On May 5,(2010,(St.(Lucie Units 1 and Unit 2 were operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent power when the Onsite Review Group (ORG)(validated the Station analysis that the condition discovered on August 7, 2009, was reportable.(During a NRC Component Design Basis Inspection(( CDBI),(the inspection team questioned the operating philosophy of restoring a non-essential component cooling water(( CCW) header to an essential header following a safety injection actuation signal ( SIAS) for the purpose of sampling of the steam generators for activity and cooling of the reactor coolant pump(( RCP)(seals.(Re-alignment of the non-essential CCW results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.
Realignment of the non-essential CCW header following a LBLOCA, both Units 1 and 2 could result in the failure of 2 or more trains in different systems from properly completing their safety function if a failure were to occur on the non-essential CCW header.(
- The cause of the event was determined to be an inadequate EOP procedure review.
Corrective actions included revisions to emergency operating procedures(( EOPs)(to preclude alignment of the non-essential CCW header((N-header)(to the essential CCW header, and issuance of a Standing Order providing guidance to the operating crews. |
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
Description of the Event
On May 5, 2010, St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating in Mode 1 at 100% power when the ORG validated the Station analysis that the condition discovered on August 7, 2009, was reportable. During a NRC CDBI, the inspection team questioned the operating philosophy of restoring a non-essential CCW [EIIS:CC] header to an essential header following a SIAS [EIIS:IB] to allow sampling of the steam generators for activity and cooling of the RCP [EIIS:AB] seals. This configuration results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety for Unit 2 and results in the failure of 2 or more trains in different systems from properly completing their safety function if a failure were to occur on the non-essential CCW header for both Units 1 and 2.
Cause of the Event
The cause of the event was determined to be an inadequate EOP procedure review.
In 1992 a major philosophy change was incorporated into EOP procedures changes to incorporate training, operating experience (OE,) INPO enhancements, and human factor improvements documented over the previous year. Technical Staff reviews of the procedures at the time determined the proposed changes did not constitute a change to the UFSAR, and subsequent reviews by the ORG approved the changes. The procedures, as written, are in agreement with CEN-152, Combustion Engineering Emergency Procedure Guideline which is written to a "standard Combustion Engineering" design. Sections of the EOPs that could potentially put the plant outside of the design basis were reserved for plant specific instructions that should have been identified by the 50.59 process. The 50.59 process at the time did not identify the error nor did the ORG identify any concerns. Additionally the ORG determined that the changes were within the design basis.
Analysis of the Event
During the NRC CDBI, an inspector identified that Unit 1 Emergency Operating Procedure, 1-E0P-99, "Appendices/Figures/Tables/Data Sheets, Appendix A, "Sampling Steam Generators" and Appendix J, "Restoration of CCW and CBO to the RCPs" provides instructions to align the non-essential CCW header to the essential CCW header.
Appendix A is used to align CCW in order to sample the steam generators. Appendix J is used to align CCW to provide cooling to the RCP seals. Both Units have a precaution statement in Appendix A and J which states, "Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present." This precaution statement implies that both essential CCW headers are available, however a failure of one diesel generator would result in the loss of one of the essential CCW headers. Therefore, implementation of 1-E0P-99, Appendix A and J to align the non-essential CCW to an essential CCW header when only one essential header is available, under certain accident scenarios ,could potentially place the plant in an unanalyzed condition.
The safety-related functions performed by the CCW system include cooling of containment safety related components and reactor decay heat removal, cooling of FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) Unit 2 control room under certain accident conditions, and cooling of safety related components associated with achieving safe shutdown coincident with a loss-of-off-site power (LOOP.) CCW system quality related functions during normal operation include RCP cooling, Unit 2 control room air conditioners, containment fan coolers and the spent fuel pool heat exchanger.
Evaluations The effects on the ability of the structures, systems, components (SSC) to perform its specified safety function during times in which Operators would realign the non essential CCW header was evaluated based on scenarios from simulator exercises.
Situations where Operators would realign the non-essential CCW header included response to LOCA events and a main steam line break (MSLB).
The non-essential CCW header is designed to be automatically isolated from the two essential CCW headers by valve closure on a SIAS. Each essential CCW header has a pump and heat exchanger designed to supply the minimum safety feature requirements during shutdown or design basis accident conditions. Two scenarios for Unit 1 and Unit 2 were investigated to determine the impact of realigning the non-essential CCW header following a large break LOCA.
