05000443/LER-2005-001
| Docket Numbersequential Revmonth Day Year Year Month Day Year N/Anumber No. 05000 | |
| Event date: | 01-15-2005 |
|---|---|
| Report date: | 03-15-2005 |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| Initial Reporting | |
| ENS 41340 | Other Unspec Reqmnt |
| 4432005001R00 - NRC Website | |
I. Description of Event
On January 15, 2005 at 0750, with the plant operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, it was determined that containment isolation valve CC-V-1095 [CC] [20] had been inoperable for a period of time longer than allowed by Technical Specifications. This resulted in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications and was reported in a 24-hour report (Event number 41340) to the NRC pursuant to Paragraph 2.G. of the Seabrook Station Operating License.
At 0910 on January 13, 2005, the power supply b'reaker for CC-V-1095 was removed from service for routine maintenance with CC-V-1095 in the open position. TS 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, was not entered for this maintenance activity. The TS allows a 4-hour allowed outage time.
Following completion of the maintenance activity approximately four hours later, the breaker for CC- V-1095 was closed. TS 4.6.3.1 requires a cycling test of this containment isolation valve prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance on the valve's power circuit. Station personnel failed to perform this retest requirement. As a result, the valve remained open and inoperable for approximately 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> following the maintenance. Since the TS only permit this configuration for a maximum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, the failure to meet both the limiting condition for operation and the actions was a condition prohibited by the TS.
On January 15, 2005, following discovery of the missed retest, Technical Specification 3.6.3 was entered and CC-V-1095 was satisfactorily retested and restored to operable status.
II. Cause of Event
The cause of the event was an inadequate process for Operations Department review of the work orders in preparation for and execution in the work week. This was the first time this component was worked on line and the specific details in the work order addressing TS 3.6.1 were missed during the Operations Department review of the work order.
III. Analysis of Event
Containment isolation valve CC-V-1095 was determined to be inoperable on January 15, 2005 at 0750 when it was discovered that a post maintenance retest required by TS surveillance requirement TS 4.6.3.1 was not performed resulting in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications.
Containment isolation valve CC-V-1095 is a Criterion 57 closed system isolation valve located outside containment. CC-V-1095 is a motor-operated valve that supplies cooling water to one of two 100% capacity reactor coolant pump thermal barrier heat exchangers.
No inoperable structures, systems, or components contributed to this event.
This event resulted in no adverse safety consequences. The plant was stable at 100% power and there were no conditions that would require the valve to be closed. The valve was successfully retested following discovery of the missed retest. This condition is of regulatory significance because it resulted in a condition prohibited by the TS.
IV. Corrective Action
- An Operations Department Work Week Coordinator was assigned to work with the work week process to enhance the Operations Department review of work orders.
- The Work Management manual will be revised to define the Operations Planner Work Week Coordinator responsibility in the Work Control Process.
V. Similar Events None