05000443/LER-1990-016
| ML20055H160 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1990 |
| From: | Belanger R, Feigenbaum T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LER-90-016, LER-90-16, NYN-90143, NUDOCS 9007250263 | |
| Download: ML20055H160 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 4432090016R00 - NRC Website | |
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1
. New Hampshire Ted C. Feigenbowm Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer NYN. 90143 July 24,1990 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk
References:
(a) Facility Operating License No. NPF 86, Docket No. $0-443
Subject:
Licensee Event Report (LER), No. 90-016-00: Enginected Safety Features Actuation -
Containment Ventilation Isolation Gentlemen:
Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-016-00 for Seabrook Station. This subndttal documents an event which occurred on June 24, 1990, and is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
Should you require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Richard R.
Bclanger at (603) 474-9521, extension 4048.
Very truly yours, (jcs/ht AtohW Ted C. Feigen aum
Enclosures:
NRC Forms 366, 366A TCF:CLB/ss!
9007250263 900724
{DR ADOCK 05000443 PDC N New Hompshire Yankee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire P.O. Box 300
- Seabrook, NH 03874
- Telephone (603) 474-9521 Ifl
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United States Nucickr Regulatory Camminaion - New Hampshire Yankee -
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i Attention: Document Control Desk ~ Page two l
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Regional Administrator j United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission '
Region I )
475 Allendale Road -)
King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. ' Noel Dudley l-NRC Senior Resident Inspector 3 P.O. Box 1149 :
Seabrook, NH 03874 INPO ,
Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway i' Atlanta, GA 30339 e
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On June 24, 1990 the normal power supply to vital 120 VAC power panel PP 1E experienced a capacitor failure and blown fuse. This failure initiated an automatic swap from the normal power supply to the maintenance power supply. An auxiliary, Operator (AO) was sent to investigate the problem and in the course of doing'so mistakenly tripped open the mamtenance power supply breaker.
De-energization of this breaker caused the train A containment on-line purge radiation anonitors to fail in the safe /high state. This initiated a train A Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI).
The root cause of this event is attributed to personnel error. Corrective actions include more descriptive labels on the inverters and power panels, and one line drawings including AC and DC feeds being placed on inverters.
At the time of this event the plant was in MODE 3, Hot Standby, with a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [AB]
temperature of 557 degrees Fahrenheit and a pressure of 2235 psig.
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On June The Contsnment Ventilation , System isolated on a high signal from the containment COP) on-line radiation purge 24 monitor due to de-energization of it's power supply.
Background
On June inverter IE experienced a capacitor failure and blown fuse. 24,1990 at 4:19 This inverter am, Uninterruptible is powered Power an either by a transformed Supply (UPS)d rectified 480 VAC power supply Control Center (MCC) E512, or a 125 VDC power supply from bus 11A. Inverter IE is the normal supply of vital 120 VAC to power panel PP 1E. Power panel PP 1E is one of six vital instrument buses used to power essential plant momtoring components. PP 1E also has a safety grade maintenance or alternate power supply of I transformed 480 VAC from MCC E531.
l Certain inverter 1E failures, such as a blown fuse, initiate an automatic swap of the power supply for PP 1E from the icverter to the main'ec mcc supply. When this occurred the morning of June 24, 1990, an Auxiliary Operator MC) was sent to investire the situation.
The AO arrived at the inverter and reported to the Control Room that the inverter was ' dead". The Control Room then, unaware of exactly what had happened, instructed the AO to check the AC input to the inverter.
When the AO questioned which MCC that would be, the Control Room instructed him to check MCC E521 or
$31.
MCC-E531 was labeled " VITAL INST BUS 1E". The AO believing that this was the inverter's AC input, checked the breaker by checking for movement in the latch, since it had no trip indicator. Some breakers, such as this one, are very sensitive and require very little movement to open. During this checking, the breaker openet and the AO immediately reclosed it.
As stated above, MCC-E531 is the maintenance supply. which was feeding PP-1E. Opening this breaker momentarily de-energized PP 1E. This resulted in the de-energization of the train A safety radiation monitors, including monitor caused the containment the failure of itson-line bistable purge in t (COP)he safeThis /high state.
initiated radiation a train monitor,Ventilation A Containment RM RM 6527A.
The CVI resulted in closure of COP su exhaust valves COP V1 and V4 respectively, isolation and (CVI). of the containment purge supply fan, Cgly the s utdown The train A Control Room Emergency Air Cicanup and Filtration Subsystem (CBA) (VI]' radiation monitors also de-energized during this event. However, power was lost for such a short duration, less than 0.5 seconds, that a CBA actuation did not occur.
Root Cause The primary root cause of this event is attributed to personnel error. The AO should have verified the correct power supply prior to checking the breaker. In addition, the AO should not have tripped the becaker in the process of checking the breaker. A contributing cause was inexplicit wording in the labeling of the breaker.
Safety Conseauences There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. All equipment functioned as designed, placing the plant in the configuration required by Seabrook Station Technical Specification 333.1. At no time during this event was there any impact on the health and safety of plant employees or the public.
Corrective Actions Both vital and non vital inverters and power panels will be labeled to more accurately identify them. The wording on these labels will be standard for all inverters and power panels. This activity is expected to be completed by October 1,1990.
In addition, one line drawings that include all AC and DC feeds will be posted on vital and non vital inverters as an operator aid. This activity is also expected to be completed by October 1,1990.
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A full Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) review will be performed. This activity is also expected
'to be completed by October 7,1990.
i At the time of this event the plant was in MODE 3, Hot Standby, with a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [AB]
temperature of 557 degrees Fahrenheit and a pressure of 2235 psig.
' l This is the first event of this type at Seabrook Station.
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