Text

Proposed Tech Specs Associated W/Sws
	ML20046A313
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	07/20/1993
From:	; CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20046A307	List: BSEP-93-0112, Proposed Tech Specs Associated W/Sws; ML20046A306; ML20046A320; ML20046A326; ML20046A329; ML20046A335; ML20046A340; ML20046A449;
References
	BSEP-93-0112, BSEP-93-112, NUDOCS 9307270227
	Download: ML20046A313 (69)
	v • d • e

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t ENCLOSURE 3 BSEP 93-0112 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324 OPERATING LICENSE NOS DPR-71 &' DPR-62 I

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES - UNIT 1

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E3-1 9307270227 930720 5

PDR ADOCK 05000324 gi i

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INDEX,

BASES PACE SECTION 3J4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (Continued)

CHEMISTRY........................................... B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.4 3/4.4.5 SPEC I F I C ACTIV ITY................................... B 3 /4 4 -2 3/4.4.6 PRES SURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS......................... B 3 /4 4-3 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES.................... B 3 /4 4-7 3/4.4.8 STRU CTUR AL INTECRITY................................ B 3 /4 4-7 3/4.5 EMERCENCY CORE C00LINC SYSTEM 3/4.5.1 HICH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM.............. B 3 /4 5-1 3/4.5.2 AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (ADS)............. B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.3 LOW PRES SURE COOLING SYSTEMS........................ B 3 /4 5-2 3/4.5.4 SU P P RE S S I O N P00L.................................... B 3 / 4 5 -4 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.I P R I M AR Y CONTAI NM ENT................................. B 3 / 4' 6 - 1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS................ B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES................ B 3 /4 6-4 3/4.6.4 VA CU UM R ELI E F....................................... B 3 / 4 6 -5 3/4.6.5 S ECOND ARY CONTAI NMENT............................... B 3 /4 6 - 5 3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTR0L...................... B 3 /4 6-6 l

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 S ERVI C E WATER SYSTEMS............................... B 3 / 4 7-1 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM f.MERCENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM............ B 3 /4 7-1/C kwv brL heNop*(

fh BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 XI Amendment No.

149 i

b[

(V f{g40 INDEX 7

\\

N BASES s

PACE SECTION h

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued)

B 3/4 7-1/'

3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION......................................

B 3/4 7-1/r J

3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM.................

B 3/4 7-2 3/4.7.5 SNUB 3ERS..............................................

B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.6 S EALED SOURCE CONTAMI NATION...........................

B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.7 F IRE SU P P RE SS IO N SY ST EMS..............................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.B FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS.............................

B 3/4 8-1 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.................................

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH...................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION.......................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD P0SITION..................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME............................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS........................................

B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.6 CRANE AMD HOIST OPERABILITY...........................

B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORACE POOL..................

3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL, and B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.9 W ATER LEVEL-REACTOR FUEL STORACE P00L.................

B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.10 CONTROL ROD REM 0 VAL...................................

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.1 PRI MARY CONTAINMENT I NTECRI TY.........................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM (DELETED).................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.'3 SHUTDOWN HARCIN D EMON STRATION S........................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 REC I R CU LATI ON LO0 PS...................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 P LANT S ER VI CE W AT ER...................................

Amendment No. 146 XII BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1

PLANT SYSTEMS SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 The service water system shall be OPERABLE with at least:

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3:

Threek OPERABLE l nuclear service water pumps, and two OPERABLE conventional-si e service water pumps capable of supplying the nuclear and conventional headers.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5:

Three OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, and two operable Unit I service water pumps, nuclear and/or conventional, powered from separate emergency buses and capable of supplying the nuclear header.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 2, 3, 4, and 5 ACTION:

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, oryIN S E RT A a.

i f 1.

With t o OPERABLE conventional servicef ater pumps and,dnly one nucl r service wate pumpOPERABLE,/estoretheremaihingnuclear ser ice water pump OPERABLE statys within 7 days /r be in HOT

/

5)!,.uudN within I hours and COLD HUTDOWN within /he following

/

14 hours1.62037e-4 days 0.00389 hours 2.314815e-5 weeks 5.327e-6 months .

/

2/ With no OPERA 8LE nuclear service water pumps, regardless of conventionaf service water p' p status, be i4 at least HOT S)djTDOWN within 12 Mours and in CO_LD SHUTDOWN withi 'the following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

3.

With t OPERABLE nucl service water pumps and only ne conven'tional service /ater pump OP

, restore at ast one add hional conventional service wat pump to OPERAB statuswithipn 7/aysorbeinHQTSHUTDOWNwithi 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and C D SHUTDOWN

/tthinthefollowing24 hours.'

/

With two OPERjtBLE nuclear serytce water pumps and no conventi al 4.

service wat pumpOPERABLE/restoreat less one convention service w er pump to OPER LE status wich' 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and store the rema ^ ing convention service water ump to OPERABL status within days from the ime of the loss /of the first p p.

Othe tse, be in at 1 ast HOT SHUTDOWH/within the nex 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and

(

in LD SHUTDOWN wi in the following'24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

I BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. 146

L g

PLANT SYSTEMS i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

[ ACTION:

(Cd'nLinued)

/

3 l

5 With only one clear service wa er pump and one c ventional l

service wate pump OPERABLE, r store at least on, additional servi e l

water pump nuclear or conve ional, to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ndrestoretheredainingservicew/erpumptoOPERA E

,/

statuspithin 7 days f ropr'the time of the Joss of the first mp.

Othepoise, be in at leadt HOT SHUTDOWN wkhin the next 12 urs and

~

I in OLD SHUTDOWN wit n the following J hours.

6.

ich one OPERABLS nuclear service er pump and no ERAB.E conventional s 'vice water pumps /be in at least H SHUTDOWN within the next 12 urs and in COLD SHilTDOWN within the following l

,-'/

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months i

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or Si

/

~

l.

With one less than the required number f nuclear servic water f'

Inps OPERABLE per, site, restore at I ast one additionet' nuclear service water pump to OPERABLE stat a within 14 days r declare the diesel generatoys inoperable and ake the ACTION r uired by Specification /3.8.1.2.

Withthe,re!

I rvice water syst nuclear header 'noperable, or no 2.

/

Unit 1,puclear service wa, er pumps OPERABL operation may c. tinue

/

proviptd that the servive water system ce ventional header i's j

OPERABLE with at least/two e nventional service water pumps j

OPERABLE. Restore ofIe service water stem nuclear heat'er to l

CPERABLE status w' hin 14 days or d clare the Core 5 y System and i

the LPCI System noperable and ta e the ACTION requ ed by Specification 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.

2.

Also, decla the diesel i

generators j operable and tak the ACTION requi d by Specifica fon 3.8.1.2.

3.

With ss than two OPER4 LE site nuclear rvice water pump,

dect,/re the diesel geogrators inoperabl and take the ACT N req'uired by Specifi ftion 3.8.1.2.

f 4.

With only one U t I service wate pump OPERABLE, r tore at least one addition nit 1 pump, eit r nuclear or con ntional, powere from a sepa te emergency bus to OPERABLE stat within 7 days declare t Core Spray Syst and the LPCI Sy em inoperable a j.

j take th ACTION required Specifications

.5.3.1 and 3.5.3

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sacusw1Cx - uw1: 1 3/4 7-24 Ar e ne ne r.t se. 1:5

INSERT A t

l N

7 1.

With one OP E conventional service water pump, restore at leas additional cony onal service water pump ERABLE status within 7 ys or be in at le T SHUTDOWN within t ext 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD s own within the f wing l

/

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

7-

/

2.

With no conventional service water pumps OPERABL store atjesft' one p

cpnv6ntional service wayp to OPERABLEytat6s'within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months scor be in at least

/ HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hoofs and in COLD tTFDOWN within the

~/

/

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3/b/ f.

(/

following 24, hours.

,y J

7*

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of 3.

ACTION b.4 apply for Unit 2, restore one additional site nuclear service water pump

$b80 within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLCs

(

SHUTDOWN within tt e following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , Iasd E site nuclear seJudater pumps anMessTh'an two OP LE F4 With two conventi service waterpurrfps, restore at lea o conventional ice water mps to OPERABLE tatus within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months e in at least HOT TDOWN within hours and HUTDOWN witberf th followino 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

5.

With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5:

With one OPERABLE Unit 1 service water pump, restore at least two Unit 1 service 1.

'ni H ' pri water pumps to OPERABLE status within 7 da s,cr d;;.;r: :he Csehbf l:

OfkttMist SM, fth sll ofwA%)

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~,,wa e fsftNNel Asr OrO Y fM resed*r H W l.

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[ith no OPERABLE Unit 1 servic}e w((gter tha enre Anrav ane' 'e' h ?

..c.a..~vw &. SkSf4nd Q eft /h hk $ fN/* /00C d fbfin 1(5 f 2.

W g3d C

& emh;9 4 roc 1 < ouse/.

3.

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of StASM8@

ACTION b.4 apply, restore at least one additional nuclear service w.ter pum to d

h OPERABLE status within 7 days :: d;ir; th; d.ea;' g;,ccc:::: M:;,;rde, j

+Le & Acnaa rtved k;r spa n n 3. t I. 2.

4.

With the service water system nuclear header inoperable, operation of both units may continue provided that two Unit 2 nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE, both units' nuclear service water header valves are administratively controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generators, at least two Unit 1 conventional

)

service water pumps are OPERABLE on the conventional header, and vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional service water system header. Restore the service water

o.

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system nuclear header and at least three site ridclear service water pumps to j

.g.. y. v.m.,, ;.'.; L."O

^ ' -

OPERABLE status 'within 14 days. Otherwise, * '

l ey by &<t; CkaN,s~...=;:=;;.=. fa Ae //4. Ac.noJ re

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m

3. [(. l. 3.

5.

With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps,

_ __ ----._ _ ____<,- M c #cACr/M q,,4 4 Sycc; A' cab 3. ?. l. A.

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1 J

'I;j INSERT-A-1 1

1.

With one OPERABLE conventional-service water. pumps a.

Ensure that, if only one Unit 1 nuclear service-water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE Unit 1 nuclear service water pump, and b.

Restore at least one additional conventional service' water. pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24' hours.

2.

With no conventional service water pumps OPERABLE:

i a.

Ensure both Unit 1 nuclear service water. pumps are OPERABLE, and b.

Restore at least one conventional service water pump-to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

l 4.

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps and one OPERABLE conventional service. water-pump:

a.

Ensure that at-least one Unit-1 nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, and g

I b.

Ensure that, if only one Unit 1 nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE Unit 1 nuclear service water pump, and' c.

Restore two conventional service water pumps or three site nuclear service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Otherwise, be in at-least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

+

e PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE!

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that i; not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on the appropriate ECCS actuation test signals.

l~

service ter system nucleaf 1

f in OPERp0NAL CONDITION 4/r 5 with c.

headey inoperable, verif vthat the service ater system conve dtonal head 4r is lined up to pply cooling wate to vital ECCS lo s and tbit the Unit 2 nucl r header is line up to supply cool' g water

/orthedieselgen ators by verifyi that each valve rvicing the

.7/

diesel generator that is not fock open is administ tively (controlled in e proper positio.

s u e e n u.' P,,i n A l d,.h,.

Ir he D_LLJ L

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SPECIAL' IEST EXCEPTIONS 3/!. 10.5 PLANT SERVlt.,4 WATER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.5 The service water conventional header required to be operating per J

Specification 3.7.1 2 ACTION b.

may be removed from operation by stopping the pumps to permit isolating and draining the service water -

nuclear header for maintenance provided'that:

i The service water conventional header. remains lined up to supply a.

cooling water to the required ECCS loads.

b.