One scenario considered failure of one CCW pump and the other considered a LOOP with failure of one emergency diesel generator. The same two scenarios for Unit 1 and Unit 2 were investigated to determine the impact of realigning the non-essential CCW header following a MSLB.
It was concluded the Unit 1 Emergency Operating Procedure, 1-E0P-99, "Appendices/Figures/Tables/Data Sheets and Unit 2 Emergency Operating Procedure, 2- E0P-99, "Appendices/Figures/Tables/Data Sheets" each have Appendices A and J that provided instructions to align the non-essential CCW header to an essential CCW header after SIAS. A design basis LOCA coincident with a LOOP and a loss-of-diesel results in automatic isolation of the non-essential CCW header from the two essential CCW headers and concurrent failure of one essential CCW header. This realignment configuration would place Unit 1 and Unit 2 outside its design bases, however for the period of time of concern neither Unit entered this configuration and consequently did not require notification of the NRC.
The limiting design basis accidents for containment temperature and pressure are MSLB.
and LOCA. If either Unit experienced a MSLB or LOCA with the non-essential CCW header isolated from two essential CCW headers, and only one of the essential CCW headers Operable, then EOP-99 would direct realignment of the non-essential CCW header to the Operable essential CCW header. Aligning the non-essential CCW header under these conditions could divert CCW flow from the containment cooling systems and degrade the heat removal paths. The earliest realignment of the non-essential CCW header under MSLB conditions is 7 minutes into the event. In this case, containment peak pressure and temperature results are unaffected because blow-down from the rupture is complete within approximately two minutes for Unit 1 and 154 seconds for Unit 2. Therefore, MSLB is not a concern for either unit.
For a large break LOCA on Unit 1, the non-essential CCW header alignment affects containment heat removal in the long-term, but does not affect the blow-down or re flood mass and energy releases. The initial peak in CCW temperature occurs when the containment fan coolers (CFCs) are actuated at approximately 30 seconds. This is FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) well before the alignment of the non-essential CCW header therefore, this peak is unaffected.
The additional heat load from the non-essential CCW header is significant and results in a higher CCW heat exchanger outlet temperature once the header is aligned. Two scenarios for Unit 1 were investigated to determine the impact of realigning the non essential CCW header following a large break LOCA. One, for 13 minutes for failure of one CCW pump and one for 23 minutes for a LOOP with failure of one emergency diesel generator. The CCW "second peak" temperature is higher and occurs following the recirculation actuation signal. Each scenario was determined to be bounded by containment pressure and temperature analysis and not affected by realignment of the nonessential CCW header.
Analysis of Unit 2 for LOCA CCW temperature was more complex than Unit 1 due to limitations imposed by the control room air conditioning system. A spectrum of scenarios considering three break locations with minimum and maximum SI delivery was considered. Realignment of the non-essential CCW header following a large break LOCA for the period of concern would have resulted in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii). While this condition is reportable for Unit 2 because Control Room cooling is adversely affected, the existing long-term containment pressure and temperature response is not affected.
At the time of discovery this condition would not have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Procedural instructions of 2-EOP-99 to align the non-essential CCW header to an essential CCW header constitutes a procedural error that could result in the failure of 2 or more trains in different systems (e.g., HPSI and containment spray) from properly completing their safety function. If a postulated deterministic failure on the non-essential CCW header results in the failure of the attached essential header, then the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix) apply.
Since realignment of the non-essential CCW header following a large break LOCA results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety, this condition on Unit 2 is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2)(ii).
Realignment of the non-essential CCW header following a large break LOCA could have resulted in the failure of 2 or more trains in different systems from properly completing their safety function if a failure were to occur on the non-essential CCW header, therefore this condition on Unit 1 and Unit 2 is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix).
Analysis of Safety Significance This condition is a legacy issue due to an inadequate review of the affects of a procedure change. At the time the procedure changes were incorporated, it was determined that the changes were within the design basis due to the 50.59 screening and the ORG review not identifying potential problems. Improvements to the 50.59 Process and ORG continuing training on potential design basis changes have minimized the potential for similar events.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
Corrective Actions
The following corrective actions resulted from the root cause evaluation. The corrective and supporting actions were entered into the Site Correction Action Program (CAP). Any changes to the proposed actions will be managed under CAP.
1.Issued a Standing Order that provides guidance to the operating crews about the need to keep the non-essential headers isolated from the essential headers when sub-cooling is lost during 1-EOP-3, "Loss of Coolant Accident LOCA" or 1-EOP-15 "Excess Steam Demand.
