05000416/FIN-2011004-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on the Fuel Handling Bridge Paddle Switch |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for inadequate preventative maintenance instructions, which resulted in the loss of control of the fuel handling bridge in the spent fuel pool. On July 15, 2011, while moving spent fuel from the spent fuel pool to the dry cask loading pool, the fuel handling platform did not stop when the paddle switch was released from the reverse position. The paddle switch did not return to the neutral position as designed, and the bridge continued to move in the reverse direction. The fuel handling bridge tripped the zone limit switches and came to a stop. The licensee concluded that the switches had to be cleaned, adjusted, and re-greased periodically to ensure proper operation. Immediate corrective actions included replacing the paddle switch and revising the preventive maintenance instruction to clean and re-grease the paddle switch before every dry cask fuel campaign. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2011-04896. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected cornerstones objective to ensure that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result from fuel handling errors that caused damage to fuel clad integrity because the fuel handling bridge movement was arrested prior to coming in contact with - 3 - Enclosure the spent fuel pool wall. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operational experience component because the licensee failed to evaluate the need to update the preventative maintenance procedure for known issues associated with the fuel handling bridge paddle switch prior to the implementation of the dry fuel storage campaign P.2(b) |
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000416/2011004 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Greene B Baca L Carson R Smith V Gaddy B Larson B Rice C Steely |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2011004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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