Screened pee EP0INlP-6041 244 2N1125264 Containment Suap Level RX2 570 18 D~eg 560Rad Functional Functieonl Walkdowae 0RLGM Screened penEF61 NP-6041 245 2N1MT5260 ContainnmentSump Level AUX 577 fB-67 Functional Functional Waikdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 4COPF values of 0RLGMfudivate that the HlCurFev*eedrl the Review Lev'elGrnoundMotive 10.2-961 bet Shota vivevifieI4CLPF coloewoo cot celvalated 0mmnc the toorpoaeetvrao screoned vot froen further evaloctioe.

• "KeyFailuro M~oden ore defined onPollow's:

Screened per itPEE.- Idivotes thet the neorpnenntvetoCevalatedIctthe 1PEE6 en~d therefore oreetst he 111GM deanvod.

S¢{tenondpereORt*ll lndir.ateethat the oenponent creetstho noneenins

• 014Ph- vtlteria of EP51Nlt-h545, Tobin 2-4 aendthaoteeith:r anvhorage, relns ohattet, see interactlons limit the r'epentedHCI.PF.

Inteeaction - BlookWalsv- letliot ev that the teerponent;i oveted naear blook wall. The block well woo o3va lated in IPEE6and therefore the bloviewall metes the 6L1rMdemand. The fonetional and ancthvtage HCLPFns noveedthe reported HICLPP valee.

Interoction - Control Roow Oeiling- Idicates that the coapoonet in locatedla the control room. The control roomtveiling*roanevalvoted In thin rpepot and haso HO*pF - at 1.34g.The fncetional and anchotege HO.PPvsetcoed the repented HOLPFealue.

Anchorage - indicates that anc:horage as the goewl}trg failure wode tor the cowponeet.

Fvnectivol'*Fakire - tndivotenthat tonctionlat6 Lrionl the gocerning rafeurn mode for thnewopone~t.

Relay Chatter.- ndiOates that reloy chatter ivthe gnoveint faguoremode for the component.

flfr - Aiteenal e- lodlvaten*thalo a *ltercate approarlr lie, p-oroedunri wodrlfcntioel lots trot, Inoorprorterl tr oorcnrtpieh*;ttire desired *oapnrwerrtlvnole lemuctiecnea pposed to lecreesninthe veinmiccaciel ooftlie cowpoient.

Total Items: 245 Page 51 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 [I Appendix C CNS FLEX Flow Paths Page 52 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 I

WATER CHEMISTRY I'-l BLDG.

BLDG. I L IZ."I1 7JL]

L;Nb.LNt1iN*i* CONCORD ROAD PORTABLE PUMP SUPPLY TO: ESSENTIAL; SERViCE *JATER HEADER I/"STORAGE FACILITY LOCATION Page 53 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 WATER CHEMISTRY LZ1 BLDG.

MEDICAL FACILITY, I ~PARKING CONCORD ROAD PORTABLE PUMP" SUPPLIY TO SO,'

Page 54 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station I *Y=

Rev. 2 I I

I .

AI*N FEE2WA*TER WRTE.R SYSTEM [73 174 173 I.7S

/4: *, T MINIFLODI TO UST STYND T

' -- AIR FEEIIWATER.

MOTOR DRIVEN ISA9 WATER TRRIN A I;

. i .. AI*N FEETWATER CGNOENEER MOT'AELL-*

~I1EA RUE FDW

[A 546 COYEC'XON UPPER SURDE . '.

AUIX FEEDWATER "* ..... _

rURBINEDIE CONE*ZNSATE STERREE TANK *

• .*. *.7 :*:*,

• TEESYERINO FLOW NuTLieaR SUNSVICE * [*,]*

RUEPERR.SIe WATER TRAIN B AN31EI3

-SAN  :. . ..

Q 44 45 4*9 TR

[ IBB TO U.OT  : ,  :*

155 F *

• i-SB US "K*.MAIT FEX WATER 32~aqE L

I BYPASS FEED.

h162

~< t,~ 1 w-fr3~.nwr Vq45 4 mSX4 R AR~>~lV3~IP.~R-~V - AUXILIARY FEEOWAER SYSTEM

~ '~ ~ .ao.n0 vo, y. noj cr.u.o 4 AR AR tAtifli W.flAZt0-It-St a a - a - - ~CRI 0 I~.S4t IAEI cao$u, I ,-,,n~snrs

~

ifli-w0~* ,+/-olornt

~UXJLIARY FEED J~TER (SUPPLY L~ND f~LTERN~~TE SD MA~<EUP)

Page 55 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 I I

ID~a.Ro. ~

soo*o., 'oItJCLE*R SERVICE WATER t m*,,¢ .. SYSmTEM(RN)

• . O*TbtO. fl5O*tW O,..O,

• OI 0t NUCLEAiR SERVI[CE WATER (sUPPLY USING PORTABLE PUMP)

Page 56 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 PRIMARY I NJECT*ION Page 57 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 I RESIDUAL HEAT RE OVAL ,SYSTEM (PHASE 31)

Page 58 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I Page 59 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 Rev. 2 I F'IPE flflLEL L

iii

-A-Cont*rol Rod Or~ve Enclosure

-l 10 LU.V0R TO LIlTT

• '*

• LOER CONTANMENT N1

~S<

~4 i~LS'~-~

p-x$

lEer V~'4tLrYL0OVTtEi~

K 7WFUWLSI~WE+/-.Wi ixl.Aflr, WEFEL EN-sETE050100 LISTEn SBTW Page 60 of 60

DUKEENERGYCatawba Vice President Kelvin Henderson Nuclear Station Duke Energy CN01VP / 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 o: 803.701.4251 f: 803.701.3221 10 CFR 50.54(f)

CNS-1 5-0096 November 5, 2015 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)

Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Numbers 50-413 and 50-414 Renewed License Numbers NPF-35 and NPF-52

SUBJECT:

ERRATA LETTER FOR 10 CFR 50.54(f) SUBMITTAL OF EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT, REVISION 2 Ladies and Gentlemen:

By letter dated October 22, 2015 (CNS-15-0083), Duke Energy Submitted the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Revision 2, in Response to NRC Request-For Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident for the Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2.

The letter referred to above inadvertently excluded pages 33 through 42 of the Enclosure.

Please find a complete Enclosure included in its entirety attached to this letter to replace the Enclosure in Duke Energy letter CNS-15-0083, dated October 22, 2015.

This document contains no new Regulatory Commitments.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter or require additional information, please contact Cecil Fletcher at (803) 701-3622.

Respectfully Submitted, Kelvin Henderson Site Vice President, Catawba Nuclear Station Enclosure

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNS-1 5-0096 Page 2 xc:

L. D. Wert, Jr., Acting Regionai Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 W. M. Dean, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop 13-HI6M 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G. E. Miller U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop 8 G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Stephen Wyman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop O-13C5 1-1-555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G.A. Hutto NRC Senior Resident Catawba Nuclear Station Justin Folkwein American Nuclear Insurers 95 Glastonbury Blvd., Suite 300 Glastonbury, CT 06033-4453

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT June 23, 2015 Revision 2 Duke Energy Catawba Nuclear Station Page Ilof 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE ........................................................................ 5 2.0 BRIEF

SUMMARY

OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES ................... 5 2.1 Maintain Core Cooling and Heat Removal FLEX Flow Path ............................... 6 2.1.1 Steam Generators Available Phase 1 ................................................... 6 2.1.2 Steam Generators Available Phase 2 ................................................... 6 2.1.3 Steam Generators Available Phase 3 .. ................................................ 6 2.1.4 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 1 .............................................. 6 2.1.5 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 2 .............................................. 6 2.1.6 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 3 .............................................. 7 2.2 Maintain RCS Inventory FLEX Flow Path .................................................... 7 2.2.1 Phase 1..................................................................................... 7 2.2.2 Phase 2..................................................................................... 7 2.2.3 Phase 3..................................................................................... 7 2.3 Maintain Containment FLEX Flow Path..................................................... 8 2.3.1 Phase 1..................................................................................... 8 2.3.2 Phase 2..................................................................................... 8 2.3.3 Phase 3..................................................................................... 8 3.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND EXPEDITED SEISMIC EQUIPMENT LIST (ESEL)................................................................................................ 8 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL..................................................... 8 3.1.1 ESEL Development....................................................................... 10 3.1.2 Power-Operated Valves ................................................................ 10 3.1.3 Pull Boxes ................................................................................ 10 3.1.4 Termination Cabinets ................................................................... 10 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators .................................................... 11 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections ............................................. 11 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation.............................................................................. 11 4.0 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS)........................................... 11 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee ................................................. 11 4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) ........................................ 13 5.0 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION (RLGM) .................................................... 15 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected.............................................................. 15 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS).............................. 16 6.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH................................................... 16 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used ......................................................... 17 6.2 IPEEE Screening Process .................................................................... 19 6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination............................................................. 20 Page 2. of 60

EpdtdSeismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL.................................. 20 6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach .............................................................. 20 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach ................................................................... 20 6.5.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information..................................... 22 6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings ........................................................ 23 6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process.................................................................. 23 6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays........................................................... 25 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)........................... 25 7.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS............................................................................. 26 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns ............................... 26 7.2 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out.................................. 26 8.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS............................................................. 26 8.1 Supporting Information..................................................................... 26 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications................................................... 28 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule .................................................. 28 8.4 Summary of Planned Actions............................................................... 28

9.0 REFERENCES

...................................................................................... 29 APPENDICES APPENDIX A Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX B Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX C CNS FLEX Flow Paths FIGURES Figure 4-1. CNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Form [4] ........................................... 122 Figure 4-2. CNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Form [4] ......................................... 123 Figure 4-3. CNS SSE (5% Damping) ..................................................................... 14 Figure 4-4. Comparison of CNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping) ...................................... 14 Figure 5-1. CNS RLGM (5% Damping).................................................................. 16 Figure 6-1. Comparison of CNS SSE and RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE........................................ 19 Page 3 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 Rev. 2 TABLES Table 4-1. CNS SSE (5% Damping) -Tabular Form [4]................................................ 13 Table 5-1. CNS RLGM (5% Damping) ................................................................... 15 Table 6-1. CNS IPEEE RLE (5% Damping) ............................................................... 18 Table 6-2. Unit 1 Components that Require Further Evaluations and/or Modifications ......... 24 Table 6-3. Unit 2 Components that Require Further Evaluations and/or Modifications ......... 24 Table 8-1. Summary of Planned Actions ............................................................... 28 Page 4 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I 1.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter [1]

requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS). The intent of the ESEP is to perform aninterim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [21.

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The CNS FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/Long-Term Subcriticality, and Containment Function are summarized below.

This summary is derived from the CNS Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [31 (as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [22], [23], [24], and [25]).

Conceptual sketches showing FLEX strategy flow paths are included in Appendix C.

Page 5 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 2.1 Maintain Core Cooling and Heat Removal FLEX Flow Path The FLEX flow path for maintaining core cooling and heat removal addresses plant operating conditions with or without steam generators available. Both scenarios are addressed below.

2.1.1 Steam Generators Available Phase 1 Phase 1 of the Maintain Core Cooling and Heat Removal Strategy relies on routing the Condenser Circulation Water (RC) inventory held in the RC piping through the steam generators. The steam generators route steam to the atmosphere via power-operated relief valves SV01, SV07, SV13, and SV19. Other piping used by both segments includes the piping downstream of the head vent valves and Valves CA178 and CA174 in the Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) system.

2.1.2 Steam Generators Available Phase 2 Phase 2 of the Maintain Core Cooling and Heat Removal Strategy introduces cooling water from the ultimate heat sink for use with the steam generators.

The water will be provided by diesel-driven portable pumps via any of a number of connection points to either the Nuclear Service Water System (RN) or the Steam Generator Wet Layup Recirculation System (BW) which vary depending on which equipment is available after the initiating event. The RN connection points will be fed by a high-capacity diesel-driven pump and will provide an uninterrupted water supply to the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump (TDAFWP) for steam generator makeup, as long as it is operational. Steam generator overfill will be controlled by starting and stopping the TDAFWP as necessary or manually throttling the CA flow control valves. The BW connection points would be fed by a low-capacity, low-pressure diesel-driven pump and include piping isolated by Unit 1 Valves 1BW51, 1BW52, 1BW53, and 1BW54 and Unit 2 Valves 2BW44, 2BW46, 2BW48, and 2BW50. These connection points would feed water directly to the steam generators.

2.1.3 Steam Generators Available Phase 3 Phase 3 of the Maintain Core Cooling and Heat Removal Strategy continues operation as Phase 2 with the addition of providing cooling for specific components in the system. Phase 3 starts when equipment arrives from the National SAFER Response Center (NSRC) to provide indefinite coping capabilities.

2.1.4 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 1 There are no necessary actions to provide coping during Phase 1. CNS has no means of providing borated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) makeup for Phase 1.

2.1.5 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 2 A low pressure pump will provide borated makeup to the RCS if the event were to occur during a refueling outage. This pump will be the same diesel-driven Page 6 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I low-pressure pump identified for connection to the BW system, as both of these strategies will not be performed at the same time. The suction supply for the portable pump will come from a new connection on the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) supply line for the Spent Fuel Pool between valves KF-2O1B and 103A on Units 1 and 2. The discharge from the portable pump will be into a new connection on the A Train Safety Injection System (NI) pump discharge piping that feeds the RCS hot or cold legs.

If the reactor vessel head is still installed when the event occurs, the reactor head vent valves will be powered using the motor control center back-feed strategy and portable diesel generators. The RCS depressurization will be initiated from the reactor head vent valves which will provide indefinite coping for depressurization. This method allows vapor to be vented in situations where voids may develop during the RCS cooldown/depressurization phase and allows the discharge of liquid inventory if required while injecting the required borated water.

If the reactor vessel head is not installed and fuel is still in the core when the event occurs, discharge of liquid inventory while injecting the required borated water will simply overflow out of the reactor vessel into the cavity/containment, keeping the fuel covered and cooled.

2.1.6 Steam Generators Not Available Phase 3 This strategy will be the same as that used for the Phase 3 strategy when the steam generators wereavailable with the exception that secondary side cooling will not be required.

2.2 Maintain RCS Inventory FLEX Flow Path 2.2.1 Phase 1 The CNS OIP identifies that a Phase 1 strategy is not required as the core is not in jeopardy of being uncovered until approximately 55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> after the initiating event.

2.2.2 Phase 2 The Phase 2 strategy for re-establishing reactor make-up water uses portable pumps to bypass the safety injection pumps, providing make-up water from the FWST to the safety injection pump discharge piping. The portable pump will be connected via connection points which will be installed by the end of each corresponding units' refueling outage.

2.2.3 Phase 3 Phase 3 of the Maintain RCS Inventory strategy relies on the use of a large diesel generator to power the residual heat removal system pumps. This diesel generator will also be provided by the NSRC.

Page 7 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I 2.3 Maintain Containment FLEX Flow Path 2.3.1 Phase 1 The CNS strategy for maintaining containment during Phase 1 relies upon passive cooling from the ice condenser. As the system is passive and does not rely on flow, a FLEX flow path was not established for Phase 1.

2.3.2 Phase 2 The Phase 2 Maintain Containment strategy has two portions. At least one train of hydrogen igniters will be re-powered. Additionally, forced air circulation will be required for containment cooling based on analyses (Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) - Ice Condenser Containment Response with FLEX Mitigation Strategies, Duke Energy Document No. DPC-1552.08-00-0280 [26]). This will be accomplished by operation of the H2 skimmer fans. Pressure inside containment is monitored by the containment pressure monitors 1NSPT5370 in Unit 1 and 2NSPT5370 in Unit 2.

2.3.3 Phase 3 The Phase 3 strategy utilizes forced air circulation for containment cooling based on analyses [26]. This will be accomplished by operation of the VX Containment Air Return fans, H2 skimmer fans, and two of the Lower Containment Ventilation Units.

3.0 Equipment Selection Process and Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL)

The complete ESELs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are presented in Appendices A and B, respectively. These lists were developed in Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic: Seismic - Catawba Nuclear Station Expedited Seismic Equipment List, ARES Corporation Report No.

030321.13.01-005, Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1211.00-06-0004 [17].

The selection of equipment for the ESEL followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2],

including the August 15 and November 14, 2013, NEI Questions and Answers.

3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event, as outlined in the CNS OIP in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [22], [23], [24], and

[25]. The OIP provides the CNS FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment Page 8 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 integrity consistent with the CNS OIP [3] and supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [22], (23], [24], and [25]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704 (2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions. Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704 (2].

1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the CNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [22], [233, [243, and [25].

2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [221, [23], [24], and [25] as described in Section 2.

3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components excluded per the EPRI 3002000704 [2]

guidance are:

• Structures (e.g., containment, Reactor Building, Control Building, Auxiliary Building, etc.)

• Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.

• Manual valves and rupture disks.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.

• Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in the ESEL.

Page 9 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 I I

3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the CNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [22], [23], [24], and [25] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&lDs) and Electrical One-Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.)

in branch circuits/branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc.

3.1.2, Power-Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power-operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that

"... functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g., RClC/AFW trips)." To address this concern, the following guidance is applied in the CNS ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power-operated valves:

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and are re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple Page 10 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 [

cables. The termination cabinets andi the internal connections provide a completely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNS OIP 1311 and subsequent updates [22], [23], [24], and [25] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 also notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either 'Primary' or 'Back-up/Alternate')."

Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports ... " are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, any active valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow paths are included in the ESEL.

3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment thatis not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation The ESEL only uses equipment that is the primary means of implementing FLEX strategy.

4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee The CNS GMRS used to select the ESEP Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) was included in the CNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. Digitized GMRS frequency and acceleration values from the CNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] are shown in Figure 4-1, which is Table 2.4-1 from [4]. The CNS GMRS is plotted in Figure 4-2.

Page 11 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 Table 2.4-1 UHRS and GMRS at Control point for Catawba (5% of critical damping

_________responlse spectra)

Freg (Hz) 1E-4 UHRS (g) 1E-5 UHRS (g) GMRS (g) 100 2.19E-01 6.91E-0'1 3.29E-01 90 2 21E-01 7.02E-01 3 34E-01 80 .2.262-01 7.252-01 3.45E-01

70. 2.40E-01 7.81E-01 3.70E-0i 60 2.75E-01 9.19E-01 4.33E-01 50 3.512-01 1.202+00 5.632-01 40 4,39E-01 I .482+00 6.982-01 35 4.67E-01. 1,,56E+00 7.352-01 30 4.82E-01 1 .58E+00 7.482-01 25 .4.792-01 1.54E+00 7.31E-01 20 4.66E-01 1.472+00 6.992-01 15 4.312-01 1.322+00 6.332-01 12.5 4.062-01 1.22E+00 5.892-01 10 3.74E-01 . 1.1IE+00 5.352-01 9 3.522-01 1 .03E+O0 4.982-01 8 3.29E-01 9.49E-01 4.61E2-01 7 3.05E-01 8.632-01 4.21 2-01 6 .2.77E-01. 7.72E-01 3.772-01 5 2.452-01 6.672-01 3.282-01 4 2.032-01 5.362-01 2.652-01' 3.5 1.80E-01 4.672-01 2.31E-01 31.56E-01 3.972-01 1.98E-01 2.5 1.272-01 3.162-01 1.582-01

2. 1.19E-01 2.902-01 1.452-01 1.5 9.492-02 2.26E-01 . 1.14E-01 1.25 8.03E-02. 1.892-01 '9.552-02

• 1 7.152-02 1.642-01 8.35E-02 0.9 6.96E-02 1.60E-01 . 8.142-02 0.8 6.732-02 1.552-01 7.872-02 0.7 6.362-02 1.472-01 7.442-02 0.6 5.762-02 1.332-01 6.742-02 0.5 4.902-02 1.132-01 5.74E-02 0.4 3.922-02 9.04E-02 4.592-02 0*35 3.432-02 7.912-*02 4.022-02 0:3 2.94E-02 6.782-02 3.442-02 0.25 2.452-02 5.652-02 2.872-02 0.2 1.962-02 4.522-02 2.292-02 0.15 1.472-02 3.392-02: 1.72E-02 0.125 1.222-02 2.832-02: 1.432-02 0.1, 9.79E-03 2.262-02 1.152-02 Figure 4-1. CNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Form [4].

Page 12 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 I CNS GMRS 0.8 i -__

0.7 '-,** -Ei .

'*0.3 - -i -

0 --2... . ._ _ .....,..-,-..

................ ... ....... k _ - -4 .* *_ . ... . .. . _ *._ __*.: G R 0.1 110 100)

Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-2. CNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Form [4].

The CNS Control Point is located at Elevation 544'-0", which is at the base of the mat foundation of the Reactor Buildings [4].

4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)

A description of the CNS horizontal SSE and spectral shape is included in Section 3.1 of the CNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. The SSE is tabulated as a function of frequency in Table 4-1 and plotted in Figure 4-3.

A comparison of the CNS GMRS plotted against the SSE is shown in Figure 4-4.

Table 4-1. CNS SSE (5% Damping) - Tabular Form [4].

Frequency Spectral Acceleration (Hz) (g) 0.33 0.06 2 0.36 6 0.36 35/PGA 0.'15 Page 13 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 Rev. 2 I l

CNS SSE 5% Damping 040

• 0.35 --

!i - -- i=

0.30

-- --SSE 0.20I

~0,0 V -

1.10 100 Figure 4-3. CNS SSE (5% Damping).

CNS GMRS vs SSE 0 .6 !  ! i i1 i ! i i *i

"* .4 . .. --* -*- - -SSE...

0.0 i -- i---- -- -"*'*!*-- s.

0.3 1........... .... 1- /: 10 -- - -=

• 100-..*

Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-4. Comparison of CNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping).

Page 14 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected The procedure for determining the RLGM for the ESEP is described in Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the spectral acceleration values for the 5%-damped SSE horizontal ground response spectrum by a scale factor. The scale factor is the largest ratio of spectral accelerations between the 5%-damped GMRS and the 5%-damped SSE ground response spectrum at frequencies from 1 Hz to 10 Hz, but not to exceed 2.0.

The ratio of the GMRS to the SSE over the 1 to 10 Hz frequency range is shown in Figure 4-4. The largest ratio of the GMRS to the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hz range is at 10 Hz. The ratio of the spectral accelerations is 0.535/0.28 = 1.91. Therefore, the RLGM is determined by multiplying the SSE ground response spectrum by 1.91. Digitized RLGM frequency and acceleration values are shown in Table 5-1.

The CNS RLGM is plotted in Figure 5-1.

Table 5-1. CNS RLGM (5% Damping).

Frequency Acceleration 0.333 0.115 0.5 0.172 1 0.344 2 0.688 3 0.688 4 0.688 5 0.688 6 0.688 7 0.637 8 0.596 9 0.562 10 0.535 11 0.509 12 0.487 13 0.468 14 0.452 15 0.436 17.5 0.404 20 0.378 22.5 0.357 25 0.339 27.5 0.323 30 0.309 35 0.287 100 0.287 Page 15 of 60 II

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv.

Rev. 2 I CNS RLGM 0.800 -*, T-*T " *7""

0.700

• _ ____i_--

, 0.5o0 O ..... ---.-

• - 0.300...

0.200 0.100i i i li 0.000 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 5-1. CNS RLGM (5% Damping).

5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)

The new ISRS for the ESEP were derived by scaling the CNS design-basis SSE ISRS (raw, unbroadened) by the RLGM scale factor of 1.91.

6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, in this case the 5%-damped RLGM spectral shape. The HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA. The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [21.

There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin [7].

2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959, Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities [8].

Page 16 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 Rev. 2 I I

6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used Seismic capacity screening was done using information from the CNS Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal [9] and supporting documentation (CNC-1535.00-00-0005 [181, Seismic Capacity Evaluations for the IPEEE and EPRI Seismic Margins Study]).

CNS used both a SPRA [10] and a SMA to address the IPEEE. The SPRA and SMA are described in the CNS IPEEE Submittal Report [9].

The SMA conducted for Catawba is documented in EPRI NP-6359 [19], Seismic Margin Assessment of the Catawba Nuclear Station. This SMA was a trial plant review to test the EPRI Seismic Margin Methodology. It was performed prior to the publication of NRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4 [6], and NUREG-1407 [5], Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, which provided the requirements for IPEEE. Consequently, it differed in some respects from most of the SMAs that were conducted for IPEEE. The Catawba SMA was equivalent to a full-scope SMA, as defined in NUREG-1407 [5], as it included a full-scope evaluation of relays, whereas NUREG-1407 [5] placed Catawba in the focused-scope category and only required a search for low-ruggedness relays.

The SMA documented in EPRI NP-6359 [19] was for Unit 2. During the IPEEE, Duke Energy conducted an additional SMA to extend the EPRI NP-6359 [19]

results to Unit 1 and all of the items on the IPEEE Seismic Equipment List in Unit 2. This SMA is documented in CNC-1535.00-00-0005 [18].

The SMA documented in CNC-1535.00-00-0005 [18] consisted of screening wallkdowns and anchorage calculations. The screening walkdowns used the screening tables from EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The walkdowns were conducted by registered professional engineers. Given the standards available at the time each of the two portions of the seismic review was done, the Seismic Review Team met the requirements and intent of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] and NUREG-1407 [5]. The walkdowns were documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) from EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. Anchorage capacity calculations utilized the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. Seismic demand was based on the Review Level Earthquake (RLE) selected for the Catawba Trial Plant Review, which was the Sequoyah 84th percentile site-specific spectral shape anchored to 0.3g PGA, which is similar to the NUREG/CR-0098 [11] response spectrum recommended in NUREG-1407 [5]. Frequency and acceleration values for the CNS IPEEE RLE are shown in Table 6-1. Figure 6-1 shows the EPRI NP-6359 [19] RLE compared to the SSE and RLGM response spectra.

Page 17 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I I

Table 6-1. CNS IPEEE RLE (5% Damping).

Freq. (Hz) Acc. (g) Freq. (Hz) Acc. (g) 0.25 0.20 3.78 0.729 0.28 0.027 4.23 0.752 0.31 0.033 4.74 0.772 0.35 0.041 5.31 0.792 0.39 0.048 5.94 0.817 0.44 0.055 6.66 0.839 0.49 0.063 7.45 0.806 0.55 0.077 8.35 0.727 0.62 0.093 9.35 0.644 0.69 0.110 10.47 0.566 0.78 0.128 11.72 0.511 0.87 0.148 13.13 0.473 0.97 0.167 14.7 0.445 1.09 0.184 16.46 0.424 1.22 0.201 18.43 0.410 1.37 0.220 20.64 0.398 1.53 0.251 23.11 0.382 1.71 0.301 25.88 0.363 1.92 0.374 28.98 0.341 2.15 0.470 32.46 0.320 2.4 0.546 36.34 0.308 2.69 0.589 40.7 0.301 3.01 0.635 46 0.300 3.38 0.689 _____ _ ____

Page 18 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe.

Rev. 2 I CN"S SSE and RLGM vs IPEEE RLE 0t

¢00 Frequeziy"(Hz)

Figure 6-1. Comparison of CNS SSE and RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE.

6.2 IPEEE Screening Process The equipment evaluations in the IPEEE were based on plant design information, including equipment qualification test and analysis reports. Failure modes considered were functional failures, including relay chatter, and anchorage failure. The original anchorage capacities were updated as needed based on the SMA walkdowns. Seismic interactions were addressed by the SMA walkdowns.

It is seen from Figure 6-1 that the RLE envelopes the RLGM at all frequencies greater than about 3.4 Hz. The RLE is less than the RLGM at frequencies below about 3.4 Hz. This may be disregarded as there are no CNS ESEL components in this frequency range. Therefore, any components whose SMA based HCLPF exceeds the RLE can be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

The screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL [71 are based on ground peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g. These both exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration of 0.69g. The anchorage capacity calculations were based on SSE floor response spectra scaled to the RLE, except for equipment in the Auxiliary Building for which new floor response spectra were generated for the RLE per EPRI NP-6359 [19]. Equipment for which the screening caveats were met and for which the anchorage capacity exceeded the RLE seismic demand can be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination because the HCLPF capacity exceeds the RLGM.

Page 19 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 I The results of the IPEEE capacity screening are noted in Appendix A for the Unit 1 ESEL and in Appendix B for the Unit 2 ESEL. For the components that were not screened out, HCLPF capacities were determined using the deterministic EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] CDFM methodology and RLGM spectral shape and/or anchorage evaluations.

6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination HCLPF capacities were determined by evaluating the function, anchorage, and seismic interaction failure modes. HCLPF functional capacities were determined using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. HCLPF anchorage capacities were determined using the CDFM methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. HCLPF seismic interaction capacities were determined by walkdown screening.

6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL The components were screened against EPRI NP-6041-SL [7], Table 2-4. ISRS were used for all components located above the basemat for the screening, and the screening levels of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] were increased by a factor of 1.5 (EPRI 1019200, Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update [20]). Thus, the accelerations for the screening levels are 1.2g and 1.8g instead of 0.8g and 1.2g.

The RLGM demand is screened against the unfactored screening level for components located at the basemat.

The raw, unbroadened SSE ISRS were amplified by a factor of 1.91 throughout the frequency range and were then clipped using the methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL, Appendix Q. The resulting clipped peaks ranged between 55%

and 100% of the original peak. The peak spectral accelerations of the North-South and East-West clipped peaks were averaged, as recommended in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7], Page 2-44. The resulting averaged peak spectral accelerations ranged between 96% and 100% of the maximum (North-South or East-West direction). Peak shifting was not performed for the CNS evaluations, since for all cases the evaluations utilized either the peak spectral acceleration or PGA.

HCLPFs for these components are shown in Appendices A and B3.

6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach Walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] for the Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]

describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria.

"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactiveor low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactiveenvironments, or possibly within Page 20 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 }

contaminatedcontainment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographicinspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurriedinspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiringan electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panelsfor detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not in tended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

If the SRT has a reasonablebasisfor assuming that the group of components are similarand are similarly anchoredj, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "~similarity-basis"should be developed before the wolkdown during the seismic capability preparatorywork (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets orpaneisfor this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedureshould be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurationswith the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondenceis found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedurefor inspection should be repeatedfor each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribedin criteriafor that component, potentialSI [Seismic Interaction1] problems, situationsthat are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend

'EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "... to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."

Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI11025287 [15]."

Page 21 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsiblefor the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidancefor sampling selection."~

6.5.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information Many of the components had been walked down previously during IPEEE evaluations and have documented SEWS recording the results. Credit is given to these walkdowns since they were performed by qualified Seismic Review Teams.

A walk-by of these components was performed and documented. The primary objective of a walk-by is to verify that the component and/or anchorage has not degraded since the original walkdown and to verify that the component is free of interaction issues that may have developed since the original walkdown.

Walkdowns were performed on all ESEL components which were not previously walked down during the IPEEE evaluations. Seismic Review Teams (SRT) were composed of SQUG-trained Seismic Capability Engineers (SCE). SRT members had B.S. Degrees in Mechanical or Civil Engineering and most were licensed Professional Engineers (PEs). Each SRT had at least one licensed PE. All SRT members had at least 7 years of engineering experience including designing and evaluating new and existing structures, systems, and components (SSCs) for nuclear facilities. The following table provides the qualifications of the ESEP SRT members.

,i ,*!, i,,*: *,*,***,:[

' : : :!**:* * '* ,* **, i: *; ,-"

• i ~!*:'***I:L 0 ***

Charles M. (Chiip) Conselman, P.E.

Paul Dorsh, P.E.

fProj ect jTechnical Manager Lead BS/Civil Engineering BS/Mechanical Engineering 25+

15+

Mike White Manager BS/Mechanical Engineering 20+ .

Jeff Martin, P.E. Senior Engineer BS/Mechanical Engineering 7+

Masonry block walls were evaluated as part of IPEEE and shown to meet the RLE demand. Therefore, they also meet the RLGM demand. Proximity of block walls to ESEL components was noted on the SEWS forms and the presence of block walls was considered in determining a HCLPF and identification of key failure modes.

Page 22 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 [

6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings All of the ESEL components included in the walkdowns and walk-bys completed to date were determined to have an existing capacity greater than the RLGM, with the exception of the components listed in Tables 6-2 and 6-3. These components require further evaluation and/or modification in order to have a capacity greater than the RLGM.

6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items not included in the previous CNS IPEEE evaluations were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The evaluations included the following steps:

• Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment not included in previous seismic walkdowns to evaluate the equipment-installed plant conditions;

• Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] as described in Section 6.2; and

• Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural failure modes (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functional failure modes.

All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in Expedited Seismic Evaluation Processfor Implementation of Seismic Risk Evaluations at Catawba NuclearStation, ARES Corporation Report 030321.13.01-003 (Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1211.00-06-0003),

Appendix D [21]. HCLPF results and key failure modes are included in the ESEL tables in Appendices A and B.

Page 23 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I Table 6-2. Unit 1 Components that Require Further Evaluations and/or Modifications.

ESEL EN Dsrpin Bldg E.Locat Recommendati PolmDsrpinAction Description ID _______ . ion on _________________Including PIP Numbers 19 lEAT Essential Area AU 5 FF- Move conduit The cabinet will likely impact a conduit Move conduit support for 7 C12 Terminal X 7 56 support. support during a seismic event. This clearance.

Cabinet 7 interaction has the potential to cause PIP# c-14-09014 (AR# 1897248) relay chatter. WO# 02169144 AR =Action Request AUX = Auxiliary PIP = Problem Investigation Process WO = Work Order Table 6-3. Unit 2 Components that Require Further Evaluations and/or Modifications.

bc Action Description ESLIDENBlg L.ati om Problem Description Including PIP ESLI I eciton Bd.E.aiendation on Numbers I I There are no Unit 2 components requiring I further evaluations or modifications.

Page 24 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 Rev. 2 I I

6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays Two types of relays (located in four cabinets) in the ESEL associated with the FLEX Phase 1 response required functional evaluations. Each relay was evaluated using the SMA relay evaluation criteria in Section 3 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7].

Specific seismic qualification test-based capacities were available for the relays in existing plant documentation. Relay capacity to demand evaluations were performed by comparing the test-based capacities with the in-cabinet seismic demand. The in-cabinet demand was determined by scaling the ESEP ISRS by the in-cabinet amplification factors from EPRI NP-6041-SL [71. In each case, the capacity exceeded the demand.

