05000361/LER-1982-135, Forwards LER 82-135/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

Forwards LER 82-135/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

ML20069N897
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	11/18/1982
From:	Ray H SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20069N901	List: 05000361/LER-1982-135, Forwards LER 82-135/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted 05000361/LER-1982-135-03, /03L-0:on 821018,during Change from Mode 4 to Mode 3,one Train of Component Cooling Water Improperly Aligned Rendering Emergency Chiller E-335 Inoperable. Caused by Improper Documentation.Personnel Reinstructed
References
NUDOCS 8212070252
Download: ML20069N897 (2)

LER-1982-135, Forwards LER 82-135/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

Event date:
Report date:
3611982135R00 - NRC Website

text

r flVED Southern California Edison Company 13y 55 S AN ONOFRE NUCLE AR GENER A TING ST A TION S A N C LEMEN T E. C A LIF OR NI A 92672

• i H. 8. R AY TELEPHONE

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November 18, 1982 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention:

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject:

Docket No. 50-361 30-Day Report Licensee Event Report No.82-135 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Pursuant to Appendix A Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.c, this letter documents a reportable occurrence involving various Limiting Conditions for Operation (LC0's) and specification 3.0.4.

The Component Cooling Water (CCW) and Electric Power Distribution Systems of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3 are interconnected such that the services normally provided to one unit can be aligned, through normally isolated cross connects, to provide that same service to the other unit.

While operating in Mode 4 on October 16, 1982, Train B of the Unit 2 CCW system was removed from service for maintenance on its heat exchanger tubes. This voluntary entry into the Action Statement associated with i

LC0 3.7.3 was properly documented and administrative controls established to prevent mode changes and expedite corrective action while in a degraded mode, were properly implemented.

In a separate activity, the Unit 2 Emergency Chiller E-335, which had already been declared inoperable due to removal of the Train B CCW heat exchanger from service, was realigned to receive power from the Unit 3 Diesel Generator in support of the preoperational load testing of that urit. In order for this chiller to properly operate as a test load, its condenser was realigned to receive CCW from the Unit 3 CCW system.

l Though realignment of the power supply was properly documented and controlled in accordance with equipment control procedures, the realignment of the CCW supply from Unit 2 to Unit 3, was not properly documented.

i 8212070252 821118 gDRADOCK05000 1 2 -52.3 e& 417

R. H. Engalken November 18, 1982 Prior to entry into Mode 3, and within the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> permitted by LC0 3.7.3, the Unit 2 Train B CCW heat exchanger was returned to service and the emergency chiller power supply was realigned to its normal Unit 2 source. Due to the lack of proper documentation, however, the chiller condenser remained aligned to the Unit 3 CCW system and was not returned to its normal Unit 2 CCW supply until 0340 on October 19, 1982, approximately 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> after entry into Mode 3.

Thus, Mode 3 was entered with emergency chiller E-335 not being supplied with an "0PERABLE" CCW system, as defined by Technical Specifications, thereby violating specification 3.0.4.

The completely redundant Unit 2 Loop A Chiller E-336 remained operable throughout the event, and the health and safety of plant personnel and the public were not compromised.

Existing procedures for control of entry into Action Statements and changing operating modes are being reviewed and will be revised as necessary to emphasize that all equipment associated with an abnormal alignment is identified.

Personnel involved in equipment control have

- been advised of this event and cautioned to ensure accurate documentation of such alignments.

A completed Licensee Event Report form is attached summarizing the above.

If there are any.. questions, please contact me.

Sincerely, H6h/f%4 Enclosure: LER 82-135 cc:

A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Unit 2)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information and Program Control Institute of Nuclear Power Operations