05000335/LER-2012-001, Regarding Inadvertent Start of EDG Upon Unexpected Under Voltage Condition

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Regarding Inadvertent Start of EDG Upon Unexpected Under Voltage Condition
ML12109A047
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/10/2012
From: Richard Anderson
Florida Power & Light Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-2012-145 LER 12-001-00
Download: ML12109A047 (4)


LER-2012-001, Regarding Inadvertent Start of EDG Upon Unexpected Under Voltage Condition
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3352012001R00 - NRC Website

text

FPL.

Florida Power & Light Company, 6501 South Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957 April 10, 2012 L-2012-145 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Re:

St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 Reportable Event: 2012-001 Date of Event: February 10, 2012 Unit 1 Inadvertent Start of Emergency Diesel Generator upon Unexpected Under Voltage Condition The attached Licensee Event Report 2012-001 is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours, Richard L. Anderso Site Vice President St. Lucie Plant RLA/dlc Attachment an FPL Group company

I NRC FORM 366 U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection (10-2010) request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resourse@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3.

PAGE St. Lucie Unit 1 05000335 1 OF 3

4.

TITLE Unit 1 Inadvertent Start of EDG upon Unexpected Under Voltage Condition

5.

EVENT DATE

6.

LER NUMBER

7.

REPORT DATE

8.

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIA REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR EL NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR NA NUMBER 2

10 2012 2012 -

001 0o0 04 10 2012 FACILITY NAME DOCKET I

I NUMBER

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)

El 20.2201(b)

[E 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

El 20.2201(d)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

[I 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) nl 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

[] 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

E 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x) 0l 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

El 73.71(a)(4) 0%

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

E-50.46(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71(a)(5)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

[3 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in

Immediate Corrective Actions

1. Risk recognition associated with the event was discussed as the main topic at a site leadership meeting.
2.

A work request was issued to perform a walk-down relay cover inspection, for each A and B train switchgear for the 480V 1A2, 480V 1B2, 4.16kV 1A2, 4.16kV

1B2, 4.16kV lAB, 4.16kV 1A3, 4.16kV 1B3, 6.9kV 1A1, 6.9kv 1B1, and Unit 1 RTGB.
3.

A sign was placed on the door of the 480V switch gear room (SWGR) 1B2-2A cabinet indicating "sensitive equipment in cabinet, bus trip function inside."

Corrective Actions

The corrective actions listed below are entered into the site corrective action program.

Any changes to the actions will be managed under the corrective action program.

1. Revise procedures that perform maintenance/testing of relays to require upon maintenance/testing to re-install or install relay covers.

If unable to install the cover, initiate an engineering change request, work request, or action request to have the relay cover procured, modified, or installed.

2.

Based on a needs analysis, develop training for appropriate station personnel to incorporate the lessons learned from this event.

3.

Review and document with the maintenance departments, the event and associated root cause, with emphasis on awareness of surroundings while working on or near energized equipment.

4.Perform an extent of condition on all safety related 480V, 41KV, and 480V switchgear relays that impact plant operation for Unit 1. Generate a condition report for relays identified and document the current configuration to include cover/no cover and the type of lugs installed.

5.Perform an extent of condition on all safety related 480V, 41KV, and 480V switchgear relays that impact plant operation for Unit 2.

Generate a condition report for relays identified and document the current configuration to include cover/no cover and the type of lugs installed.

Similar Events

A search of the corrective action database for inadvertent emergency diesel starts due to human performance for the past three years identified no similar events for St Lucie Units 1 and 2.

Failed Components None