05000400/LER-2018-004, Independent Trains of the Emergency Core Cooling System Inoperable During Testing
| ML18263A022 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/2018 |
| From: | Dills J Duke Energy Progress |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RA-18-0158 LER 2018-004-00 | |
| Download: ML18263A022 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| 4002018004R00 - NRC Website | |
text
John Dills Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562-9300 919.362.2000 10 CFR 50.73 September 20, 2018 Serial: RA-18-0158 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-400/Renewed License No. NPF-63 Subject: Licensee Event Report 2018-004-00 Ladies and Gentlemen:
Duke Energy Progress, LLC, submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report 2018-004-00 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (HNP). This report addresses a surveillance test that employed testing methodology which impacted both trains of the Emergency Core Cooling System simultaneously.
This event had no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. There are no regulatory commitments contained within this report.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Jeff Robertson, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (919) 362-3137.
Sincerely, John Dills Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2018-004-00 cc:
J. Zeiler, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, HNP M. Barillas, NRC Project Manager, HNP C. Haney, NRC Regional Administrator, Region II
NRC FORM 366 (04-2018)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
NRC FORM 366 (04-2018) 05000
- 3. Page 1
OF
- 4. Title
- 5. Event Date Month Day Year
- 6. LER Number Year Sequential Number Rev No.
- 7. Report Date Month Day Year
- 8. Other Facilities Involved Facility Name Docket Number 05000 Facility Name Docket Number 05000
- 9. Operating Mode
- 10. Power Level
- 11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.36(c)(2) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(a)(4) 73.71(a)(5) 73.77(a)(1) 73.77(a)(2)(i) 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
Other (Specify in Abstract below or in Page of 05000-
- 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.
C. Causal Factors The online testing sequence for the interlocks for the RHRS isolation valves renders a single train of HHSI inoperable by injecting a test signal in place of a pressure transmitter [PT] measuring RCS pressure. Additionally, an isolation valve from the Refueling Water Storage Tank [TK] is shut, making the respective train of LHSI inoperable.
The potential for impacting both trains of ECCS was not recognized when the surveillance tests were moved into online test procedures. A more systematic review of the new test procedure sections would have ensured no unintended consequences, such as cross-train impacts, would result.
D. Corrective Actions
Operations immediately halted the testing until the test procedures were revised. The test procedures were revised to incorporate testing methodology which would not result in cross-train impact. Lessons learned were shared among organizations involved in the original implementation of the online test procedure sections.
E. Safety Analysis
For each of the three tests conducted, the duration of cross-train impact was less than one hour. No loss of safety function occurred, as a train of LHSI and HHSI was operable throughout testing. Emergency operating procedures contain further administrative barriers to ensure the ECCS would have performed its safety function in the event the system was required to mitigate the occurrence of a design basis event during the tests. Therefore, these events did not significantly impact plant safety. There was no actual safety consequence on the health and safety of the public as a result of these events.
F. Additional Information
There have been no events in the past three years resulting in unintended cross-train impact during testing. There are no NRC commitments contained in this Licensee Event Report.
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