05000416/FIN-2012002-02
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Manual Reactor Scram Caused by Failure to Ensure the Main Steam Supply Valve to Reactor Feed Pump Turbine B was Full Open |
Description | The inspectors reviewed a Green self-revealing finding for the failure to ensure the correct position (full open) of the main steam supply valve 1N11-F014B to reactor feed pump turbine B, which resulted in a manual reactor scram due to decreasing reactor water level. During plant shutdown activities to begin refueling outage 18, the at-the-controls operator manually scrammed the reactor from approximately 23 percent rated thermal power due to the decreasing reactor water level. Water level in the reactor was decreasing because valve 1N11-F014B was not fully open, and because pressure in the main steam lines had been reduced when the crew opened turbine bypass valves to begin cooling the main turbine. With valve 1N11-F014B less than fully open and reduced steam pressure, the operating feed pump wasnt able to maintain water level. After the scram, reactor core isolation cooling and reactor feed pump turbine A were used to restore water level. The licensee plans to repair valve 1N11-F014B during the current refuelling outage. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report CR-GGN-2012-01838. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and that challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors concluded that the finding contributed to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would not be available. The inspectors, in consultation with the regional senior reactor analyst, performed a Phase 2 estimation using the pre-solved work sheets for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The inspectors determined by entering the power conversion system column that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This result was validated by the senior reactor analyst using the current revision of the plant-specific SPAR model. The inspectors determined the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because the operating staff proceeded with the start up of the reactor feed pump B with the main steam supply valve 1N11-F014B in an unknown position. |
Site: | Grand Gulf ![]() |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000416/2012002 Section 1R11 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.11 |
Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson R Smith V Gaddy B Rice D Reinert J Braisted N Greene |
CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
INPO aspect | DM.2 |
' | |
Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||