The ESEP relay functional evaluations are documented in Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Implementation of Seismic Risk Evaluations at Catawba Nuclear Station, ARES Corporation Report 030321.13.01-003 (Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1211.OO-06-0003), Appendix D, [21].

6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1 and Append ix B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables:

• For items screened out using the IPEEE evaluations, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per IPEEE."

• For items screened out using EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] screening tables, the screening levels are provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per EPRI NP-6041."

• For items where interaction with masonry walls controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Interaction - Block Walls."

• For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is noted as "Anchorage."

• For items where component function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Functional Failure."

• For items where relay function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Relay Chatter."

Page 25 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 [

7.0 Inaccessible Items 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns All ESEL items in Unit :1 were accessible for walkdowns except for hydrogen igniters 1EHMO035, 1EHMO039, and 1EHMO045 located in the Unit 1 Reactor Building. These igniters were judged seismically adequate based on similarity to the 65 igniters that were accessible and included in the walkdowns.

All ESEL items in Unit 2 were accessible for walkdowns except for hydrogen igniters 2EHMO041 and 2EHMO045 located in the Unit 2 Reactor Building. These igniters were judged seismically adequate based on similarity to the 65 igniters that were accessible and included in the walkdowns.

Accessibility to the igniters noted above was prevented due to unsafe access path. The SRT members judged that the igniters could be screened based upon similarity to the accessible igniters and the fact that all of the ignitors observed were properly anchored and in good material condition. Further effort to gain access was judged not to warrant the time and personnel exposure involved in construction of scaffolding.

7.2 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out There are no additional required walkdowns or evaluations.

8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 Supporting Information CNS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall CNS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. On March 12, 2014, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted to the NRC results of a study [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "... site-specific seismic hazards show that there clearly has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants." based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "... current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis ... "

Page 26 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 [

The NRC's May 9, 2014, NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [14]

concluded that the "... fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the G1-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in G1-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for CNS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12]; therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter (14] also apply to CNS.

In addition, the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of structures, systems and components (SSCs) inherently contain margin beyond their design level; (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs; and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. .This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

• Safety factors applied in design calculations;

• Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs;

• Bounding synthetic time histories for ISRS calculations;

• Broadening criteria for ISRS;

• Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications;

• Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis;

• Bounding requirements in codes and standards;

• Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel);

• Bounding testing requirements; and

• Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.

Page 27 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I I

8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications Tables 6-2 and 6-3 identify items where modifications will be made to enhance

• the seismic capacity of the plant.

8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule Plant modifications will be performed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [13] (endorsed by the NRC in their May 7, 2013, letter [16]), which states that plant modifications not requiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 2016 and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31, 2014.

8.4 Summary of Planned Actions The actions listed in Table 8-1 will be performed as a result of the ESEP.

Table 8-1. Summary of Planned Actions.

Action Equipment Equipment

1. ID Description Action Description 'Completion Date 1 N/A N/A Perform seismic walkdowns, generate Completed March 2015.

HCLPF calculations, and design and implement any necessary modifications for Unit 2 items as detailed in Section 7.2.

Note that this action is complete as of March 2015.

2 N/A N/A Complete modifications of Unit 1 Not !ater than the end of the components listed in Table 6-2. second planned Unit 1 refueling outage after December 31, 2014.

3*N/A N/A Complete evaluations!/modifications of Completed March 2015.

Unit 2 components listed in Table 6-3.

Note that this action is complete as of March 2015.

4 N/A N/A Submit a letter to NRC Summarizing The expected date for the results of item 1 and confirming Unit 1 letter is 60 days after implementation of the plant modifications the Spring 2017 outage which associated with items 1 through 3. is the second refueling outage after December 31, 2014. The expected date for Unit 2 would be no later than December 31, 2016, which is two years after the December 31, 2014, date.

Page 28 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 I I

9.0 References

[1] Letter from E. Leeds and M. Johnson, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al.,

"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012.

[2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance:Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013, EPRI 3002000704.

[3] CNS Overall Integrated Plan, Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses With Regard To Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events, EA-12-049"; Enclosure, Overall Integrated Plan (attachments 1 through 5), dated February 28, 2013, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[4] Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Additional Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 31, 2014, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[5] Proceduraland Submittal Guidancefor the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407.

[61 USNRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities- 10 CFR 50.54(f),"

June 28, 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

[7] A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI NP-6041-SL.

[8] Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities,Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, July 1, 1994, EPRI TR-103959.

[9] CatawbaNuclear Station IPEEE Submittal Repb~rt, July 1994, Duke Energy, York, SC.*

[10] CatawbaNuclear Station Unit 1, ProbabilisticRisk Assessment, September 1992, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[11] Development of Criteriafor Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, published May 1978, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-O098.

Page 29 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 I I

[12] Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States," March 12, 2014.

[131 Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations," April 9, 2013.

[14] Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.

[15] Seismic Evaluation Guidance:Screening, Prioritizationand Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February 2013, EPRI 1025287.

[16] Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to J. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

• Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013.

[17] Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic: Seismic - Catawba Nuclear Station Expedited Seismic Equipment List, Rev. 0, ARES Corporation .Report No. 030321.13.01-005, Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1211.00-06-0004.

[18] Seismic Capacity Evaluationsfor the IPEEE and EPRI Seismic Margins Study, Revision 3, Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1535.00-00-0005.

[19] Seismic Margin Assessment-of the Catawba Nuclear Station, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April 1989, EPRI NP-6359.

[20] Seismic FragilityApplications Guide Update, December 2009, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI 1019200.

[21] Expedited Seismic Evaluation Processfor Implementation of Seismic Risk Evaluationsat Catawba Nuclear Station, Revision 2, ARES Corporation Report 030321.13.01-003, Duke Energy Document No. CNC-1211.00-06-0003.

[221 First Update to CNS Overall Integrated Plan, Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy);

Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 28, 2013, Duke Energy, York, SC.

Page 30 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv. Rev. 2 I I

1231 Second Update to CNS Overall Integrated Plan, Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy);

Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; "Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2014, CNS-14-020, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[24] Third Update to CNS Overall Integrated Plan, Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy);

Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 28, 2014, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[25] Fourth Update to CNS Overall Integrated Plan, Letter from Kelvin Henderson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy);

Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Renewed License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; Fourth Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 26, 2015, Duke Energy, York, SC.

[261 Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) - Ice Condenser Con tainment Response with FLEX Mitigation Strategies, Revision 2, Duke Energy Document No.

DPC-1552.08-00-0280 Page 31 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I Appendix A Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 32 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESELand HCL.PF Rtesulta EIE ghn Devcrition tadO El. uNortan Dsoired Waibdywno Lovution Operating State OpeoratingStute or Waliv-by Rv:roeoinCRotes HCLPF" Key Failurt Modese 1 1NC25OA Reactor Head Vent Valve CV1i 600 080De825Rod Cloned Open Walkdownt >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-gRAS 2 1ttCi53A Reactor SoadVolts Valve Cvi 600 d4 06g2760 Rd closed Opet Walkdowcn >tlGM Smenacedper EPHI00-6841 102 tog Cosned Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 4 ONE$ Pressudztergafety Valve cvi g37 102 Deg Closed Functional Walk-by >RLGM SCreened per IPEEE 4 iNC2 PressurizerSafety Valve CVi 637 102 leg Closed Functional Walk-by vRLGM Screened per IPEES 6.. .. _5iNC .4A... ... Pressu.rzer..PouwerOp~eratedR~eief.Valve"..... . ... . .......... .. . .. 6I......

65. _ 565 Deg Cloned Fanctional Walk-by >RI/iM Screened HonIPSEEE 7 iNcKli VroessudzerReliefT~ank1 Ct/i 554 HRDog Fo~nctinnal Fauntional Walkdowno >RLGM Screened pet EPRIRP-H041 229 Deg38 Rod Open Cloned Walkdownn ... . . .........

.... . .. . 3_"

M.. ........... Screened perPRIp- ...... . ...

3 265 leg 53 Had Closed Open Walk-by Included in IPEEE,pg 5. >RLGOM Screenedper FPEEE H0 IAXARFD cottainmoent Air Return Fan SAinte Cv1 599 265508g53 Rad OHf On Walk-by >RLGIM Screened per I/PEEE iS1 1A(ARF4 Coo~tajonentAir Retort Fan S6Dape C~ti 599 253088g49 Had lonsed Open Wallk-by Included in IFEEE,0035. >RLSM Screened per IPSEEE 12 18VXCARF containmoentAir Return Fan 08 Ct/i 569 293 leg ARRad Ott On Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 23 it/lIA HydrogenSkimmeerFan IA tsolation CVi 658 2H0 DegA S5 ad Cloned Open Walkdowun 8.29 FunctioneelFailure 24 itatHOFA HydrogenSkimmer Fan 1A CVi 652 266 Dog5480ad Off On Walkdowny 0.44 Anckorage 15 50028 Hydrogenikimmrerran is Isolation Valve CVi 658 285 Deg45 Had Cloned Open Walkdowno 0.29 Functional Failure 16 IVERSFO HydroenvSkiotmer Fan 18 CV- 6s2 272 leg 49 tad Off On Walkdawno 0.44 Anvhorage 17 ONDiR Residual Heat Renmoval A Trait Isolation Valve CV1 568 176 Deg 25 Had cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM Screenedper IPEEE 58 iNO2A Residual Heat ReonovalA Train Isolation Valve CVi 567 176 Ded 50 Had Cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM Svreened per IPEEF 19 1NDPUA Reaidual Rent Removal Pump :IA AU11 S22 3G-54 Functional Functional Walk-ky >RLGM Screenedpor PErEE 20 1NHSHAPMP Residual Heat RemtovalPaumpMechaniral Seal Hear ExhavtugerIA ASS 5g22 FF-5S Functional Functional Walk-by tale-of-the-boo wvith1N03PUA vRIGM Screened pet IPlEEg 21 i1lC6X040S Residual Hent RennovalPomp 14 Motor Cooler ASS 522 G0-53 Functional Functional Walk-k3 Role-nf-tke-bvvoix w Sh10

• PUA >RlGtd Screened per tP666 22 1NDHXA Residual Heat RemovalHeat Evchanger tA ASS 5RHO li-Ri Fanctional Functional - Walk-by vRLGM Screened per IFEEE 24 iSFiOiB FW/Systemn/KFSystett Isolation Valve AUX 584 JJ-52 Closed Open Walkdownn >RIGM Screened per EPHINP-g04I 24 SFWTE0S RefuelirgWater Storage Tankl(FWST) Yard Intact Intact Walbdowno ,30 Anchorage 25 ilKcHXA Contponeot CoolingHeat Exrhanger IA ASS 577 Functional Functienal Walk-HR >RLOM Screened pmr FEES 66-58 Functional Functional Walk-by vRLGM Screened per IPEEE 27 1KCPHXA1 Contponent CoolingPuttp lA1 Motor Cooler AUX 560 Functional Fonctional Walk-by Rule-of-the-boo wnith1KCP/ UA1 >RLGM Screenedper FPEEE 28 OHcog6A Residual SeatRemnoval Heat Exchanger 1AItolation Valve AUX 590 Cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM Screenedper IPEEE 29 iRNg3A NudearServiveWatertoStandbysvdearServiceWateraond lincharge AiX 581 00-60 Closed Open Walk-by vRLGM Screened per PErEE Isolation Valve 35 18N250A Rudear ServiceWater to SCAPUTD IsolationValve ASS 587 Li-SR Cloned Open Walk-by

>RLGM Screened per IPEEH 32 /AWLCv'U IA lowverContaitnmett Ventilation Unit 1LCVU-I-SI RW 585 16 leg Functional Fanctional Walbdowne >RLGM Screenedper EPRINF-6041 Page 33 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESELand HCLPFResults ESEL NdoriTnal Desired Walkdlown 10 CIN Description OperatingSitote Opertitog 1t00e or Wolic-by Srcrveeig Notes 0 BldS CL Lcoativo H4aPF Icy Failorme Mode*"

30 1DWLCVU iD Lower ContainmtentVentilation Unit (LCeU-1D) tixi ins 344 Den Functinonl Functional Walbdown >RFLGM Screened per EP51RINP-6041 33 1BB24 SteanmGenerotor 1C Blowdown FlowControl Vaolve TB1 578 iL-29 Open Closed Walkdown >RLGSM irreened per EPSINP-60541 34 1BI36 SteoamGenerator 1D BlowdownFlow control Vaice TB1 583 1L-29 Open Closed Walkdown >RLGSM screened per EPSINP-604i 35 1Be69 iteamsGenerator IA SlowdownFlowControl Voive Tel 5ea 11.-29 Open Closed Walkdown >GM Screened per EFPINJP-6041 an 1nS7a itearn Generaotor1n elowdownFlowControl Vaive Tem sea 11.-29 Open Closed Walkdown >RLGM icreened per FF51NP-604il 37 1cA174 Condensor Circulating Water System,Isolation Valvo AUX 544 CC-is closed Open WoNk-by >RLGM Screened per IPFEE 3e iCA257 SCAPUTD Feedwater sofety Volvo AUX 534 VA-Si closed Fuectional Walkdowo >SLGM Screened per EFRiNF-6041 39 1CA~lSA Nuclear Service Water System Train IA Isolation Voice ASX i55 ne-il Closed Open Walk-bV >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 40 1CAPUTD Torbine DrivenAuxiliaryFeed Water Pump ASS i3i A-iB1 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLiM Screened per [PEFF 41 iCAHXS~l Torbine DrivenAuxiliaryFeed Water PumnpLube OilCooler ASS 551 DD-53 Functional Functinonl Walk-by lRule-of-the-lbox with 1CAPUD >RLGM Screened per IPFEEP 42 lCAe4 AuxiliaryFeedwater to SteamtGenerotor IA*Isioltion Valce ASS 55S ne-is Open Throttled Walltdown >RLGM Screered per EPRINP-6041 43 1CAS2 AuxiliaryPeedwaterto iteoamGenerator in Isloltion Valve AUS 546 Cc-ia Open Throttled Walkdown >RFIGM Screened per SPRIl NP-604i 44 1CA48 AuxiliaryFeedwater to SteameGenerator i(C Isolation Volvo ASS 551 10-53 Open Throttled Wolkdowo >RLGM Screened per CPSINP-6041 45 lcA36 AuxiliaryFeodwoter to Steom Generotor SD Isolation Volvo AUX 5i4 BB-49 Open Th1rottled Walkdown N/A N/A -WAternate 45 1SV2 Stea Genoerotor1DSafey Volvo Dn1 e18 tE-4 Closed Punctinonl Walk-bS >RLGM Screened per IP6CC 47 lSV3 SteoamGenerator iD Safety Voice 041 608 EE-44 closed Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP6CC 48 15V4 iteam Geneerotor10 Safety Valve DH1 519 EE-44 Closed Functionol Wolk-by >RLGM Screened per IP5CC 49 iSVS Steow Generator SDSafety Voice DH1 518 CE-44 Closed Functional >RFLGM Screened per IPtEE i0 15V6 Steam Generatorl1D SfetyeValve 041 6iS CE-44 closed Functinonl Walk-bV >RLGM Screened per IP6CC i1 1SMC Sooea Generotor iD Mominteanm Isolation Volvo 041 615 DD-44 Open Closed Walk-by >RFLGM screened per PIPES 52 15V8 Steoa Venerator 1c Safety Voice SDll 515 6E-52 closed Functinonl Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP0CC 0H1 618 1E-52 closed Functional Walk-bV >RLGM Screened per IPECC 54 1SV1O iteamnGenerotor iC Safety Voice 041 sin CC-i2 closed Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP6CC 55 ISVll Steam Generator 1c Safety Valce 041 618 CF-i2 closed Functional Walk-by >RlG~M Screened per PEEE 5n lSV12 SteamnGenerotor 1CSafety Volvo ens sin EE-i2 closed Functional Wal1k-by cRLGM Screened per IP6CC 57 15M3 iteom Generotor IC:Mole SteamtIsolation Voice DH1 515 DD-52 Open closed Walk-by cRLGM Screened per [PEEE 58 15V14 Steaw Generator iBnSafetyVoice lDH1 619 EE-53 Closed Functional Walk-bV >RSLGM -Screened per IP6EE 59 lSVIS Steow Generator in Safety Voice 0H1 6i8 EE-53 Closed Functional Walk-by >RFLOM Screened per IPEE6 43 1SVIS Steaw Generator in SafetVVoice 041 6in EE-53 closed Functional Walk-by >RLGM screened per PEEE 41 DSVi7 Steaw Generator iB SofetyVolce Del 518 66-53 closed Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP6CE 62 15V18 SteantGenerator 1BSafetyValve DH11 618 EC-53 Closed Functional Wal1k-by Screened per IPEEE

