05000416/FIN-2011007-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Take Timely Corrective Actions to Protect Safe Shutdown Equipment From Fire Damage |
| Description | The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take timely corrective action to modify the control circuits for 33 motor operated valves that are relied upon during safe shutdown due to fire. Noncited violation NCV 05000416/2008006-04, Failure to Ensure That Damage to Motor-Operated Valve Circuits Would Not Prevent Safe Shutdown, documented the licensees inadequate review of Information Notice 92- 18, Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During Control Room Fire. The licensee failed to develop modification packages such that motor operated valve control circuit modifications could be implemented during the fall 2010 refueling outage. As a result, 33 motor operated valves associated with safe shutdown equipment continue to remain susceptible to potential damage during spurious operation due to circuit hot shorts. The licensee has maintained a fire watch as a compensatory measure. The licensee entered this into their corrective action program as CR-GGN-2011-02779. The failure to take timely corrective actions to address the potential for fire induced hot shorts to impact the ability to safely shutdown the plant following a fire is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone attribute for protection against external events (fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Since the finding involved control room evacuation, a Phase 3 SDP risk assessment was performed by a senior reactor analyst. Because a bounding change to core damage frequency was 9.58 x 10-7, and the finding was not significant with respect to large, early release frequency, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green). The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with Decision Making, because the licensee failed to demonstrate that nuclear safety is an overriding priority. Specifically, the licensee did not promptly initiate control circuit reviews and implement modifications required for corrective actions after the licensees inadequate evaluation of Information Notice 92-18 was identified in the 2008 violation. |
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000416/2011007 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N O'Keefe J Mateychick E Uribe B Correll N Okonkwo |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2011007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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