3F0694-15, Provides Info Requested in Suppl 6 to GL 89-10,re Program Status,Schedular Extension & Response to NRC

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Provides Info Requested in Suppl 6 to GL 89-10,re Program Status,Schedular Extension & Response to NRC
ML20070A043
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/22/1994
From: Boldt G
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
3F0694-15, 3F694-15, GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9406280150
Download: ML20070A043 (11)


Text

i Florida ERygr i=a June 22, 1994 3F0694-15 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 Program Status, Schedular Extension and Response to NRC letter dated April 14, 1994

References:

1. NRC to FPC letter, 3N0494-12, dated April 14, 1994
2. FPC to NRC letter, 3F0394-03, dated March 8, 1994

Dear Sir:

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) has completed its 3rd refueling outage since GL 89-10 was issued. Startup from this outage occurred on June 3rd. As stated in section "i" of GL 89-10, certain motor operated valve (M0V) activities should be completed within 3 refueling outages .o_I 5 years (whichever is later) from the issue date of the subject GL. Since GL 89-10 has an issue date of June 28, 1989, then the five year schedule date to complete GL 89-10 commitments is June 28, 1994.

By letter dated March 8, 1994 (Reference 2), FPC provided a status of GL 89-10 MOV activities which included a list of valves that can not be dynamically tested. Consistent with FPC's M0V Program and recommendations of GL 89-10, valves that can not be dynamically tested have been or will be setup using the best information then available by June 28, 1994. FPC, therefore, considers the schedular requirements of GL 89-10 to be satisfied without the need for schedule extension. However, we further recognize that the results of ongoing EPRI testing programs may lead FPC to reevaluate and/or modify our M0V program in the future. Via Supplement 6 to GL 89-10, NRC has reque.sted additional information for those valves within the scope of GL 89-10 that are not being dynamically  !

tested, even though current commitments and associated schedule will not be changed. Therefore, FPC is submitting this letter to provide the information l requested in Supplement 6 to GL 89-10 for those valves that can not be i j

dynamically tested. l l

y, CRYSTAL RIVER ENERGY COMPLEX: 16760 W Power une St e Crystal Rwer, Floride 34428-6708 e (9041 796-6486 k j 9406280150 940622 PDR ADOCK 05000302 I P PDR

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. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0694-15  ;

Page 2 of 11  ;

Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 Program Status ,

As stated in the March 8, 1994 letter (Reference 2), FPC has dynamically tested all MOVs that can be tested under differential pressure (AP) conditions. There are a certain number of MOVs that can not be AP tested or could only be tested at a reduced AP, as identified in the MOV Program Manual, and will be further evaluated when EPRI completes the performance prediction program or other '

industry information becomes available. Attachment 1 provides a listing of those valves. Each of the valves listed in Attachment I have been setup and tested i with diagnostic equipment using the best information available. Typically, very  :

conservative assumptions were used in determining AP, Rate of Loading (ROL). and  :

velve factor, which results in reasonable operating margins, thus assuring -

functionality.

Schedular Extension FPC has satisfied the commitments (schedule and scope) made to the NRC regarding i GL 89-10 M0V activities and does not consider a schedular extension necessary.

However, Supplement 6 to GL 89-10 requires additional information concerning MOVs that will not be dynamically tested, regardless of previously established ,

commitments. Therefore, FPC is providing the information, also in Attachment 1, i consistent with that request. The schedule for completing any further testing  !

for the valves listed in Attachment 1 is dependent on the outcome of the EPRI  :

program which leaves us unable to determine a meaningful schedule until the EPRI l program results are evaluated.

Response to NRC letter dated April 14, 1994 j The intent of FPC's communication regarding pressure locking and thermal binding  ;

(PL&TB) (Reference 2), was to inform the NRC that activities and discussions  ;

associated with PL&TB will be managed outside of the GL 89-10 arena. FPC has applied considerable resources to address the PL&TB issue. All safety ,

significant valves affected by PL&TB have been appropriately modified. l t

closure .

With the exception of those valves listed in Attachment 1, all GL 89-10 MOVs have been dynamically tested. FPC cc.'inues to participate in industry MOV related  ;

activities and will revise our M0 Program appropriately as new information is <

made available. Therefore, FPC considers the initial phase of GL 89-10 closed ,

based on dynamic testing completion and information provided in Attachment 1.

Sincerely, f ,

G. L. B'oldt Vice President l Nuclear Production l l

GLB/PVF:ff j Attachment xc: Regional Administrator NRR Project Manager Senior Resident Inspector ;

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. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  ;

3F0694-15 i

.Page 3 of 11  !

Attachment 1  :

NOTE: The highest ranked component is the "A" train diesel generator with a  !

Fussel-Vesely value of 0.17081 and a Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) of  !