>RSISM Page 34 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL.and IHCIPF Results ESEl S~onnlal Desired Walkdowvn III kEtt Devunipti~n Ps~da El. lutoyno Operatingsta~e Ope'ra~lo Stote or Walk-ky Screening NoteS ISCIPP* Ken PailareModera 63 EMS5 Steam Generator SBMole Steam lsolation Value Dlii 615 DD-54 Open cloned Walk-ky >RLGM Screened per IPEE 64 IS5V20 Steam Generator IA Safely Vaive DHt 616 EE-44 Closed Punctional Walk-by 061GM Screened per [PEEE 65 iSV2I SteamGlenerator IA Safety S/aloe DHs 658 EE-44 Closed Functional Walk-by* >RLGM Screeneedper IPEER 66 ESV22 Stean, Generator IA Safety Valve DHS 618 EE-44 Closed Punctional Walk-by >R1GM Screened per IPEER 67 1SSV23 SteamlGeneratorIA Safety Valve DH1 tlS8 EE-G4 Closed Fanctional Walls-by >RLGM Screened per PEEE 68 IS/VZ4 Steam Generator lA Safety Value - . DH11/ 618 ER-44 Closed Funsctional Walk-by v6LGM Screened per [PEER 69 1GM7 Steam Generator IA Main Steam looietion Value Del 615 OD-43 Open Closed Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 75 ES/i Poner Operated R11ene Valve-Steam GoeneratorID DH61 601 PP-44 Closed Open *Walk-by >ELaM Screened pet PFEBE 71 ESV7 PowrerOperated ReliefValve -SteamlGenerator 1C Dlii 661 PP-53 Cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM ScreenednorlIPfER 72 15VE Power Operated RteliefValve-Steans Genetator 1.6 DHS 661 FF-53 Closed Open Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPERE 73 ESISV Power Operated Reliefyalvee-Steam Generatorl1A DHD 6111 PP-Ge Cloned Open Walk-by >RIGM Screened yerlPEEE 74 1SA2 iCAPUTDSteam Peedisolation S/aloe DC!. 626 PP-SI Cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPREEE 75 ESA145 1CApUTD Trip Throttle Valve(Stop Valvel ASS 534 A.A-Si Open Throttled Walk-by Ruale-ef-the-boxwith DCAPUD >RLGM Screened per IPEtE 76 1SA144 SCAPUTD Control Valve ASS 531 AA-5S Open Throttled Walk-by Rule-of-the-bee witb SCApUD v>RLSM Screened per IPEER 77 iNS/lXt Residual SeatRemoval Heat Exchanger 1B AUS 565 KlI-SD Intact Intact Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEER 78 51N454 AcuvmolatorTank IA lsolatiovValve CS/i 560 46 Dog 47 Rad Open Closed Walk-by >RLGM Screened peerfEEE 78 1NIBS6 Accomulator Tank 16 Isolation Valve 0/1 565 E37Deg4? Road Open Closed Walk-6y >RL1GM Screened per IPEEE 80 SNI76A AccumulatorTank IA Isolation S/alan CS/i 560 226 Deg 47 Rad Opeo Closed Walk-by >61LGM Screened per IPEER 81 1NI880 Atcumulator Took SAIvolationValue CS/i 580 SE Deeg47aRd Open Cloned Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 82 NSPISXIA Contaimnent Spray Heat Evekaeger 1A "AUX 577 LL-52 Intact Intact Walk-by " 11>RLM Screened perlPEtE 83 1N1HXB Containment Spray Heat Exchanger1B ASS 577 LL-S2 Intact Intact Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 84 iHLPIP Hot LegParticulate Sample Panel ASS 543 PP-S4 Intact intact Walkdownl vELGM Screened per EpRI P-6541 85 iNMHStl7 Reactor Coolant Rot tegSample Heat EnukangerlA ASS 543 Rne238 Intact Intact Waibdoen >RLGM Screened per EPRINIP-6041 86 t.NM/IIID8 Reactnr Coolant Hot lee SampleHeat Exckanger 16 AUX 545 Smn218 Intact Intact Walkdown vERLGM Scr*eenedper EPRINP-6541 87 iPSS PrimarySample SinE16 - ASS 541 PP-Sd lntaut Intact Walbdowne 8/A 11/A- Alternate 88 iEMP4tlA A Train KCRadiationMonitor ASS 577 86-57 Intact Sntart Walkdowvn 5.15. Anchorage 89 1K11gB AuxiliaryBu/itldn Noen-EsnentialReturn Header Isolation Value ASS 567 HH-57 Open Cloned Walk-by >R1GM Screened per PEEE 50 1tC3A EeactorBildineg1/o-EssentiaLRetain Header Isolation Valve ASS 567 HH-57 Open Cloned Walk-ky >S1GM Screened per tPEER 9i SRCSSB AooiliaryBuildingNon-EnventlalReturn Header IsolatinonValve ASS 585 JJ-55 Open Closed Walk-by >R1GM Screened per IPEEE 92 i/KC2SSA Reactor BuildingNon-Ersen~olRetomaHeader IsnoatiovValve ASS 566 HH-SS Open Closed Walk-by v-RI/M Screened per IPEEt 93 IKCTKlA Component CoolingSorge Tack 1A ASS 594 NNl-S9 - Intact Intact Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Page 35 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEI.and HCLPFResults dEEL Noromal Desired Walkdowon ID SIN Desocription lids EL location Operating State Operating State or Walk-by Screnoing Note$ HO-Pl" KeyFailure Moden' 94 1KFHXA FuelPool Cooling CeatExchanger t-A AUX 577 NN-52 Intact Intact Waikdowrn >RLGM - Soreoned per EPRINP-C04l as 1KFHXB FoelPool Cooling Heat Exchtanger16 AIX 577 NN-52 Intact Intact Walkdownc >RISM Soeeened per EPERI NP-604l 96 1NVHX0009 Let town Heat Exchlanger AUX 977 66-*53 Intact Intact Walkdown 0.30 Anohorage 97 iRS~llA Nuclear Setnice Water PunmpIA Isolation Vaice 6N6 603 PlanA Open Cloned Wnik-by >RLGSM Screened per IPEEE 96 2R1511A NuloearServiieWater Paup 2Aisolation Volve 696 601 52S71Y Open Cloned Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 99 1CPJ48B NudearlercicoWaterScpplyCrossoverlsolationValve ASX 681 Pp-5a Open Closed Walk-by >R[GM Screened perIPEEE 1SS 2RN48B Nociear ServiceWater SapplyCronsorer IsolationValve AUX 515 PP-60 Open Cloned Wolk-by Indluded in IPEEE,pg720. >RtL6M Soreenedp*er IPEtE Sill 1RNSFA NuclearlercireWaterStrolnerlB RNB SIC Putmphouse Intact Intact Walk-by >OLGM Screenedp*er IPdEE 902 2RNSrA Noclear ServiceWater Strainer 2B 696 6O Pautphoane Intact Intact Walk-by >RlLGM Screenedper IPEtE 593 1RN5IA Unitl1 Nuear ServiceWatertNon-Essential Eetarn HeaderlIsolationValve AIX 566 NN-55 Open Cloned Walk-by >RLGSM Screened per IPEEE 104 2RN51lA Unit2 Naclear ServiceWater Non-Ensential Reater HeoderlIsolation Valve AUlS 586 MM-I8 Open Cloned Walk-by Included in IPEEE,pg720. >RtLGM Screened or ]PlEE 10OS 166536 NucdearSeraice Water Cronnoveer Isolatlon Voive AUX 566 1L-56 Open Closed Wolk-by >RLGM Screened par IPEER 506 1RN57A lintel Generator CoolingWater InolationValve ASS 561 PP-53 Open Cloned Walk-by Inciuded in ]PEEE,pg 720. >5L6M Screened per IPEtE 167 16N586 Unit 1 NuclearService Water Header B Retuor to SNSWPInolationValce ASS Ill PP-CS Cloned Cloned Walk-by >ILISM Screened per P666 106 1RN2ggA A Diesel GeneratorCooling WaterlIsolation Valve DIA 565 El-SC Cloned Cloned Walk-by IncludedninPtEE, pg 24. >ILIM SCreenedp+erIPlEE 109 1EMIA EnnentialMotor Control Center, 600 VAC AUX 577 PP-54 Punctional Functional Walk-by >RIGM Screened per IPEEt ill SEMSB EnnentialMotor Control Center, 6W(VAC All 566 PP-SC Punctional Punctional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per [P86E 151 1EMXC Ensential Motor Control Center, 600 VAC AUXS 577 66-10 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 152 lEtatD EnnentialMotor Control Center, COO VAC ASS 1660 6-50 Punctional Functional Walk-by >lLISM Screened per IPEEE 153 SIMXE Ensential Motor Control Center, 6110SAC DISA 566 CC-39 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 114 IEMXG EsnentiolMotor Control Center, C0OVAC ASS 594 PP-SC Functional Functional Walk-by >RILGM Screened per PIttE 113 IEMXI Motor Control Center, SWo VAC,singlephace, normal peowertoorce Per AUX 577 EE-54 Fntlonoal Ponctiocnal Walk-by >RIGM Screened per IPEEE Hydrogen Igniter Group A 116 1EMSJ Essential Motor Control Center, 6CW SAC AUX 569 66-56 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 117 1EMSK Essential Motor Controi Center,CWX)VAC AUX 177 B6-47 Fonctional unoctional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEE 116 1EMSL EnnentialMotor Control Center, 600 AC AlX 560 66-47 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGSM Screened par IPEEE 119 1EMIM Ensential Motor Control Center, C00VAC ASS 577 CC-S3 Functional Funetional Walbdowne >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalin 126 SEMIN EnnentialMotor Control Center, 600 VAC AUX 566 CC-S3 Functional Puncticonl Walbdowon >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls 125. 1EMWS MotorControlCenter,480VAC, singlephaoe, Emergency powernsourcefor AUX 577 66-40 Functionai Functionol Walk-by >RLGM ScreenedperlPEdE Hydrogen Igniter Groap A 5-27 lETA dssentlallnwitchgear,41C0 VAC AOX 177 AA-49 Farictional Funrtional Walk-by >REGM Screened per IP666 129t SMIR NlonnolMotor Control Center, C00VAC ASS 560 663-49 Punctional Punctional Walk-by >RetGM Screenedper iPEEE Page 36 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP} Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPFResuiks ESEL Ndormal Desired Walhdowno IS EIN Description 8ldg EL. location Opo~ratingState Operating State or WalS-hy Screening Nlotes HCLPFP OnyVailuro *odyco 124 1MXb BlackoutMotor Control Center, 600 VAC AUX 577 BE-49 Functional Functiona[ Walhdow~n >RLGM Interaction - BlochWalls 128 5100W48430 Transtet SwitchIinigle Pole Sooble"rhnal, Hydrogen Ignltet Soop A AUX 577 R8-48 Functional Fonctionot Wolkdooan >R1GM Interaction-Blotit Walls 129 OXFMROO13 Transfortoer, 480 VAC- 120 VAC,IlydrogenIgniter SroopA AUS 577 88-ta Functional Functional Walhdowot >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalso tsa 1VREGO013 Voltage Regulator,Hydrogen igniter Groap A AUX 577 88-48 Fonctional Functional Walkdowno >R1GM lnteraction- BockWalls 131 1O.ATES Essential AreaTermninalCabinet AUS 577 EE-54 Funotlonal Functional Walkdowcn 0.32 Anchcorage 132 2ELCP0278 Hydrogen Igniter SroopA Control Panel ASS 577 B8-4a Dle-Energloed Energized Walkdowan >RLOM lnteraction.- ock Walls 133 iDGL3A DiesellGeneratorLoadSequencing Panel AUlS 558 88-43 Functional Functional Walkc-by >RLGM Screened perIPlEEE 134 1ELCP0357 SWO1,Hydrogen Igniter On/Oft switch {Alt.Sourcel located on panel 1ELCP03S7 AUS 577 B8-48 Functional Functional Walkdnown >RLGM interaction - BlackWAIlt 13S 1MC7 Main ControlRoomcPanel Alit 594 88-56 Functional Functional Walkdaowa 0.38 Interaction - Control 80oom Calling 138 1EHM0003 Group2AlIgniter BOx CV1 882 88 Dug48lgad De-Energited Energized Walhdowao 8.33 Anchorage 157 1EHMCO05 Scoup2.8Igniter Boo Cvi 562 178 Dog 55 Rod De-Enecgioed Energioed Walkcdown 0.33 Anchorage 138 1EHM5307 Scoop2.8 Igniter Boo CVi 582 277 Dog 46 Rad De-Fnergited Energized Walbdownt 1.33 Anchorage 138 IEI4MOSIS Stoop 2AIgniter Boo CV1- 562 0 Dog48 Rod DO-Energited Enetgined Walbdocco 8.33 Anchorage 140 1EHMOe71 Group 2.8Igniter Boo COV1 555 103 Dog 35 Rod De-Energiced Energized Walkdowcn 0.33 Anchorage 141 1E9M4311 Scoop3A Igniter Boo iVi 601 324 Deg 209Re4 De-Energiaed Energized Walhdowcn 0.29 Functiaonl Pailure 142 1EHIMW13 Group 3A IgrniterBoo CVI 5911 325 Deg 48904d De-Energioed Energized Walkdowcn 0.33 Anchorage 143 1EHMO015 Group 3.8 Igniter Boo CV1 842 335 Dog45 Rod De-Eneagloed Energized Walkdaocn 0.29 FunctionalPailure 144 -1.EMC8117 Snop 3A Igniter Boo CVI 601 SS Deg 18 Rod De-Enecgined Energiced Walbdovac 0.23 PunctinonlPailure 145 1EHM0519 Group 3A igniter Boo CVI 590 2 Dog51804d De-Eoergioed Eoergized Walkdowun 03nhrg 148 3EH101521 Group 3A Igniter Bon CVI 842 18 Dog 41 Rad De-Eeergized Energiced Walhdacwn 0.29 Functinonl Pailure 347 SEHMO023 Sroop4A Igniter Boo CVI 590l 53 Deg 49 Rod De-Energized Energiged Walbdacwn 0.33 Anchorage 143 1E9105625 Scoop4A Igniter Boo CVi 590 217 Dog 51804d De-Enetgloed Energined Walkdownn 0.33 Anchorage 145 1E11O02)7 Groap 4Algniter BOo CV1 530 24SDeg $1 Rd De-Ennrgiced Energioed Walhdoown 5.33 Anchorage 150 1E81M5023 Groap 4A Igniter Boo CVi 590 91 Dog 51 Rod De-Energized Energioed Walkdewn 0.33 Anchorage 151 1EHMO031 Scoop4A Igniter Bon CVI 803 10 Oeg 129Re4 De-Energized Energined Waikdown g,29 Functional Poilure 152 E1EHM5033 Scoop4A Igniter Boo CVi 641 113 Beg32 Rod De-Energited Energioed Walbdowun 0.29 PunctionolFailare 153 1EgMl035 Grnop 5A Igniter Boo CVi. 801 133 gog30 Rod De-Energiced Energined Walcdnown 0.25 Functinonl Follate 154 1E4M4037 Group 5A Igniter Boo Cvi 590 148 Seg55 Rod Se-Energized Energioed Walhdowon 0.33 Anchorage 155 1EHMO0039 Oroup5A Igniter Box Cvi 842 161 Deg41 Rod CDe-Energlzed Energized Walkdowcn 0.29 Fanctional Pailure 158 iEHM0434 Oroup5A Igniter Boa Cvi 801 258000g21 Rod De-Energlzed Energized Walhdowcn 0.29 Fonctional Pailure 157 1EHM5043 Group 5A Igniter Boa Cv1 590 372 Dog Si1Re4 De-EneagLoed Energized -Wolkdowno 0.33 Anchorage Page 37 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESELand HCLPF Results ESEL Nort-crl Desired Woibdeown 1D E1N lescription tidg EL Location Operating State Operating State or Walk-by Screening Notes H40,PF* KeyFallate Mode*'

