05000313/FIN-2014005-02
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Provide Flow Protection For Auxiliary Feedwater Pump in Emergency Operating Procedures |
| Description | Inspectors identified a noncited violation of Unit 1 Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, for the licensees failure to establish adequate emergency operating procedures. Specifically, the licensees emergency operating procedures failed to establish minimum flow protection for the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater pump, which could result in catastrophic failure of the pump. The issue was documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2014-00286 and the procedures were revised to correct the condition. The failure to establish minimum flow protection for the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater pump in emergency and abnormal operating procedures in accordance with the emergency operating procedure writers guide was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, inadequat
emergency and abnormal operating procedures could have resulted in failure of the auxiliary feedwater pump, a mitigating system for a loss of main and emergency feedwater. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represented a loss of system function. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed the detailed risk evaluation and determined that the change to the core damage frequency was less than 4.2E-7/year (Green). The dominant core damage sequences included losses of one of the safety related 4160 volt electrical buses, steam generator tube ruptures, and plant transients. The equipment that helped mitigate the risk included the high pressure injection system (for feed and bleed) and the main and emergency feedwater systems. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributing cause was not indicative of current performance. Specifically, the emergency and abnormal operating procedures for operating auxiliary feedwater had not changed for at least 2 years. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2014005 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Tindell G Guerra J Drake J Melfi J Rollins M Young P Elkmann R Lantz S Hedger |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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