05000341/FIN-2014004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Incorporate Operating Experience into Preventive Maintenance Activities |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance with an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, was self-revealed on March 18, 2014, when the failure of a reactor protection system (RPS) power contactor caused an invalid half-scram due to loss of power and the resultant closure of several containment isolation valves during the Cycle 16 refueling outage. The licensee failed to incorporate operating experience into its preventive maintenance practices and implement preventive maintenance activities to inspect and replace RPS power contactors susceptible to age-related degradation and failure. The licensee replaced the failed contactor and initiated a corrective action to create preventive maintenance activities for inspecting and replacing the two RPS power contactors. The finding was of more than minor safety significance because if left uncorrected it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Under different plant operating conditions, the RPS power contactor failure and loss of power could have resulted in a reactor scram or loss of shutdown cooling event. In addition, the finding was sufficiently similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, Example 7(c), in that this violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) had a consequence ...such as equipment problems attributable to failure to take industry operating experience into account when practicable. The finding was determined to be a licensee performance deficiency of very low safety significance during a detailed quantitative Significance Determination Process review since the delta core damage frequency was determined to be much less than 1.0E-6/year. The inspectors concluded this finding affected the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution. Specifically, in the area of operating experience (P.5), the licensee did not appropriately evaluate and implement relevant external operating experience in a timely manner. A licensee review of preventive maintenance activities for RPS logic relays was performed following an RPS response time test failure in November 2010, during which the licensee identified that preventive maintenance activities to replace the two RPS power contactors were never created in response to operating experience it had received in 1990. Corrective actions from the November 2010 evaluation to perform the RPS power contactor replacements were still open when the event occurred in March 2014. The licensee completed two refueling outages in the interim, which would have afforded opportunities to replace the RPS power contactors. |
| Site: | Fermi  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000341/2014004 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dahbur A Shaikh B Kemker J Bozga M Kunowski M Learn P Smagacz R Edwards S Bell |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) 10 CFR 50.65 |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Fermi - IR 05000341/2014004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fermi) @ 2014Q3
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