The draining / maintenance on the service water nuclear header will not affect the service water conventional system or lineup described in a.

above.

i l

c.

Average coolant temperature is <100 F and the heatup rate is 110*F per hour.

d.

Two dedicated qualified members of the unit operational staff are assigned to initiate the, service water conventional header pumps, should any of the following occur:

1.

Any event occurs which requires ECCS actuation.

0 2.

Primary coolant temperature exceeds 180 F.

3.

A loss of of fsite power occurs.

o pSRATn1 MAL APPLICABILITY: ACONDITIONS 4 and 5 with the nuclear header inoperable.

ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, as soon as practicable, restore the:

4 Service water conventional header to operating status per the a.

requirements of Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.

, or b.

Service water nuclear header to OPERABLE status per Specification 3.7.1.2.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.10.5 When the service water conventional header is not operating as specified above:

a.

Prior to securing all service water pumps, verify that the service water conventional header is lined up to supply cooling water for ECCS by verifying that each valve servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked in the proper position is administrative 1y controlled in the proper position.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 10-5 RETTPED TECH. SPECS.

Updated Thru. Amend.

o

/

3/4. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS

/

s BASES

/

g 3h. 7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS

/

\\ uring the initial stage of a DBA (0-10 minutes), the service watey

/

system provides lobe water and service water cooling to the diese Two pumps are neelssary to generat s.

header to supply diesel generator cooling water.

flow to cool all f our diesel generators under wo+st-case supplysufijciente also supplying. flow to other safety and non-saie/y related any combination of three OPERABLE nucipdr service scenarios wh' components.

erefore, an assure diesel water pumps pe site will meet the single failure criterit.

generator coolin The requirement for two OPERABLE nuclea service water pumps associated

'th a unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1,

, or 3 and at least ne or both units are three OPERABLE nuclhAr service water pumps per site when in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 ensures that emergency diesel generator

./

cooling requirements a met.

y nal loads require cooling additi After the initial te gminutes of a DBA, olers, RHR service water These loads includegRHR and CS pump room heat exchangers, and RHR puma seal heat exchange s.

Evaluations have water.

determined that the RHR pump stals, as well as he equipment in rooms serviced he manufacturers' temperature by the RHR and CS room coolers,\\ remain within the additional loads limits for the first ten minutes.f a DBA.

o meet a DBA, wo service water pumps on the during the post-ten minute stage o n ord r to assure single failure criteria must be in service, affected unit the Technical Specification rh res two OPERABLE conventional service is met, water pumps per unit while in OPERATIO CONDITION 1, 2, or 3.

TIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the reduced As discussed above, when in OF load and the acces,4ibility \\o the reactor building for manual core decay heat for OP(RABLE service water pumps after operator action reduce the requirementfherefore, when\\in OPERATIONAL COND an accident / transient to one.

or 5, two OPERABLE service wat4r pumps (any com " nation of nuclear and/or ying the nuclear he der are required provided conventional) capable of sup th e OPERABLE nuclear ser (ce water pumps per site.

that there are at least ervice water pumps (nuclear and/or conventional)'on Maintaining two OPERABLE ONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 assure, long-term cooling can g

the unit while in OPERA application of the single failu'ke criteria.

be supplied, even aftehree OPERABLE nuclear service wateh pumps per site Stipulating at least tor cooling will be available followi'q any DBA, assures diesel gene regardless of whie unit suffers the accident / transient.

established in j

The allowe out-of-service times and compensatory measure s

the ACTION St ements are conservative.

In particular, ACTION bNatement a.2 L CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 requires the unit tobein%0TSHUTDOWN for OPERATIO within 12 P urs and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Nich no Analyses have been performed 'w ich OPERABLE clear service water pumps.

~

I l

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\\

8 3/4 7-1 Amenament No. 146 RUNSWICK - UNIT 1

\\

-. _ ~ -..

- ~.

3/4. 7 PIANT SYSTEMS 4

BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS i

The service water system is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from equipment such as the emergency diesel. generators, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump coolers, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment, that is required for a safe reactor shutdown following design basis accident (DBA) or transient.

The service water system also.

a provides cooling to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System and.

the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System, as required, during normal and shutdown operation.

The service water system provides lubricating water for the service water pumps and cooling water for the service water pump During the initial stage (0 - 10 minutes) of a LOCA or LOOP, the service motors.

automatically provide cooling water to the emergency diesel water system must Following the first ten minute period, additional safety-related and generators.

shutdown cooling loads must be supplied. The service water system also provides flow to the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System, the Chlorination System, and fill to the Circulating Water System.

The service water system design allows either (or both) unit's nuclear header to supply diesel generator cooling water when required.

The phrase " sire nuclear service water pump" refers to any nuclear service water pump on either unit.

The four Other pump designations refer to the specific unit under discussion.

nuclear service water pumps on site, two per unit, are each on a separate emergency bus so that a single failure could prevent only one nuclear service water pump from operating.

The OPERABILITY requirements are structured to ensure that the Service Water System is capable of automatically supplying sufficient cooling water for the i

Diesel Generators assuming no operator action for the first 10 minutes following a DBA, and that at least one service water pump per unit is available to supply the safety-related and shutdown cooling loads after the first ten minutes following a DBA. The OPERABILITY requirements for the service water system are, in general, based on a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident), and in some cases combined with a LOOP (Loss of Offsite Power), since.this event or combination would provide the most significant challenge to the system's capabilities.

i The four nuclear service water pumps are powered from separate emergency buses.

The three conventional service water pumps on each unit are on separate emergency buses For each unit, two of the conventional pumps are on the same emergency The loss of one nuclear pump buses as the two unit nuclear service water pumps.

and one conventional pump on the unit due to a single failure of one emergency bus has been accounted for in the OPERABILITY requirements.

However, more strictly defined in conventional service water pump OPERABILITY will be for cases where only one nuclear pump and one conventional pump are available r

operation.

Therefore, with one unit nuclear service water pump and one conventional service water pump available, the conventional service water pump j

must be powered from a separate emergency bus to be considered OPERABLE.

BRUNSWICK UNIT - 1 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.

~

-~-..

~

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS a

BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued) i i

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, a conventional service water pump must be capable of supplying water to both the nuclear header and the conventional header to be considered OPERABLE.

This will ensure that the vital header and RHR service water heat exchangers can be supplied from either header when a single failure of any header isolation valve is assumed and personnel access is not available for manual valve alignment. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because of reduced primary pressure, the possibility of a LOCA is not considered credible and access is considered available to manually position header isolation valves if required. Therefore, in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, a conventional pump may be considered OPERABLE when only the nuclear header discharge valve is OPERABLE except as specifically identified in the ACTION statement for a nuclear header outage.

This allows maintenance on the conventional header-without reducing service water system OPERABILITY. However, a conventional pump aligned to the nuclear header is not considered to meet the requirements for an OPERABLE nuclear pump since it is not automatically powered and restarted on the diesel generators following an accident signal.

For OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2,

3, 4,

and 5, and a DBA in either unit, two nuclear service water pumps from one or both units are capable of supplying sufficient flow to cool all four emergency diesel generators under worst-case scenarios while also supplying flow to other potential flow paths (vital header loads, cross-header leakage, and lubevater). To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water to the diesel generators during the first 10 minuteu following a DBA, at least three nuclear service water pumps per site required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.

l are After the first ten minutes following a DBA, additional loads may require cooling water on the affected unit.

These loads include RHR and CS pump room coolers, RHR service water heat exchangers, and RHR pump seal heat exchangers.

Evaluations have determined that the RHR pump seals, as well as the equipment in rooms serviced by the RHR and CS room coolers, remain within the manufacturers' temperature limits for at least the first ten minutes of a DBA. Operator action is credited af ter the first 10 minutes following a DBA to make the necessary pump and valve alignments either remotely or manually, except that manual action inside the Reactor Building following a LOCA while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 is not credited because of the potential for unsafe conditions.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2,

and 3, one conventional service water pump supporting the affected unit is capable of supplying the additional required safety-related and shutdown equipment.

No single failure can prevent the necessary loads from being aligned to one of the nuclear or conventional headers by manual or remote operator action.

To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two operable conventional service water pumps are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.

BRUNSWICK UNIT - 1 B 3/4 7-la Amendment No.

I

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS e

JASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, one unit service water pump, nuclear or conventional, is capable of supplying the additional required safety-related and shutdown equipment. Manual action in the Reactor Building is credited to ali p equipment to the nuclear header if required. To prohibit any single failure from t

preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two OPERABLE unit service water pumps, nuclear or conventional, are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5.

The allowed out-of-service times and compensatory measures established in the ACTION statements are conservative.

Although the probability and-consequences of a DBA are reduced in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the ACTION statements for the nuclear service water pumps for a unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are based on the assumption that the other unit is in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.

Specific ACTION statements and LCO time limits have not been established for both units in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 since the ACTION statements for one unit in 0PERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are more conservative.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because of reduced core decay heat load, the i

reduced possibility of a LOCA, and the accessibility to the reactor building for manual operator action, the vital header loads could be manually aligned to the nuclear header if a failure prevented remote valve alignment.

Therefore, the.

operability requirements for the unit service water pumps apply for nuclear or-conventional pumps.

With one OPERABLE unit service water pump, the core spray and LPCI systems remain OPERABLE. However, to minimize the possibility of loss" of these systems due to loss of the single pump, the out-of-service time for one OPERABLE unit service water pump is. set at 7 days. For no OPERABLE unit service water pumps, the core spray and LPCI systems must be declared inoperable. This is equivalent to the ACTION statement for core spray and LPCI systems inoperable.

ACTION statement 3.7.1.2.b.4 for OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 ' allows one unit to operate with the nuclear service water header inoperable for up to 14 days

.l provided that:

a) two nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE on the other unit, b) both unit's nuclear service water header valves are administratively controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generators, c) the service water system conventional header is OPERABLE with two j

unit conventional service water pumps OPERABLE, and d) vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional service water system header.

i e

BRUNSWICK UNIT - 1 B 3/4 7-lb Amendment No.

I

~

3/4. 7 PIANT SYSTEMS a.

BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)

Considering any additional single failure, this requirement ensures at least one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump to supply the Diesel Generators during the, first 10 minutes after a DEA and one OPERABII conventional service water pump to supply the unit safety-related and shutdown cooling loads following the first 10 minutes after a DBA. By requiring administrative control of both unit's nuclear header valves, the ACTION statement minimizes the risk of inadvertent valve.

action that could reduce cooling water flow to the diesel generators.

l t

6 l'

l i

6 BRUNSWICK UNIT - 1 B 3/4 7-Ic Amendment No.

P c'.

PLANT SYSTCMS BASES 37??twi,1ERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continuec) demonstrate operatto.

PERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 through 3 wirk

.aABLE e

table provided

. teast two nuclear nuclear service water pumps ta service water pumps are OPERABLE on th e unit and two conventional pumps are OPERABLE on the aff **. anit.

Spec CTION statements and LCO time limits for th'

. au on have not been developec a more viION Statement has been established in order to...

' mise the conserv

... of personnel error in acministrating'this situation.

3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERCENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the control room ventilation system ensures that

1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature f or continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and 2) the control room will remain ~ habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accidenC conditions. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunc6 ion with control room design provisions is based on limiting the. radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less, whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of Ceneral Design Criteria 10 of Appendix "A",

10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION The limitation on flood protection ensures that facility protective actions will be taken and operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions. The limit of elevation 17'6" Mean Sea Level is based on the maximum elevation at which f acility flood control measures provide protection to saf ety related equipment.

