05000361/LER-1982-033, Forwards LER 82-033/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

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Forwards LER 82-033/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
ML20071L308
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 07/22/1982
From: Ray H
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To: Engelken R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20071L310 List:
References
NUDOCS 8208020414
Download: ML20071L308 (2)


LER-1982-033, Forwards LER 82-033/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
Event date:
Report date:
3611982033R00 - NRC Website

text

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Southern California Edison Company W? P y p, C", U S AN ONOFRE NUCLE AR GENER ATING ST A TION P.O. sox 128 1

S A N C LEME NTE. C A LIFOR NI A 92672 C

H.B. RAY TELEPHONE ST ATION M AN AGE R 4 714) 492-7 F00 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention:

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject:

Docket No. 50-361 30-Day Report Licensee Event Report No.82-033 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Reference:

Letter, H. B. Ray (SCE) to R. H. Engelken (NRC),

dated July'2, 1982 The referenced letter confirmed our prompt notification of your office of our failure to provide Licensee Event Reports (LER's) within 30 days of the dates upon which the event had occurred.

Pursuant to Appendix A Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.b to Operating License N.PF-10 for San Onofre Unit 2 this submittal provides the required 30-day written report and a copy of LER forra, for an occurrence involving the Turbine Overspeed Protection System (TOPS).

On June 9, 1982 while in Mode 3, work was authorized to clean spilled oil and locate and repair leaks in the electro hydraulic actuation portion of the TOPS.

This rendered the System inoperable. lechnical Specification 3.3.4 requires that at least one Turbine Overspeed Protection System be operable.

The associated Action b. requires that the turbine be isolated from the steam supply within six hours.

Isolation was achieved because the MSIV's and Turoine Stop Valves were closed at that time.

The cause of the event was maintenance being performed to repair oil leaks on the unitized actuator.

The immediate corrective action was in place as the MSIV's and Turbine Stop Valves were closed.

No additional corrective actions are needed.

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6 Mr. R. H. Engelken July 22, 1982 Since there is no decay heat in the core and the MSIV's were closed, there was no effect on public health and safety as a result of this event.

Should you require additional information concerning this incident, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Ady, fSh Yb Enclosure cc:

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information and Program Control Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

A. E. Chafee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Unit 1) i

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