LER-2003-001, Re Unescorted Access Inappropriately Approved Due to Falsified Pre-Access Information |
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| 3352003001R00 - NRC Website |
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Florida Power & Light Company, 6501 S. Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957 FPL L-2003-054 10 CFR § 73.71 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re:
St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Reportable Event: 2003-001-00 Date of Event: February 18, 2003 Unescorted Access Inappropriately Approved Due To Falsified Pre-Access Information The attached Licensee Event Report 2003-001 is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 to provide notification of the subject event.
Very truly yours, Donald E. Jernigan Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant DEJ/KWF Attachment 2vf an FPL Group company March 17, 2003
Abstract
At 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> on February 18, 2003 a review of a contract employee pre-access questionnaire revealed that the contractor had a positive test for THC in 1998 at a non-nuclear facility (hospital).
This individual is not currently badged at the Site and access has been denied.
However, this contractor had previously been granted access during fall of 2002.
The pre-access questionnaire completed for the 2002 access did not contain this information, and no criminal record of the event was found during the background investigation.
Had that information been provided, access for this individual would have been denied in 2002.
This event is reportable as a one hour phone call per 10 CFR 73.71 in that pre-employment records were incomplete (falsified) and unescorted access would have been denied based on developed information.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
St. Lucie Unit 1 LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION I NUMBER NUMBER 2003 001 00 TEXT (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Description of the Event On February 18, 2003 a contractor carpenter (employed by Day Zimmerman NPS) applying for unescorted access revealed a previous positive drug test for marijuana when he applied for a job at a local hospital in 1998.
This information was disclosed on a personal history questionnaire form.
The contractor had previously been badged at St. Lucie from September 24 through 26, 2002 and had not divulged the positive drug test result.
A review of the personal history questionnaire form from this period did not reveal the positive chemical test.
Had the individual revealed the previous positive drug test his access would have been denied.
In 2002 the individual was badged for protected area access only and did not enter any vital areas.
On February 18, 2003, the individual was denied unescorted access and did not enter the protected area.
Analysis of the Event
A review of the event revealed that had the individual not disclosed the previous chemical test this information would not have been revealed during the background investigation.
The individual submitted to pre-access chemical testing on September 13, 2002 and February 18, 2003 with negative results.
The safety significance of this situation was determined to be low due to the fact the individual was not granted vital area access during the September 2002 time period.
Corrective Actions
The individual was denied plant access upon disclosure of the positive chemical test.
Additional Information
None
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