05000346/FIN-2011004-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, were identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to establish adequate measures (e.g., perform a review of radiographic (RT) film weld records) to ensure material procured from a contractor (replacement control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) housings) met the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code. Consequently, two replacement CRDM housings were procured with RT film weld records that did not conform to the ASME Code-required film density ranges. As a corrective action, the licensee returned the affected CRDM housings to a vendor facility for completion of new RT film records prior to installation on the replacement vessel head. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 2011-00750. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Absent NRC identification, the failure to complete an adequate RT examination of welds on two CRDM housings could have allowed unacceptable weld flaws to be placed in service. Specifically, weld flaws such as cracks, can reduce the CRDM housing integrity, and place the reactor coolant system (RCS) at an increased risk for through-wall leakage and/or failure. Because this finding was identified prior to placing the CRDM housings into service, the inspectors answered No to the Significance Determination Process Phase 1 screening question: Assuming worst case degradation, would the finding result in exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) limit for any RCS leakage or could the finding have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function assuming the worst case degradation? Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices because the licensee staff failed to ensure adequate supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety was supported. Absent NRC intervention, the failure to establish adequate measures to ensure material procured from a contractor (replacement CRDM housings) met the ASME Code would have allowed welds on two housings with non-conforming RT records to be placed into service. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
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| Report | IR 05000346/2011004 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson D Kimble J Beavers J Maynen J Neurauter J Steffes L Jones M Bielby M Holmberg R Jones T Bilik T Go |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2011004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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