3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SiSTEM i

The reactor core isolation cooling system (RCICS) is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and " tu loss of f eedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring A

I actuatiosI.of any of tha Emergency Core Cooling equipment. RCICS is conservat5vely required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 113 psig even though the Residual dest Removal (RHR) system provides adequate core cooling up to 150 psig. The condensate storage tank provides sufficient water 1

to reduce the reactor coolant temperature and pressure to permit the RHR system to be operated.

BRUNSWICX - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1 Arnenament No. 146

ENCLOSURE 4

- BSEP 93-0112 BRUNLNICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324 OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR 71 & DPR-62 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES - UNIT 2 4

l

}

1 s

f f

i E4-1 1

'l

i

'O.

INDEX 5

+

I BASES PACE SECTION 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (Continued) 3/4.4.4 CHEMISTRY............................................ B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.5 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY.................................... B 3/4 4-2 E

3/4.4.6 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LI..ITS.......................... B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES..................... B 3/4 4-7 3/4.4.8 STRUCTURAL INTECRITY................................. B 3 /4 4-7 3/4.5 EMERCENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 3/4.5.1 HICH PRES SURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM............... B 3 /4 5-1 3/4.5.2 AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (ADS)......'........ B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.3 LOW PRESSURE COOLINC SYSTEMS...................

..... B 3/4 5-2 3/4.5.4 S UP PR ES S I ON PO0 L..................................... B 3 / 4 5 -4 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT.................................. B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS................. B 3 /4 6-3 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONT.kiNMENT ISOLATION VALVES................. B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF........................................ B 3/4 6-5 t

3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT................................ B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTR0L....................... B 3/4 6-6 l

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS................................ B 3/4 7-1 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRAT:0N SYSTEM............. B 3 /4 7-1p[ -

3/4.7.2 c

( QJheA OfL p,,,w o w r Ib I

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 XI Amendment No. 179 i

W.

INDEX J"f%c k

BASES

~

SECTION PACE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION......................................

B 3/4 7-1,g' 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM.................

B 3/4 7-1 d

3/4.7.5 S NU B B ER S..............................................

B.3/4 7-2.

3/4.7.6 S EALED SOURCE CONTAMI NATI ON...........................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 F IR E SU PP RESS IO N S Y ST EMS..............................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.8 FIRE BARR7ER PENETRATIONS.............................

B 3/4 7-5 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.................................

B/3/4 8-1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACT 0k DE SWITCH...................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 I N S TR UM ENTATI ON.......................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD P0SITION..................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME............................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 COM M UN I CATI ON S........................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND HOIST OPERABILITY...........................

B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL-SP ENT. FUEL STORACE P00L..................

B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL, and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR FUEL STORACE P00L.................

B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.10 C ON TROL ROD R EM0V AL...................................

B 3/4 9-2 3/4.10 SPECIAI. TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRI HARY CONTAINMENT I NTECRI TY......................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 ROD S EQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM ( DELETED)................. B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 S HUTDOWN MARCIN D EMONSTRATIONS........................ B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 R ECI R CU LATI ON LO0 PS................................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 P LANT S ER VI CE W AT ER............................

B 3/4 10-1 i

l i

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 XII Amendment No. 177 j

1 1

., ~

a.

PLANT SYSTEMS SERT? ICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITINC CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 The service water system snall be OPERABLE with at least:

In C JF.'.ATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3:

hibR Three he OPERABLEfnuclear service water pumps, and two OPERABLE conventional service water pumps capable of supplying the nuclear and conventional headers.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5:

Three OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps; and two OPERABLE Unic 2 service water pumps, nuclear and/or conventional, powered from separate emergency buses and capable of supplying the nuclear header.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITI0 tis 1,~-2, 3, 4, and 5

/ 7 ION:

INSERT'3 a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or f 1.

With two O RABLE convention service water pup s and only one

[

nuclear ervice water pump PERABLE, restore te remaining nuclepr servic water pump to OP ABLE, status withi days or be in HOT SHUT)DdWNwithin12hout and COLD SHUTDOWlV ithin the. followidg 24,ehou rs.

l 2.[With no OPERABLE nuclear service water pumps, regsrdless of conventional sevice water pump sJ,stus, be in at lea / HOT SHUTDOWN j

j

/

within 12 ho s and in COLD SH COWN within the fo ' lowing 24' hours.

3.

With two PERABLE nuclear safvice water pumps nd only one conventional service watep pump OPERABLE, r tore at least one addi fonal conventional, service water pum to OPERABLE statu within f

7 (sys or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12.

urs and COLD SHUT WW wi' thin the following'24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

4./With two 0FERABLI nuclear service y'.

ater pumps and no onventional

/

service water / pump OPERABLE, re ore at least one nventional service watM pump to OPERAB status within 72 urs and restore the remaiMng conventional evice water pump OPERABLE status within[daysfromtheti of the loss of t first pump.

Other :se, be in at lea /HOTSHUTDOWNwit n the next 12 ho s and

(

in LD SHtTIDOWN withjf the ' following 24 ours.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. 177

k av PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

T FACTION:(Cont I ed) 5.

th only one nuclear serptce water pump and one nventional service water pump OPERA'BLE, restore at least op additional service

/ water pump, nuclear or' conventional, to OPERA LE status within i

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and restore'the remaining service ter pump to OPERABLE status within 7 a'ys from the time of the oss of the first pump.

l[

Otherwise, be jo)at least HOT SHUTDOWN tchin the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and l

in COLD SHUTDOWN within the followin 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

I

/

With one dPF.RABLE nuclear servic wa*.er pump and no OPERAS E 6.

e conventional service water pum, be in at least HOT SHlifDOWN within I

the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COL VFlfUTDOWN within the folYowing 24/ hours.

/

b.

In_0PERATIONAL CONDITION 4 5:

/

With one less than he required number of. clear service water

~

pumps OPERABLE p site, restore at leasr/one additional nuclear

['

service water mp to OPERABLE status thin 14 days or declar the diesel gener ors inoperable and tak the ACTION required by Specificat ~on 3.B.l.2.

2.

With t.he service we,,ar system clear header inoperabl, or no Unit /f nuclear service water umps OPERABLE, operati may continue ppo'vided that the service,;, tater system conventiona header is PERABLE with at least tato conventional service yater pumps Restore th [14 days or declare fth ervice water system nugiear header to OPERABLE.

'n Core Spray System and OPERABLE status wit

/

the LPCI F stem i perable and take the AC7 ION required by Specifications

.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2.

Als, declare the diesel

/

generato-

'r

'Ierable and take.the ACT N required by Specif'

.g;xi R-1.2.

/

3.

With le,ys..... c 1 OPERABLE sit nuclear service water pjenps, declarethediesel.anerators/noperableandtakethe TION re urfred by Specification 341.2.

4.

ich only one Unit 2 se e water pump OPERABL8' restore at least one additional Unit 2 ump, either nuclear or onventional, powered /

from a separate eme ency bus, to OPERABLE atus within 7 days o declare the Core ray System and the LPC System inoperable a take the ACTION required by Specificati s 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3..

)

l BRUNSWICK - bHIT 2 3/4 7-2a Amendment No. 177

INSERT B a

T 1.

With on ABLE conventional Mater pump, re at least one addi ' a e

ntional service water puntp OPERABLE stat ithin 7 days or be i t least HOT SHUTDOWN wit the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months an OLD shutdown withi e following

]

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2.

With no onventional service water pumps OPERAB E; restore at least o s

conv sonal service water p to OPERABLE status hin 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , or be in

. T SHUTDOWN with e next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months an n COLD SHUTDOWN - thin the p

N following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months /;

g f g 3.

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of ACTION b.4 apply for Unit 1, restore one additional site nuclear service water pump g

within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD gf ["

SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

4.

With tw PERABLE site nuclear s ice water pumps and le an two OPERA co ntional service water p ps, restore at least two nventional service ater j pumps to OPERABLE sta within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be i least HOT SHUTDO within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD UTDOWN within the foll wing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

(

5.

With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , b.

In OPERATIONAL CUNDITIONS 4 or 5:

l 1.

With one OPERABLE Unit 2 service water pump, restore at least two Unit 2 service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 7 days,m uuciam G.c Co.c Opcor ;.d LPCN

=,=cm: a ;;@= 0NtrQs se 6ftra 5 5 '/AAl haJ~(

44. pJenna i for draniq,3hSpd a //

c fle. res car Jessel.

Qy 2.

With no OPERABLE Unit 2 service water pumps, do;';:: Se C;;c Croy a trcr 5 4 5 f f n d A ll O f t # G M o n.y 4 [ / a u t.

N r,ncm; br -9" o

W n l$*

A f O r4 ?n u n g & r tta t. h e (Jule f, 3.

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of peut fM ACTION b.4 apply, restore at least one additional nuclear service water pum to OPERABLE status within 7 daysj;- d;da ; 'ho fe;;l g;..e.eiei h0pereb!e. Of arktif e

&t. }Lt. A C.T?Dk VtQue'rLA by.i i

Ss"Ca No% 3

E. I* *).

f 4.

With the service water system nuclear header inoperable, operation of both units may continue provided that two Unit 1 nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE, both units' nuclear service water header valves are administratively controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generators, at least two Unit 2 conventional service water pumps are OPERABLE on the conventional header, and vital ECCS loads

i i

a e aligned to the conventional service water systern'hsader. Restore the service water.

l system nuclear header and at least three site nuclear service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 14 days. - Otherwise, J;;'cr: +: cere e '*r';:, -.... Um LTC;.

4 ke Me-A CT76d

,,,e.s. g:er-, ;cne.2.c. A:: rgi e ce Qu;r cJ by 5pt e: f.'es %

1. T. l. 2.

5.

With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pu p s, " - ' - - - - d:- - '

e- ?+~e - r-rd'r - bkt Mt AGD64 rtgw!

by i

8 4. c,' [j cakos

3. t.1. 2.

6

?

r f

F f

f 1

k

-r 1

l 1

i

i i

INSERT B-1 1.

With one OPERABLE conventional service water pump:

I a.

Ensure that, if only one Unit 2 nuclear service l

water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump.is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE-Unit'2. nuclear service water pump, and b.

Restore at least one additional conventional service J

water pump to OPERABLE status.within 7 days.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s-and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2.

With.no conventional service water pumps OPERABLEi a.

Ensure both Unit 2 nuclear service water pumpsLare OPERABLE, and b.

Restore at least one conventional service-water' pump-l to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and. COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24' hours, l

4.

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps'and one OPERABLE conventional service water pump:

a..

Ensure that at least one Unit 2 nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, and b.

Ensure that, if only one Unit 2 nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE Unit'2 nuclear service water pump, and c.

Restore two conventional service water' pumps or 1

three site. nuclear service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

j Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12, hours

)

and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24' hours.

1

~

l

b, PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise se:ured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment a-tuates to its-correct position on the appropriate ECCS actuation _ test signals.

l In ERATIONAL CONDITION 4

' 5 with service water ystem nuclear 7

F he[aderinoperable, verify c.

hat the service water ystem conventional deader is lined up to s ply cooling water to v'tal ECCS loads and that the Unit I nucle r header is lined up t supply cooling water for the diesel gene ators by verifying tha each valve servicing.

e diesel generators hat is not 16cked ope is administratively (con rolled in t)(e proper position.

3 1

1 --

f [F__

A f T* f A A I l-AY JC C i t.U. \\ D t c ( \\ % I IVIN U.

i/.

dDb

~A t len t once pai-9a day 5 % <>ai, ryi,,9

&t & alhrn& d:eseIgew<he sw,ee dalJc. to: ll Opn on r wler suy19

/w Au/u pcsswre. 3;p/.

~

ftnAstbA h

/9.5//92 sk% ne BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2b Amendment No. 177

i SPEC 2AL TEST EXCEPT.