2.Issued CAUTION tag for each Control Room QSPDS console to ensure that Operators know to isolate the non-essential CCW header if sub-cooling is lost during 1-EOP-3, "Loss of Coolant Accident LOCA" or 1-EOP-15 "Excess Steam Demand.
3.Issued CAUTION tags for each Control Room QSPDS console to ensure that Operators know to isolate the non-essential CCW header if sub-cooling is lost during 1-E0P-3, "Loss of Coolant Accident LOCA" or 1-EOP-15 "Excess Steam Demand.
4.Revise 1/2-EOP-99, "Appendices/Figures/Tables/Data Sheets" to resolve the issue that aligning the non-essential CCW header (N-header) to the essential CCW header as specified in Appendices A & J is outside the design basis.
Similar Events A review of condition reports for the last 3 years for procedures causing the potential for the plant to be outside of its design basis did not identify any similar events.
Failed Components
None
|
---|
|
|
| | Reporting criterion |
---|
05000220/LER-2010-001 | Reactor Scram Due to Inadequate Post Maintenance Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000410/LER-2010-001 | Reactor Scram Due to Inadvertent Actuation of the Redundant Reactivity Control System During Maintenance | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000395/LER-2010-001 | Reactor Building Cooling Units Reduced Air Flow Rate Below Technical Specification Limits | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000382/LER-2010-001 | Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Single Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | 05000374/LER-2010-001 | High Pressure Core Spray System Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Room Ventilation Control Relay | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000373/LER-2010-001 | Unauthorized Individual Gained Access to the Protected Area. | | 05000370/LER-2010-001 | Loose connection in a panel board serving a Solid State Protection System Train concurrent with redundant train maintenance could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000261/LER-2010-001 | Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable in Excess of Technical Specifications Allowed Completion Time | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000263/LER-2010-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000255/LER-2010-001 | Potential Loss of Safety Function Due to a Service Water Pump Shaft Coupling Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000266/LER-2010-001 | Engineered Safety Features Steam Line Pressure Dynamics Modules Discovered Outside of Technical Specification Values | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000306/LER-2010-001 | Unit 2 Turbine Trip during Reactor Shutdown Resulting in a Reactor Scram | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000305/LER-2010-001 | Safety Injection Pump Recirculation Line Isolation Results in Violation of Technical Specifications | | 05000298/LER-2010-001 | Cooper Nuclear Station 05000298 1 of 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000269/LER-2010-001 | Standby Shutdown Facility Letdown Line Orifice Strainer Blocked by Valve Gasket Material | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(b) | 05000282/LER-2010-001 | Unanalyzed Condition Due to Postulated High Energy Line Break On Cooling Water System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000277/LER-2010-001 | Multiple Slow Control Rods Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 05000361/LER-2010-001 | Broken Manual Valve Prevents Timely Condensate Storage Tank Isolation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000483/LER-2010-001 | Emergency Core Cooling System MODE 4 Operating Practices Prohibited by current Technical Specification 3.5.3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000498/LER-2010-001 | Unit Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000316/LER-2010-001 | Valid Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System in Response to Valid Steam Generator Low-Low Levels | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000321/LER-2010-001 | Corrosion Induced Bonding Results in Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Drift | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000336/LER-2010-001 | Millstone Power Station Unit 2 Reactor Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000413/LER-2010-001 | Technical Specification Violation Associated with Failure to Perform Offsite Circuit Verification | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000440/LER-2010-001 | Invalid Isolation Signal Results in Shutdown Cooling Interruption | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | 05000424/LER-2010-001 | Breaker Failure Results in I B Train Containment Cooling System Being Declared Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000416/LER-2010-001 | Automatic Reactor Scram On Decreasing Reactor Water Level Due To Inadvertent Reactor Feed Pump Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000249/LER-2010-001 | OPRM Power Supply Failure during Maintenance Results in Unit 3 Automatic Reactor Scram | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000251/LER-2010-001 | Two Shutdown Bank Rods Were Dropped from Fully Withdrawn Position | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000261/LER-2010-002 | Plant Trip due to Electrical Fault | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000255/LER-2010-002 | Condition that Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000335/LER-2010-002 | Opened ECCS Boundary Door in Violation of Identified Compensatory Measures | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000334/LER-2010-002 | 270 Degree Circumferential Flaw Found on Residual Heat Removal System Drain Valve Socket Weld | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000316/LER-2010-002 | Containment Divider Barrier Seal Mounting Bolts Not Properly Installed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000250/LER-2010-002 | Fuel Transfer Pump Failure Renders 3B Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000269/LER-2010-002 | Manual Reactor Trip due to 1A1 and 1A2 Reactor Coolant PumDHigh Vibration Indication | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000315/LER-2010-002 | Manual Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation in Response to Main Feedpump Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000271/LER-2010-002 | Inoperability of Main Steam Safety Relief Valves due to Degraded Thread Seals | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000277/LER-2010-002 | Improperly Fastened Rod Hanger Results in Inoperable Subsystem of Emergency Service Water | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000413/LER-2010-002 | Discovery of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leak at Thermowell 1NCTW5850 Seal Weld. | | 05000282/LER-2010-002 | Postulated Flooding of Unit 1 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Motor Starters Could Have Resulted In Reduced Fuel Oil Inventory | | 05000414/LER-2010-002 | Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 803-701-4251 803-701-3221 fax December 15, 2010 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:�Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2
