05000416/FIN-2011004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Ensure Correct Fuses were Installed in the Hydrogen Igniter Control Circuits |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to install the correct amperage fuses in the hydrogen igniter control circuit. On August 4, 2011, the inspectors were performing an operability review of a condition report dealing with the division 1 hydrogen igniters. The licensee had determined that half the division 1 hydrogen igniters would not energize, and in their investigation, they determined that the loss of power to the hydrogen igniters was due to a blown fuse. The licensee also determined that the blown fuse was 0.3 amps and should have been 0.8 amps per plant drawings. The licensee performed an operability determination for the as found condition and determined that the circuit required 0.193 amps to power the circuit, which included the light bulbs. The inspectors reviewed the operability determination and the calculations and determined that the licensees conclusions were reasonable. The licensee immediate corrective action was to replace the incorrect fuses one division at a time with the correct size 0.8 amp fuses and restore the hydrogen igniters to operable status. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2011-005388. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstones objective to ensure that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, inspectors determined that Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, was required. Inspectors determined that this was a type B finding and, using section 6.0, determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because during their review, the inspectors noted that the hydrogen igniters had maintain functionality over the life of the plant based on satisfactory surveillance tests and no previous failures. Therefore, the exposed time for the de-energized hydrogen igniters was less than 3 days, resulting in very low safety significance. The Appendix H evaluation and the final risk significance determination were reviewed and concurred on by a regional senior reactor analyst. This issue is a latent issue associated with original plant equipment and is not indicative of current performance; therefore, no cross-cutting aspect was identified |
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
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| Report | IR 05000416/2011004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Greene B Baca L Carson R Smith V Gaddy B Larson B Rice C Steely |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2011004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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