05000346/FIN-2011003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Training on Procedure Requirements Results in Auxiliary Feedwater Inoperability |
| Description | A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, were identified for the licensees failure to ensure that activities affecting quality are properly accomplished in accordance with instructions, procedures, and drawings. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow radio usage guidelines when performing fire detection surveillance testing in the auxiliary shutdown panel. The procedure did not contain a specific requirement to exclude radio usage in the vicinity of the auxiliary shutdown panel. The inappropriate use of radio communication caused interference in the auxiliary shutdown panel, resulting in a momentary loss of emergency feedwater controls. The licensee included this issue in their corrective action program as CR 11-90403. An immediate corrective action was taken to post signs restricting radio usage within the auxiliary shutdown panel room. The procedures that govern in-plant radio communications and security communications were revised to prohibit the use of portable radios in the auxiliary shutdown panel room. Additionally, a corrective action was initiated to provide training to the appropriate personnel to ensure awareness and adherence to radio communication use in the vicinity of plant equipment. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to follow radio usage guidelines when working inside the auxiliary shutdown panel cabinet was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Attachment 1, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. Using the Phase 1 SDP worksheet for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, the inspectors answered no to all five screening questions. Because of the short duration of the reduction in control signals (approximately 27 seconds), it was determined that sufficient design margin was available to accommodate the worst case scenario of an auxiliary feedwater flowrate increase to both steam generators during any transient described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. An SDP Phase 2 analysis was not required because the emergency feedwater system remained available throughout this event. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding is associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance cross-cutting area, because the licensee did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, personnel were not adequately trained on procedure DB-OP-05441, Radio Communication System. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2011003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Kimble T Briley M Marshfield A Wilson |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2011003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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