.S 3/4 10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER a,

J LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 4

3.10.5 The service water conventional eader required to be operating per Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.

may be removed from operation by stopping the pumps to permit isolating and draining the service water nuclear header for maintenance provided that:

The service water conventional header remains lined up to a.

supply cooling water to the required ECCS loads.

b.

The draining / maintenance on the service water nuclear header will not affect the service water conventional system or lineuo described in a. above.

c.

Average coolant temperature is f100*F and the heatup rate is 110*F per hour.

d.

Two dedicated, qualified members of the unit operational staff are assigned to initiate the service water conventional header pumps should any of the foi, lowing occur:

1.

Any event occurs which requires ECCS actuation.

2.

Primary coolant temperature exceeds 180*F.

3.

A loss of offsite power occurs.

OPERATloNAL APPLICABILITY: ACONDITIONS 4 and 5 with the nuclear header inoperable.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, as soon as practicable, restore the:

4 Service water conventional header to operatingkstatus per the a.

requirements of Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.%, or b.

Service water nuclear header to OPERABLE status per Specification 3.7.1.2.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.10.5 Vhen the service water conventional header is not operating as specified above:

a.

Prior to securing all service water pumps, verify that the service water conventional header is lined up to supply cooling water for ECCS by verifying that each valve servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked in the proper position is administrative 1y controlled in the proper position.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 10-5 RETTPED TECH. SPECS.

Updated Ihru. Amend. 78 m_...,.

w 4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BA

?'4.7 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS During the initial stage of a DBA (0-10 minutes), the service water system pro ' des lube water and service water cooling to the dies generators. The service water system design allows either unit's nuclear head;r to sup y diesel generator cooling water. Two pumps ar necessary to supply suffici. t flow to cool all four diesel generators un r worst-case scenarios while lso supplying flow to other safety and non safety related components. Ther(ore,anycombinationofthreeOPERABLE uclear service water pumps per sit will meet the single failure criteri and assure diesel generator cooling.

e requirement for two OPERABLE nu ear service water pumps associated with unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS

, 2, or 3 and at least three OPERABLE nuclear ervice water pumps per site w en one or both units are in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5 ensures that emerg cy diesel generator cooling requirements are m t.

After the initial ten mi utes of a DBA, ad tional loads require cooling These loads include RH( and CS pu5p ro coolers, RHR service water water.

heat exchangers, and RHR pump sd I heat excha gers. Evaluations have determined that the RHR pump seal, as well s the equipment in rooms serviced by the RHR and CS room coolers, re in wit n the manufacturers' temperature limits for the first ten minutes of DB To meet the additional loads during the post-ten minute stage of a two service water pumps on the affected unit must be in service.

In der to assure single failure criteria is met, the Technical Specification r qu'res two OPERABLE conventional service water pumps per unit while in OPERA ONAL.

NDITION 1, 2, or 3.

As discussed above, when in ERATIONAL ONDITIONS 4 and 5, the reduced core decay heat load and the ac ssibility to he reactor building for manual operator action reduce the req rement for OPE BLE service water pumps af ter an accident / transient to one.

Therefore, when i OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5, two OPERABLE service w ter pumps (any combin tion of nuclear and/or conventional) capable of s plying the nuclear head are required provided that there are at least t ree OPERABLE nuclear servi water pumps per site.

Maintaining two OPERAB service water pumps (nuclear d/or conventional) on the unit while in OPER IONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 assures ong-term cooling can be supplied, even af t r application of the single fail re criteria.

Stipulating at least three OPERABLE nuclear service Jr mps per site assures diesel gen stor cooling will be available following any DBA, regardless of whi unit suf fers the accider.t/ transient.

The allow out-of service times and compensatory measures stablished in the ACTION St emeu.s are conservative.

In particular, ACTION St ement a.2 for OPERATIO AL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 requires the unit to be in T SHUTDOWN wi thin 12 urs and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the follouing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months w th no OPERABLE clear service water pumps. Analyses have been performed w 'ch J

UNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No. 17 i

l i

3/4. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.

BASES j

i 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS The service water system is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from equipment such as the emergency diesel generators, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump coolers, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment, that is required for a safe reactor shutdown following a design basis accident (DBA) or transient.

The service water system also provides cooling to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Vater (RBCCW) System and the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System, as required, during normal and shutdown operation.

The service water system provides lubricatin5 water for the service water pumps and cooling water.for the service water pump l

motors. During the initial stage (0 - 10 minutes) of a LOCA or LOOP, the service water system must automatically provide cooling water to the emergency diesel generators. Following the first ;en minute period, additional safety-related and shutdown cooling loads must be supplied. The service water system also provides flow to the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System, the Chlorination Wem, and fill to the Circulating Water System.

The service water system design allows either (or both) unit's nuclear header to supply diesel generator cooling water when required. The phrase " site nuclear service water pump" refers to any nuclear service water pump on either unit.

Other pump designations refer to the specific unit under discussion. The four nuclear service water pumps on site, two per unit, are each on a separate emergency bus so that a single failure could prevent only one nuclear service water pump from operating.

The OPERABILITY requirements are structured to ensure that the Service Water System is capable of automatically supplying sufficient cooling water for the Diesel Generators assuming no operator action for the first 10 minutes following a DBA, and that at least one service water pump per unit is available to supply the safety-related and shutdown cooling loads after the first ten minutes following a DBA. The OPERABILITY requirements for the service water system are, in general, based on a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident), and in some cases combined with a LOOP (Loss of Offsite Power), since this event or combination would provide the most significant challenge to the system's capabilities, i

The four nuclear service water pumps are powered from separate emergency buses.

The three conventional service water pumps on each unit are on separate emergency buses.

For each unit, two of the conventional pumps are on the same emergency buses as the two unit nuclear service water pumps. The loss of one nuclear pump and one conventional pump on the unit due to a single failure of one emergency bus has been accounted for in the OPERABILITY requirements.

However, conventional service water pump OPERABILITY will be more strictly defined in cases where only one nuclear pump and one conventional pump are available for operation.

Therefore, with one unit nuclear service water pump and one conventional service water pmp available, the conventional service water pump-must be powered from a separate emergency bus to be considered OPERABLE.

4 i

BRUNSWICK UNIT - 2 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.

-~

b 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS e

BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, a conventional service water pump must be capable of supplying water to both the nuclear header and the conventional header to be considered OPERABLE.

This will ensure that the vital header and RHR

=

service water heat exchangers can be supplied from either header when a single failure of any header isolation valve is assumed and personnel access is.not available for manual valve alignment. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because of reduced primary pressure, the possibility of a LOCA is not considered ~ credible and access is considered available to manually position header isolation valves if required. Therefore, in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, a conventional pump may be considered OPERABLE when only the nuclear header discharge valve is OPERABLE except as specifically identified in the ACTION statement for a nuclear header outage.

This allows maintenance on the conventional header without reducing service water system OPERABILITY. However, a conventional pump aligc--

to the nuclear header is not considered to meet the requirements for an OPERABLE nuclear pump since it is not automatically powered and restarted on the diesel f

generators following an accident signal.

For OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2,

3, 4,

and 5, and a DBA.in either unit, two nuclear service water pumps from one or both units are capable of supplying sufficient flow to cool all four emergency diesel generatora under worst-case scenarios while also supplying flow to other potential flow paths (vital header loads, cross-header leakage, and lubevater). To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water to the diesel generators during the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least three nuclear service water pumps per site i

are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.

Af ter the first ten minutes following a DBA, additional loads may require cooling water on the affected unit.

These loads include RHR and CS pump room coolers, RHR service water heat exchangers, and RHR pump seal heat exchangers.

Evaluations have determined that the RHR pump seals, as well as the equipment in rooms serviced by the RHR and CS room coolers, remain within the manufacturers' temperature limits for at least the first ten minutes of a DBA, Operator action is credited after the first 10 minutes following a DBA to make the necessary pump-and valve alignments either remotely or manually, except that manual action inside the Reactor Building following a LOCA while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 is not credited because of the potential for unsafe con /1tions.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2,

and 3,

one conventional service water pump i

supporting the affected unit is capable of supplying the additional required safety-related and shutdown equipment.

No single failure can prevent the necessary loads from being aligned to one of the nuclear or conventional headers by manual or remote operator action.

To pcohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two operable conventional service sater pumps are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.

BRUNSWICK UNIT - 2 B 3/4 7-la Amendment No.

i

_.._m.,

3/4. 7 PIANT SYSTEMS d.

BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, one unit service water pump, nuclear or conventional, is capable of supplying the cdditional required safety-related and shutdown equipment. Manual action in the Reactor Building is credited to align equipment to the nuclear header if required. To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two OPERABLE unit service water pumps, nuclear or conventional, are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5.

The allowed out-of-service times and compensatory measures established in the ACTION statements are conservative. Although the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the ACTION statements for the nuclear service water pumps for a unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are based on the assumption that the other unit is in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.

Specific ACTION statements and LCO time limits have not been established for both units in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 since the ACTION statements for one unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are more conservative.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because of reduced core decay heat load, the reduced possibility of a LOCA, and the accessibility to the reactor building for manual operator action, the vital header loads could be manually aligned to the nuclear header if a failure prevented remote valve alignment.

Therefore, the operability requirements for the unit service water pumps apply for nuclear or conventional pumps.

With one OPERABLE unit service water pump, the core spray and LPCI systems remain OPERABLE. However, to minimize the possibility of loss of these systems due to loss of the single pump, the out-of-service time for one OPERABLE unit service water pump is set at 7 days. For no OPERABLE unit service water pumps, the core spray and LPCI systems must be declared inoperable. This is equivalent to the ACTION statement for core spray and LPCI systems inoperable.

ACTION statement 3.7.1.2.b.4 for OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 allows one unit i

to operate with the nuclear service water header inoperable for up to 14 days provided that:

a) two nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE on the other unit, b) both unit's nuclear service water header valves are administratively controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel-generators, c) the service water system conventional header is OPERABLE with two unit conventional service water pumps OPERABLE, and d) vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional service water system header.

BRUNSWICK UNIT - 2 B 3/4 7-lb Amendment No.

- - ~ - - - -

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

'NA.

BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)

Considering any additional single failure, this requirement ensures at least one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump to supply the Diesel Generators during the first 10 minutes after a DBA and one OPERABLE conventional service water pump to supply the unit safety-related and shutdown cooling loads following the first 10 minutes after a DBA. By requiring administrative control of both unit's nuclear header valves, the ACTION statement minimizes the risk of inadvertent valve action that could reduce cooling water flow to the diesel generators, l

l

.I 1

a BRUNSWICK UNIT - 2 B 3/4 7-lc Amendment No.

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued) demonstrate operation ERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 through 3 w' PERABLE nuclear service water pumps is table provided least two nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE on the e unit and two conventional pumps are OPERABLE on the af f unit.

Speci ic N statements and LCO time limits for th' ation have not been developed sine e

conserva i10N Statement has been established in order to minimt personnel error in administrating.this situation.

.o 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERCENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the control room ventilation system ensures that

1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature f or continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and 2) the control room will remain. habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident. conditions. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control roba design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less, whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent vith the requirements of Ceneral Design Criteria 10 of Appendix "A",

10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION The limitation on flood protection ensures that facility protective actions will be taken and operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions. The limit of elevation 17'6" Hean Sea Level is based on the maximum elevation at which facility flood control measures provide protection to saf ety-related equi pment.

3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling system (RCICS) is provided to assure adequate core cooli*ng in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling equipment. RCICS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 113 psig even though the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system provides adequate core cooling up to 150 psig. The condensate storage tank provides sufficient water to reduce the reactor coolant temperature and pressure to permit the RHR systen to be operated.

BRUNSVICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-1,/'

Amendment No. 177

ENCLOSURE 5 BSEP 93-0112 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324 OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 & DPR-62 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TYPED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES - UNIT 1 l

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E5-1 l

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i INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (Cantinued) 3/4.4.4 CHEMISTRY................................................

B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.5 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY.......................................

B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.6 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS.............................

B 3/4 4-3' 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES........................

B 3/4 4-7 3/4.4.8 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY....................................

B 3/4 4-7 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM..................

B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (ADS).................

B 3/1'5-1 3/4.5.3 LOW PRESSURE COOLING SYSTEMS............................

B 3/4 5-2 3/4.5.4 SUPPRESSION P00L........................................

B 3/4 5-4 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS-3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT.....................................

B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS....................

B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.....................

B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF...........................................

B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT...................................

B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTR0L..........................

B 3/4 6-6 a

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7..

SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS...................................

.B 3/4 7-1

[

3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM................

B 3/4 7-Ic I.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 XI Amendment No.

a -

INDEX BASES SECTICN PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PR0TECTION....................................... B 3/4 7-lj 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM.................. B 3/4 7-lj 3/4.7.5 S NU B B E RS............................................... B 3/4 7 - 2 3/4.7.6 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION......;..................... B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.7 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS............................... B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.8 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS.............................. B 3/4 7-4 3/4.8 EL ECTRIC AL POWER SYSTEMS................................. B 3/4 8-1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH.................................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION........................................ B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD P0SITION................................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 D EC AY T I M E............................................. B 3/ 4 9 - 1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS......................................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND H0IST OPERABILITY............................ B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORAGE P00L................... B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL, and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR FUEL STORAGE P00L.................. B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.10 CONTROL R0D REM 0 VAL.................................... B 3/4 9-2 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.......................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 R0D SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM (DELETED).................. B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS......................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS.................................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER.................................... B 3/4 10-1 BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 XII Amendment No.

m

.1 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 The Service Water System shall be OPERABLE with at least:

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3:

Three OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, and two OPERABLE conventional service water pumps capable of supplying the nuclear and conventional headers.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 AND 5:

Three OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, and two OPERABLE Unit I service water pumps, nuclear and/or conventional, powered.from separate emergency buses and capable of supplying the nuclear header.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 ACTION:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3:

1.

With one OPERABLE conventional service water pump:

a.

Ensure that, if only one Unit I nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE Unit I nuclear service. water pump, and b.

Restore at least one additional conventional service water pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the.following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2.

With no conventional service water pumps OPERABLE:

a.

Ensure both Unit I nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE, and b.

Restore at least one conventional service water pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Otherwise, be in at least H0T. SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD-SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3-With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of ACTION b.4 apply for Unit 2, restore one additional site nuclear service water pump within 7 days or be in at least-HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

l

-PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION:

(Continued) 4.

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps and one OPERABLE conventional service water pump:

a.

Ensure at least one Unit I nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, and b.

Ensure that, if only one Unit I nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE Unit I nuclear service water pump, and c.

Restore two conventional service water pumps or three site nuclear service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

5.

With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5:

1.

With one OPERABLE Unit I service water pump, restore at least two Unit I service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Otherwise, suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

2.

With no OPERABLE Unit I service water pumps, suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

3.

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of ACTION b.4 apply, restore at least one additional nuclear service water pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Otherwise, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.

4.

With the service water system nuclear header inoperable, operation of both units may continue provided that two Unit 2 nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE, both units' nuclear service water header valves are administrative 1y controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generators, at least two Unit I conventional service water pumps are OPERABLE on the conventional header, and vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional service water system header.

Restore the service water system nuclear header and at least three site nuclear service water-pumps to OPERABLE status within 14~ days. Otherwise, take the ACTION-required by Specification 3.8.1.2.

5.

With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2a Amendment No.

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PLANT SYSTEMS

)

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on the appropriate ECCS actuation test signals.

c.

At least once per 92 days by verifying that the alternate diesel generator service water supply valve will open on a low header pressure signal.

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2b Amendment No.

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SPECIf(L TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4 10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

4 3.10.5 The service water conventional header required to be operating per Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.4 may be removed from operation by l

stopping the pumps to permit isolating and draining the service water nuclear header for maintenance provided that:

a.

The service water conventional header remains lined up to supply cooling water to the required ECCS loads, b.

The draining / maintenance on the service water nuclear header will not affect the service water conventional system or lineup described in a. above.

c.

Average coolant temperature is s100*F and the heatup ' rate is s10*F per hour.

d.

Two dedicated, qualified members' of the unit operational staff are assigned to initiate the service water a

conventional header pumps, should any of the following

~

occur:

1.

Any event occurs which requires ECCS actuation.

2.

Primary coolant temperature exceeds 180*F.

3.

A loss of offsite power occurs.

l APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 with the nuclear header inoperable.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, as soon as practicable, restore the, a.

Service water conventional header to operating status per the requirements of Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.4, or l

j b.

Service water nuclear header to OPERABLE status per Specification 3.7.1.2.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.5 When the service water conventional header is not operating as specified above:

a.

Prior to securing all service water pumps, verify that the service water conventional header is lined up to supply cooling water for ECCS by verifying that each valve.

servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked in the proper position is administratively controlled in the proper position.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 10-5 Amendment No.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS The service water system is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from equipment such as the emergency diesel generators, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump coolers, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment, that is required for a safe reactor shutdown following a design basis accident (DBA) or transient. The service water system also provides cooling to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System and the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System, as required, during normal and shutdown operation.

The service water system provides lubricating water for the service water pumps and cooling water for the service water pump motors.

During the initial stage (0 - 10 minutes).of a LOCA or LOOP, the service water system must automatically provide cooling water to the emergency diesel generators.

Following the first 10 minute period, additional safety-related and shutdown cooling loads must be supplied.

The service water system also provides flow to the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System, the Chlorination System, and fill to the Circulating Water System.

The service water system design allows either (or both) unit's nuclear header to supply diesel generator cooling water when required. The phrase " site nuclear service water pump" refers to any nuclear service water pump on either unit.

Other p' imp designations refer to the specific unit under discussion.

The four nuclear service water pumps on site, two per unit, are each on a.

separate emergency bus so that a single failure could prevent only one nuclear service water pump from operating.

'p The OPERABILITY requirements are structured to ensure that the service water system is capable of automatically supplying sufficient cooling water for the Diesel Generators assuming no operator action for the first 10 minutes following a DBA, and that at least one service water pump per unit is i

available to supply the safety-related and shutdown cooling loads after the first ten minutes following a DBA. The OPERABILITY requirements _for the service water system are, in general, based on. a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident), and in some cases combined with a LOOP (Loss of Offsite Power),

since this event or combination would provide the most significant challenge to the system's capabilities.

The four nuclear service water pumps are powered from separate emergency buses. The three conventional service water pumps on each unit are on separate emergency buses.

For each unit, two of the conventional pumps are on the same emergency buses as the two unit nuclear service water pumps. The loss of one nuclear pump and one conventional pump on the unit due to a single failure of one emergency bus has been accounted for in the OPERABILITY requirements. However, conventional service water pump OPERABILITY will be more strictly defined in cases where only one nuclear pump and one conventional pump are available for operation. Therefore, with one unit nuclear service water pump and one conventional service water pump available, the conventional service water pump must be powered from a separate emergency bus to be considered OPERABLE.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.

-3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, a conventional service water pump must be capable of supplying water to both the nuclear header and the conventional header to be considered OPERABLE.

This will ensure that the vital header and RHR service water heat exchangers can be supplied from either header when a single failure of any header isolation valve is assumed and personnel access is not available for manual valve alignment.

In.0PERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because of reduced primary pressure, the possibility of a LOCA is not considered credible and access is considered available to manually position header isolation valves if required. Therefore, in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, a conventional pump may be considered OPERABLE when only the nuclear header discharge valve is OPERABLE except as specifically identified in the ACTION statement for a nuclear header outage. This allows maintenance on the conventional header without reducing service water system OPERABILITY.

However, a conventional pump aligned to the nuclear header is not considered to meet the requirements for an OPERABLE nuclear pump since it is not automatically powered and restarted on the diesel generators following an accident signal.

For OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and a DBA in either unit, two nuclear service water pumps from one or both units are capable of supplying sufficient flow to cool all four emergency diesel generators under worst-case scenarios while also supplying flow to other potential flow paths (vital header loads, cross-header leakage, and lubewater).

To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water to the diesel generators during the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least three nuclear service water pumps per site are required while in OFERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.

After the first 10 minutes following a DBA, additional loads require cooling water on the affected unit.

These loads include RHR and CS pump room coolers, RHR service water heat exchangers, and RHR pump seal heat enhangers.

Evaluations have determined that the RHR pump seals, as well as the equipment in rooms serviced by the RHR and CS room coolers, remain within the manufacturers' temperature limits for at least the first 10 minutes of a DBA.

Operator action is credited after the first 10 minutes following a DBA to make the necessary pump and valve alignments either remotely or manually, except that manual action inside the Reactor Building' following a LOCA while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 is not credited because of the potential for unsafe conditions.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, one conventional service water pump supporting the affected unit is capable of supplying the additional required safety-related and shutdown equipment. No single failure can prevent the necessary loads from being aligned to one of the nuclear or conventional headers by manual or remote operator action.

To prohibit any single failure

.i from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two operable conventional service water pump.' are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.

r BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-la Amendment No.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, one unit service water pump, nuclear or conventional, is capable of supplying additional required safety-related and shutdown equipment. Manual action in the Reactor Building is credited to align equipment to the nuclear header if required.

To prohibit any single s

failure from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes-following a DBA, at least two operable unit service water pumps, nuclear or conventional, are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5.

The allowed out-of-service times and compensatory measures established in the ACTION statements are conservative. Although the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the ACTION statements for the nuclear service water pumps for a unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are based on the assumption that the other unit is in OPERATIONAL

~

CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.

Saecific ACTION statements and LCO time limits have not been established for 10th units in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 since the ACTION statements for one unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are more conservative.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because af reduced core decay' heat load, the reduced possibility of a LOCA, and the accessibility to the reactor building for manual operator action, the vital header loads could be manually aligned to the nuclear header if a failure prevented remote valve alignment.

Therefore, the operability requirements for the unit service water pumps apply for nuclear or conventional pumps. With one OPERABLE unit service water pump, the core spray and LPCI systems remain OPERABLE.

However, to minimize the possibility of loss of these systems due to loss of the single pump, the out-of-service time for one OPERABLE unit service water pump is set at 7 days.

For no OPERABLE unit service water pumps, the core spray and.LPCI systems must-be declared inoperable. This.is equivalent to the ACTION statement for core spray and LPCI systems inoperable.

ACTION statement 3.7.1.2.b.4 for OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 allows one unit to operate with the nuclear service water header inoperable for up to 14 days provided that:

I a) two nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE on the other unit, b) both unit's nuclear service. water header valves are administratively controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generators.

c) the service water system conventional header is OPERABLE with two unit conventional service water pumps OPERABLE, and d) vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional service water system header.

Considering any additional single failure, this requirement ensures at least one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump to supply the Diesel Generators during the first 10 minutes after a DBA and one OPERABLE conventional service water pump to supply the unit safety-related and shutdown cooling loads following the first 10 minutes after a DBA.

By requiring administrative control of both unit's nuclear header valves, the ACTION statement minimizes the risk of inadvertent valve action that could reduce cooling water flow to the diesel generators.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-lb Amendment No.

