05000395/LER-1982-064, Forwards LER 82-064/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-064/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20083N195
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 01/21/1983
From: Dixon O
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20083N197 List:
References
NUDOCS 8302010584
Download: ML20083N195 (2)


LER-1982-064, Forwards LER 82-064/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3951982064R00 - NRC Website

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'd SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC Sc GAS COMPANY

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'l COLUMotA. South CAROLINA 29218 O. W. DixON, JR.

VICS PnESIDENT January 21, 1983 NucLaAn OPanAttoN.

Mr. James P.

O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

SUBJECT:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Thirty Day Written Report LER 82-064

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #82-064 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.

This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement C of Technical Specification 3.6.4 " Containment Isolation Valves" and Technical Specification 3.6.1.1

" Containment Integrity" on December 23, 1982.

If you have any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Ve truly yours,

/

d O. W.

ixo, Jr.

HCF:OWD:dwf Attachment cc:

V.

C.

Summer A. R.

Koon T.

C. Nichols, Jr.

G.

D. Moffatt E.

C.

Roberts Site QA O. W.

Dixon, Jr.

C. L. Ligon (NSRC)

H.

N.

Cyrus G. J. Braddick H.

T.

Babb J.

L.

Skolds D.

A.

Nauman J.

B.

Knotts, Jr.

l M.

B.

Whitaker, Jr.

B.

A.

Bursey l

W.

A.

Willians, Jr.

I&E (Washington)

O. S. Bradham Document Management Branch R.

B.

Clary INPO Records Center M.

N. Browne NPCF File B302010584 830121 OFFICIAL C(3py PDR ADOCK 05000395 S

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Mr. James P. O'Rollly LER No.82-064 Page Two January 21, 1983 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On December 23, 1982 at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> with the Plant in Mode 1, Naclear Sampling System Valves 9398A (B) failed to close within the required isolation time identified in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.3.

Containment integrity was re-established at 1451 hours0.0168 days <br />0.403 hours <br />0.0024 weeks <br />5.521055e-4 months <br />, upon the closure of the associated manual valves, in compliance with the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES Ther'e were no adverse consequences from this event.

The closure of the associated manual valves insured that the possible loss of containment integrity could not occur.

CAUSE(S) OF THE. OCCURRENCE The cause of this occurrence is attributed to crud buildup on the valve seats which inhibited the normal stroke of the automatic valves.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN The manual isolation valves for 9398A (B) were closed within one (1) hour in order to insure that containment integrity was maintained.

Investigation performed on December 23, 1982 indicated that mechanical binding was causing the slow closure of the automatic valves (3 - 5 minutes).

Upon this determination the valves were left shut and scheduled for repair during the next plant outage.

Temporary relief from Technical Specification 3.0.4 was requested and granted in regard to mode escalation with the inoperable valves on December 28, 1982 after the plant experienced a reactor trip.

However, prior to reactor criticality the valves were returned to an operable condition by exercising the valves concurrent with tapping on the valve body.

Crud buildup in the valvs body was dislodged and the valves were declared operable at 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br /> on December 28, 1982, upon the satisfactory performance of surveillance testing.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The crud accumulation present in the sample lines was apparently the result of the 20 to 30 PPM of suspended solids observed in the Steam Generators during initial power escalation.

The concentration has since been reduced by a significant amount.

The licensee plans no additional action in regard to this event unless warranted by a similar occurrence in the future.