Docket No. 50-414
Licensee Event Report 414/2010-002
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 414/2010-002, Revision 0 entitled, "Technical Specification Violation Involving Mode Change with Inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater System Train Due to Closed Pump Discharge Valves". This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter or its attachment. This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. If there are any questions on this report, please contact L.J. Rudy at (803) 701-3084. Sincerely, faius4- A James R. Morris LJR/s Attachment www.duke-energy.corn (14 Document Control Desk Page 2 December 15, 2010 xc (with attachment): L.A. Reyes Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 J.H. Thompson (addressee only) NRC Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 8-G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G.A. Hutto, Ill NRC Senior Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station INPO Records Center 700 Galleria Place Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10-2010) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send commentsLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to infocollectssesource@nre.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used(See reverse for required number of to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRCdigits/characters for each block) may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the info(mation collection. 1.. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER I3. PAGE Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 05000414 1 OF 7 4. TITLE Technical Specification Violation Involving Mode Change with Inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater System Train Due to Closed Pump Discharge ValvesD • | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000306/LER-2010-002 | Unit 2 Turbine Shutdown Due To the Loss of a Main Feed Water Pump That Resulted in a Reactor Scram | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000440/LER-2010-002 | Piping Leak Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000382/LER-2010-002 | Main Feedwater Isolation Valve B exceeded allowed outage time due to tubing connection failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000370/LER-2010-002 | ref Energy® REGIS T. REPKO Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy MGO1VP / 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd. Huntersville, NC 28078 980-875-4111 980-875-4809 fax regis.repko(Codu ke-energy.corn 10 CFR 50.73 May 10, 2011 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Subject: D Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Docket Nos. 50-370 Licensee Event Report (LER) 370/2010-02, Supplement 1 Problem Investigation Process (PIP) M-10-05982 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a) (1) and (d), attached is Supplement 1 to Licensee Event Report 370/2010-02, regarding past inoperability of the Unit 2 "A" Train Nuclear Service Water System and satisfies the commitment to supplement the LER following completion of the root cause analysis This supplement to LER 370/2010-02 supersedes the LER previously submitted December 20, 2010. Completion of the root cause analysis has not affected the original reporting criteria which was completed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B), an Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications, and 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (v) (B), any Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of the Safety Function needed to remove residual heat. Additionally, the supplement did not affect the significance of the event which was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. There are no regulatory commitments contained in this report. If questions arise regarding this LER, contact Rick Abbott at 980-875-4685. Very truly yours, Zi1:77 Regis T. Repko Attachment www. duke-energy. corn U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission May 10, 2011 Page 2 cc:�V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Marquis One Tower
245 Peachtree Center Ave., NC, Suite 1200
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257
Jon H. Thompson (Addressee Only)
Senior Project Manager (McGuire)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
J. B. Brady
Senior Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
McGuire Nuclear Station
W. L. Cox Ill, Section Chief North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources Division of Environmental Health Radiation Protection Section 1645 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-1645 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB. NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2013 (10-2010) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: SO hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to info (See reverse for required number of collects resmirceOnrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory digits/characters for each block) Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-01041, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE McGuire Nuclear Station,2Unit 2 05000-212
0370 OF-7 4. TITLE Unit 2 Nuclear Service Water System "A" Train Past Inoperable due to
Failed Strainer Differential Pressure Instrument. | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000369/LER-2010-002 | | | 05000456/LER-2010-002 | Limiting Condition for Operation Action Not Completed Within the Required Time | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000249/LER-2010-003 | Steam Leak Results in HPCI Inoperability | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000251/LER-2010-003 | Damaged Speed Sensor Caused the 4A Emergency Diesel Generator to be Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
|