05000341/FIN-2014003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Mis-Positioned Control Switch Inadvertently Rendered the Division 2 EECW System and Supported Systems Inoperable |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance with an associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was self-revealed on February 6, 2014, when the Division 2 emergency equipment cooling water (EECW) system and its supported systems were inadvertently rendered inoperable. Control Room operators incorrectly positioned the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch to manual override while attempting to place the system in its normal standby configuration, disabling the systems automatic initiation function. The licensee promptly restored the affected systems to an operable status by returning the override switch back to normal. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program for evaluation and additional corrective actions. The finding was of more than minor significance since it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the mis-positioned control switch rendered the Division 2 EECW system and its supported systems inoperable. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance during a detailed quantitative Significance Determination Process review since the delta core damage frequency was determined to be less than 1.0E-7/year using the NRC Standardized Plant Analysis Risk model. The inspectors concluded this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance since adequate licensee personnel work practices did not support successful human performance (H.12). Specifically, human error prevention techniques, such as pre-job briefing and peer checking, were not adequately used to ensure that the correct procedure section was performed. |
| Site: | Fermi  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000341/2014003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Kemker J Bozga M Kunowski P Smagacz R Morris S Bell |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Fermi - IR 05000341/2014003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fermi) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Fermi)
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