1 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 1

3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM f

Background

One of the principal design objectives of the Control Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (CBHVAC) System is to permit continuous occupancy of the Control Room Emergency Zone under normal operating conditions and under the postulated design basis events throughout the life of the plant.

The Control Building HVAC System must function to provide protection to the operators for three type events:

a radiation event, up to and including a Design Basis Accident (e.g., Main Steam Line Break [MSLB] Accident, Refueling i

Accident, Control Rod Drop Accident, or Loss of Coolant Accident [LOCA]), a toxic gas event (complete rupture of the 55 ton chlorine tank car located near the Service Water Building, or a slow leak lasting for an extended period' of time), and an external smoke event. These events form the basis for the 1

design of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREVS) function 'of the CBHVAC System.

The CREVS is designed to meet General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 (Reference 1).

In addition, the system is designed using the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1 (Reference 2).

Commitments have also been made to design the radiation protection function of the CBHVAC System to meet the_

single failure criteria described in IEEE 279-1971, and the chlorine detection and isolation logic to single failure criteria, both with approved exceptions (Reference 12, Section 3.6).

LC0 Operability of the CREVS ensures that the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible hazard event scenarios external to the control room, consistent with the assumptions in the various analyses. Two redundant subsystems of the CREVS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failun 1

disables the other subsystem. The CREVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are operable in both subsystems.

For the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode, a subsystem is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

a 1.

Fan is OPERABLE, 2.

HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions, and i

i BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-Ic Amendment No.

l

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

LC0 (Continued) 3.

Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained as required in Reference 12, Section 3.1.

For the Chlorine Protection Mode, a subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:

1.

The isolation dampers are OPERABLE, and 2.

The logic components necessary to achieve automatic isolation are functional, as described in Reference 12, Section 3.1.

l Two additional OPERABILITY requirements apply to all modes of CREVS operation.

The CBHVAC Control Air System must be OPERABLE to support damper operation.

In addition, the Control Room Envelope must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.

The Control Room Envelope includes the electronic equipment rooms, the central control room area, computer rooms, kitchen, restrooms, and the supply and return ductwork up to and including the isolation dampers.

The following components, including their associated logic trains,-actuation devices, and power supplies, are non-redundant.

Their OPERABILITY affects both trains of the CREVS. These components are:

control room (washroom) exhaust isolation damper, control room normal make-up damper, and the control room emergency recirculation damper.

In addition, the Brunswick control-room is not equipped with redundant outdoor air intakes (References 4 and 5).

The Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode of operation protects the control room operators from those events which may result in the release of radioactivity.

The Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode of operation also provides protection to the control room operators in the event of an external smoke event.

During a radiation event, the CBHVAC System is required to automatically isolate and enter the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode on a Control Room Intake l

High Radiation signal from the Area Radiation Monitoring System. Upon receipt of a high radiation signal, the CBHVAC System is automatically realigned to the emergency mode of operation. The normal fresh air inlet closes, and, at approximately the same time, the emergency air filtration units begin operation, recirculating control room air and providing filtered makeup air to minimize contamination build-up and provide positive pressure in the Control Room Envelopa. The CBHVAC System responds to an external. smoke event in the same manner as it does for a radiation event.

In the event of a chlorine release, the CBHVAC System enters a full a

recirculation made (Chlorine Protection Mode), with no outdoor air intake.

The emergency filtration trains do not start, since they do not effectively remove chlorine and may be damaged by the presence of chlorine.

Protection-for chlorine gas events " overrides" any concurrent, ongoing, or subsequent radiation or smoke initiation signals. The override design offers protection BRUNSWICK - UNIT I B 3/4 7-Id Amendment No.

-l

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued) e LCO (Continued) to operations personnel in the Control Room by providing protection against potentially fatal chlorine gas releases. This protection is required any time the chlorine tank car is within the exclusion area.

Applicabilitv The OPERATIONAL C0tiDITION applicabilities ensure that the system is capable of performing these functions when the potential for radiation releases and external smoke hazards exist.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, the system must be OPERABLE to reduce control operator exposure during and following a design basis accident, since the accident could lead to a fission product release.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a design basis accident are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS. Maintaining the CREVS OPERABLE is not required in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, except for the following situations under which significant radiological releases can be postulated:

1.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, 2.

During CORE ALTERATIONS, and 3.

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

Requiring OPERABILITY of the Radiation Protection Mode of the CREVS during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 ensures that the system is available during the above evolutions, with the exception the movement of irradiated fuel in secondary containment; therefore, a specific applicability OPERATIONAL CONDITION has been added for this activity.

OPERABILITY of the Chlorine Protection Mode of the CREVS is required any time the chlorine tank car is within the exclusion area.

Analyses demonstrate that movement of the tank car outside the exclusion area sufficiently reduces the threat of control room operator incapacitation from a release of this chemical.

i Action a.

{

With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem i

must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control. room-radiation protection. The loss of a single emergency filtration unit means that the CREVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability. The 7 day out of j

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-le Amendment No.

l i

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTRGL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

Action a. (Continued) service time is based on the low probability of a design basis' accident and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.

During OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS I and 2, the plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk if the inoperable subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required 7 days.

To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . These allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS from full power operation in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.

The loss of both emergency filtration subsystems means that the radiation protection function is lost.

The plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk.

To achieve this status,.the plant must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . These allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the pla1t to reach these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS from full power operation in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.

Action b.

With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection. The loss of a single emergency filtration unit means that the CREVS reliability is oduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability. The 7 day out of service time is based on the low probability.of a design basis accident'and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.

During 0PERATIONAL CONDITION 3, the plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk if the inoperable subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required 7 days.

To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The allowed completion time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach this OPERATIONAL ~ CONDITION from HOT SHUTDOWN in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.

The loss of both emergency filtration subsystems means that the radiation protection function is lost.

The plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk.

To achieve this status, the plant must be BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-If Amendment No.

l

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL _ ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

Action b. (Continued) placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

The allowed completion time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach this OPERATIONAL CONDITION from HOT SHUTDOWN in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.

Action c.

With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in any'of these conditions, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection.

The loss of a single emergency filtration unit means that the CBEVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability.

The 7 day out of service time is based on the low probability of a design basis accident and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.

During 0PERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5, and while irradiated fuel is being moved in secondary containment, if the inoperable emergency filtration subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, the remaining OPERABLE subsystem may be placed in the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode.

This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, and that no failures which could prevent automatic actuation will occur. This action also ensures that any active failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to placing the remaining subsystem in service is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require operation of the CREVS.

This alternative places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

Action d.

With the Chlorine Protection Mode inoperable, the chlorine tank car must be removed from the exclusion area within the next eight (8) hours to ensure adequate protection for the operators.

Chlorine gas protection is not required with the tank car outside of the exclusion area.

Eight hours is considered adequate time to perform the necessary system alignments and to allow plant personnel to remove the chlorine tank car from the site in an orderly manner.

With the plant physically unable to remove the chlorine tank car from the site, as required by this statement, ACTION d. requires the plait to take actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes risk of core damage or other types of radiological release events.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1g Amendment No.

l

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES

,2 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

Surveillance Reauirements The SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) in this specification verify that a subsystem in the standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate.

Standby systems are checked periodically to ensure that the automatic start function is consistent with the assumptions in the Control Room Habitability-Ana'yses (References 4 and 6).

Since the environmental conditions on this system are not severe, monthly demonstration of the capability of the system to operate by SR 4.7.2.a is considered adequate. The 2.15 minute run time is considered adequate for operation of systems without heaters (Reference 16).

SR 4.7.2.b verifies the capability of the filtration system at least once every 18 months, or 1) following any structural maintenance on the filtration unit HEPA filter or charcoal adsorbers or 2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communication with the system.

Testing is performed in accordance with applicable sections of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, and ANSI N510-1975. Acceptance criteria provides assurance that the efficiency used in the Control Room dose analyses is conservative. This is consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 83-13 (Reference 7).

SR 4.7.2.c verifies adequacy of the charcoal filtration system following every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of operation. The time of operation is based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.52,. Revision 1 (Reference 8), and early nuclear plant filter testing (Reference 10).

SR 4.7.2.d demonstrates functional capability of the system by varifying

1) pressure drop across the HEPA and charcoal filtration units, 2) autaatic emergency system initiation upon receipt of a smoke detector or high raaittinn-test signal, 3) the override function of the chlorine protection. function, and

4) ability of the system to maintai: a positive pressure relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation. The maximum pressure drop of f 5.25 inches water gauge is based on a CREVS pressure drop analysis (Reference 9) and fan capability. This maximum pressure drop ensures-the system is capable of delivering rated fiow with 1 inch water gauge margin for filter loading.

The positive pressure test is performed to ensure that the control room is maintained positive to any potentially contaminated external atmosphere, including the outside atmosphere and adjacent building atmosphere (s).

Testing of the chlorine override function ensures operability of the chlorine protection mode of the CREVS by demonstrating the capability-of the system to prevent the emergency filtration units from initiating during a chlorine event.

SR 4.7.2.e and SR 4.7.2.f verify that the filtration capability of the HEPA and charcoal adsorber banks is consistent with that assumed in the Control Room Habitability Analyses (References 4 and 6) following partial or complete replacement of either filtration component. The testing is performed in accordance with the applicable sections of ANSI N510-1975 (Reference 14).

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-lh Amendment No.

l

r PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

References 1.

10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19, Control Room.

2.

Regulatory Guide-l.95, Revision 1, Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chemical Release.

I 3.

Updated FSAR, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2.

4.

NUS-3697, Revision 2, February 1983, Control Room Habitability Analysis.

5.

NLU-83-673, TMI Action Item III.D.3.4 - Control Room Habitability, NRC Safety Evaluation dated October 18, 1983.

6.

NUS-4758, Control Room Radiological Reanalysis, August,1985.

L 7.

Generic Letter 83-13, Clarification of Surveillance Requirements for HEPA Filters and Charcoal Adsorber Units in Standard Technical Specifications of ESF Cleanup Systems, March 2, 1983.

8.

Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976, 9.

CP&L Calculation G0077A-01, control Room Emergency Filter System Differential Pressure Analysis.

10.

Original FSAR, BSEP, Units 1 and 2, Appendix K.

11.

IEEE 279-1971, IEEE Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

12.

DBD-37, Design Basis Document for Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System.

13.

NRC-89-103, NRC Safety Evaluation for' Control Room Habitability, February 16, 1989.

14.

ANSI N510-1975, Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems.

i 15.

ANSI N509-1976, Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units.

16.

NUREG-1433, Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/4, Revision 0, September 28, 1992.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-11 Amendment No.

l

PLANT SYSTEMS-BASES 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION The limitation on flood protection ensures.that facility protective actions will be taken and operation wi?1 be terminated in the event of flood conditions.

The limit of elevation 17'6" Mean Sea Level is based on the maximum elevation at which facility flood control measures provide protection to safety-related equipment.

3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling system (RCICS) is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling equipment.

RCICS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 113 psig even though the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system provides adequate core cooling up to 150 psig. The condensate storage tank provides sufficient. water to reduce the reactor coolant temperature and pressure to permit the RHR system to be operated.

l i

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4'7-lj Amendment No.

l

f

- ENCLOSURE 6 BSEP 93-0112-BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324' OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 & DPR-62 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TYPED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES - UNIT 2 9

L t

t E6-1 4

I p

w 6

~.

INDEX BASES

+

SECTION PAGE 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (Continued) 3/4.4.4 C H EM I ST RY................................................ B 3/4 4 - 2 3/4.4.5 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY........................................ B 3/4.4-2 3/4.4.6 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS.............................. B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES......................... B 3/4 4-7 3/4.4.8 STRUCTURAL I NT EGRITY..................................... B 3/4 4,

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM................... B_3/4 5-1 4

3/4.5.2 AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM....................... B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.3 LOW PRESSURE COOLING SYSTEMS............................. B 3/4 5-2 3/4.5.4 SUPPRESSION P00L......................................... B 3/4 5-4 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 1

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT...................................... B'3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS....................