3894.67, which is provided here for comparison purposes. Most of the valves in this attachment were not PSA ranked because they did not

  • contribute to the set of final core. damage sequences in the CR-3 PSA.

Therefore, relative values are provided in brackets for the valves in this -

table using a scale of 1 (highest) to 11 (lowest). >

Valve Tag # DHV-42 Description RB Sump to "A" Train LPI Safety Function Open Type & Size SMB-0, ALOYC0 14" Gate AP 51.7 psi Valve Factor 0.5, 30% ROL Relative Risk Fussel-Vesely ranking is 0.0817 with a RAW score of Significance 104.88. This valve is important for establishing sump recirculation. There is a redundant train and therefore does not rank high. [1]

Valve Tag # DHV-43 Description RB Sump to "B" Train LPI Safety Function Open Type & Size SMB-0, ALOYC0 14" Gate AP 51.7 psi Valve Factor 0.5, 30% R0L Relative Risk Fussel-Vesely ranking is 0.09349 with a RAW score of Significance 106.03. This valve is important for establishing sump recirculation. There is a redundant train and therefore does not rank high. [2]

Valve Tag # DHV-3 Description DH Drop Line Isolation (Inside RB)

Safety Function Close (Normally Closed)

. . .= - . _ .- - . . . . - - -.. . ..

. 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission )

3F0694-15  ;

Page 4 of 11 i Attachment 1 Type & Size SMB-2, WALWORTH 12" Gate  !

AP 577 psi i

Valve Factor 0.5, 30% R0L  !

Relative Risk Fussel-Vesely ranking of 0.00262 with a RAW score of l

~

Significance 1.64. This valve only becomes important when establishing decay heat removal to recover from a steam generator tube rupture. [3]

Valve Tag # DHV-4 .

Description DH Drop Line Isolation (Inside RB)

Safety function Close (Normally Closed)

Type & Size SMB-2, WALWORTH 12" Gate ,

AP 577 psi Valve Factor 0.5, 30% R0L ,

Relative Risk Fussel-Vesely ranking of 0.00262 with a RAW score of  ;

Significance 1.64. This valve only becomes important when establishing decay heat removal to recover from a steam l generator tube rupture. [3] j l

Valve Tag # DHV-41 1

Description DH Drop Line Isolation (Outside RB) l Safety function Close (Normally Closed)  !

Type & Size SMB-0, ALOYC0 12" Gate AP Open 252 psi, Close 127 psi Valve Factor 0.5, 30% R0L Close, 15% ROL Open Relative Risk Fussel-Vesely ranking of 0.00262 with a RAW score of Significance 1.64. This valve only becomes important when establishing decay heat removal to recover from a steam generator tube rupture. [3]

i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  !

3F0694-15  ;

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Attachment 1  :

Valve Tag # RCV-11  :

Description PORV Block  !

Safety Function None  ;

i Type & Size SMB-00, VELAN 2 1/2" Gate AP 2380 psi i Valve Factor 0.5%, 15% R0L Relative Risk Fussel-Vesely ranking is 0.00081 with a RAW score of  :

Significance 1.12. [4] ,

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Valve Tag # DHV-5  ;

Description "A" Train LPI Injection ))

Safety Function Open  ;

Type & Size SB-3, WALWORTH 10" Gate l

AP' 1756 psi Valve Factor 0.5, 15% R0L This component is of relatively low importance, not only Reittive Risk Significance compared to the other valves in this attachment but also  :

to components evaluated in the IPE. [5] .

i Valve Tag # DHV-6  !

Description "B" Train LPI Injection i Safety function Open  ;

Type & Size SB-3, WALWORTH 10" Gate ,

i AP' 1756 psi 1

Valve Factor 0.5, 15% ROL i

Relative Risk This component is of relatively low importance, not only l Significance compared to the other valves in this attachment but also  !

to components evaluated in the IPE. [5] )

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. l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i 3F0694-15  !

Page 6 of 11 Attachment 1 Valve Tag # MSV-55 Description Steam Isolation from "A" 0TSG to the Turbine Driven Emergency feedwater Pump Safety Function Open (Normally Open)

Type & Size SMB-0, CR*.NE 3" Angle Stopcheck AP' 1100 psi Valve Factor 1.1, 30% R0L Relative Risk Redundant to MSV-56 and therefore does not rank high.

Significance [6]

Valve Tag # MSV-56 Description Steam Isolation from "B" OTSG to the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump ,

Safety function Open (Normally Open) ,

Type & Size SMB-0, CRANE 3" Angle Stopcheck AP' 1100 psi Valve Factor 1.1, 30% ROL Relative Risk Redundant to MSV-55 and therefore does not rank high.

