05000346/FIN-2011005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Decay Heat Pump 1-1 Damaged and Rendered Inoperable By Personnel Climbing on Equipment |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified when low pressure injection equipment was damaged by operators attempting to access an overhead valve. Specifically, by climbing and standing on sensitive plant equipment, the licensee failed to comply with the standards and expectations for accessing plant equipment contained in procedure NOP-OP-1002, Conduct of Operations . An immediate corrective action was taken to repair the damaged temperature element and restore low pressure injection pump no. 1 to operable status. A long-term solution to providing access to the overhead valve is under evaluation in the corrective action program. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the damage caused when falling from plant equipment rendered low pressure injection train 1 inoperable. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, using the Phase 1 SDP worksheet for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The finding screened as very low safety significance because the inspectors answered no to the screening questions in Table 4a. Specifically, the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control Component, because the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee did not appropriately plan for job site conditions impacting human performance since an appropriate available method for accessing CC258 was not evaluated. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2011005 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson D Kimble J Cameron J Neurauter J Steffes L Jones M Holmberg M Mitchell P Cardona Morales P Smagacz T Briley T Go |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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