05000341/FIN-2013005-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Correctly Connect Thermocouple Wiring During Maintenance Resulted in Inoperable Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolation Instrumentation |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance with an associated Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a on procedures was self-revealed on August 30, 2013, when the Division 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Equipment Room temperature input to the associated steam line isolation logic was discovered inoperable during a scheduled surveillance test. Maintenance craftsmen had failed to correctly terminate thermocouple wiring as specified by the work instructions during maintenance to replace terminal block knife switches two weeks earlier. As a result, the Division 1 RCIC Equipment Room temperature input to the associated steam line isolation logic for RCIC steam supply primary containment outboard isolation valve 1E51-F008 was rendered inoperable for greater than the TS 3.3.6.1 completion time. The licensee promptly corrected the wiring discrepancy and restored the Division 1 RCIC system steam line isolation logic to an operable status. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program for evaluation and additional corrective actions. The finding was of more than minor safety significance since it was associated with the Human Performance attribute and adversely affected the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the Division 1 RCIC system steam line isolation logic was rendered inoperable for greater than the TS 3.3.6.1 completion time because maintenance craftsmen failed to correctly terminate thermocouple wiring as specified by the procedure when replacing terminal block knife switches. The finding was a licensee performance deficiency of very low safety significance because it only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the Reactor Building and was not a complete loss of the barrier function provided by the RCIC system steam line isolation instrumentation since the Division 2 RCIC system steam line isolation logic remained operable. The inspectors concluded that this finding affected the crosscutting area of human performance since adequate licensee personnel work practices did not support successful human performance. Specifically, human error prevention techniques, such as self and peer checking, were not adequately used to ensure the thermocouple wiring was correctly terminated upon replacing the terminal block knife switches. |
| Site: | Fermi  |
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| Report | IR 05000341/2013005 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Jones M Kunowski N Adorno P Smagacz R Morris B Kemker B Palagi C Zoia J Laughlin J Nance K Carrington M Bielby |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Fermi - IR 05000341/2013005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fermi) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Fermi)
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