05000313/FIN-2014004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Improper Maintenance on Circuit Breaker Caused Loss of Unit 1 Decay Heat Removal Pump |
| Description | Inspectors documented a Green self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to ensure activities affecting quality were accomplished in accordance with documented instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow Job Order JO-00968863 for replacement of a prop spring in circuit breaker MA137. As a result, the wrong prop spring was replaced, reducing the reliability of the Unit 1 train B decay heat removal pump P-34B and ultimately causing a failure of the pump to start. The licensee corrected the condition by replacing the breaker and returning the pump to service. The issue was documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2013-00701. The inspectors determined that the failure to follow Job Order JO-00968863 in 1998 for replacement of a prop spring in circuit breaker MA137 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and was therefore a finding. Specifically, the failure to replace the appropriate prop spring in 1998 adversely affected the availability and reliability of Unit 1 decay heat removal pump P-34B and caused a failure to start in 2013. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Exhibit 3, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of system safety function and did not represent an actual loss of safety function of at least one train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. The inspectors determined that there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the cause of the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago, and was not representative of current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2014004 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Fairbanks B Larson B Tindell J Melfi J Watkins K Clayton M Hayes M Young R Kopriva R Lantz R Latta T Farina |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2014004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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