05000341/FIN-2014002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Control the Work Hours of a Covered Worker |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance with an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 26.205(c) and (d) for the licensees failure to schedule and control the work hours of a covered worker directing and performing surveillance testing on a safety-related check valve during the refueling outage. Specifically, an engineer performing inservice testing was scheduled successive 12-hour shifts and was inappropriately excluded from the work hour limits specified in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(1) and (d)(2). As part of its corrective action, the licensee removed the engineer from covered work activities for the remainder of the refueling outage and reviewed the work activities of other engineers to ensure that any engineer performing covered work appropriately met work hour limits. The finding was of more-than-minor significance since the failure to schedule and control the work hours of a worker performing covered work, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern because it could reasonably result in human performance errors that could affect the function of safety-related structures, systems, and components. Since the issue involved inservice testing on a safety-related emergency core cooling system check valve, the inspectors concluded this issue was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The finding was a licensee performance deficiency of very low safety significance because it: (1) was not a design or qualification deficiency; (2) did not represent an actual loss of function of a system; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train or two separate trains for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time; (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as high safety significant; and (5) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors concluded this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance and the cross-cutting aspect of resources (H.1). Specifically, the engineer did not meet expectations regarding the performance of covered work activities because he did not challenge his role in directing the work activity and he assisted the maintenance craftsman while the craftsman attempted to exercise the check valve. In addition, licensee management inappropriately assigned the engineer responsibility for the test activity without ensuring he was in compliance with the 10 CFR 26.205 work hour requirements. |
| Site: | Fermi  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000341/2014002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Kemker J Jandovitz M Kunowski P Smagacz S Bell |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 26.205 Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Fermi - IR 05000341/2014002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fermi) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Fermi)
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