158 GAIniter 1F4C045 Be Crep CVS 6 2 24 Deg 41 Red De-Energized EnergizedWldufl09FntalFile 159 SEHMW45 Group 5A Igniter tax CV1 7142 06Dg2 u eFerle trj Walkdeewn 0.29 Functional Failure 150 1EHMWOS5 Group 7A Igniter RaX 0V1 724 498 Deg24 Rad De-Energiaed Foergized Walkdowne 0.20 Functional Failure 161AEGMOtO goter Goup oe Ci 7 4 914Dee 24 Rad De-Fnergized Fnergized Wldeo09Fntoe oit se0 lEHMro6G Group 7A Igniter Roe CV1 714 28e 4ta D-orjednrgedWalkdowne 0.29 Functional Failare 162 t-i ERMW3 Inite Grup BooCt/i 660 100 Drg 2t ted Ge-tnergized Energiaed Wlden02 odea elr 1ea 1ERMC(156 Group 7A- Igniter tea CV1 te7514 g4 ~d Oeteted nrie Walkdownn 0.29 Functional Failure 062 1FRM0q615 CreepRAnIgniterBoe Cvi 666 208 Sea t4 tad De-Energized Energized Walkdaown 0.29 Functional Failure itt 1EHM6443 Greup 6A-2 Igniter uee CO1 666 321 Deg 46 Rad De-FEnergiced Energizod Walkdaown 0.29 Functional Failure 167 1EHM10155 CreepRA-2Igniter Ron cv. tee 157Org 4GGad De-Energiand Energiaed Walkdoeun 0.29 Functional Failare itR 1EHM10157 CreepRA-2Igniter too CVi 666 259 Dega4sRed De-Energiaed Enerrized Walkdowun 0.29 Functional Failure 169 1FHM84O7 Creep40 trniter Roe CV1 t53 21t Deg 32 tad De-Energioed Energiaed Walkdowun 0.29 Functional Failure 170 lERMOOO9 Creep RAIgniter Roe CVi tG0 41 lDeu32 Rad De-Energiaed Energiaed Walkdaown 0.29 Functional Failare 171 IAFWPTCF AueiliaryFeedwtaterPomp Turbine Control Panel (ELCF0245) AUX 540 CC-53 Functional Functional Walk-by >RtLGM Screened per [PEtEE 172 lEDt PownerSupplyforSoelenoidcvalvelSAsV002 and othercvalves, 125VOC AGX 577 B0-4t Functienal Functional Walk-by >RLGM Sareened per IPttE Distribution Ceoter, 020VDCDistributioo Center, compartments FOIA.F01G, Fell 173 1EATC2S Essertial Area TenrminalCabinet AUX 577 65-SO Functional Functional Walkdowno 0.37 Anehorage 174 tOSPOS Sulid State Proteetion System Cabinet. Control Panel, Control Cabinet AGX 594 CC-G5 Functional Functional Walkdoear 0.30 Interaction - Control 6RoomCeiling 175 1EATC2]O EssentialArea Tenoinal Cabinet AUX 077 60-53 Functional Functional Walkdowun >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls 176 lMC1 Main Control RoamFaonel AGO 504 05-53 Functional Functional Waikdowcn 0.00 Interaction -Control RoermCeiling 177 1MCOO Main Control teem Panel AGO 594 et-O6 Functional Functional Walkdowne 030 Interaction - Cootrol RoomCeilinra 170 1MC2 Main Control teen Panel AGO 5094 A-56 Functional Functional Walkdowcn 0.30 Interaction - Control PeonmCeiling 179 iMC4 Main Control Roan Fanel AGO 594 B6-56 Functional Functional Wolkcdown 0.00 Interaction - Cuntrol RonmCeiling log SMC5 Main Control Roan Panel AGO 599 66.56 Functional Functional Walkdown 0.30 Interaction - Control Roan Ceiling 101 1PCC1 PLCCabinet AGX 594 06-55 Fonctional Functional Waiimdowun 0.30 Interaction - Control teem Ceiling 102 1PCC2 PLCCabinet AGX 594 06-54 Functional Functional Walkcdowun 0.30 Interaction -Control teen Ceilirg 183 1PCC3 PLCCabinet AGO 094 66-55 Functional Functional Walkdeown 0.30 Interaction - Central teen Ceiling 184 1FCC4 PLCCabinet AGO 594 00-54 Functional Functional Wallrdown 0.30 Interaction -Control GoomCeilieg 105 1FCCS PLCCabinet AugO G94 CC-05 Functional Functional Walb<down 0.30 Interaction - Control Soon Ceiling 1GO 1PCC6 PLCCabinet AGO 594 CC-54 Functional Functional Waledewn 0.30 Interaction - Control Roan Ceiling 187 IPCC7 PLCCabinet AGX 594 CC-55 Functional Functional Waledowne Page 38 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station UnitS tSEL and HCLPFResults ESE Fionmal esirend Waibdowon IS F_11[ Oercr iytion Bldg EL L~~~ Oarnraing Stare* Opcrar.ngSrtrat or Walk-by SnreenoungNaote HICS.pp CoyFola(treMadone 188 lPcCS PLCCabinet AUE 594 CC-54 Furnctironl Functinoal Walkrdown 0.S0 Interaction -Control Room Ce~irin 189 SRVI/S FrocnssCabinet ASS 577 CC-53 Functinonl Functional Waikdownr >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls 590 1MW8 Main Control Sioon,Panel ASS 594 RB-SR Functional Fundtional Walkdown '0.30 Interaction - Control Room Ceiling 191 1T5055509 Control Panel Yard 598 505484 Functional Functional Walkdowrn 8.29 Anchorage 192 5TB12X0519 Wide Range Neutron FluxSignal Processor TermninalBo ASS 577 AA-51 Fonctional - Functional Walkdowna >IILM Screened per EPRtlNP-5041 193 1T0OX0537 Wide Range Neutron FluxnAmplifier Terminal Boo ASS 577 AR-Si Functional Functiuonl Waibdownt >RLGM Screened per EPRlINP-t04l 194 1TBOXOSRR WidetRangeNeutron FluxPowerSupply TerminalBox ASS 537 AR-SI Functional Functional Walikdown >RLGM Screened per EPRIlSP-6541 195 STBOX05R7 Wide Range Neutron FluxPowereSupplyTerinlal Boo ASS 577 AR-Si Functional Functional Waikdown >RILut Screened per EPRIBP-6041 1-96 SEPA 125 VDCPower Fanelbtord ASS 554 DD1-55 Energized Energized Walk-by >RLISM Screened per IPEtE 197 SEATCS2 EnnentialAreaTeneinal Cabinet ASS 572 PP-SR Functional Functional Walkrdowno 0.29 Modification 1.98 1TuOX0522 Central Panel VIA 55R BB-45 Functional Functiaonl Walkdown C>RLGM Screened per EPRItJP-6041 199 ISguTCS Control Panel ASS 577 FF-OS Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls 2110 IEIA Vital120V/ACInverter ASSX S54 5D-55 Energized Energized Walkdown SEWSincloded in PEEt, pg 392. However, tRverter >RL1GM Interaction - BlockWA011S replaced since Originalenaluation.

201 SEIB Vital 120YAC inverter ASS 554 CC-S5 Energioed Energiled Walidnoon SEWSincloded In PEEE,pg552. Hlowever,inertter >RI.SM Interaction- BloctkWalin replaced snounoriginal eualoation.

2027 SEIC Vital 120 VACInoerter ASS 554 CC-55 Energi~ed Energized Waikdown SEWSIncluded in IPEEE,pg392. llowevnr, inverter >RLGM Interaction - FinockWalls replaced since original evaluation.

203 11ID Vital 120 VACInverter ASX 554 BB-55 Eneegized Energized Walfidowne SEWSincluded in FPEEE, pg 392. Howeveer,inuerter >RLSM Interaction - BlockWalls0 replaced snoce original eoaluatioo.

254 1EIIPD 120 I/ACPowterPanel ASS 554 08-55 Energized Energized Walk-by cRIGM Screeoed per IPEEE 2115 SI£ipO 520V/AC power Fannl ASS 554 CC-SS Enetgized Energized Wall-by cLGSM

> Screened per FREEE 206 1ERPA 120 VACPower Panel ASS 554 DD-55 Energized Erergized Walk-by >RLGSM Screened perlPEEEl 257 1ERPC 120 I/ACPower Panel ASS 554 CC-59 Energized Energized Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP1111 205 SCATCSI EssentialArea TerminalCabinet ASS 560 tI-St Functinnal Functional Waikdowan Ou29 RelayClatter 2ug 1EDF 125 VOCPanel, 025VDCDlstributian Center, romepartmentso FOI.5,F0il ASS 550 BB-4Ri tEergized Energized Walk-by >RLOM Sorneeredper IPFEEE 210 JISFPB Control Cabinet ASS 594 00-55 Functional Functional Walbdowo 0.30 interaction - Control Roam Ceilirg 211 StASA Auctioneerirg Diode Assembily ASS 577 fB*-Si Fonctinoal Functional Wanikdowan >RISM Interaction - BlockWall 212 SERVO AuctiuneedingfDiodedoAsembly ASS 560 B8-5S Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Interaction - BlockWall 213 SEBA 125V/DCBattery ASS 554 00-54 Functional Functional Walkdawn SEWSincluded in IPE1EE, pg 4514.Rowever,battery rack 08>RGM interaction- BlockWalit modified sirne original evalaation.

254 11108 125 VDCBattery ASS 554 CC-5S Functional Functional Waibdowct SEWSincloded inIPEEE,pg 404. Howecer, battery rack >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls modified tince original evaluation.

215 11181 125 I/DCBattery ASS 554 CC-54 Functional Funutinnal Walbdown SEWSincluded in IPEtE,pg 404. Hloaweer,battery rack >81GM Interaction - Black Walls mtodifiedsince original evaluation.

Page 39 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL Nionral Desired Waltidowve IDS EIt DescrIption fikdg EL Location Operoting State Operating State or Walk-by Screening tNtote HCLpFF KeyFailureModle~t 210 stao 125 VOCBattery AUS 554 08-55 Functional Fuoctional Walkdowe SEWS included in PEEE,pg 484. Hoowecer,battery rant >RLGM Interaction - BlackWalls modified since original evaluation.

217 SECA 525Voc Battery Charger AUX 554 D0-55 Functonal Functional Walkduwn SEWSincluded in IPEEE,pg 389. However, charger >RLGM Interaction - BludsWalls replaced since original evaluation.

9 218 SECB 12sVDc BatteryCharger ASS 554 CC-S4 Functional Functional Walkdnwn SEWSincluded in IPEtE, pg 38 . Hiowever,charger >RLGM Interaction - Bisock Walls replaced since odigioal evaluation.

210 1ECC 125VDcBattery Charger ASS 554 CC-5t Functional Functional Walkdlown SEWSincluded in IPEtE, pg 389. However, chargec >RLGM Interaction - BlunkWails replaced since original evaluation.

220 1ECD 125 VvCBattery Charger ASS 554 BSS4 Functional Functional Walkduaas SESlvlincludedie PEtE, pg389,However, charger >RLGM Interaction -Block Wagls replaced since onginal evaluation, 222 SEDA 225VOCSintributico center, cotnpartemeots WZc,FOSS,P028,P53B,FO2A,P03A ASS 554 DD-50 Functional Functional Walk-by >BLGSM Screened per IP00E 222 iEDR 125 VDCfDistributinonCenter,tuonpartmnentsFO2B,FO3B,0024, F03A ASS 554 CC-54 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLOM Screened per IEEt 223 SEDC 125 VOCDistribution Center, compartments F0SC,FOSS,FO2RS, FO3B,FO2A,FS3A ASS 554 CC-5S Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 224 SODS 125 VSC DistributionCenter, comportments FOSC,FORS,FO2B,FO2A,FO3A ASS 544 88-54 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGSM Screened per IPEEE.

220 SCAFTS04I2 SCAFUTD FlowTransmitter AUXS 546 BB-51 Functional Furctional Walkdown >BLGM Screened per EFRINF-6041S 228 1CFLTSglO Steam Glenerator WlideBargeLevelInstrumeot ANS 568 28 Seg83 Bad Functionol Functional Walkdown 0.06 Functional Failure 227 SCFLCS82O 50eamGenerator Wide Barge Levelinstrument ASS 507 168 Dog 59 Rad Foectiuonl Functional Waikdown 0.08 Functiuona Failure 228 1CPLT5635 Steam GeneratorWide Range Levellnstrument ASS 585 210 Deg 59 Bud Functional Functionul Waikdown 8.88 Functional Failure 229 SCPL'5645 Steam Generator Wide Range LevelInstrument ASS 568 335 Seg59 Bud Functional Functional Walkdown 0.86 Fvnctional Failure 230 1NCPT512.0 812Wide Range Pressure Instrument ASS 506 CC-SO Functional Functiotal Walkdewn > RIGM Screened per EFRISF-6l04S 221 SNCPT5140 812Wide Runge Pressure Instrument Aug 588 SO-Si Functional - Functional Walkdown >R[GM Screened per tPRI NP-6041 232 SCFLT543S Steam Genecator Narrow Rarge Level Instrument ASS 575 1 Seg09 Bad Functional Functional Walkdown .886 Functional Failure 233 1CFLTSS2S Steam Generator Narrow Range Level Instrument ASS S569 200 Deg 59 Bud Functional Functional Walkdewn 0.86 Functioral Failure 234 1CFLT5555 Steam Generator Sorrow Range LevelIvstrumeet ASS 575 205 Dorg59 Bad Functional Functional Walkdown 0.88 Functionel Failure 235 SCFLTSIWO Steam Generator Narrow Range Level Instrument ASS 088 315 Deg 59 Bad Fvnctional Functional Walkdown 0.86 Functional Failure 236 1NCLT5571 Pressurizer Level Instrument CVI 570 104 DogS57Bud Functiunul Functionul Walkdown 0.20 Functional Failure 237 ISMFT5080 Steam Generator Pressure Instrument ASS 582 00-46 Functional Functional Walkdowun >RLGM Screened per EF81NP-v041 238 1SMFT5S10 Steam Generator Pressure Instrument ASS 582 00-52 Functional Functional Walkduow >RLGM Screened per EFRINP-6041 239 1SMPT5140 Steam Generator Pressure Instrument ASS 582 DD-52 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened pee FF81NP-8045 240 1SMtuTS170 Steam Generator Pressure Instrument ASS 582 50-46 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGSM Screened per SF81NPF6041 241 SNCRDSSW0 1A SCLoop Hot LegWide BangeTemperature CVS 567 20 Deg 25 Bad Functional Functional Walkdowu >RIGM Scrented per EF81NP-v041 242 1NCRDS860 1ANCLoopCold Leg WideRange Temperature CVS 587 51Soeg28Red Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPBlNP-6041 243 SNCBO587S 1B NCLoop But Leg Wide Range Temperature CV1 567 585 Dog 18 Bad Functional Functional Walkdolwn >RLGM Screened per £PRI F-ti045 Page 40 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ESEL and NCLPF Results P041. Riorro Desired Woildoloy ID EIN Description 61ds EL Locaotion Operoting Stote Operating State or Walls-by Svreenin.g Notes HOLPP* my Failure Modeoa 244 SNCRDS860 lBNC Loop ColdtLgWideRange Temoperature 001 567 l24 Deg 28Rd Fusnctional Functional Waldeown >RLUM Screened per EpRINP-6041 245t iNCRO5900 1<CtC Loop PlotLeg Wide PoogeTemperatore CVI. 567 204 tes 20 Pod Functional Functional Walkdown >PIUM Screened per OPPINP-PO4l 246 1NCRD5910 lc:NC Loop Cold Leg Wide RangerTemperature CV1 567 240 Degl23 Rod Funotional Functieonl Walkdowcn >-RLUM Sreened per EPRINP-S041 247 1NCRII592O 2DNC Loop Not Leg Wide RangeTeorperature 6 4 o 26Rd ,V F>Roo on~niWldw -LUM Screened per EPRINP-PO4l 246 1NCPO5930 ID NCLoop Cold Le0 Wide Range Temperature CVI 567 306 Deg 28 tad Functional Functionaol Walkdown c-SLUM Sgeeened per Ep~I66-6541.

249 1EATC7 EssentialArea Teneinal Cabinet AUXS 577 PP-OS Punctional Funttional Walikdowon >RLGM Interaction -BlockWalls0 250 1TBOXO691 SR/ItN31/36Neotron FlossAmrplifier AUX 582 CC-51 Funotional Functional Walhdown >RSLUM Screened per EPSINP-P041 251 1TBOXOOO9 631,/35Neutron riux Amplifierlsolation Transfonmer AUX 579 CC-Si Functioona Functional Walkdowcn >-RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 252 itil* DoterCore Nuclear instroeent Cabinet Rook$AUX 59N cc-se Punctional Ponotioool Walldoowo 0.36 interoction - Conrrol RiooroCeiling 253 SNCLTP630 6VUS Plenuo {Upperflange)level Channel S AUX 562 AA-49 Functionol Functional Walkdown >RIUM Screened per EPRINP-P041 254 1NCI.T6400 PVUIS Sorrow orageLevel Channel S AUX 592 AA-49 Functional Functional Walkdowo c-SLUM Screened per EPPINP-6541.

255 iMif9 Moin Control floor Ponel AtX SS, Cc-Se Fuooc-ional Funotional Wolkdowcn 0,36 lnterac-tion-Control R~oorCelling 256 151LTS266 Containment $unrp evel 661 5S2 20 DegS5ORd Funedloonl Functional Walkdownt >61GM Screened perPEFlINp-6041 257 511IL5261 Containmventilctop Level RX11 550 2 Deg4S Pod Funtilonal Functional Walkdowe c-PLUM Screened per EPRINP-6041 259 iNILTS262 CootainmoentfiompLevel 661 560 4 Dog45 Rod Fuontional Funotional Walidcown c-PLUM Screened per"EPPINP-6t4i 253 1N11T5263 ContainmoentSc-sp Level 661 565 2 CDop45 Pod Functlonal Punctional Wollodowo c-PLUM Screened per EPRINP-P04l 260 1NI6T5264 ContainmenotSump Level 661 669 0 Degsf5 Rod Funcotional Functional Walkdowo c-SLUM Screened per EPRlNP-P041 261 SNIMT5260 ContainmrentSumrpLevel AUX 077 CC-47 Functionaol Puectional Walkdowne >RLUM Scroonedper EPRINP-6641 262 iNSgPT537S Contanoernto Pressc-e Train A AU*t 561. Cc-Si Punctionol Fonctional Wniikdo'n c-SLUM Screened per EPSINP-6541 PIHCPF c-hoesof c-RLUM ildioote thot the HCLPFenceeds the ReciewoLeVelUround Motion (0.25g), hut that a spec-fic-HCLWvoauewoo nnt calcuolatedc-loverho vowyonent was screened ont frose hsrtherevaluation.

ic PFuicreMv400. oredofhoed asifolowss Ry Scrmooed por IPE*E- Indicates thot tire ompvonentwoo ec-oloated lnthe IP*EE008thorefore meets the RL~icIderoced. .

