05000346/FIN-2011004-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Control ECCS Room Cooler Valve Position |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, were identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to control the configuration of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) room cooler service water (SW) outlet valves in accordance with procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to update procedures used to set the appropriate throttle position for the valves, and by using information tags to control valve position, failed to follow plant status control procedures. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of Design Control and Configuration Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, an incorrect throttle position of the ECCS room cooler outlet valves could have an effect on the reliability or availability of ECCS train 2 equipment. A past operability review determined that the as-found flowrate to ECCS room coolers 1 and 2 was reduced with outlet valves SW87 and SW103 mispositioned, however, the flow was sufficient to not affect the operability of ECCS room coolers 1 and 2. Using the Phase 1 SDP worksheet for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered No to the screening questions in Table 4a. Specifically, the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources component, because the licensee did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee did not process a document change request to update procedures used to verify SW valve alignments. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2011004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson D Kimble J Beavers J Maynen J Neurauter J Steffes L Jones M Bielby M Holmberg R Jones T Bilik T Go |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |
Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2011004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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