G 3/4 6-3 f

3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES..................... B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF............................................ B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT.................................... B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTR0L........................... B 3/4 6-6 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS.................................... B 3/4 7-1 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM.................B 3/4 7-Ic ll i

BRUNSWICK'- UNIT 2 XI Amendment No.

INDEX BASES-SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.7.3 F LOOD PROT ECTION......................................... B 3/4 7 - lj -

3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM....................B 3/4 7-lj 3

3/4.7.5 SNUBBERS..............

..................................B 3/4 7-2 3/4.7.6 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.............................. B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS.................................B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.8 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS................................B 3/4 7-5 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS..................................

3/3/4 8-1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH...................................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 I NST RUM ENTAT ION.......................................... B 3/4 1 3/4.9.3 CONT ROL R0D P0S ITI ON..................................... B 3/4 9 - 1 3/4.9.4 D E CAY T I M E............................................... B 3/4 9 - 1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS...........................................B 3/4 9 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND HOIST OPERABILITY............................. B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORAGE P00L.....................B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL, and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR FUEL STORAGE P00L....................B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.10 CONTROL R0D REM 0 VAL......................................B 3/4 9-2 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY............................B 3/4 10 :

3/4.10.2 R0D SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM (DELETED)................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS.......................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS..................................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER..................................... B 3/4 10-1 BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 XII Amendment No.

]

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS-

. 3/4.7.I SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

3.7.1.2 The Service Water System shall be OPERABLE with at least:

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3:

Three OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, and two 0PERABLE conventional service water pumps capable of supplying the nuclear and conventional headers.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 AND 5:

Three OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, and two OPERABLE Unit 2 service water pumps, nuclear and/or conventional, powered from separate emergency buses and capable of supplying the nuclear header.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS I, 2, 3, 4, and 5 ACTION:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3:

1.

With one OPERABLE conventional service water pump:

a.

Ensure that, if only one Unit 2 nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE. conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE Unit 2 nuclear service water pump, and b.

Restore at least one additional conventional service water i

pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD-SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2.

With no conventional service water pumps OPERABLE:

a.

Ensure both Unit 2 nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE, and b.

Restore at least one conventional service water pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of ACTION b.4 apply for Unit 1, restore one additional site nuclear service water pump within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

l 5

1

PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION:

(Continued) 4.

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps and one OPERABLE conventional service water pump:

a.

Ensure at least one Unit 2 nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, and b.

Ensure that, if only one Unit 2 nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE Unit 2 nuclear service water pump, and c.

Restore two conventional service water pumps or three site-nuclear service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

5.

'With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water-pumps, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the folluwing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5:

1.

With one OPERABLE Unit 2 service water pump, restore at least two Unit 2 service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Otherwise, suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

2.

With no OPERABLE Unit 2 service water pumps, suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

3.

With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of ACTION b.4 apply, restore at least one additional nuclear service water pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Otherwise, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.

4.

With the service water system nuclear header inoperable, operation of both units may continue provided that two Unit I nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE, both units' nuclear service water header valves are administratively controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generators, at least two Unit 2 conventional service water pumps are OPERABLE on the conventional header, and vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional i

service water system header. Restore the service water system nuclear header and at least three site nuclear service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

Otherwise, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.

5.

With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2a Amendment No.

l

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 The service water system shall be demonst' rated OPERABLE:

a.

. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on the appropriate ECCS actuation test signals.

c.

At least once per 92 days by verifying that the alternate diesel generator service water supply valve will open on a low header pressure signal.

P k

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2

3/4 7-2b Amendment No.

I

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4 10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.5 The service water conventional header required to be operating per Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.4 may be' removed from operation by l

stopping the pumps'to permit isolating and draining the service water nuclear header for maintenance provided that:

a.

The service water conventional header remains lined up to supply cooling water to the required ECCS loads.

b.

The draining / maintenance on the service water nuclear header will not affect the service water conventional system or lineup described in a. above.

c.

Average coolant temperature is s100*F and the heatup rate is $10"F per hour.

d.

Two dedicated, qualified members of the unit operational.

I staff are assigned to initiate the service water conventional header pumps should any of the following occur:

1.

Any event occurs which requires ECCS actuation.

2.

Primary coolant temperature exceeds 180*F.

3.

A loss of offsite power occurs.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 with the nuclear header inoperable.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, as soon as practicable, restore the:

a.

Service water conventional header to operating status per the requirements of Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.4, or j

b.

Service water nuclear header to OPERABLE status per i

Specification 3.7.1.2.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4'.10.5 When the service water conventional header is not operating as specified above:

a.

Prior to securing all service water pumps, verify that the service water conventional header is lined up to supply cooling water for ECCS by verifying that each valve servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked in the proper position is administratively controlled in the proper position.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 10-5 Amendment No.

i

J-3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES i

3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS The service water system is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from equipment such as the emergency diesel generators, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump coolers, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment, that is required for a safe reactor shutdown following a design basis accident (DBA) or transient.

The service water.

system also provides cooling to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System and the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System, as required, during normal and shutdown operation. The service water system provides lubricating water for the service water pumps and cooling water for the service water pump motors.

During the initial stage (0 - 10 minutes) of a LOCA or LOOP, the service water system must automatically provide cooling water to the emergency diesel generators.

Following the first 10 minute period, additional safety-related and shutdown cooling loads must be supplied.

The service water system also provides flow to the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System, the Chlorination System, and fill to the Circulating Water System.

The service water system design allows either (or both) unit',s nuclear header to supply diesel generator cooling water when required. The phrase " site nuclear service water pump" refers to any nuclear service water pump on either unit. Other pump designations refer to the specific unit under discussion.

The four nuclear service water pumps on site, two per unit, are each on a separate emergency bus so that a single failure could prevent only one nuclear service water pump from operating.

The OPERABILITY requirements are structured to ensure that the service water system is capable of automatically supplying sufficient cooling water for the Diesel Generators assuming no operator action for the first 10 minutes following a DBA, and that at least one service water pump per unit is available to supply the safety-related and shutdown cooling loads after the first ten minutes following a LBA. The OPERABILITY requirements for the service water system are, in general, based on a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident), and in some cases combined with a LOOP (Loss of Offsite Power),

since this event or combination would provide the most significant challenge to the system's capabilities.

The four nuclear service water pumps are powered from separate emergency buses. The three conventional service water pumps on each unit are on separate emergency buses.

For each unit, two of the conventional pumps are on the same emergency buses as the two unit nuclear service water pumps. The loss of one nuclear pump and one conventional pump on the unit due to a single failure of one emergency bus has been accounted for in the OPERABILITY requirements. However, conventional service water pump OPERABILITY will be more strictly defined in cases where only one nuclear pump and one conventional pump are available for operation. Therefore, with one unit nuclear service water pump and one conventional service water pump available, the conventional service water pump must be powered from a separate emergency bus to be considered OPERABLE.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3L4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)

In GPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, a conventional service water pump must be capable of supplying water to both the nuclear header and the conventional header to be considered OPERABLE. This will ensure that the vital header and RHR service water heat exchangers can be supplied from either header when a single failure of any header isolation valve is assumed and personnel access is not available for manual valve alignment.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS'4 and 5, because of reduced primary pressure, the possibility of a LOCA is not considered credible and access is considered available to manually position header isolation valves if required. Therefore, in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, a conventional pump may be considered OPERABLE when only the nuclear header discharge valve is OPERABLE except as specifically identified in the ACTION statement for a nuclear header outage. This allows maintenance on the conventional header without reducing service water system OPERABILITY.

However, a conventional pump aligned to the nuclear header is not considered to meet the requirements for an OPERABLE nuclear pump since it is not automatically powered and restarted on the diesel generators following an accident signal.

For OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and a DBA in either unit, two nuclear service water pumps from one or both units are capable of supplying sufficient flow to cool all four emergency diesel generators under worst-case scenarios while also supplying flow to other potential flow paths (vital header loads, cr oss-neader leakage, and lubewater). To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water to the diesel generators during the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least three nuclear service water pumps per site are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.

After the first 10 minutes following a DBA, additional loads require cooling water on the affected unit.

These loads inc h de RHR and CS pump room coolers, RHR service water heat exchangers, and RHR pump seal heat exchangers.

Evaluations have determined that the RHR pump seals,'as well as the equipment in rooms serviced by the RHR and CS room coolers, remain within the manufacturers' temperature limits for at least the first 10 minutes of a DBA.

Operator action is credited after the first 10 minutes following a DBA to make the necessary pump and valve alignments either remotely or manually, except that manual action inside the Reactor Building following a LOCA while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 is not credited because of the potential for unsafe conditions.

t In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, one conventional service water pump supporting the affected unit is capable of supplying the additional required safety-related and shutdown equipment.

No single failure can prevent the necessary loads from being aligned to one of the nuclear or conventional headers by manual or remote operator action.

To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two operable conventional service water pumps are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.

P BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-la Amendment No.

1

PLANT SYSTEMS

-BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, one unit service water pump, nuclear or conventional, is capable of supplying additional required safety-related and shutdown equipment. Manual action in the Reactor Building is credited to align equipment to the nuclear header if required. To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two operable unit service water pumps, nuclear or conventional, are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5.

The allowed out-of-service times and compensatory measures established in the ACTION statements are conservative. Although the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the ACTION statements for the nuclear service water pumps for a unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are based on the assumption that the other unit is in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.

Specific ACTION statements and LC0 time limits have not been established for both units in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 since the ACTION statements for one unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are more conservative.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because of reduced core decay heat load, the reduced possibility of a LOCA, and the accessibility to the reactor building for manual operator action, the vital header loads could be manually aligned to the nuclear header if a failure prevented remote valve alignment.

Therefore, the operability requirements for the unit service water pumps apply for nuclear or conventional pumps. With one OPERABLE unit service water pump, the core spray and-LPCI systems remain OPERABLE. However, to minimize the possibility of loss of these systems due to loss of the single pump, the out-of-service time for one OPERABLE unit service water pump is set at 7 days.

For no OPERABLE unit service water pumps, the core spray and LPCI systems must be declared inoperable. This is equivalent to the ACTION statement for core spray and LPCI systems inoperable.

ACTION statement 3.7.1.2.b.4 for OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 allows one unit to operate with the nuclear service water header inoperable for up to 14 days provided that:

a) two nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE on the other unit, b) both unit's nuclear service water header valves are administratively controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generators.

c) the service water system conventional header is OPERABLE with two -

unit conventional service water pumps OPERABLE, and d) vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional service water system header.

Considering any additional single failure, this requirement ensures at least one OPERABLE nuclear ser/ ice water pump to supply the Diesel Generators during the first 10 minutes after a DBA and one OPERABLE conventional service water pump to supply the unit safety-related and shutdown cooling loads following the first 10 minutes after a DBA.

By requiring administrative control of both unit's nuclear header valves, the ACTION statement minimizes the risk of inadvertent valve action that could reduce cooling water flow to the diesel generators.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-lb Amendment No.

PLANT SYSTEMS 1

BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM Backaround One of the principal design objectives of the Control Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (CBHVAC) System is to permit continuous l

occupancy of the Control Room Emergency Zone under normal operating conditions l-and under the postulated design basis events throughout the life of the. plant.