Ucreeoned per EPRIfiP-U041- Indiscatesthat the componeot meeto the screening criteria vf EPP616P-6641, Tahie 2-4 osedthot eeit heranohorage, romapchatter, nor lnteractinos liwi: the reported HLPF.

lontesoctsov-OlvokWalls - lndivcstescholthe compoesovis, Soar-ed 00cr 0 *iios "ail.

-o¢ *tir Mo61c-lowol woo eoloosed in IPLEPand lhIerenore tle bloc-hrecol}

woee tire SLUMderond *he SonctSloni* and avohoosge *iOPPS.oceed lice repor~d 0C1PFcvaine.

luteraotinn - Control Soow Ceiling- lodigotenthat the component Is 1ocatedin thn cont rol roam, the oontrol room cegiig woe eraluated in thio report and hns o HICLPF of O,5g. the functioeal and aevhoe'age RCL.PSnyc-eed the reported 4CLPFooilue, Anchorage -Indicaotesthat anciroroge iotihe governing faicuremode for the vomponenr.

ForsctinoralPaiunre-Fulvrltes thntfvc-tivonl loilure is the gsoroeg~uPoiunce rondo fr the romponnot.

Reloy Chatter - lndicates thct relay ohatterinthe govervivo fi81curmode lor the romponeot.

Modlfikatvon - lndivatesthrat tire repvtted HC-PFcolon10ronditional en tihe rooditicatlonos reported on the 56665, N/A - Alteroate - indic-atesthat an5atoroate approach li~e.prvodcdral modification) has keen inc-orpvrated to oaootplish the desired caompooeet/oystro inoc-tion 00oppnsedto increosiog the seismic-oapac-ir01 rho compoonat.,

Total items: 259 Page 41 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 I

2 Rev.

Appendix B Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 42 of 60

,Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESL ln~mal Doomed Waibdocan or Is tINS Deoncr/ptico* aids EL Lacatcon Operating State Opetating State Walk-by Screening Sates HCLPF* Ke-yFaiklre Mode"*

1 2NC250A Reactor Head Vent Voice 0/2 6100 38Deg25 Rod Closed Open Waibdaown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-5541 2 2NC253A Reactor Head VestValee 0/2 600 43 Deg27 Rad Cloned Open Walkdowan O>RLOM Screened per EPRIHP-6541 3 2Nd1 Prenssurier Safety Valve 0/2 637 502Beg 37 Rad C/oced Fanctional Walk-by Includedin IPEtE. pg 718. >R1GM Screened per IPEEt 4 2NC2 Safetyf HeliefVa/ae 0/2 637 SIOS eeg 37 Rod Cloned Funational Wa/k-by Included in IPEEE,pg 758. >RLGM Screened per IPEtE 5 2NC/ Safety/ye//ef Va/ne CV2 637 206 Deg 37 aad Cloned Functinnal Walk-by Included in IPEEE,pg 718. >RLDM Screened per IPEtE 6 2NC34A PressurizerPower Operated ye~ieyyalve CV2 635 105 Deg39SRed Clnosed Cloned Walk-by Included in IPEEE,pg718. >RLOM Screened per IPEEE 7 2NCTK1!C Pressuricer teliefTank 2 0/2 554 90ODeg Fundt/neal Functional Walkdowon 0.75 Screened per PELR HP-k60OS 8 25V1A fOC Letdowntta Regenerative H{eatExchanger Islan/tonaVa/ve CVI. 554 226 Cog38804d Open Cloned Walkdouon >81GM Screened per IPEEE 9 2ARFD2 Air ReturnaFan antper2 0/C2 59S 265 Deg53 Rad Closed Open Walk-by >RLGSM Screened per IPEtE 55 ZARPFD4 Air Retain Fon Damoper4 0/2 595 292 8e0048Red Cloned Open Walk-by >RLGM Screeoed per IPEtEE 11 2AVXCARF 2AContainmoentAirgReturnPan ICARF-2Al CV2 5/35 265 Dog OHf On Walk-ky aR/GM Screenoedper IPEEt

12. 2BVXCARF 28ContainmnentAirRetarnFan (CARF-2B) 0/2 585 293 Cog Off 0n Wa/b-b3 >RLGM Sareened per IPEtE 13 iVEHSFA 62 Sk~innterEonA 0/2 045 2.68 Dog OHf On Walidaown 0.34 Anchaorge 14 2W/HOFB 62 Skinmmer Fan 8 CV2 645 220 Dog Off 0n Walkdownt 0.44 Anchorage iS 2W/iA 62 Ski/amer Fan A Damper 0/2 658 263 0e0649gad Cloned Open Walbdowno 0.28 Functionol Pailore 56 2/V9128 H23bicnmmer FanRDanmper CV2 659 233 Deg46 Had Cloned Open Walkdowno 0.29 Functlonal Pa/lore 17 2ND56 Residual Heat RenmocalATtain Ito/at/onValve 0/2 572 220 Deg 33 Had Cloned Open Walk-by Included in IPEEt,pg 1356, >RLGM Screened per IPEtE 16 2ND2A Ren/dualHeat RenaovalA Teain lsolationVa/an 0/2 567 176 Deg 55 Rod Cloned Open Walk-by /ncludedin IPEtE,pg 1316. >RLGM Screened per tPEEk 33 2NDSPSA Residoal Heat Removal Pomp 2.4 AIIX 522 FPP-O Fonti/anal Fanctianal Walk-by 0R1GM Screened per IPEEE 20 2NDHXAPMP Residual Heat Removal Pump Meabanical Seal Heat txchanger2A AUX 522. FF-HS Fonctianal Fonct/anal Wa/k-by Rule-of-the-ban with 2NDPUA >R1GM Screened per IPEEE 21 20CH540 RenidualHeat Remnoal Pump2A Motor Cooler AUX5 522 PF-kS Funntineal Fond/aonal Walk-by fule-of-the-box wintb2NDPUA >RL6M Screened per IPEtEE 22 2NDHX5A RenidoalHeat Removal Heat txcbanger1A A/IS 560 11-62 Fondtinnal Fonntional Walkdown >RLOM Screened per EPRINIP-g041 23 2EF10iB PW Syotem/EFSystemlnolan/annHalve AUXS 583 JJ-62 Cloned Open Walkdown >RLGM Screencedper EFRIfiP-So41 24 2FVWEH1 Refne/lingWafen Storagetaob lpFct-) Vord intact lna/3d Waikdoono D,830 Anchorage 25 2ECPUAS Component Coo//ag Pomp 2Ai AUX 577 Et-SO Fund/aonal Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IP0EE 26 2KCXHXA Compnnent CoolingPomp 2Ai Motor Cooler AUXH 577 fE-58 Fundtianal Fandtional Wa/k-by Ru/e-o-f-te-bao wc/tb2KCPUAS >RLGM Screened per JPEtE 27 2KCIIXA Component Coaling Heat Excanager2A AUX 577 66-59 Foodtianal Funct/anal Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEtE 26 2K0O5HA Residual Heat RemnovalHeat Excbanger 1A Isolatian Va/ca AUS 535 LL-Hi Closed Open Wa/k-by >RLGM Screened per IPEtE 239 2052555 Nudoot Sero/ceWatef to SCAPP*tIno/ationValve PAUS 504 KK&-53 Cloned Open Walk-bay 061GM Screened per IPEtE 30 2AWL0VU 2A LaowerContainm/entVent//at/on On/f(IcVU-2A) 0/2 565 16 Dog Off On Walkdown >R1GM Screened per 01PR/NP-H041 31 2D///L0/U 2/SLower Containment Vent/lotion U/n/f110VU-2D)I 0/2 505 344 Dog oHf On Walkdownn >R1GM Screened per EPRINP-6041i Page 43 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL Normal Oeciked Walkdowo or IS E1N Descriptiora Bldg El. Locatica Operating Stole Operating State Walk-by Screening Notes HCLPFF Key FoiSereMode**

32 28854 Steam Generator BlowdownFlowControl Vaive TB2 581 21.-29 Open Closed Waikdown >yLGM Screened per EPRINP-B0SS 33 25855 Steam Generator BlowdowinFlow ControlValve TB2 581 2K(-29 Open Consed Walkdowan cRIGM Screened pertPRI NP-5542 54 288S9 SteamnGenerator BiowdownFlowcontrol Valve TB2 583 21.-5 Open Closed Walkdown >RLGM Soreened per EP~IINP-6045 35 28BBP Steam Generator Blowdown FlowControl Volve T82 583 2M-29 Open Cloned Walkdown >RLGM Screened perEPRI NP-6041 36 2CA174 CondenserCircuiating WaterSystem Isolation Valve AUS 545 CC-Si Closed ,Open Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-SINS 37 2CA516A NunlearSerciceWaterSyotemTrain2AlsolationValve ASS 555 88-02 Closed Open Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 38 2CAS57 2CAPUTDFeedwater Safety Valce ASS 540 B8-63 Closed Open Walkdown >RISM Screened per EPRINP-SI4S 39 2CAPUJTD Turbine Srcen AnxiliaryPeedWater Pomp ASS 531 AA-63 Functional unoctional Walk-by >tLGsM Screened per IPEEE 40 2CAIISO4 Torbine OnicenAoniiiaryFeed Water Pomp LotteOil Cooler ASS 535 A4-62 Functional Functional Walk-by Soule-fo-the-boa witS 2 CAPSTD aSISM Screened per IPEEB 41 2CAS4 AnoiliaryFeedwater to steam Generator 2A ASS 557 BB-64 Open Throttled Walkdown N/A N/A -Alternate 42 20852 AooiliaryFeedwater to Steam Generator 2B ASS 550 DD-S2 Open Throttled Waikdown >RLGM Screened per EPSINP-SINS 43 2CA48 AnxilioryFeedwaterto Steam Generator 2C ASS 551 SD-Si Open Throttled Walkdowo oRLGM Screened per EPRINP-SINS 44 2CA3S AuxiliaryFeedwater to Steam Generator SD AUXS 554 BB-SS Open Throttled Waikdowo N/A N/A- Alternate 45 25V5.9 Power Operated ReliefValce- Steam Generator 2A DHS 594 FF-75 Closed Open Waik-bp >RIGM Screened per IPEEE 48 25V33 Power Operated Relief1aloe-SteamGenerator2SB OHS 835 FF-S0 Closed Open Walk-by >51GM Screened perIPSEEE 47 231/7 Power Operated DeliefValve- Steam Generator2SC DH2 535 PP-Si Consed Open Walk-by >01GM Screened per PEEt 48 2SVS Power Operated ReliefVoice-Steam Senerator20 082 635 FF-S9 Closed Open Walk-by >RLSM Screened per IPEEP 49 2553 Steam Generator SDSafety Valve 082 613 EE-69 Closed Functional Walk-by Inndded in IPEtE, pg 725. >RLGM Screened per IPEPE 55 25V3 SteamGenerator2DSatetyValve OH2 61.5 FE-SN Closed Functional Walk-ky lncluded inIPEEE,pg 721. >RLGM Screenedper]PfEEE 55 2SV'5 Steam Generator 2DSafety Valve DH2 615 EE-69 Closed Functional Walk-ky lncluded in lPEEE,pg721. >RLGM Screenedp*erlyPEEE 52 23511 Steam Generator 2DSatety Valve DH2 615 EE-69 Cnosed Functional Walk-ky lncludediniPEEE, pg72S. >RLGM Screenedp*erlIPEEE 53 2SV6 SteamwGenerator2DSafety Valce 032 615 EE-69 Cloned Funntional Walk-ky lnduodedinlPEEE,pg721. cRLGM Screenedp*erlIPEEE 54 SSMS Steam GeneratorSD Main Steam IsolationValve O82 615 DD-69 Open Cloned Walk-ky >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 55 2SVN Steam Generotor2SCSafety Valve 082 555 tt-SS Closed Punctional Walk-ky Included in IPEE, pg 721. >RLGM Screened per IPECE 56 25V5 Steam Generator2CSafety Valve D82 615 EE-Si Closed PFunctonal Walk-ky lnduoded in IPEEE, pg722. >RLGM Screeeed perIPEtEE 57 SSV5G Steam Generator2C Safety Valve 5112 815 E£-51 Closed Functional Walk-by lncludedin IPSE8s,Pg722. >R1GM Screened perlIPEEk 58 231/11 Steam Generator2C Safety Valve DH2 815 00-81 Closed Functional Walk-ky lncluded inlIPEEE,pg722. >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 59 23V/.2 Steam Generator 2C Safety Valve DH2 815 EE-65 Closed Functionat Walk-by lncloded in IPEEE,pg722. >8LGM Screened per IPEEE SO 2SM3 Steam Generator 2lMain Steam Isolation Vaive OH2 555 DD-SS Open Closed Walk-by >RLISM Screened per IPtEE 51 2SV1/4 Steam Generator 2BSafety Valve 5H2 555 BE-SO Cloned Functional Walk-by lnciudedin IPEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per IPOEE 82 23V55 Steam Generator 25 Safety Valve D85 815 EE-SS Closed Functional Walk-ky lnciuded is PEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per [PEEE Page 44 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Regults ESEL N~ormali Desired Waibdown or IO Sill Descripstion Bldg* EL Locotice Opecating Sltat OpcsotinySscrte Woikoby Screening. NOtes HCLPFP Ke-yPalkre Modece

-63 2SV16 SteasmGenerator 26 Safety Vaice DHl2 015 EE-P0 Closed Fanctional Walk-by included In IPEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 64 2SV17 StevemGenerator 2B SofetyVoice D62 615 EE-OS Closed Functional Waik-bsy Incloded in IPEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per IPESE 65 2SV1B Steae Generator lOSofety Voice 082 655 EE-65 Closed lounctisoia Woik-Icy lnciuded irsipEEE,pg 722. cRLGM ScreesnedpeeIPSEE 66 2SMS SteamsGenerator 26 Moin Steam Isiolaton Volvo 062 615 D0-65 Open Closed Waik-bV >RL6GM Screened per IPEEE 67 25V20 Steam Generator 2A*SafetyVaice 062 615 0E-76 Closed Ponctional Wails-by incloded is IPEEE,pg 722. vOLGM Screened perIPEEE 60 2SV21 Stoos G~enerator2A10fety Voice 062 615 EE-75 Closed Punctional Wolk-by i~ccided in iPSEE,pg 722. cBlGSM Screened per FPEES 69 25V22 Steam Generaolr 2ASafetyVaice 01H2 015 EE-70 Closed Funetional Wallk-by Incloded in IPEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 70 2SV23 Steam Genrartor 24 Safety Voice DH2 615 EE-78 Closed Punctional Walk-try Included is IPEEE,pg 722. cRLSM Screened per IPEEP 71 25V24 - SteamsGeneraonrlA SafelyValve 0112 01.5 EE-70 Closed Functionol Walk-by insioded in tPEEE,pg 722. >RLGM Screened per IPEEO 72 25M7 SleonmGenerator 2AMole Stearm Isolotion Voice 0112 615 00-76 Open Closed Wolik-by >RLGM Screened per IPOEE 72 25A144 2CApUITD Control Vaice ASS 031 66-63 Opec Tlhrottled Wollk-by ICAPUD Rcle-of-tlse-bsoxcwith >RLGM Screene=dper iPEEE 74 23A145 2EAPITDTriplThrothe Voice (Stop Voice) AUlS 554 00B-63 open Throttled Walk-by Buie-of-thse-bovcwithSCAPUDO >RLGM Screened peerPSEE 75 2SA2 2CAPUTDSteamsPeedIssolatonVoice 002 062 FP-OS Ciosed Open Walk-by Included in IPESE,pg 725. >OLGM screened peerPEEE 76 2NDHSB SesidoolHeat Remnovallent Eochangerl2B ASS SOS LL-02 Punctionol Functionai Walkdowrn >BLGSM Screened per EPRIOP-O04S 77 2NI046 AeccumulatorTank 2A solation Valve CV2 560 46 Degs55Rd " Open Closed Walk-by lndcudedin lPEEE,pg719. >RLGMc Screened perelPEEE 78 2N5658 Accsnrclator Tank 2gIsolationyValce CV2 608 136 Deg 55Red Open Closed Wolk-Isy IncrludediniPSEE~spg7l9, >RLM ScreenedporlIPEEE 79 2NI70A ArcomulaosrTank2C IsolatioonVlce CV2 5OS 222Dog 45 Rad Open Cloned Wailk-bV lncludedin IPEEEpg 719. OLGM

