05000346/FIN-2011002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Adequately Control Construction Material Adjacent to the Switchyard |
| Description | A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 were identified for the licensees failure to establish and implement procedures recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to appropriately establish and implement a procedure addressing an act of nature (high wind conditions) when material adjacent to the Davis-Besse switchyard was displaced by high winds and blown into switchyard equipment causing the loss of one required offsite power circuit. The licensee included this finding in their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 11-89062. An immediate corrective action was taken to clear the debris from the switchyard and restore the affected offsite power circuit. A corrective action was initiated to develop procedural guidance for high wind conditions, including guidance for securing material in the switchyard. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to control material near risk significant equipment, or to appropriately apply the standards in the Material Readiness and Housekeeping Inspection Procedure (IP), was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Attachment 1, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. Using the Phase 1 SDP worksheet for the Initiating Event Cornerstone, transient initiator contributor, the inspectors determined that the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, because the licensee did not ensure that an adequate procedure was available to assure nuclear safety by addressing high wind conditions and properly securing loose material near the switchyard. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2011002 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Rutkowski A Wilson D Kimble T Go J Cameron |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2011002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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