05000335/LER-2008-001

LER-2008-001, Unattended Ammunition Discovered Inside Protected Area

Docket Number
Event date:	10-18-2008
Report date:	12-16-2008
3352008001R00 - NRC Website

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

Description of the Event

On October 18, 2008, at the St. Lucie Material's Warehouse a sealed cardboard box containing six cans of ammunition was discovered unattended inside the Protected Area (PA). The container was previously received and searched via x-ray on October 6, 2008, but its contents were not identified. The event was reported to the NRC in accordance 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G.

Cause of the Event

An evaluation of the event identified that a latent organization weakness resulted in an ineffective search by Security and a failure to implement process controls during identification and authorization of materials, before entry into the protected area (PA).

Analysis of the Event

A review of the event determined the contents of the box were not positively identified by Security when using the X-Ray machine. Additionally, contributing causes included multi-tasking which contributed to the lack of Security Officer focus to x-ray duties and volume of materials being scanned and poor alignment (inconsistencies) between plant procedures and Physical Security Plan.

Other contributing causes to the improper search included: lack of verification and authorization of the box prior to entry into the PA: lack of written instruction regarding handling/processing of ammunition: and exclusive reliance upon X-ray searches for identification of contents. As a result, a box containing ammunition was not identified as containing ammunition and was permitted to enter the PA before being properly processed. This event resulted in a one hour reportable event to the NRC per 10CFR 73.71 Appendix G was made.

Analysis of Safety Significance Given that the location of the uncontrolled box of ammunition was unknown until discovered within the warehouse by a Nuclear Material's Management employee; there is no safety related equipment in the warehouse area or in close proximity; and there are no firearms at PSL that are capable of firing the caliber of ammunition found, it is concluded there was no threat to the health and safety of the general public or risk of radiological sabotage.

Corrective Actions

The corrective actions and supporting actions have been entered into the site corrective action program. Any changes to the proposed actions will be managed under the corrective action program.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

Immediate Corrective Actions

I. Site wide extent of condition walk downs were conducted in locations where packaged materials are located to identify potentially unsearched packages.

2. Communications were conducted to provide new instructions on the package search and material hand search processes used at the warehouse loading dock to ensure that searched loading dock material remains separated from unsearched material.

3. Communications were conducted to provide confirmation that all packages have been verified and authorized prior to allowing materials "On-Site.

4. Established a Supervisor Post to oversee the vehicle and packaged material search process.

Corrective Actions:

I. Revise Security procedures to include additional requirements regarding specific roles and responsibilities of Security personnel involved in the material search process.

2. Established a Supervisor Post to oversee the vehicle and packaged material search process.

3. Revise Warehouse Receipt, Storage, Issuance and Maintenance procedures for receiving, handling and storing of items procured without category identification (Non PO Material) and not processed by the Nuclear Supply Chain.

4. Conduct effectiveness measures to evaluate security search performance.

Similar Events A search of the corrective action database for St. Lucie was performed to identify events related for the past 3 years determined there were no documented cases of unauthorized material entering the protected area.

Failed Components

N/A niro CriOn/I OCC /0 /30/171