05000313/FIN-2013012-03
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Scope Required Components in the Stations Maintenance Rule Monitoring Program |
| Description | The NRC identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i) for the licensees failure to monitor non-safety-related structures, systems, or components that are relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients. Specifically, the Unit 1 decay heat removal pump room level switches, which were credited for mitigating the effects of internal flooding, were not being monitored as part of the maintenance rule. The licensees corrective actions included developing a preventative maintenance task to test the operation of the level switches. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2013-03168. The inspectors determined that the failure to effectively monitor the performance of both Unit 1 decay heat removal room level switches in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and directly affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, in that it called into question the reliability of flood mitigation equipment. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, to evaluate the significance of the finding. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not: (1) result in an actual loss of operability or functionality, (2) represent a loss of system and/or function (3) represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, (4) represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and (5) involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect since the switches were installed and evaluated in 2003, and therefore it is not indicative of current performance (Section 4OA3.5.2). |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2013012 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Latta G Werner J Melfi L Willoughby N Okonkwo |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65(b) 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) 10 CFR 50.65 Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2013012 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2014Q1
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||