05000346/FIN-2011005-04
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Finding | |
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Title | Reactivity Manipulations Performed By Non-Licensed IndividuaL |
Description | The inspectors identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 54(i) when a non-licensed member of the licensees engineering staff was observed operating switches that directly caused the insertion of various control rods that were being subjected to timing tests. Specifically, the inspectors observed that key switches used to interrupt power to the control rod drives and cause control rod insertion were manipulated by a member of the licensees engineering staff, and not a licensed individual. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as CR 2011-06318. The issue was determined to be associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality. However, the inspectors subsequently determined that the issue had not adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Because of several factors, the inspectors determined that the issue was of minor safety significance and, as such, did not constitute a finding. These factors included: All control rod group withdrawal activities were accomplished from the control room by an on-watch licensed reactor operator; All activities in the electrical penetration room were performed in accordance with an approved written test procedure, and under the direct supervision of a licensed Senior Reactor Operator; The operation of the local key switches in the electrical penetration room, albeit by a non-licensed individual, could only cause control rod insertion. There was no withdrawal capability; and. The individual operating the local key switches in the electrical penetration room was always in continuous communication with the on-watch licensed reactor operator in the control room. The inspectors determined that the issue was subject to the NRCs traditional enforcement process as an issue that had the potential to impact the agencys ability to perform its regulatory function. Specifically, the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process fundamentally assumes that only duly licensed individuals are allowed to manipulate reactor controls and alter core reactivity or make changes to reactor power, and that all licensed individuals perform their licensed duties in accordance with any restrictions associated with their individual licenses. The inspectors conferred with NRC Region III management and members of the enforcement staff and determined that, because of the factors noted above, the issue constituted a SL IV violation that resulted in no, or relatively inappreciable, safety consequences. Because this issue was dispositioned through the traditional enforcement process and had no Reactor Oversight Process aspects, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with the violation. |
Site: | Davis Besse |
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Report | IR 05000346/2011005 Section 1R19 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson D Kimble J Cameron J Neurauter J Steffes L Jones M Holmberg M Mitchell P Cardona Morales P Smagacz T Briley T Go |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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