>R Srreenedpele PEEE 60 2Ni88g AcrosnoulatrTonk 2DsolatiiooyVoloe CV2 SgO 312 DegO45Bd Open Closed Walis-by Inlcudedl}nlPEEE,pg 79. >RLGM ScreenedperIPoEEE 81 2N50110 Containmeot Spray Heal Exchsanger2A ASS 565 11-02 Intac Intat Walkdowno cBLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 62 235601B ContaicnmentSpryV Heot Exchranger20 ASS SOS 11.g2 bntacS intact Waibdownb >0LGM ISreenedper EPSINP-g041 03 2N1MHXO7 ReactorCoolant lint Leg Sample Heat ExchangerA ASS 543 OW248 Intact mInta Walkdown 0>BLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 04 2NMH1508 ReactorCoionan~ctHoegSample HeatExchanger B AUS 543 Rm248 intact intact Walkdownn >ROLGM Screenedper EPRI N~P-6054 85 2EMP4OA A Train tc PazdiotiorsMonitor ASS 077 11-69 in~toct mInta Woikdsnwn 0.31 Anchrosage 06 2KC26 Acxi~iaorBuildingNon-EssentiaiReturn Header isolation Valve ASS 500 PP-SO Open Closed Walk-by ->cLGM Screened per IPEES 87 2KCSA Reactor BuildingNon-EssenlialReturn Header Isolation Voice AUX 580 PP-57 Open Closed Walk-by >R1GM Screened pee IPESO 68 2KC538 Ausoiiry OoiidinglNon-Essen~al OReturHeader isolation Valve ASS 504 110-59 Open Closed Walk-by >01DM Screened pee IPESE 09 2g1C230A Reactor Budiding-Non-EnsentliaRntons Header isolatIon Voice ASX 580 0H-59 Open Closed Waikdocwn >RLGM Screened peeSPRINP-O041 95 2K(CTKA ComeponentCooiingSurge Tank/A AUS 094 NN9-S9 Intact intact Walkdnown >RLGM Screened per EPBI NP-O04I 91 23V4050 Let DowsnHeatEchanger ASS 577 OlK-HI Intctd intact Waibdowco 5.30 Anchsorage 32 2Rf506A PoelPool Oral Eoxchanger 2A ASS 577 3N-01 Intact intact Walkdowns >RLGM Screened per EPRI Np-O041 93 2KF060 Purl Pool Oral Exchanger 28 ASS 577 NN1-62 Intact intact Walkdown, >0LDM Sraeened per EPRINp-6134L Page 45 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 F.SEE.and HCLPF Results 00CC Normal 0ee,'re Wultdown or ID EIN De, eription Bldg EL. Looationt Oporating State Operating State Wollabv Screeni~g Notes HCLPF toy Failure Mdode' 94 2R8g32A 2A ieoselGererator CoolingWater Isolation Voleo D2A 564 DD-75 Closed Closed Walkn-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 95 2MC1 Main Control Room Panel AUXS 594 AAN-57 Functional Functional Walkdown 0.35 Interaction - Control Room Ceiling 96 2MC10 Main control Room Panel ASS 594 B0-50 Functional Functional Walkdeow 0.50 Interottion - Control eoom ceiling 97 2MC2 Main Control RoomPonel ALIX S94 Ad-SO Functional Fonctional Walkdowen 0.30 Interaction -Control ReoomCeiling 98 2MC4 Main control Room Panel - ASS 594 00-58 Functional Fonctionaol . Walbdown 0.30 Interaction -control Room coiling 99 2MC5 Mole Control Room Panel AUX 594 B0-50 Fuectional Functieonl Walbdowno 0.30 nteraoction-Control Room Ceiling 100 2PCCS Proresn Control Cabinet 1 Protection Sot I Cabinet AUX 594 B5-59 Fonctional Functional Walkldowno 0.30 Interaotion- Control Room Ceiling 101 2PCC2 Proness ControlCabinet 2 Protection Sot 2 Cabinet ASS 594 B0-60 Functional Functional Walkdown 0.30 Interaction - Control Room Ceiling 102 2PCC3 Protons control Cabinet 3 Protection Set 3 Cabinet AUS 594 BR-59 Functional Punctional Waibdowna 0.30 Interaction - Control Room Ceiling 103 2MC8 Mole Control SeemPanel ASS 594 08-50 Functional Functional Walkdownt 0.30 Interaction - Central Room Ceiling 104 2PCC4 Protest Control Cabinet 4Protection Set 4 Cabinet ASS 594 RB-60 Punctional Functional Walkdown 0.30 interaction -Control RonrmCeiling 105 2PCC5 Procrss Control Cabinet 5Protection Set 5 Cabinet ASS 594 CC-SO Punctional Functional Waibdown 0.90 Interaction -ContmolRoom Ceiling 3.00 2PCC6 ProneunControl CabinertS Protection Set S Cabinet ASS 594 CC-O0 Functional Functional Walbdowno 0.30 Interaction - Control RoomCeiling 107 2PCC7 Proeses Control Cabinet 7 Protection Set 7 Cabinet ASS 594 CC-S9 Functional Functional Walkdown 0.30 Interaction - ControlSoomCeiling I0O 2PCCO Protest Control Cabinet 0 ProteotioneSet 8 Cabinet AUlS 994 CC-ES Functional Funttional Waikdown 0.30 Interaction - Cantrol RoomCeiling 109 2RV05 RVSISProcess ContmolCabinet ASS 577 CC-Si Functional Functional Walbdowno >RLGM Interaction - BlonkWalls 110 2TBOOSO69 SR/IS N31/N35SNeotron FluxnAmplifier Terminal Son ASS 580 CC-63 Punctional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Sgreened per EPRINP-604tJ.

111 2TBOXSOS9 SR/ISN31/35 Neutron PleaAmplifier Isolation Transtortner Terminal Boo ASS 500 Cc-S3 Functional Functional Walkdown >RIGM Soreened per EPRINP-6041 112 25151 Onter Care Nuatear Instrument Cabinet Rackb ASS 594 CC-SO Functional Functional Walkdowne 0.30 Interaction - Control Ream Ceilrng 113 2T5O05519 Wide Range Neutron FloeSignal Proessor Tnrminol Boo ASS 577 AA-63 Punctional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-O041 134 2TBOXO537 Wide Range Neatron FluxAmoplifier Terminal Boo ASX 577 AA-63 Functional Functional Walbdown 0RLGM Screened per EPSINP-6041 115 2TROXO5S6 Wide SangeNeutron Plan ~ownerSupplyTenninal Boo ASS 577 AA63 Fnnctional Futlctional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRt14P-g041 116 2TRO50S87 Wide Range Neutron PlanPaowroupply Terminal Boa ASS 577 AA4-03 Functional Functional Walkdown OSRLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 117 2MTSWSO00 Transfer Swaitch(SinolePole DoubleThrow), Hydrogen Igniter Group A ASS 577 CC-RN Functional Functional Waikdown ORLOM Interaction - B1ockWalls 110 2XPMRSO13 Transformer, 490 VAC- 12g VAC,HydrogenIgniter Groap A ASS 577 CC-O5 Energized Energized Waibdowno >R1GM Interaction - BtnocWalls 119 2V5E65013 Voltage Regulator, Hydrogen Igniter StoopA ASS 577 CC-OS Energized Energized Wallkdowne 0R1GM Interaction - Bloock Walls 320 2SATC8 EssentialArea Terminal Cabinet ASS 577 ES-60 Functional Functional Waikdown 0.32 Anchorage 323 2S5CPS278 Hydrogen Igniter Group A Control Panel AilO 577 CC-Os Do-Enertized Estergied Waibdeowo 081GM lnterantlon -BlockWalsa 122 20GL0A Diesel Generator Nto.lA LoadSequencer SelayLoadingRelay ASS 555 80-71 Functional Functional Walkdown 081GM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 123 2E1CP0357 SW01, Hydrogee Igniter On/Off switch letr.Source) located an panel 2EL.CP0357 ASX 577 CC-OS Functional Functional Walkdown >RLOM Interaction - BlockWalls 124 2MC7 Malt Control Room Panel ASS 594 BB-56 Punctional Functional Walkdown 0.30 Interaction - Control Room Ceiling Page 46 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station ReV. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL.and HCEPFResults Ema Normal -Deo;ired Wu~rdownoor iD Ein Drmription Bldg tE. Location Operating State Operntiegsgtae Wolk-Izy Screening Eloteno HCI.PF* to KFaiilure Mode*

126 2EHM4003 Group 24 igniter Box CV2 352 88 Dog 48 Rod DeEneorgized Energized Walkdown 0.33 Anchorage 326 2tEHM1005 Greoup2Algniter~o 00/ 562 1780Deg5lRed De-Snerginod tnergized Wallkdowvo 0.33 Anchrorage 127 2EHMOB07 Group 2Aigniter Boo 002 562 277 Dog46 Rod De-Energized Energized Walkrdown 0.33 Anchorage 128 2EHM0009 Group ZAigniter Boo CV2 562 5 Dog46 Rod ge-Energized tnergized Wolkdowan 0.33 Anchorage 129 2EBM50I71 Group 24 Igniter Box 012 555 103 Dog 35 god Se-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.33 Anrchorage 330 2EBMOW11 Group SAlIgniterBoxo CR2 601 324 Deg 20 Rod De-Energized Energized Walkrdowon 0.29 Functional Failure 131 2EBMWO3 Group 3AIgniter Boo 012 590 - 32e Dog 40 Rod De-Beergized Energized Wallzdow~n 0.33 Anchorage 132 2E11M4015 Group 3A Igniter Boo 01'2 642 335 Beg41 Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdownn 0.29 FunCtionalFailure 133 2EHMdl017 Group 3A gniter Box 02 633 85 Begl1O ad De-tuergized Energized Walzdowon 0.29 Functional Failure 134 2EBM4013 Group 3A Igniter BOo 012 533 20De051 Rod Be-Energized Energized Walkdowuo 0.33 Anelhorage 335 2EB14rD21 Droop 34 Igniter Boo 012 64.2 10 Deg 41 Bad De-Energized Energized Walrduown 0.29 Fnuntional Failure 136 2EBMO023 Group 4A Igniter Boo 002 595 53 Dee 50 Rod De-Eneegized Energized Walkndowno 0.33 Anchorage 537 2E9M4025 Group 4AIgniter Boo 002 595 214 Dog 40 Bud De-Energiond Energized Wazlndown 0.33 Anchorage 130 2E11M4087 Group 44 Igniter Boo 012 330 245 Beg51 Bud Do-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.33 Anchoroge 539 2E1IM5029 Group 44 Igniter Boo 002 5911 91 Beg31 Rod De-Energioed Energized Wolkdoezn 0.33 Anrchorage 140 2EHMO031 Group 44 Igniter Boo 012 603 50 Beg13 Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdown Fonctinonl Failure 0.29 141 2tEIMO33 Grnop 44AlgniteoBoo 012 643. 13.40Dog04 Sod Io-tEnergiond Energioed Wolludnon Enenninnal Failuro 0.23 142 2EH1M4035 Greup SAIgniter Boo 012 601 140 Dog 30 Bad Be-Energized Energized Walhdowno FountionolFailure 0.29 143 2ERM19237 Group 9AIgniter Boo 00CV 590 146 Dog 51 Bud ge-Ernorgized Energized -Wolludozun Anulhorage 0.33 144 2EBM0039 Group 5AIgniter Boo 012 642 161 Dge 41 Bad Do-Energized Energized Walkdowng Funotional Foalore 0.23 145 2ElIMGI4I Group 04 ignior Bon 0V2 601 216 Beg21 Rod Do-Energized Energined Walkdoeun 0.29 Functional Failune 146 2EHM3043 Groop 5A Igniter BOo 002 590 0730De051Bad Be-Energized Eoergized Walkdowun 0.33 Anchorarge 147 2EIIM[454 Group 5A IgninerBon 002 642 206 Deg 4I Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.29 Function*alFoilure 140 2EBMG059 Group 74 Igniter BOx 012 734 3DBDog 24 Bed Oe-Energized Energized WaOkdounn 0.29 Fnuntional Failure 149 2EHM400g Group 7A igniter ROn 01V2 714 49 Dog24 Bed Do-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.29 Fuontlonal Failure 130 2EHMO0G3 Group 74 Igniter Boo 002 754 140 Dog 24 Bad Do-Energized Energized Waihdownn 0.29 Funrtionol Failure 151 2EH1MG365 Group 7A Igniter Boo 012 714 210 Dog 24 Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdowno 0.29 Functional Failure 132 2EBM0053 Group 64-1 Igniter Boo 012 666 108 Deg 48 Red Do-Energined Energized Walkdeown 0.29 Fuontional Failure 153 2EBM4005 Group 8A-1 Igniter Boo 002 666 137 Deg 46 Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdowno 0.29 Functional Failure 334 2EHM4057 Group 6A-3 Igniter Boo 012 666 206,Dog 46 Bad Be-Energized Energized Walkndowun 0.23 Functionol Failure 155 2EHM1G247 Group 64-2 Igoiter Boo 012 666 321 Dog 46 Rod Do-Energized Energized Walkdowun 0.29 Fnuntionel Failure Page 47 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESEL.and HCLPF Results SELNormal Dsirked Walkdiownor I0 tIN Description RId4 EL [ovatian Operatieg State Operatiny State Walk-by Screening Nates HCLPF' KoyFuillre Mode**

156 2EHM3O49 Graup gA-2igniter Boa CV2 666 11 Deg46 Rod De-Energiaed Energized Walirduwn 0.29 Funztional Failure 157 2EHM5451 Droup 6A-2 igniter Boo CV2 606 59 Deg46 Rad De-Energized Energized Walkdownz 0.29 Functional Failure 158 2EHM0067 Group BAigniter Ban CV2 653 218 Dog 30 Rad De-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.29 Functional Failure 559 2EHMWR9 iGroup8Aigniter Baa CV2 653 41 Dog32 Bad Do-Energized Energized Walkdown 0.29 Functional Failure i6S 2AWFrPCF AuxiliaryFeedwater PumnpTurbineControl Panel (ELCP0245) ASS 543 CC-ti Functiaonl Functiornal Walkdown >RIGM Interaction -Block WalI 161 2EDE 125 VOCDistribuationCenter, cuonparttmentsESIA,FouG, Foil ASS 577 BB-68 Functional Functional Walk-by aRLGM Screened per IPEEE 162 2EATC23 EssentialArea Terminal Cabinet AUX 577 CC-65 Functional Functional Walkdownl 0.37 Anchorage 163 2SSPSA SolidState Pruteation Systent Cabinet, Control Panel, Central Cabinet ASS 504 CC-59 Functional Functional Walkdownn 0.30 Interaction -control Route Ceiling 164 2EATc21 Essential Area Terminal Cabinet AUS 577 BB-62 Funational Functional Walkdown aRIGM Interaction - BlockWalls 165 2EP'A 125 VDICPower Panelboard ASS 554 DD-55 Energized Energized Walk-by >RL0M Screened per IPEtE 106 2EATc12 EssentialArea Terminal Cabinet ASS 577 FF-S9 Functional Functional Waikdown B.29 RelayChatter 167 2TBO05522 Control Panel ODA 556 BB-69 Functional Functional Walkdownr >RLGM Screenredper EPRINP-6041 168 2SMTC1 Control Panel AdS 577 00-59 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Interaction - BlockWalls 269 2EIA Vital 120VrAC Inverter AUS 554 DD-59 Energized Energized Waikdown SEWSincluded inIPEEE,pg 1474. However, inventor OBLGM Interaction - BlockWaills replaced since odginol enaloatiun.

170 2510 Vital120 SIACrooerer ASS 554 CC-SO Energized Energized Walkdawn SEWSincluded in PEEt, pg 1475. Bowever, invertor >RLOM Interaction - BlockWalls 171 2EIC Vital120 VACInverter ASS 554 CC-SO Energized Energized Walkdown SEWSincluded in PEEE,pg1476. However, invertor >RLGM Interaction - BlnckWalls

- replaced since original evaluation, 47 7 172 2EID Vital120 VACinverter ASS 554 BB-59 Energized Energized Walkduwn SEWSincluded in IPEEE,pg 1 . However, inventor >RBL0M lnteraction- BlnckWalls replaced since original evaluation, 173 2EBPD 120 VAC FuwerPanel ASS 554 BB-59 Energized Energized Walk-by aRLGM Screened per IPEEE 174 2ESFB 120 SACFowerpanel ASS 554 CC-SO Energized Energized Walk-by aRLGM Screened Per IPEEE 175 2ERPA 120 VACPower Panel ASS 554 00-SO Bnergized Energized Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 176 2RPFC 120VAC Power Panel AUS 554 CC-SO Energized Energized Walk-by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 177 2SATC12 EssentialArea TerminalCubinet AUS S6B IlJ-SB Functional Functional Walkdown 0.29 Relay Chatter 17B 2EOF 125 VDICPanel, 125 SSCDistribution Center, compartments FOIA,FOil ASS 565 BB-68 Energized Energized Walk-by >BLGM Screened per PEEE 179 25SP5B Control Cabinet ASS 504 DD-SO Fonctional Functional Walkrdown 0.30 Interaction- Cuntrul Rnnm Ceiling 100 2EADA Auctinonering DiodeAssembly ASS 577 BB-63 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Interaction - BlockWail lBS 2EADB Anctinneerirg DiodeAssembly ASS ORB 80-63 Punctional Functional Waikdown >RLGM Interaction - BlockWall lBS 2ERA 125 VOCBattery ASS 154 00-60 Functional Functional Walhdown SEWSincluded in IP5EE,pgl1454. Howeaer°battery rack >RLGM Interaction -SBockWalls modified since original evaluation, 103 ZEOB 120 i/DC Battery ASS 554 CC-SR Functional Functional Waibdown SEWS included in FPREE, pg 1455. However, battery rack >Rl.CM Interaction -Black Wails modified nieceodiginaleaalaationi.

