05000285/FIN-2015007-04
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Justification for Power Supplies Installed Beyond Vendor Recommended Life |
Description | The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Specifically, prior to March 12, 2015, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of the reactor protective system power supplies: 1) service life as a function of expected life minus shelf life; 2) vendor requirements for in-storage and poststorage maintenance; and 3) including or addressing laboratory failure analysis conclusions that a required component was, although functional, at its end of life after 18 years. In response to this issue, the licensee performed an immediate operability determination, verified the power supplys ripple checks were within tolerance, performed an engineering evaluation to support an operable but non-conforming condition, and generated rework activities to replace/refurbish the installed power supplies. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports CR 2015-02809 and CR 2015-02811. The team determined that the failure to perform an adequate justification for having reactor protective system power supplies installed beyond vendor recommend life was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform an adequate justification for continued operation for reactor protective system power supplies that were beyond vendor recommended life. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. The team determined that this finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance. |
Site: | Fort Calhoun |
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Report | IR 05000285/2015007 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Correll C Smith G Gardner J Bozga J Braisted J Dixon M Yeminy T Farnholtz |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2015007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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