05000285/FIN-2015007-07
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Perform an Adequate Evaluation for the Intake Structure Crane Trolley and Bridge Rail |
| Description | The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Specifically, prior to March 13, 2015, the licensee failed to perform an adequate design review to ensure the intake structure crane trolley and bridge rail were constructed to seismic class II over I standards. The licensee failed to ensure the intake structure crane trolley rail, trolley rail clip, trolley clip connection, crane rail, crane rail clip and crane clip connection were evaluated for loads due to the safe shutdown earthquake loading concurrent with a lifted load. In response to this issue, the licensee performed an operability determination and concluded that the crane was operable but nonconforming based on a load test that was performed at 1.25 times the rated capacity. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR 2015-02353. The team determined that the failure to perform an adequate design review to ensure the intake structure crane trolley and bridge rail were constructed to seismic class II over I standards was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to comply with seismic class II over I requirements to ensure the intake structure crane structural integrity when subjected to safe shutdown earthquake loads concurrent with a lifted load; for safe load handling of heavy loads near the safetyrelated raw water system. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the issue screened to Exhibit 4, External Events Screening Questions, because it was a function specifically design to mitigate a seismic event. Per Exhibit 4 the issue screened to a more detailed risk evaluation because if the seismic function were assumed to be completely failed and a load were dropped it would impact the safety function of the raw water system. Therefore, the Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a more detailed risk evaluation. Given that the frequency of the initiating event is less than 1 x 10-6, the analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with documentation because the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate, and up-to-date documentation. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2015007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Correll C Smith G Gardner J Bozga J Braisted J Dixon M Yeminy T Farnholtz |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2015007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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