6 184 2EBC 125 SOCBattety ASS 554 CC-tiO Functional Functional Walkduwn SEWSincluded in FREEE, pgl45 . However, battery rack >RLGM Interaction -Black Wails modified since original eraluation.

Page 48 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESELand HCLPFResults EsEL Nosrral Desired Wolbdowoneo IS EliN Description Bldg EL Location Operating, State Operating State Walk-fly Screening,Notes HCLPFF SeyFuilure Mode'*

185 2EnD 125 VDCBattery AUX 554 8B-59 Functional Funrtional Walkdowsn SEWSinriuded in IFEEE,pg 1457. However, battery rack >RLGM Interaction - Blork Walls modified since otiginal evaluation.

1BS 2ECA 125 SDCflattery Charger ASS 554 DD-59 Functional Functiornal Walkdaown SEWSincluded in IPEtEEpg 1464. Ilowever, charger >15GM Interaction - BlankWalls replaced since original evaluation.

187 lECt 125 SECBattery Charger ASS 554 CC-6B Functional Functional Walkrdowso SEWSincluded in IPSEEtpg 1465. Howeeer, charger >REIM Interaction - BlockWalls replaced since anginolevaluation.

588 2tCC 125 SOCBattery Charger ASS 554 CC-59 Functional Functional Waibdeono SEWSincluded in IPEltE,pg 1466. However, charger eBRLGM Interaction - tiods Walls repinced snice original evaluation.

159 2ECS 125 SDCBattery Charger ASS 554 BlB-6O Functional Functional Walkdowno SEWSInclu~dedin PEEE,pgl1467. However, chtarger eBLGM Interaction - BlockWalls replaced nieceoriginal evaluatioe.

1958 ZEDA 125 SOCDistribution Center, coerpartmenets F0SC,FOLD,FS2B, FOSS,FS2A,FS3IA ASS 554 DD-55 Functional Functional Walk-ky nRLGM Screened per IPSEEE 155 2EBe 525SOClinttibution Center, conepacrtments FD2B,FO3B,FB2A,POSA ASS 554 CC-SO Functional Functional Wulk-by >BISM Screened per FPEEE 192 2tEDC S25VC Distribution Center, compartments F01C, POSB, P025,P835,PO2A,FE3A AUSX 554 CC-SB Functional Functional Walk-ky >REIM Screened per FPEES 193 2EDD 125 SECBistributionCenter, coerpartmenots PS1C, FOSD,F02B, Fg2A,FOSA ASS 544 SB-B- Functional Functiooal Walk-ky >RLGM Screened per FEEt 194 2EMXI Motor Control Center, 60 SAC,dsiglepkase, noenalpower source for AUX 577 FE-O4 Functional Functional Walk-ky >RLGM Screened per FPEEE BydrogenIgniter DroopA lBS 2EMXS Motor Central Center, 480 SAC,single phone, Enrergenry power souurcetoe ASS 577 BB-45 Functional Functiunal Walk-ky >BLGM Screened per FPEEE Sydrogeo cignierStooupS 2

19S EtutD Essential Motor Contfro Center, 600ovac ASS 560 85-55 Ponctional Functional Walk-ky >RLGM Bcreenedper IFESE 197 2EMXK Essential Motor Control Center, SW0VAC ASS 077 5B-67 Fonctional Functional Walk-by >RBLGM Screened per PEEE 198 2EMXC Essential Motor Conttol Center, S00SAC ASS 577 sn-Sd Functional Functional Walk-by >RIGM Screened per FPEEE 299 2EMXL Essential Motor Control Center, SW0SAC ASX SSS 88-67 Functional Functional Walk-by >BLGM ScreeneS per FPEES 280 2EMSA Essential Motor Control Center, SW0VAC AUX 577 FF-SO Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened yen IPSEEE 201 2EMWJ EsseNetialMotor Control Center, 6W0SAC ASS 668 GG-58 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened par [PE55 202 2EMSH Esseetial Motor Control Center, SW0SAC ASS 894 FF-58 Functional Functional Walk-ky >RLGM Screened per IFEES 202 2EMSE Esoential Motor Control Cenrter,60WSAC I2A 556 EE-70 Functional Functional Walk-by >RLGM Screened reF FPEEE 204 2EMSB S00SACEssential MCC ASS 560 FF-58 Functional Functional Walk-by >nLGM Screened pen' FEES 2025 2EMSM 550VACEssential MCC ASS 077 CC-SC Functional Functinonl Waikdowrn 55GM loneracgnin- Block Walls 2BS 2EtdXt 550SACEssential MCC AUX 569 CC-f1 Funntional Functional Wulkidown 0.32 Anchorage 2E7 2CTA 41S0 EssentialSecitckgear ASS 577 AA-64 Functional Functional Walk-ky >BLGM Screened per IPEEF 208 2TBOSS008 TenrminalBoaxforTransmitter2FWL15000 SYRD 598 SO0X53' Functional Functional Walbdowne 0.29 Anckorage 289 2NdSPT5370 Containment Pressure Train A ASS 581 CC-63 Functional Functional Waikdowne >RLGM Screenedper EFR1SF-SI41 220 2T6O05535 TermninalBoxofor2CMu77l&2CM878 TB2 574 2L.-17 Functional Fuyctional Walkdowsn >tRLGM Screened per EFRINP-6041 211 2CAFTOS4S 2CAPUTD Disckarge Flows ASS 546 6B-62 Functional Functional Walkdoant >RLGM Screened per SF5I NF-6041 Page 49 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report, Catawba Nuclear Station ,Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESRLand HCLPF Results 555EL Normal Desired - Walhdowts on ID SIN Description R]dg SEL Location Opercatingstate Opetutingl State Walk-by ScroetningNotes HCLPF* Soy Faihlre Mode**

212 2CFLTSS1D 2Asteam Geoerator Wide Raoge LevelChattel 8l AN2 ss6 as8 Deg 59 Rad Funttional Functional Walkdton 0.88 Functional Failure 213 2CFCT5620 28eSteamGeeneratorWide RanegeLevelChattel 92 RN? 565 149 DegS59Red Fonctional Fanctional Walhdown 0.86 Functitonl Failute 214 2CFLTS63R 2C Steam Generator Wide Ratge LevelChattel t3 AN2 567 205 Deg 59 Rad Fusnctional Futctiotal Walbdown 0.86 Functional Foliate 215 ?CFLTS640 20 Steam Generator Wide Range Level Chattel 114 AN? 567 327 Deg59 Rtd Founcional Funtionlal Walhdtwn 11.86 FooctitooalFailate 216 2NCPT5.2l0 NCLoop?2Hot Leg Wide Range Prettore Chattel 81 ASS 556 CC-Sd Functional Fanctional Walkdown >RLGM Seteeted per SF61NP-g04S 217 2NCFT5140J 2C NCLoopHot LegWide Range Pressore Chattel 114 ASS 566 cC-6a Fuctitonl Faunctional Walkdown >RLGSM Streened pet tEPRINP-t04S 258 2CPL55490 2A Steam Getetator Narrow Range LevelChannel#4d AN? 575 002 DeoR te Rd Fuoctitonal Fauntional Walkdown 0.86 Functional Failloe 259 ZCPLTSS20 28 Steam Genetator Narrow Range Level Chatnel#4d AN? 565 3130Dog59 Rod Fonctiteal Functional Walkdown 0.86 Functional Foliate 2212 2CFLTSSW0 ZCSteamGeneraton Narrow Range LevelClnannel#4 AN? 575 255 Doeg 59 Rod Fonctional Functional Walkdown 12.86 Funttional Failure 221 2CPLT5580 20 steam Generator Narrow Range LevelChtannel#t4 AN? 568 315 Deg 59 Rod Foodtional Fonctional Walkdowne 0.86 Functional Failure 222 2NCLT5717 FrotsurizerLevel-LowlTeoperature CV2 571 113 Dog 56 Rod Functional Fonrtitonal Walhdown 11.29 Funttional Failure 223 25MP15080 2ASbteamGeneorator Steam Ste Pressure Channel S 582 D0-89 Fauntional Fundtional Walkdown oRLGM Screened per SF61NFP-8041 224 2SMPT5SSS 28 Steam DecoratorSteam Ste FressureChaonel 1 ASS 582 110-62 Functional Functional Walkdown Screeted per EFRINP-RO4S 225 25MPT5543 2C Steam Gceneator Steam Lioe Prescore Charnel 1 ASS 585 DD-82 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per SF111 NF-5104t 225 25MPT5270 20 Steam Geoerator Steam lice PrenscureChaonel S ASX S8O 00-89 Fonctional Functional Walkudowe >RLGM Screened per SF81NP-6543 237 2RATC7 EssenoialArea Terminal Cabinet ASS 577 FF-s9 Functional Fonctional Walkdown >RLGM Interaction - Blodt Walls 228 2MSR Normal Motor Control Center, S00VAC ASS se0 8B-65 Fonctional Functional Walkdown vRLDM interaction - RiockWalls 229 2MXC, BiaackoutMotor Control Cretnte,6116VAC ASS 577 Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM interaction - elochWalls 230 2NCIIS5850 2A NCLoop Hot Leg Wide Range Temperatore C52 567 20 l eg 28 Rod Fonctional Ponctinaal Walkdown Screened per RFRINF-SS41 231 2NCRD5865 2A NCLoop Cold LogWide RangeTemperature CV2 587 51 Dog28 tad Functional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per SF81NP-ROS1 23? 2NCRD5870 2B NCLoop Rot Leg Wide Range Temperature CV2 567 160 Deg 18 Rod Functionol Functional Walkudown Screeted per RFRINP-ROSS 233 2NCR0NSS 28 NCLoop Cold LegWide Range Temperatune CV2 567 224 Dog 28 Rod Fuinctional Functional Walkdown >RLOM Screened per SF61Np-654L.

?S4 2NCRDSW00 2C NCLoop HostLeg Wide RangeTemperature CV2 567 204 Deg 20 Rod Functional Founctional Walkdown >RL1GM Screened per EFRINF-6045 235 25CRD5950 2C NCLoopCold LegWide Range Temperature CV2 567 243 Dog 29 Rod Functional Functional Walkdown >RLOM Screened per EPRINF-6045 236 2NCRSN92S 20 NCLoop Rot Leg Wide Range Temperature CV2 567 340 Deg 20 Rod Functional Functional Walkdown Screened pen SF81NP-6041 237 2NCRD5930 20 NCLoop Cold LogWide RongeTemperature CV? 567 389 Dog 28 Rod Functional Functional Walkdowan Screeted per tFRI NF-6045 238 2NCLT6550 SSVUS Plenum lUpperRaege) LevelChattel 1 ASX 582 AR-Rd Functional Functional Walkdown >RLOM Screened per SF61NP-6045 239 2NCCI5450 RVLUS Narrow Range LevelChannel S ASS 582 AA-Sd Fotctional Functional Walhdown >RLGM Scwetned per SF81NP-S04S 240 2N1LT5260 ContaintmentSump Leaed 502 552 21 Dog 58 Rod Functional Functional Waihdown >RLGM Screened per SF61NP-Sa4s 241 2NILT5261 Containmeot Sump Level 15(2 558 2 DogSNRod Fonctnonal Punctional Walhdown >RL1GM Screened per SF61NP-6045 242 2NILS5262 Contaioment Sump Level 5(2 580 3 Deg 45 Rad Punctional Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screeted per EPRINP-g0d?

Page 50 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP} Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 ESELand HCLPFResults ESEL Nennol Oeaired Wa~lkdowva or 10 6165 Qeneriptiot hldg EL. Iocatiorn Opecatntn*Stont Ope Laoogsea; Weitek-a Snin{l totev 11C1P12 to5 felurrtvMorO'*

243 25IL75263 ContainmenrtSumnpLevel R112 566 2 eslo 54 Rad Functional Funotienal Waikdown >01GM Screened pee EP0INlP-6041 244 2N1125264 Containment Suap Level RX2 570 18 D~eg 560Rad Functional Functieonl Walkdowae 0RLGM Screened penEF61 NP-6041 245 2N1MT5260 ContainnmentSump Level AUX 577 fB-67 Functional Functional Waikdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 4COPF values of 0RLGMfudivate that the HlCurFev*eedrl the Review Lev'elGrnoundMotive 10.2-961 bet Shota vivevifieI4CLPF coloewoo cot celvalated 0mmnc the toorpoaeetvrao screoned vot froen further evaloctioe.

• "KeyFailuro M~oden ore defined onPollow's:

Screened per itPEE.- Idivotes thet the neorpnenntvetoCevalatedIctthe 1PEE6 en~d therefore oreetst he 111GM deanvod.

S¢{tenondpereORt*ll lndir.ateethat the oenponent creetstho noneenins

• 014Ph- vtlteria of EP51Nlt-h545, Tobin 2-4 aendthaoteeith:r anvhorage, relns ohattet, see interactlons limit the r'epentedHCI.PF.

Inteeaction - BlookWalsv- letliot ev that the teerponent;i oveted naear blook wall. The block well woo o3va lated in IPEE6and therefore the bloviewall metes the 6L1rMdemand. The fonetional and ancthvtage HCLPFns noveedthe reported HICLPP valee.

Interoction - Control Roow Oeiling- Idicates that the coapoonet in locatedla the control room. The control roomtveiling*roanevalvoted In thin rpepot and haso HO*pF - at 1.34g.The fncetional and anchotege HO.PPvsetcoed the repented HOLPFealue.

Anchorage - indicates that anc:horage as the goewl}trg failure wode tor the cowponeet.

Fvnectivol'*Fakire - tndivotenthat tonctionlat6 Lrionl the gocerning rafeurn mode for thnewopone~t.

Relay Chatter.- ndiOates that reloy chatter ivthe gnoveint faguoremode for the component.

flfr - Aiteenal e- lodlvaten*thalo a *ltercate approarlr lie, p-oroedunri wodrlfcntioel lots trot, Inoorprorterl tr oorcnrtpieh*;ttire desired *oapnrwerrtlvnole lemuctiecnea pposed to lecreesninthe veinmiccaciel ooftlie cowpoient.

Total Items: 245 Page 51 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 [I Appendix C CNS FLEX Flow Paths Page 52 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 I

WATER CHEMISTRY I'-l BLDG.

BLDG. I L IZ."I1 7JL]

L;Nb.LNt1iN*i* CONCORD ROAD PORTABLE PUMP SUPPLY TO: ESSENTIAL; SERViCE *JATER HEADER I/"STORAGE FACILITY LOCATION Page 53 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 WATER CHEMISTRY LZ1 BLDG.

MEDICAL FACILITY, I ~PARKING CONCORD ROAD PORTABLE PUMP" SUPPLIY TO SO,'

Page 54 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station I *Y=

Rev. 2 I I

I .

AI*N FEE2WA*TER WRTE.R SYSTEM [73 174 173 I.7S

/4: *, T MINIFLODI TO UST STYND T

' -- AIR FEEIIWATER.

MOTOR DRIVEN ISA9 WATER TRRIN A I;

. i .. AI*N FEETWATER CGNOENEER MOT'AELL-*

~I1EA RUE FDW

[A 546 COYEC'XON UPPER SURDE . '.

AUIX FEEDWATER "* ..... _

rURBINEDIE CONE*ZNSATE STERREE TANK *

• .*. *.7 :*:*,

• TEESYERINO FLOW NuTLieaR SUNSVICE * [*,]*

RUEPERR.SIe WATER TRAIN B AN31EI3

-SAN  :. . ..

Q 44 45 4*9 TR

[ IBB TO U.OT  : ,  :*

155 F *

• i-SB US "K*.MAIT FEX WATER 32~aqE L

I BYPASS FEED.

h162

~< t,~ 1 w-fr3~.nwr Vq45 4 mSX4 R AR~>~lV3~IP.~R-~V - AUXILIARY FEEOWAER SYSTEM

~ '~ ~ .ao.n0 vo, y. noj cr.u.o 4 AR AR tAtifli W.flAZt0-It-St a a - a - - ~CRI 0 I~.S4t IAEI cao$u, I ,-,,n~snrs

~

ifli-w0~* ,+/-olornt

~UXJLIARY FEED J~TER (SUPPLY L~ND f~LTERN~~TE SD MA~<EUP)

Page 55 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 I I

ID~a.Ro. ~

soo*o., 'oItJCLE*R SERVICE WATER t m*,,¢ .. SYSmTEM(RN)

• . O*TbtO. fl5O*tW O,..O,

• OI 0t NUCLEAiR SERVI[CE WATER (sUPPLY USING PORTABLE PUMP)

Page 56 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear Station Rev. 2 PRIMARY I NJECT*ION Page 57 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe. Rev. 2 I RESIDUAL HEAT RE OVAL ,SYSTEM (PHASE 31)

Page 58 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRv2 Rev. 2 I Page 59 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Catawba Nuclear StationRe2 Rev. 2 I F'IPE flflLEL L

iii

-A-Cont*rol Rod Or~ve Enclosure

-l 10 LU.V0R TO LIlTT

• '*

• LOER CONTANMENT N1

~S<

~4 i~LS'~-~

p-x$

lEer V~'4tLrYL0OVTtEi~

K 7WFUWLSI~WE+/-.Wi ixl.Aflr, WEFEL EN-sETE050100 LISTEn SBTW Page 60 of 60