The Control Building HVAC System must function to provide protection to the operators for three type events:

a radiation event, up to and including a Design Basis Accident (e.g., Main Steam Line Break [MSLB] Accident, Refueling Accident, Control Rod Drop Accident, or Loss of Coolant Accident [LOCA]), a l

toxic gas event (complete rupture of the 55 ton chlorine tank car located near the Service Water Building, or a slow leak lasting for an extended period of time), and an external smoke event. These events form the basis for the design of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREVS) function of the l

CBHVAC System.

The CREVS is designed to meet General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 (Reference 1).

In addition, the system is designed using the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1 (Reference 2).

Commitments have also been made-to design the radiation protection function of the CBHVAC System to meet the single failure criteria described in IEEE 279-1971, and the chlorine detection and isolation logic to single failure criteria, both with approved exceptions (Reference 12, Section 3.6).

LC0 Operability of the CREVS ensures that the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible hazard event scenarios external to the control room, consistent with the assumptions in the various analyses.

Two redundant subsystems of the CREVS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least.one is available, assuming a single-failure disables the other subsystem. The CREVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are operable in both subsystems.

For the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode, a subsystem is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

1.

Fan is OPERABLE, 2.

HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions, and BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-Ic Amendment No.

l

PLANT SYSTEMS

. BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

LC0 (Continued) 3.

Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained as required in Reference 12,_Section 3.1.

For the Chlorine Protection Mode, a subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:

1.

The isolation dampers are OPERABLE, and 2.

_The logic components necessary to achieve automatic isolation are functional, as described in Reference 12, Section 3.1.

Two additional OPERABILITY requirements apply to all modes of CREVS operation.

The CBHVAC Control Air System must be OPERABLE to support damper operation.-

In addition, the Control Room Envelope must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors. The' Control Room Envelope includes the electronic equipment rooms, the central control room area, computer rooms, kitchen, restrooms, and the supply and return ductwork up to and including the isolation dampers.

The following components, including their associated logic trains, actuation devices, and power supplies, are non-redundant.

Their OPERABILITY.affects-both trains of the CREVS. These components are:

control - room._ (washroom) exhaust isolation damper, control room normal make-up-damper, and the control room emergency recirculation damper.

In addition ~, the Brunswick control room is not equipped with redundant outdoor air intakes (References 4 and 5).

The Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode of operation protects the control. room operators from those events which may result in-the release of radioactivity.

The Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode of operation also provides protection to the control room operators in the event of an external smoke event.

During a radiation event, the CBHVAC System is required to automatically isolate and enter the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode on a Control Room Intake High Radiation signal from the Area Radiation Monitoring System. Upon receipt of a high radiation signal, the CBHVAC System is automatically realigned to the emergency mode 'of operation. The normal fresh air inlet closes,.and, at approximately the same time, the emergency air filtration units begin operation, recirculating control room air and providing' filtered makeup air to minimize contamination build-up and provide positive pressure in the' Control Room Envelope. The CBHVAC System responds to an external-smoke event in the same manner as it does for a radiation event.

In the event of a chlorine release, the CBHVAC System enters a full recirculation mode (Chlorine Protection Mode), with no outdoor air intake.

The emergency filtration trains do not start, since they do not effectively.

remove chlorine and may be damaged by the presence of chlorine.

Protection for chlorine gas events " overrides" any concurrent, ongoing, or subsequent radiation or smoke initiation signals. The override % sign offers protection BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-Id Amendment No.

l

PLANT SYSTEMS

. BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION. SYSTEM (Continued)

LC0 (Continued) to operations personnel in the Control Room by providing protection against potentially fatal chlorine gas releases. This protection is required any time 1

the chlorine tank car is within the exclusion area.

Applicability The OPERATIONAL CONDITION applicabilities ensure that the system is capable of performing these functions when the potential for radiation releases and external smoke hazards exist.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, the system must be OPERABLE to reduce control operator exposure during and following a design basis accident, since the_ accident could lead to a fission product release.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a design basis accident are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS. Maintaining the CREVS OPERABLE is not required in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, except for the following situations under which significant radiological releases can be postulated:

1.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, 2.

During CORE ALTERATIONS, and 3.

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

Requiring OPERABILITY of the Radiation Protection Mode of the CREVS during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 ensures that the system is available during the above evolutions, with the exception the movement of irradiated fuel in secondary containment; therefore, a specific applicability OPERATIONAL CONDITION has been added for this activity.

OPERABILITY of the Chlorine Protection Mode of the CREVS is required any time the chlorine tank car is within the exclusion area. Analyses demonstrate that movement of the tank car outside the exclusion area sufficiently reduces the threat of control room operator incapacitation from a release of this chemical.

i Action a.

With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this 1

condition, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection. The loss of a single emergency filtration unit means that the CREVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability. The 7 day out of BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-le Amendment No.

l

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

Action a. (Continued) service time is based on the low probability of a design basis accident and a-single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.

During OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2, the plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that. minimizes risk if the inoperable subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required 7 days. To achieve this-status, the plant must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTD0UN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . These allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS from full power operation in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.

The loss of both emergency filtration subsystems means-that the radiation protection function is lost. The plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

These allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS from full power operation in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.

Action b.

With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem -

must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection.

The loss of a single emergency filtration unit'means that the CREVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE-subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability..The 7 day out of service time is based on the' low probability of a design basis accident and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period,'

and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.

During 0PERAlIONAL CONDITION 3, the plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk if the inoperable subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required 7 days. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the -following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The allowed completion time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow

-1 the plant to reach this OPERATIONAL CONDITION from HOT SHUTDOWN in an orderly i

manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.

The loss of both emergency filtration subsystems means that the radiation

)

protection function is lost.

The plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the plant must be j

1 BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-lf-Amendment No.

[

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES

_.m_

3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATI^N 'iyf.di (Continued)

Action b. (Continued) placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The allowed completion time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach this OPERATIONAL CONDITION from HOT SHUTDOWN in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.

L Action c.

With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the incperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

With the unit in any of these conditions, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection. The loss of a single emergency filtration unit means that the CBEVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability.

The 7 day out of service time is based on the low probability of a design basis accident and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.

During OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5, and while irradiated fuel is being moved in secondary containment, if the inoperable emergency filtration subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, the remaining OPERABLE subsystem may be placed in the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mcde. This action-ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, and that no failures which could prevent automatic actuation will occur. This action also ensures that any active failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to placing the remaining subsystem in service is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require operation of the CREVS. This alternative places.the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

i Action d.

With the Chlorine Protection Mode inoperable, the chlorine tank car must be removed from the exclusion area within the next eight (8) hours to ensure adequate protection for the operators.

Chlorine gas protection is not required with the tank car outside of the exclusion area.

Eight hours is considered adequate time to perform the necessary system alignments and to allow plant personnel to remove the chlorine tank car from the site in an orderly manner.

With the plant physically unable to remove the chlorine tank car from the site, as required by this statement, ACTION d. requires the plant to take actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes risk of core damage or other types of radiological release events.

l BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-Ig Amendment No.

l

t PLRNT SYSTEMS:

BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

Surveillance Reauirements The SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) in this specification verify that a subsystem in the standby mode starts en demand and continues to operate.

Standby systems are checked periodically to ensure that the automatic start function is consistent with the assumptions in the Control Room Habitability Analyses (References 4 and 6).

Since the environmental conditions on this-system are not severe, monthly demonstration of the capability of the system to operate by SR 4.7.2.a is considered adequate. The 2 15 minute run time is considered adequate for operation of systems without heaters (Reference 16).

SR 4.7.2.b verifies the capability of the filtration system at least once every 18 months, or 1) following any structural maintenance on the filtration unit HEPA filter or charcoal adsorbers or 2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communication with the system.

Testing is performed in accordance with applicable sections of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, and ANSI N510-1975.

Acceptance criteria provides assurance that the efficiency used in the Control Room dose analyses.'is-conservative. This is consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 83-13 (Reference 7).

SR 4.7.2.c verifies adequacy of the charcoal filtration system following every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of operation. The time of operation is based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1 (Reference 8), and early nuclear plant filter testing (Reference 10).

SR 4.7.2.d demonstrates functional capability of the system by verifying

1) pressure drop across the HEPA and charcoal filtration units, 2) automatic a

emergency system initiation upon receipt of a smoke detector or high' radiation

~

test signal, 3) the override function of the chlorine protection function, and

4) ability of the system to maintain a positive pressure relative to the-outside atmosphere during system operation. The maximum pressure drop of

< 5.25 inches water gauge is based on a CREVS pressure drop analysis-(Reference 9) and fan capability. This maximum pressure drop ensures the system is capable of delivering rated flow with 1 inch water gauge margin for filter loading. The positive pressure test is performed to ensure that the control room is maintained positive to any potentially contaminated external atmosphere, including the outside atmosphere and adjacent building atmosphere (s).

Testing of the chlorine override function ensures operability of the chlorine protection mode of the CREVS by demonstrating the capability of the system to prevent the emergency filtration units from initiating during a chlorine event.

SR 4.7.2.e and SR 4.7.2.f verify that the filtration capability of the HEPA and charcoal adsorber banks is consistent with that assumed in the Control Room Habitability Analyses (References 4 and 6) following partial or complete replacement of either filtration component.

The testing is performed in accordance with the applicable sections of ANSI N510-1975 (Reference 14)~.

L BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-lh Amendment No.

. l'

t PLANT-SYSTEMS

'i

' BASES.

3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

References i

1.

10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19,' Control Room.

2.

Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1, Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chemical Release.

3.

Updated FSAR, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2.

4.

NUS-3697, Revision 2, February 1983, Control Room Habitability Analysis.

5.

NLU-83-673, TMI Action Item III.D.3.4 - Control Room Habitability, NRC Safety Evaluation dated October 18, 1983.

6.

NUS-4758, Control Room Radiological Reanalysis, August,1985.

7.

Generic Letter 83-13, Clarification of Surveillance Requirements for HEPA Filters and Charcoal Adsorber Units in Standard Technical Specifications of ESF Cleanup Systems, March 2, 1983.

8.

Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976, 9.

CP&L Calculation G0077A-01, Control Room Emergency Filter System Differential Pressure Analysis.

10.

Original FSAR, BSEP, Units 1 and 2, Appendix K.

11.

IEEE 279-1971, IEEE Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

12.

DBD-37, Design Basis Document for Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System.

13.

NRC-89-103, NRC Safety Evaluation for Control-Room Habitability, February 16, 1989.

14.

ANSI N510-1975, Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems.

j 15.

ANSI N509-1976, Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units.

16.

NUREG-1433, Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/4, Revision 0, September 28, 1992.

1 0

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B

, 7-li Amendment No.

l r

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION The limitation on flood protection ensures that facility protective actions will be taken and operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions. The limit of elevation 17'6" Mean Sea Level is based on the maximum elevation at which facility flood control measures provide protection to safety-related equipment.

3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling system (RCICS) is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater. flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling equipment.

RCICS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 113' psig even though the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system provides adequate core cooling up to 150 psig.

The condensate storage tank provides sufficient water to reduce the reactor coolant temperature and pressure to permit the_RHR system to be operated.

t i

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-lj Amendment No.

l-

ATTACHMENT 1 BSEP 93-0112 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324 OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 & DPR-62 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS REPORT (CONTAINS G0050A-16, REV.1, AND G0050A-18, REV. 0) j

v t e Letter Sequence Request
TAC:M85466, (Open)
Initiation Request Acceptance... Administration Questions 3 August 1993 Answers Results Approval... Other: BSEP-93-0126, Forwards Response to NRC 930803 RAI Re SWS License Amend Request Submitted on 921231 & Suppl by, ML20056F858
MONTHYEAR1993-08-27 [Table View]

BSEP-93-0112, Proposed Tech Specs Associated W/Sws

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