05000346/FIN-2011002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadvertent Removal of Control Power to Containment Air Cooler Isolation Valve |
| Description | A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of TS 3.6.3 were identified for an inadequate clearance that inadvertently removed control power to a containment isolation valve (CIV), SW1358, Containment Air Cooler (CAC) 3 Outlet Temperature Control Valve. Without power to control SW1358, the valve was unable to be closed for longer than allowed by TSs. The licensee included this finding in their CAP as CR 11-88594. An immediate corrective action was taken to restore control power to SW1358. The inspectors determined that a performance deficiency occurred when the licensee inadvertently placed a clearance that removed control power to CIV SW1358, rendering the valve inoperable and unable to be closed for longer than allowed by TSs. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it is associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of Systems, Structures, and Components (SSC) and Barrier Performance, and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Attachment 1, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. Using the Phase 1 SDP worksheet for the barrier integrity cornerstone, the inspectors answered no to all four screening questions under the containment barrier column. Specifically, the affected penetration was associated with a closed piping system within containment such that a significant breach in the piping would need to occur to provide a viable release pathway. In addition, CAC 1 and 2 remained operable during the period of time that the CAC 3 outlet temperature control valve was inoperable. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, because the licensee did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2011002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Rutkowski A Wilson D Kimble T Go J Cameron |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2011002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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