Significance [6]

Valve Tag # MUV-40 Description Letdown Cooler 3A Outlet Isolation Safety Function Close Type & Size SMB-000, WALWORTH 2 1/2" Gate b

AP 1610 psi Valve Factor 0.5, 15% R0L Relative Risk [7]

Significance

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U. S. Nucla w Regulatory Commission i 3F0694-15  :

.Page 7 of 11 l Attachment 1 Valve Tag # MUV-41 l

Description Letdown Cooler 3B Outlet Isolation Safety Function Close ,

Type & Size SMB-000, WALWORTH 2 1/2" Gate ]

i b

AP 1610 psi j I

Valve Factor 0.5, 15% R0L Relative Risk [7] l Significance  ;

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Valve Tag # MUV-505 1 Description Letdown Cooler 3C Outlet Isolation Safety Function Close Type & Site SMB-00, Westinghouse 3" Gate b

AP 1610 psi Valve Factor 0.5, 15% R0L i

Relative Risk [7]

Significance Valve Tag # MUV-258 Description RCP-1A Controlled Bleed-0ff Isolation Safety Function Close Type & Size SMB-000, Rockwell 1" Globe AP" 2208 psi i

Valve Factor 1.1, 15% R0L Relative Risk Not modelled in the CR-3 PSA. [8] l Significance I l

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0694-15 Page 8 of 11 Attachment 1 Valve Tag # MUV-259 Description RCP-1B Controlled Bleed-0ff Isolation Safety Function Close Type & Size SMB-000, Rockwell 1" Globe AP* 2208 psi Valve Factor 1.1, 15% ROL Relative Risk Not modelled in the CR-3 PSA. [8]

Significance Valve Tag # MUV-260 Description RCP-lC Controlled Bleed- Off Isolation Safety function Close Type & Size SMB-000, Rockwell 1" Globe AP* 2208 psi Valve Factor 1.1, 15% ROL Relative Risk Not modelled in the CR-3 PSA. [8]

Significance valve Tag # MUV-261 Description RCP-ID Controlled Bleed- Off Isolation Safety Function Close Type & Size SMB-000, Rockwell 1" Globe AP* 2208 psi Valve Factor 1.1, 15% ROL Relative Risk Not modelled in the CR-3 PSA. [8]

Significance

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j U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  ;

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.Page 9 of 11 l Attachment 1 j Valve Tag # BSV-3 Description "A" Train RB Soray Isolation / Control Safety Function Open Type & Size SMB-000, ALOYC0 8" Globe AP 237 psi Valve Factor 1.1, 15% R0L Relative Risk This component is of relatively low importance, not only Significance compared to the other valves in this attachment but also i to components evaluated in the IPE (level 2 only). [9]

Valve Tag # BSV-4 Description "B" Train RB Spray Isolation / Control Safety Function Open Type & Size SMB-000, ALOYC0 8" Globe AP 237 psi Valve Factor 1.1, 15% Rol Relative Risk This component is of relatively low importance, not only .

compared to the other valves in this attachment but also Significance to components evaluated in the IPE (level 2 only). [9]

l Valve Tag # WDV-3 Description RB Sump Isolation Safety Function Close Type & Size SMB-000, Crane 4" Gate AP 55 psi Valve Factor 0.5, 30% ROL Relative Risk Level 2 release path. [10]

Significance

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-Page 10 of 11 Attachment 1 i Valve Tag # WDV-60 Description RC Drain Tank Vent Isolation Safety function Close .

Type & Size SMB-000, Anchor Darling 2" Globe  ;

AP 110 psi Valve Factor 1.1, 30% R0L Relative Risk Not modeled. [11]

Significance Valve Tag # WDV-94 Description RC Drain Tank /RC Drain Pump Isolation Safety Function Close Type & Size SMB-000, VELAN B10-03074B 3" Globe AP' 172 psi l l

Valve Factor 1.1, 30% R0L Relative Risk Not modeled. [11]

Significance Valve-Tag # WDV-405-Description RB Vent Header Isolation Safety Function Close Type & Size SMB-000, Rockwell 3624F316MT 1 1/2" Globe AP 700 psi I

Valve Factor 1.1, 30% R0L Relative Risk Not modeled. [11]

Significance

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3f0694-15

-Page 11 of 11 Attachment 1 Valve Tag # WDV-406 Description RB Vent Header Isolation Safety Function Close Type & Size SMB-000, VELAN W7-374 1 1/2" Globe AP 700 psi Valve Factor 1.1, 30% R0L Relative Risk Not modeled. [11]

Significance A/ Reduced AP test was performed.

b/ This AP excludes the expected conditions for a main feedwater line break and certain small break loss of coolant accident scenarios, pf This AP excludes the expected conditions for a main feedwater line break.