05000313/FIN-2014003-03
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Repair a Through Wall Flaw in Spent Fuel Pool Piping |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, with two examples. Criterion V, states, in part, Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to accomplish operability and functionality assessments in accordance with Procedure EN-OP-104, Revision 7, Operability Determination Process. Example 1. In March of 2013, the licensee identified that the reactor coolant sample cooler E30 was leaking reactor coolant into the nuclear intermediate cooling water system. In the operability/functionality assessment, the licensee stated, in part, that the nuclear intermediate cooling water system was not safetyrelated and that the system was not part of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary; therefore, this was not within the scope of the operability determination process. No functionality assessment of the reactor coolant system sample system was performed. Example 2. Two through wall leaks in the reactor coolant system supply line to the reactor coolant sample cooler 2E30 were identified on February 3, 2014. After a visual inspection of the leaks in the reactor coolant sample system, the licensee documented the following information in the operability description of Condition Report CR ANO 2-2014-00268: For the stated condition, the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the Unit 2 Containment Building are OPERABLE. No Degraded or Nonconforming Condition exists per Procedure EN-OP-104, Revision 7 Attachment 9.1, Table 1. The licensee did not perform a functionality assessment of the reactor coolant sample system as required by Procedure EN-OP-104. The sample system was the system directly affected by the degraded condition. When this assessment was challenged by the NRC inspectors and the licensees ability to meet the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.4.8.1 for dose equivalent xenon which is required once per seven days, as well as the acceptability of the system for continued service, the licensee recognized that the permanent repairs to the sample system would not be completed by the time the next sample was required. For the Unit 1 sample system, the licensee performed a functionality assessment and the system remained functional with the current leak rate. For the Unit 2 sample system, the system was isolated and the flaws were repaired. This issue was documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2014-1800. The inspector determined that the failure to perform functional assessments of the Unit 1 and 2 reactor coolant sampling systems was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the leakage could result in the inability to sample the reactor coolant for activity which would upset plant stability by causing an unplanned shutdown as required by technical specifications. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to a stable shutdown condition. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, training, because the licensee failed to provide training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent work force and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that operators were adequately trained on the use of Procedure EN-OP-104 such that required functionality assessments for degraded and/or non-conforming non-technical specification systems were performed as required [H.9]. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2014003 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Young N Greene P Jayroe R Latta A Fairbanks B Baca B Tindell G Werner J Melfi J O'Donnell L Carson L Ricketson |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2014003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||