05000346/FIN-2011005-06
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Procedure Resulted in Water Intrusion Into Safety-Related Motor Control Center |
Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance was identified for the licensees failure to establish, implement, and maintain technically adequate procedures to permit the proper switching of feedwater sources for the stations auxiliary boiler, such that when the switching of feedwater sources from demineralized water to the stations normal condensate system took place per approved procedures, there were detrimental results. Specifically, the approved procedures for this activity relied upon a check valve to keep the demineralized water header from being exposed to greater pressure than its design. When that check valve failed to function as designed, failure of demineralized water system components and the inadvertent deluge and failure of safety-related electrical equipment resulted. A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance was identified for the licensees failure to establish, implement, and maintain technically adequate procedures to permit the proper switching of feedwater sources for the stations auxiliary boiler, such that when the switching of feedwater sources from demineralized water to the stations normal condensate system took place per approved procedures, there were detrimental results. Specifically, the approved procedures for this activity relied upon a check valve to keep the demineralized water header from being exposed to greater pressure than its design. When that check valve failed to function as designed, failure of demineralized water system components and the inadvertent deluge and failure of safety-related electrical equipment resulted. RCS Closed and No Inventory in the Pressurizer; Time to Boiling Less Than 2 Hours. The inspectors determined that the finding did not adversely impact any shutdown defense-in-depth or mitigation attributes, nor did it meet any of the checklist specific requirements for a Phase 2 or Phase 3 SDP analysis. Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program (CAP) component, because the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address the safety issue in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance and complexity. Specifically, the licensee had multiple previous opportunities to have appropriately diagnosed and corrected the issue, but failed to do so. |
Site: | Davis Besse |
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Report | IR 05000346/2011005 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson D Kimble J Cameron J Neurauter J Steffes L Jones M Holmberg M Mitchell P Cardona Morales P Smagacz T Briley T Go |
CCA | P.3, Resolution |
INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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